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THE THIRD COALITION AGAINST FRANCE

1804–1805

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SELECT DESPATCHES

FROM THE

BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE ARCHIVES

RELATING TO THE FORMATION OF THE

THIRD COALITION AGAINST FRANCE

1804–1805

EDITED FOR THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

BY

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LONDON

OFFICES OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

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1904

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General
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INTRODUCTION

THE causes which brought Russia and Austria into hostility with France in the year 1805 were manysided. Some were of a personal nature, as will appear subsequently; others resulted from a deep-seated suspicion of the plans which the First Consul of France pursued even after the Peace of Lunéville (February 9, 1801) gave peace to the Continent, and after the Peace of Amiens (March 27, 1802) closed the war which for nine years had raged between Great Britain and France. There is no need to detail the provisions of those treaties, as they are well known; nor does it fall within our scope to enter into the circumstances which brought about the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens. Our purpose is to trace the course of events, as set forth in the most important State Papers of the British Foreign Office, which brought about the alliance of Russia and Austria with Great Britain against France. It is necessary, however, briefly to refer to the events of the early part of the year 1804 in order to understand the causes which finally led the two imperial courts to take up arms against France.

The policy of the Emperor Alexander had hitherto been pacific, and in the years 1802–1803 was marked by friendliness to the First Consul. A change came over it, however, at the close of the year 1803, resulting, first, from the occupation of Hanover and the southern part of the kingdom of Naples by French troops, and from the threatening attitude of Napoleon towards the Turkish Empire, especially on the coasts of Albania and the Morea. The

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former provocations touched Alexander, seeing that he was to some extent a guarantor, conjointly with the First Consul, of the Germanic System as determined by the treaties relative to the Secularisations of the Ecclesiastical States; and he also claimed, as the Czar Paul had done, to champion the interests of the Kings of Naples and Sardinia. The former of these sovereigns now saw part of his dominions occupied by French troops; Piedmont, too, had recently been definitely incorporated in the French Republic and parcelled out into departments, no indemnity being offered to the King, now a refugee in the island of Sardinia. Nevertheless, Russian foreign policy was so passive up to the autumn of the year 1803 that even these slights, and the many rebuffs which Alexander sustained from the First Consul during the course of the Secularisations, would probably have passed unresented if a change had not come over the spirit of the Russian Foreign Office and if the plans of the First Consul had not openly threatened the existence of the Turkish Empire.

A new life was breathed into Russian policy when, at the close of 1803, the elder Woronzow virtually retired from the office of chancellor and the young and ambitious Polish Prince Czartoryski assumed almost complete control of the Foreign Office. Filled with the desire of leading up to the restoration of Poland, Czartoryski urged his master 'to be the protector of the weak and oppressed' throughout Europe.[1] The idealism of Alexander and his close friendship with Czartoryski ensured the success of this appeal, and Russian foreign policy threw off the inertia of the past two years. The movements of the French off the coasts of Albania and the Morea led to the first overtures for an Anglo-Russian alliance, which were made by the Russian chancellor to the Russian ambassador in London, Count Simon Woronzow, in a despatch dated St. Petersburg, Nov. 20, 1803 [o.s.], which is in our Foreign Office despatches—Russia, No. 54. It states that France evidently aimed at the break-up of Turkey, with a view

[1] Czartoryski, *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 9 (Engl. edit.).

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to the seizure of Egypt as a base of operations against India; that both Russia and Great Britain ought to withstand these designs, and should therefore come to an understanding.[1]

Matters, however, moved very slowly, owing to the difficulty of communications through the Baltic ports in the winter, the known weakness of the Addington Ministry, and the timid policy of the Courts of Vienna and Prussia. Pitt returned to power in May 1804, and soon infused new vigour into British councils; but the two chief German Powers remained so passive as long to thwart all efforts at forming a coalition. Prussia was still the henchman of France, and even the resentment felt at Berlin against the French occupation of Hanover failed to end that humiliating dependence. Austria had far more cause for resisting French encroachments, but her disputes with Russia and Great Britain during the War of the Second Coalition barred the way to a good understanding. The King of Sweden, Gustavus IV., was most anxious to frame a new coalition on strictly monarchical principles, but these were disliked by the Czar, and the terms on which he, somewhat later, offered Swedish troops to Great Britain for service in North Germany were quite impracticable. For these reasons, and others set forth in the ensuing despatches, the formation of a coalition presented very grave difficulties; but, seeing that all these topics were discussed in the Anglo-Russian despatches, we need not refer to them here. We may also without much loss neglect the archives of Vienna, Berlin, Stockholm, and Naples, and concentrate our attention on those of St. Petersburg; seeing that the policy of those Courts has been well described in the works of Beer, Ekedahl, Fournier, Häusser, Oncken, Sorel, Ulmann, and Wertheimer, as well as in the Memoirs of Hardenberg, Metternich, and other statesmen. The Anglo-Prussian despatches will be dealt with only for the period October–December 1805, in the latter part of this volume.

[1] By permission of the Council of the Royal Historical Society I have published this despatch in the Appendices of my volume entitled *Napoleonic Studies* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1904).

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It may be well to introduce the reader to the Anglo-Russian official correspondence, at a time when it begins to be of interest and importance, by giving a few extracts from the despatches sent by Sir J. B. Warren, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Lord Hawkesbury, who held the portfolio for Foreign Affairs in the Addington Ministry. On February 24, 1804, he reported that he had sought to convince the Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Czartoryski, 'of the desire of His [Britannic] Majesty to act in conjunction with Russia, and to press the explanation required as to the measures of this Court in the Morea and Albania.' But the Prince replied that 'a little time would be necessary before the Emperor's Sentiments respecting it could be made known, and added that in the meantime we were acting together in the Mediterranean. He further alluded to the necessity of an arrangement with Austria and of a distant Insight into the Conduct of Prussia.'

In a long despatch dated St. Pétersbourg, le 26 Février, 1804 [o.s.], Prince Czartoryski stated to Count Simon Woronzow, Russian ambassador at London, the great satisfaction with which the Emperor Alexander had seen 'la manière franche et amicale dont la cour de Londres a répondu aux ouvertures confidentielles que vous avez été chargé de lui faire sur les dangers que court dans ce moment la Porte Ottomane;' and he added: 'Le but unique que la Russie peut avoir c'est de préserver l'Empire Ottomane dans son état actuel et d'empêcher qu'il ne soit entamé.' It was his master's intention 'à redonner de l'activité aux anciennes liaisons qui ont existé entre la cour de Russie et les sujets Ottomans de la Communion Grecque.'

On March 10, 1804, Warren also reported that Prince Czartoryski had been empowered to send explicit instructions to Count Woronzow at London of the Emperor Alexander's 'intention to support the Ottoman Porte against the attacks of France, and to prevent her obtaining a footing in that country,' as also of 'the Emperor's desire to act in union with Him [his Britannic Majesty].'

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A large Russian force would therefore be sent to the Ionian Islands or to Italy, 'as circumstances may require,' while the Emperor hoped that 'His [Britannic] Majesty would order a corps of troops to be kept in readiness at Malta, which might act in conjunction with those of Russia.' The greatest secrecy was necessary, and for this purpose it was desirable that no treaty should be drawn up. Warren suggested that secrecy might be secured by 'a short Treaty with one or two separate articles.' In this Czartoryski seemed to acquiesce. Warren reported also that a Russian expedition had left Sevastopol for Corfu on February 2 [o.s.], and further forces would follow; many Greek officers had sailed with the first force.

Matters were in this state when there occurred an event which aroused the bitter resentment of Alexander I. against the First Consul—namely, the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien by French cavalry in the territory of Baden (March 15, 1804) and his subsequent execution at Vincennes. There had recently been sharp discussions between the Russian and French Governments respecting the pressure brought by the latter to bear on the Pope to give up to it M. de Vernègues, a French *émigré*, but a naturalised Russian subject; and in the course of these discussions the Russian ambassador at Paris, M. de Markoff, had been subjected to rude treatment by the First Consul in person. But the seizure of a Bourbon prince on German territory touched the Czar very closely for the reasons stated above, and he protested energetically against this violation of German neutrality. On April 24, 1804, Warren reported to Lord Hawkesbury that an official notice had appeared at St. Petersburg that the Russian court should go into mourning for the space of seven days. This action, as is well known, gave great offence to the First Consul; but the friction thus aroused, far from leading to an immediate rupture and the formation of a coalition against France, seemed to pass away, partly owing to the timid attitude of Austria, Prussia, and the lesser German States towards Napoleon. His assumption of the imperial

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title in the month of May aroused further resentment at St. Petersburg, but only served to show the weakness and complaisance of the Prussian and Austrian Governments. The following despatches will serve to correct the statements that have often been made as to the paramount importance of the execution of the Duc d'Enghien in the diplomatic developments of this period.

This brief Introduction does not aim at describing the history of the time previous to the commencement of serious negotiations between London and St. Petersburg. It is designed to remind the reader of facts, the full details of which must be sought in the histories of the period. We may now leave the despatches to tell their own tale. They are of the highest value as showing the unfolding of events week by week and month by month, thus enabling the student to correct the hasty judgments which are so easily formed by a perusal of the condensed narratives dealing only with salient facts and important results. They show that the formation of the Third Coalition, far from being a foregone conclusion after the sinister events of the month of March 1804, was hampered by grave differences of opinion between the Powers whose interests were at stake, and that the final aggressions of Napoleon in the early summer of 1805 alone sufficed to bring them to a tardy and reluctant agreement.

Limits of space preclude the possibility of including in this volume the later diplomatic correspondence between the British and Russian Governments. The accession of Austria to the Anglo-Russian treaty of alliance took place on August 9, 1805, in the form of 'Declarations' made by Count Stadion, Prince Czartoryski, and Lord Gower. They are printed in the Appendix to this volume.

Other details relative to the Russian protest against the British refusal to surrender Malta, as well as to the plans arranged by the Russian and Austrian Governments for the opening of the campaign and the coercion of Prussia, may be found in the 'Traités' of Martens and Garden; in the works of Bailleul, Beer, Ekedahl,

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Fournier, Häusser, Lefebvre, Oncken, Potrel, Tatistcheff, Ulmann, and Wertheimer; also in the 'Memoirs,' Diaries or Correspondence of Czartoryski, Hardenberg, Sir George Jackson, Metternich, 'The Paget Papers,' and the 'Woronzow Archives.'

This collection of State Papers from the British Foreign Office aims at setting forth the growth of the Third Coalition in its essential features, excluding military affairs; and, after the formation of the Anglo-Austro-Russian alliance by the treaty of April 11, 1805, and the Declarations of August 9, 1805, the chief interest centres in the efforts of the allies to induce, or compel, Prussia to join them. The later part of this volume will therefore consist of the communications between the British and Prussian Governments on this very important topic, especially those which took place during the special mission of the Earl of Harrowby, formerly British Foreign Minister, to the Court of Berlin in October–December, 1805.

The despatches are reproduced word for word, even where the construction of the sentences is ungrammatical or obscure. The archaic spelling has also in nearly all cases been retained.

It has been thought advisable, in order to bring these materials within the limits of one volume, to omit some of the despatches, or parts of them, which are of inferior interest or importance. This has been done especially in the case of the despatches of Sir John B. Warren, who, as may be seen by reference to the 'Czartoryski Memoirs' (vol. i. ch. xiii.), did not enjoy the complete confidence of the Czar and of his Foreign Minister. His despatches, also, are inferior in every way to those of his successor, Lord Granville Leveson Gower.

Notice was first called to the importance of the documents of the British Foreign Office relating to the Third Coalition by Mr. Oscar Browning, who undertook some preliminary work in the selection of the more important despatches. This was continued by Mr. J. W. Headlam, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, on the instructions of the Royal Historical Society. For various reasons the work was not carried on to any great length;

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but at the request of the Council of the Royal Historical Society the present Editor undertook to complete the selection of despatches and to add an Introduction and Notes. For these last he alone is responsible, but he desires to express his acknowledgment of the valuable work previously done by Mr. Oscar Browning and Mr. Headlam.

J. H. R.

August 1904.

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DESPATCHES RELATING TO

THE THIRD COALITION

1804–1805

PART I.—RUSSIAN DESPATCHES

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PART I

RUSSIAN DESPATCHES

1

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Hawkesbury.

F. O. Russia, vol. 54, *No. 28.*

St. Petersburgh: April 27, 1804.

I yesterday saw Prince Czartoryski, and communicated to him the contents of Mr. Foresti's[1] dispatches of the 22nd and 26th Feby., the departure of M. de Romieu from Corfu, and of the other particulars of the same dates.

I again expressed to Prince Czartoryski the uneasiness I felt in the little information which had been afforded me of the state of affairs between this country, Austria and Prussia, and my hopes, as a courier from the former had just arrived, that something might at last transpire that was favourable to our wishes. The Prince said the reason that he had not communicated any thing to me on that head was, that nothing had hitherto been fixed with the Court of Vienna; which had acted with so much mystery and secrecy, and shewn so much fear and weakness in the proposals made to them from hence that every thing had been palsied by their conduct; that he was informed an Austrian courier had now arrived and that the ambassador had written to him for a conference; but he had not yet seen him; that this Government had however some hopes of ultimate success; altho' until the business with Austria was settled, it would be impossible for our two

[1] Mr. Foresti was British agent at Corfu to the Government of the Republic of the Seven Islands, where a considerable Russian force was then established.

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countries to act with effect in Italy; and when that was fixed this Government would apply to us about a general arrangement. That it was probable the Emperor of Germany would be called upon to support all rights of the Empire, as well as the public rights of the States, lately violated by France, and it would be curious to see how Austria would act, and all the other princes concerned, and this was the more particularly necessary with respect to the King of Naples, as any operation without a general basis would only be partial and for the moment, and that it would be better even to suffer a temporary inconvenience, than by hastening the operations in favour of Naples, for the two Powers to act solely, and before Austria was decided: That the King of Naples had done so formerly,[1] and from being unsupported has felt the ill effects of his conduct.

I then stated to the Prince that it was advisable to learn the state of affairs with Prussia, as he must be persuaded that a mere system of neutrality, or any similar measure, if such was ever in the contemplation of the Continental Powers, would never, with such a man as Bonaparte, and the Government of France, produce any favourable issue, or fix the repose and integrity of the different States of Europe upon a solid foundation. The Prince mentioned that, with respect to Prussia, they had once proposed a plan of neutrality to her for the north of Germany, and to prevent the French invasion of Hanover and the Hanse Towns, but that Prussia had refused and broke off, and immediately commenced negotiations with France. That Prussia had now communicated her having finished her discussions with France, and expressed good intentions in future, and it remained therefore to be seen whether their future conduct would justify these new opinions.

I must state to your lordship that with respect to this change of opinion of the Prussian Government, I am informed from undoubted authority that the Prussian monarch has decided not to enter into an alliance with France; and has broken off all negotiation with Paris upon that subject. He also states that he wishes his dominions to remain neutral in the present war, but expresses his determination, in case of further attack from France on Germany, or its public rights, to resist, and also that he had

[1] In the campaign which he undertook in November 1798 against the French in the Roman States.

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given orders for the assembling of a considerable corps of troops to maintain the tranquillity of Prussia. Whether the arrival of General Duroc [1] and Colonel Rappe [2] at Berlin on a special mission will occasion any change in his Prussian Majesty's resolutions will be seen hereafter.

2

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Hawkesbury.

F. O. Russia, vol. 54.

[*Most Secret and Confidential.*]

St. Petersburgh: April 27, 1804.

I am informed from a source to which I have every reason to give credit, that it was lately agitated in the Emperor's council, whether, in the present moment, this Government should break at once entirely with France, or pursue a more circumspect mode of acting; and that this latter mode had been adopted; altho' it is a satisfaction to learn that the Emperor was of the former opinion.

In consequence therefore of these measures, a note from this Government will be sent to the Diet at Ratisbon, as well as to Vienna and Paris, in which the Emperor of Russia will state his grievances, and invite the Chief of the Empire to defend it's rights, so lately invaded by France, and appeal to the Co-Estates and Princes of the German Empire, to assist the Emperor of Russia in restraining the ambition of France, and defending those rights and laws so long and happily established, and which must be most dear to all Europe.

. . . . . .

[1] Duroc, Michel (1772–1813), served as aide-de-camp to Bonaparte in Egypt and elsewhere; undertook diplomatic missions to Berlin in 1803, 1804, 1805; he became Marshal of France and Grand-Marshal of the Palace, and had the title of Duc de Friuli; was killed in the Silesian campaign of 1813.

[2] Rapp, John (1772–1821), served as aide-de-camp to Desaix in Germany and Egypt; distinguished himself at Austerlitz; became Governor of Danzig in 1807, and stubbornly defended that city in 1813–1814.

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3

F. O. Russia, vol. 54.

Traduction d'une Dépêche de S. E. M^r le Prince de Czartorisky au Comte de Woronzow, datée St. Pétersbourg ce 30 *Avril*, 1804 [*N.S.*].[1]

[*Extract.*]

Monsieur le Comte,—

Avant que d'expédier à V. E. ce Courier j'air crû nécessaire de m'expliquer avec l'Ambassadeur Anglois, d'après le Contenû des Depèches qui vous sont envoyées, sur la nécessité que la Cour de Londres assiste de Ses Subsides les Puissances qui pourroient prendre part à la guerre, contre la France. J'ai reçû en consequence de M. le Chev^r Warren une lettre Confidentielle par la quelle il m'informe de la Commission dont il est chargé par sa Cour de traiter cette affaire ici.

Cette lettre qui ne détermine rien positivement, met cependant pour base, a fournir ces subsides, l'époque où les deux Empires conjointement avec la Prusse affermiront l'Alliance pour un armement réuni contre l'ennemi commun. Le jour après que j'ai reçu cette reponse, l'Ambassadeur étant passé chez moi, a entre autres choses confidentiellement touché dans la conversation la disposition de l'Angleterre à fournir des Subsides aux Puissances Alliées qui se décideront sur le champ à porter les armes contre la France en prenant pour régle d'amener tout dans le *Status quo ante bellum.*

Il est extrèmement difficile d'adopter ces deux propositions faites par l'Ambassadeur Anglais pour base des conditions sur les subsides. La premiére par la raison que quoiqu'on entrevoye la possibilité d'amener la Cour de Vienne à une coopération commune avec nous, cependant on ne saurait s'attendre à y faire accéder la Cour de Berlin en même tems, qu'après de longues insinuations et en l'y engageant peu à peu par le concours des circonstances.

De sorte que, si le Ministre Britannique veut attendre que l'Autriche et la Prusse s'entendent pour des mesures actives et ne se prète pas autrement à fournir des subsides, dans ce cas rien ne

[1] This important despatch will show that Russia, despite her diplomatic reserve, was pressing Great Britain to accord subsidies for the expected war between Russia and Napoleon, as also to the future allies of Russia.

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sera encore conclû préalablement, et la Cour de Vienne, ne se trouvant point assurée d'obtenir ces subsides qui lui sont indispensables, n'accédera pas au plan qu'on pourroit lui proposer. Je crois inutile de m'arreter ici pour exposer toutes les suites funestes que cela pourroit amener, comme V.E. pourra facilement se les représenter Elle-même et ne manquera certainement pas de les expliquer au Ministère Anglois.

La seconde proposition est désavantageuse parceque la puissance de la France et les succès rapides de ses entreprises ont tellement épouvanté les Puissances qui ont plus de raison à craindre et qui par leur position doivent nécessairement agir les premiéres, qu'aucune d'Elles ne se décidera point a commencer une guerre offensive, et par cette raison essentielle, connoissant la timidité et l'irrésolution qui existent dans les Cabinets de ces Puissances, à peine espérons-nous les porter à s'armer, en leur suggérant la necessité de s'opposer à la France *seulement dans le tems où ses trouppes tenteroient d'outrepasser la ligne derriére la quelle elles se trouvent maintenant.*

S.M. l'Empereur charge V.E. d'expliquer tous ces motifs au Ministère Anglois et de lui faire reconnoitre la nécessité de faire sans délai à la Cour de Vienne soit par notre entremise soit directement la proposition de lui fournir des subsides *en cas qu'elle se décide à accéder à l'alliance dont il est question de notre côté.*

Le Ministère Autrichien encouragé en trouvant une pareille facilité dans le Cabinet de St. James, se portera sans doute à une prompte détermination à s'entendre sur une coopération pour *mettre obstacle à une extension* ultérieure des vues despotiques du Premier Consul. Au contraire si on lui proposait de commencer à agir immédiatement, le Cabinet Autrichien sera tout à fait effrayé, et en se représentant le danger plus grand qu'il n'est, il se refusera à toute mesure. Pour completter ces reflexions il est nécessaire d'ajouter, et d'y porter l'attention du Ministère Anglais, que comme les armées Autrichiennes sont actuellement sur le pied de paix, la Cour de Vienne, pour les mettre en état d'agir efficacement et avec succès, doit employer, tant que j'ai pû comprendre par les renseignemens de l'Ambassadeur Comte Stadion, près de 40 millions de florins: chaque campagne ne coûtera pas moins de 100 millions: l'Angleterre pourra par conséquent proportioner à ces deseins la quantité de Subsides, ou se conformer à ceux qu'Elle

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a donnés à cette cour pendant la dernière guerre. Il faut absolument remarquer ici cette seule circonstance, que l'Etat délabré des finances de l'Autriche ne lui permettra pas d'accepter des Subsides suivant les exemples précédens, en forme d'Emprunt:—outre cet accord conditionel avec la Cour de Vienne, l'Angleterre doit reconnaitre la nécessité d'entrer pour le même but dans de pareils avec d'autres Puissances du Nord de l'Allemagne, et de l'Italie, en cas qu'Elles participent à la cause commune, ce à quoi S.M. l'Empereur ne cessera pas d'employer les moyens les plus efficaces pour les y engager; mais pour donner plus de succès à ses représentations, S.M. Imp^le^ désireroit avoir la certitude des Subsides que l'Angleterre se propose de donner à chacune d'Elles.

. . . . . .

(Signed) Pr. ADAM CZARTORISKY.

4

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 36* (inclo.)

Communicatum Ratisbonæ die 7 Mai, 1804.
Per Archicancellariensem. [*Sic.*]

Ratisbonne le 4 Avril, / 6 Mai., 1804.

Le Soussigné Ministre Résident de sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies près la Diète du Corps Germanique, d'après un ordre qu'il vient de recevoir, a l'honneur de transmettre à Son Excellence Monsieur le Baron d'Albani, Ministre Directorial, la Note ci-jointe qu'il le prie de porter immédiatement à la connaissance de la Diète générale de l'Empire.

(Signé) KLÜPFFELL.

NOTE.

L'évènement qui vient de se passer dans les Etats de S.A.S. l'Electeur de Bade et dont la fin a été aussi affligeante,[1] a fait éprouver la plus vive douleur à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies. Il n'a pu voir qu'avec un profond chagrin l'atteinte portée à la tranquillité et à l'intégrité du territoire de l'Allemagne.

[1] The seizure of the Duc d'Enghien by French troops on March 15, 1804; he was shot at Vincennes, March 20.

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Sa Majesté Impériale en fut d'autant plus affectée qu'Elle ne pouvoit en aucune maniére s'attendre qu'une Puissance qui avoit exercé de concert avec Elle, la Médiation, et qui s'étoit obligée par conséquent de partager ses Soins à l'égard de la prospérité et du répos de l'Empire Germanique, pût s'écarter de la sorte des principes sacrés du droit des gens et des engagemens qu'elle avoit contractés récemment.[1]

Il seroit inutile de fixer l'attention de la Diète sur les consequences funestes auxquelles s'expose l'Empire Germanique si les Actes de Violence dont on vient de voir le premier et l'unique example, étoient passés sous silence. Elle sentira facilement dans sa prévoyance accoutumée, à quel point la tranquillité et la sûreté futures de tout l'Empire et de chacun de ses membres seroient compromises, si de pareilles violences pouvoient se réputer admissibles, et avoient lieu, sans être ressenties ni rencontrer d'obstacles.

L'Empereur, ému par ces considérations et dans sa qualité de garant[2] de la constitution de l'Empire Germanique et de Médiateur, croit devoir solemnellement protester contre un acte aussi attentatoire au repos et à la sûreté de l'Allemagne. Sa Majesté justement allarmée sur la perspective affligeante qu'il présente, n'a point balancé de manifester en meme tems sa façon de voir à ce sujét au Premier Consul, par la voie du Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Paris.

Sa Majesté Impériale, en faisant une démarche, que les considérations les plus importantes pour le bien du Corps Germanique lui ont dictée, est convaincue, que la Diète de l'Empire, ainsi, que Son Chef, rendant justice a des soins aussi désintéressés qu'évidemment indispensables, s'empresseront de réunir leurs efforts aux siens, et n'hésiteront pas à faire parvenir au Gouvernement François leurs justes reclamations pour le porter à se prêter à toute démarche et mésure qui seroient dûes de sa part à leur dignité compromise, et nécessaires au maintien de leur sûreté future.

[*Endorsed*] In Sir J. B. Warren's. No. 36.

[1] France and Russia mediated jointly in German affairs at the time of the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss (March 1803), which led to the Secularisations.

[2] Russia was admitted as guarantor of the Germanic system by the Treaty of Teschen (1779).

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F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No 32.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Hawkesbury.

[*Extract.*]

St. Petersburgh: May 12, 1804.

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With respect to Austria, he [Prince Czartoryski] observed that she had suffered so much from the last war, and was so much alarmed at every word from France, that the idea of entering into an immediate war induced her to turn a deaf ear to propositions that were calculated to call forth any exertion on their part:—And as to Prussia, that little reliance could be placed on that Cabinet; although on the present occasion the Prussian Government appeared to have an intention of acting with more firmness, and better policy: But that they were also much alarmed at entering into active measures against France; and in looking towards the minor princes of Germany, they were so much under the influence of France, that nothing could be expected from them, unless a strong force were at hand to succour and support their exertions.

After having stated thus much, the Prince said that every effort had been made to induce the Court of Vienna to join in more vigorous measures to restrain the further progress of French ambition, but that the system of policy pursued, and the characters of the persons at the head of affairs, left no hope of their acting immediately; particularly as they believe they would be first attacked in Italy, and were alarmed at the very idea of such an event.

In the Mediterranean, the Prince continued to remark, if Great Britain and Russia were to enter upon active measures, and succeed in defeating the French in Naples, yet the independence of the rest of Italy and what he supposed to be a principal object, the restoration of Piedmont, the evacuation of Switzerland, Holland, and the north of Germany would not be obtained, as neither of the principal Powers would move, and the whole would fail. He enquired, if active measures were adopted in Italy, what number of troops Great Britain would be inclined to furnish on her side. I replied that would depend much on what could be sent from this country; and I should suppose twenty or twenty-five

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thousand men; that this, however, could only be regulated by a fixed agreement.

The Prince said that such a measure as I had just mentioned could be adopted only with respect to Greece, but that any partial plan which had Italy alone for its object must fail, that the Russian Government had therefore considered that the only measure in the present state of the principal cabinets of Europe *was a system of defence to prevent any further advance or aggression on the part of France upon the territory or independence of the rest of Europe.* That this was the only system in which it would be possible to induce those Powers immediately to join; and which the Russian Government, (however desirous they were that more decisive measures might be pursued) considered as all that in the present state of affairs could be effected; that in this plan it was probable Austria, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark might be brought to unite; and that the Emperor had ordered him to write to Count Woronzow to that effect, and to enquire what forces and funds England would be willing to furnish for such a purpose for the general defence.

I expressed my concern at learning the degraded state of the cabinet his Excellency had described; and at the inefficiency of the measure to restrain the ambitious projects of the First Consul, as all he now possessed of Europe would be left in his hands; and Hanover still remain in his power; that it would prevent England perhaps from making use of more vigorous and decisive exertions.—The Prince answered that could not be the case as England would still pursue her own mode of warfare, and what she would be requested to furnish in money to enable Austria, and the German Princes, as well as the King of Sweden to act, would only be called for in the event of their taking the field; that the latter Prince possessed the important post of Stralsund[1] and had some most excellent troops, and should Prussia join in such a convention the whole might at last be brought to act against France. To this I remarked that this plan seemed merely defensive, and eventual; and that I understood we should not be required to assist in the execution of it but in the event of France committing fresh aggressions. To this the Prince replied that however it was to be regretted, a different line of policy could not be adopted, but there

[1] Stralsund was the chief town of Swedish Pomerania.

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was little or no doubt that incidents would arise on the part of France to oblige all the Powers who joined with Russia in this plan to act offensively against France, when the whole of the countries now in her possession might be recovered, and the French influence diminished, as well as the independence of Europe secured; Count Woronzow therefore would be enabled to explain all these circumstances to your lordship. I could not avoid stating to the Prince my regret that the situation of the two Courts of Austria and Prussia did not admit of a more vigorous line of policy; that the plan now proposed certainly might turn out in the end better than was expected, and that I did not see any ill that would accrue to Great Britain in any eventual engagement, altho' I must again repeat my regret that a more bold and dignified system could not have been produced by the example of this country. The Prince replied that he lamented as much as I did the impossibility of bringing the principal Powers to act with more vigour; but that if Great Britain and Russia alone were to engage in establishing the future independence of Europe, the other Powers would be left to the influence or attack of France, and deprive us of the success of our undertaking. . . .

6

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 40.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Hawkesbury.

[*Extract.*]

St. Petersburgh: June 12, 1804.

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The following are the parts communicated by the Prince.[1]

That the First Consul was much surprized at the receipt of the last note from Russia, in which a complaint had been made respecting the conduct the French Government had pursued in a State measure which concerned it's own safety, and the First Consul was the more astonished at any thing of that kind coming from Russia, as the French Government had never interfered in

[1] This refers to news imparted to Sir J. B. Warren by Prince Czartoryski from the despatches lately come from the Russian chargé d'affaires at Paris, M. d'Oubril.

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the internal concerns of that empire; and on the present occasion the two Powers more immediately concerned had not preferred any complaint against those measures, but had observed a perfect silence on the occasion. That the First Consul had the highest respect and attachment for the character and person of the Emperor, whom he was sorry to see entertain opinions unfavourable, and inimical to the interests of France, and which could only be owing to the bad counsels of his ministers, and those by whom the Emperor was surrounded, the majority of whom were known to be in the interests, and under the influence of England. That the First Consul was desirous of being at peace with all the world, and particularly with Russia, and had shewn in several instances this desire to preserve it. But that if war was sought for, France was prepared for that event, and did not fear it; and he made no doubt that the same victories which had accompanied the French arms, and which had established the Republick, would afford a similar course of triumphs, and attend his endeavours to secure the glory and independence of the empire.

The Prince further mentioned that M. Oubril had communicated the suspension of the functions of all the Diplomatic Body, and of Bonaparte's having taken upon himself the title of Emperor of the French,[1] and that altho' the foreign ministers could not communicate with the French Government, until they received fresh credentials from their several Courts, yet that M. de Talleyrand had orders to enter into private and confidential conferences with them upon what concerned their several Courts. . . .

[The next despatches refer to the resentment shown by the Swedish king at Prussia's acknowledgment of Napoleon's imperial title, and his desire to see the formation of a European coalition. The limits of space prevent our quoting them here. It may be remarked that the more important despatches that follow were sent by, and addressed to, Lord Harrowby, who took the portfolio of the Foreign Office under Pitt.[2] The following despatch is the first indication of the policy of the new Ministry towards Russia.]

[1] By the *Senatus Consultum* of May 18, 1804.

[2] Dudley Ryder, first Earl of Harrowby (1762–1847), became Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1789, and then held various appointments under

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7

F. O. Russia, vol. 55. (*Draft.*)

Lord Harrowby to Count Woronzow.

Sir,— Downing Street: June 26, 1804.

I have laid before his Majesty the copies of the several dispatches from Prince Czartoriski which your Excellency has communicated to me.[1]

His Majesty embraces with pleasure the opportunity afforded him by these confidential overtures, of explaining without reserve, his sentiments upon the present situation of Europe.

While his Majesty is employing with energy all the resources of his own dominions in resisting the ambitious views of France, he laments, in common with his I[mperial] Majesty, the timid policy of those cabinets which cannot be roused to a sense of their dignity, or even to those measures which are essential to their own security, by anything short of an immediate hostile attack. And he pays a just tribute of admiration to the superior justice and magnanimity which distinguish the views of his Imperial Majesty.

Obliged as his Majesty was to conclude the late war without an ally, and left as he now is singly to maintain a contest in which the independency, not only of his own dominions but perhaps of a great part of Europe is at stake; he still feels it to be equally becoming his own dignity and the real interests of his people, to embrace the hope, however distant, of uniting the great Powers of Europe against their common enemy, by entering into a concert with Russia. The vast resources of that Power, when called into action by the generous sentiments which animate its sovereign, best enable it to take the lead on the Continent in so salutary

Pitt, whose confidence he enjoyed. His control of the Foreign Office in 1804 was ended by an accident. In July 1805 he became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and in spite of bad health went on a special mission to Berlin in November of that year. In 1812 he became President of the Council in the Liverpool Ministry.

[1] With the exception of that of April 30, 1804 [o.s.], printed above, these are missing. Some of them are, however, printed in the *Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski*, vol. ii. chapters ii.–iii.

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a design; and these sentiments are the best security to Europe that any league which may be formed under his guidance, will not be diverted by petty and partial interests from its essential objects.

The union of the Court of Russia with those of Vienna and Berlin, for the declared purpose of restoring the balance of power in Europe, would undoubtedly be the most desirable event; but the co-operation of either, even for the limited object of preventing the further progress of French arms, is of great importance both in itself, and with a view to ulterior consequences. His Majesty entertains a sanguine hope that the efforts of his Imperial Majesty for this purpose, backed by the considerable force which he has assembled on his frontiers, can hardly fail of producing their effect either at Vienna or Berlin. And that as soon as either of these Courts is assured that an eventual concert, even for defence, is established between the other Court and that of Petersburgh, the dread of the immediate pressure of French arms which has hitherto operated upon each, will be removed by the certainty of such a powerful support.

Much however as his Majesty would rejoice at such a concert as the first step towards the relief of Europe, it would not be consistant with his first duty towards his own people to add materially to those burthens which are already necessarily imposed on them, by furnishing pecuniary aid to Powers upon the Continent, without the certainty that the active exertions of those Powers will be proportioned to the extent of such succours. It would therefore be impossible for his Majesty to consent to make advances merely for the purpose of facilitating to the Powers upon the Continent, preparations which are avowedly confined to their own defence, and which sooner or later the care of their own existence must compel them to make. The propriety of this determination cannot fail to be felt by the Court of Petersburgh without it being necessary for me to enter into the various reasons which render it indispensable.

His Majesty is sensible, on the other hand, it may be difficult to persuade either the Court of Vienna or that of Berlin to risk the danger of an attack which those preparations might possibly accelerate, without being assured eventually of some pecuniary assistance whenever they shall be actually engaged in hostility and he is therefore ready to state to his Imperial Majesty (as far as

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he at present can judge) the extent of those sacrifices which in any event it would be possible for him to make. If both or either of these Courts should enter with that of St. Petersburgh into a defensive alliance, and should in consequence find themselves actually at war with France, his Majesty would be disposed to make every exertion in his power to contribute to the success of their joint efforts. He would even give eventual orders to his ministers at those Courts, and also at Petersburgh, to advance a considerable sum for facilitating the first movements of their armies; in case events should lead to a state of actual war, previous to any precise engagements being compleated between his Majesty and those Courts; such sum to be paid in three monthly instalments. This period is mentioned for the purpose of affording time, afterwards, to settle the terms of a treaty by which the number and destination of troops, and the amount and conditions of a further subsidy might be regulated.

The extent to which it would be possible for this country, by such a treaty, to carry its pecuniary assistance, must be determined at the time by the state of it's resources, by the pressure of more immediate demands, and by the degree in which those demands might be expected to be lessened by the effect of any diversion on the Continent; but it is hoped that notwithstanding every pressure, the energy and resources of this country might enable it to furnish, in the whole the sum of five millions within the year.

Desirable however as it would be for the ultimate interests of Great Britain, to make an exertion even to so large an amount for an adequate object, it would be impossible for his Majesty to propose this measure to his Parliament, without the best grounded expectations that such a force would actually be collected and put into action against France by the joint efforts of the several Powers who may be included in such a treaty, as would at least be equal, in point of numbers, to any portion of the French armies that could be opposed to it, and it would afford a reasonable prospect of such military success as might ensure, in the end some permanent security to the Continent.

It is impossible to state beforehand, the proportion of the whole sum, which, on a view of the actual circumstances, it might become advisable to allot to each of the combined Powers.

His Majesty would be very desirous of receiving on this point,

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any suggestions from the Court of Petersburgh; and any general ideas on the subject which I shall now state to your Excellency will be open to be modified in any manner which, on further consideration, may be found advisable.—They are stated only to explain the general principles upon which the distribution of pecuniary succours might be made. The particular appointment, to be regulated by a future treaty, must depend, not only upon the forces which each Power could bring into the field, but upon it's means of maintaining them, and, in some degree, upon the quarter in which they may actually be employed.

This appointment must evidently be different upon the two suppositions

First. That Russia may be able to engage both Austria and Prussia in the contest.

Secondly. That Russia may be joined by one of these Powers only—in either case, some portion might be left to bring forward any of the smaller States, and particularly Sweden, in case that monarch should transport his troops into Pomerania, and co-operate, not merely for the defence of that province, but also for the independence of the north of Germany.

Upon the first supposition, the exhausted state of the finances of Austria, and the great extent of frontier exposed to French attack, would naturally require the largest proportion—perhaps to the amount of two millions, or two millions and an half.

The efforts required from Prussia, supported by the two Imperial Courts, might be upon a smaller scale; and as that Power has remained un-exhausted by the late war, the assistance of eight hundred thousand, or one million, ought to be sufficient.

The troops of Sweden, and of Saxony, with those of any smaller States might employ four or five hundred thousand pounds, and one million, at the least, would thus be left to relieve his Imperial Majesty from some part of his great expences in supporting, at a distance from his own dominions, those armies which would be the soul of the whole confederacy, and which would undoubtedly be proportioned to the resources of his immense empire, and to the superior dignity of the part he is disposed to take in any great effort for the deliverance of Europe.

Upon the second supposition, that only two of the great Powers should join, a larger proportion would necessarily be allot[t]ed to each, as the whole force to be employed must still be carried as

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nearly as possible to the same extent as upon the first supposition.

The frank and explicit nature of these overtures, must be a sufficient proof of the confidence which is placed in his Imperial Majesty—if it were possible for his Majesty to put out of his own hands the conduct of any negotiations the result of which may oblige him to call upon his people for such considerable sacrifices it would be in his Imperial Majesty alone that such a trust could be reposed. But while he must reserve to himself the ultimate determination respecting the extent and conditions of any treaties of alliance or subsidy, he is willing to strengthen the hands of his Imperial Majesty in any negotiations with Austria or Prussia by the knowledge of his intentions upon that subject, and by authorizing his Imperial Majesty, whenever there appears a sufficient prospect of exciting either of these Powers to active operations, to declare to them his knowledge of such intentions, and to call upon his Majesty's ministers at such Courts to give weight and effect to this declaration, and to enter, conjointly with the ministers of his Imperial Majesty, into the full discussion of such proposals as may be made for a definetive arrangement.

His Majesty is fully persuaded, that this confidence on his part will meet with an equal return from his Imperial Majesty.

If Great Britain is to make either directly or through the medium of Russia, a proposal of furnishing subsidies to Austria, in case that Power should be involved in a war with France in consequence of a proposed treaty with Russia, the conclusion of which treaty such an eventual offer from Great Britain is expected to promote, it is indispensably necessary that his Majesty should be fully informed of the terms of the proposed treaty.—The same observation applies, with equal force, to any negotiations for such a purpose between Russia and Prussia. His Majesty therefore entertains a confident expectation, both that your Excellency will receive instructions to communicate in the most confidential manner the state and progress of such negotiations to the Court of London, and that the imperial ministers at Vienna and Berlin, will receive similar instructions respecting their communications with his Majesty's ministers at those Courts.

Animated as the sovereigns of Russia and Great Britain are with the same views of generous policy, such a system of confidential intercourse can alone forward the accomplishment of these

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views, and enable them to form an effectual concert notwithstanding the distance of their respective dominions, and the consequent delay and uncertainty of intercourse.

His Majesty would have felt no reserve in entering still further into his ideas of the grounds upon which any system of future security for Europe could be founded; but in the present uncertainty whether either or both of the great German Powers can be roused to active exertions, such an explanation must be adapted to so many and such uncertain contingencies, that it could lead to no practical conclusion.

Whenever his Imperial Majesty is enabled to ascertain those essential points, his Majesty trusts that he shall receive from his Imperial Majesty, a communication of his views upon the whole of those great questions. It will be considered with all that attention which is due to any suggestion from his Imperial Majesty, and with the most anxious desire to find the same concurrence of sentiment respecting the means of action which his Majesty is persuaded exists as to the ultimate object of their efforts.

Endorsed] Draft to Count Woronzow,
June 26, 1801,
No. 1.

8

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 50.* (*Cypher.*)

St. Petersburgh: June 30, 1804.

I saw Prince Czartoriski yesterday by his own appointment. His Excellency enquired what accounts I had received from England, as several reports had been sent from thence that we were engaged in discussions with France respecting peace, and that no courier having arrived, or anything official from Count Woronzow, this Government was anxious to learn if there was any foundation for such a measure. The Prince remarked that he could not suppose after what had passed between our two Courts, and the manner in which the Emperor had explained himself to England, and after the measures which Russia had since proposed, that Great Britain would make peace at once by herself, without the co-operation of this country—without which, and a solid basis to ensure the tranquillity of Europe, any peace must be uncertain;

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and altho' he understood that our Government was not averse to relax upon the Article of Malta, since we had enlarged our territory in the East Indies and secured it by such brilliant conquests, the Prince expressed his earnest wish that a final arrangement might, beforehand, be taken between our two Governments, but he supposed that as no information had reached him with respect to the conferences of Count Woronzow with your lordship, the delay had been occasioned by various unforseen circumstances, and hoped that some information would soon arrive from England.

I asked if the reports of peace were official, or from authority that might be relied on;—he said they were general opinions only—and I answered,—it was impossible to conceive that the British Government should, all at once, place implicit confidence in a negotiation for peace, with Bonaparté, after what had happened since the treaty,—I said that I hoped something had been arranged between Count Woronzow and your lordship, and that I was persuaded the British Government would not be inclined to enter into any particular arrangement with France upon light grounds, and give her the extent of territory already so unjustly acquired by Bonaparté, and that on the contrary a more vigorous prosecution of the war seemed to be the measure pursued by the British Administration; and in which, for the reasons stated in a former dispatch to your lordship, it was to be hoped, his Imperial Majesty might be induced to join. The Russian minister then recapitulated the state of several of the European Powers, and confirmed the information of Prussia having recognized the imperial diginity in Bonaparté,—and added that the two Baltick Powers were however inclined to act together, and he trusted in unison with us,—either in resisting the encroachment of France, or establishing peace on a solid foundation.

Prince Czartoriski expressed his fears that from information he had received from Constantinople, that the Turks might at last thro' the intrigues of France, be induced to turn against Russia and England.—I remarked to the Prince that with a view to our possessions in India, as well as our commerce, and the honour of the British flag in the Mediterranean and to prevent any sudden irruption, even in time of peace, in Egypt—he must see the impolicy and impossibility of our giving up Malta.

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Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 51.*

[*Extract.*]

St. Petersburgh: July 3, 1804.

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The Swedish ambassador here has received the explanations from his sovereign which were required by this Court relative to the measures of defence to be concerted between the two Powers:—His Excellency informed me that the answer he has to communicate on this matter is conformable to the wishes of the Emperor, and that in an audience he has had with his Imperial Majesty, the Emperor assured him of his desire to co-operate with Sweden, but also of his regret that he is thwarted by the conduct of other Powers—I do not flatter myself that the Swedish ambassador conceives he has made much progress in his negotiation, and indeed he expressed his disappointment with little reserve—He is however to receive an official communication from the Russian ministers, and I trust I shall be able to communicate it to your lordship.

A notion prevails here that the Court of Vienna has intimated to the French Government the readiness of the Emperor to acknowledge the new titles in France, provided Bonaparté will guarantee the succession of the imperial diginity of the German Empire in the House of Austria.—The Prussian minister is forward in suggesting the existence of such a negotiation, and I am sorry to find, (though I have had no conversation on the subject with the Russian ministers) that this Government is rather disposed to believe that Austria entertains hopes of concluding a transaction of the nature above mentioned with France.

It may be proper to inform your lordship that the hope expressed by Prince Czartorysky to the Danish chargé d'affaires relative to a concert of the Powers of the North was not the object of a formal conference but was mentioned incidentaly in a conversation on other matters.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 52.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

[*Extract.*]

St. Petersburgh: July 6, 1804.

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The Prince afterwards[1] expressed the anxiety of this Government as to his Majesty's decision respecting the late communication and proposals from hence, as everything concerning an arrangement of peace or war must remain suspended until the courier arrived from England, and that from the interest the Emperor took in everything in what his Majesty was concerned, and in which he hopes the two Courts might act together, renders the present crisis of more importance, as any partial settlement of the affairs of Europe would not be of long duration.—I enquired if his Excellency had received further information with respect to the Court of Vienna; he said he understood that Austria had not yet acknowledged the French imperial title, and hoped she would shew a more favourable disposition in future.

The Austrian ambassador has received a courier from Vienna, but his Excellency has not since seen the Russian minister.

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11

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 53.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburgh: July 10, 1804.

In the conversation I had with the Russian minister as mentioned in my last dispatch he remarked, that much had been said respecting the terms of peace proposed by France to England, but that nothing relative to that subject was known here; that he supposed when any arrangement of peace took place Bonaparte must evacuate Naples and the greater part of Piedmont and Switzerland, and that he might probably agree to surrender Holland, and give up part of the Low Countries; in which case if any difficulties occurred with the other Powers he supposed Great

[1] In the former part of this despatch Warren describes a conversation with Prince Czartoryski similar to that set forth in the despatch No. 50.

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Britain might be induced to give up Malta. I could not avoid saying that if Bonaparte gave up any part of his continental conquests which he might resume at pleasure it would be with a view of obliging us to cede the only strong and necessary port and post we held near Egypt to secure the Mediterranean as well as our commerce when our factories in Italy were safe, and that this seemed to me a very unlikely and unwise measure.

The Prince remarked confidentially, that it was not the desire of this Court but that of others to whom the presence of so many British ships in those seas might not be equally agreeable. I answered that it would be an impolitic measure in this country to assist in any plan that might occasion the British force to retire from the Mediterranean in which the Prince acquiesced.

Though the above opinion is not directly official it is of importance as it affords your lordship an idea of what may be brought forward by France and her allies, Spain, Italy and Prussia.

[Warren's despatch (No. 55), dated St. Petersburgh, July 19, 1804, reports the conditions on which the 'Emperor of Germany' was said to have insisted if he acknowledged the imperial title in Bonaparte's family: (1) the confirmation of the same hereditary dignity in the House of Austria; (2) the re-establishment of some member of that House in Tuscany; (3) the annexing of Salzburg to the Habsburg dominions; (4) the extension of the Austrian frontier on the side of Bavaria. The King of Sweden had expressed at Vienna his earnest hope that the Austrian Government would not recognise the imperial title in Bonaparte's family; but received a chilling response to the effect that the re-establishment of monarchy in France would secure that country and others against the return of Jacobinism.]

12

Lord Harrowby to Sir J. B. Warren.

F. O. Russia, vol. 55. (*Draft.*) *No. 2.*

Downing Street: July 24, 1804.

The King having been graciously pleased to grant to your Excellency the permission to return to England which you have

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solicited, and to appoint Lord Granville Leveson Gower[1] to succeed you as his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of St. Petersburgh, I have to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you notify his lordship's appointment to the ministers of the Emperor of Russia, and that you express to them his Majesty's hope that this appointment will be perfectly agreeable to his Imperial Majesty.

13

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 55 *No 58.*

St. Petersburgh: July 24, 1804.

I had yesterday a conference with the Russian minister respecting the several objects communicated in your lordship's dispatches of the 29th of June, and the state of the negotiation between your lordship and Count Woronzow. I pressed his Excellency by every argument in my power to come to some decision upon the frank and candid explanation and propositions made by his Majesty to the Emperor, and urged the necessity of establishing some basis or permanent point or compact to which all those States who were inclined to act with Russia and Great Britain for the safety and independence of Europe might rally and form an union, and without which every day that was lost would enable Bonaparte to extend his baneful influence and prepare the system of universal empire, and I did flatter myself Russia might induce the Court of Vienna and other Powers to join in so useful a plan.

The Prince said his Government was much satisfied with the clear and full explanation of the points which had been discussed in London, and that such a system was certainly to be desired, but that it required some time to consider and discuss it, and that he should receive the Emperor's orders next day, and would inform me when a courier was dispatched to London. He then made the following observations—First, that the pecuniary succours pro-

[1] Granville Leveson-Gower, first Earl Granville (1773–1846), was third son of Granville, Marquis of Stafford. He became a Lord of the Treasury in the Pitt Administration. After holding various responsible posts, he received the title of Viscount Granville in 1815. In 1824 he went as British ambassador to Paris, an appointment which he held, with two intervals, till 1841.

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posed to be furnished by Great Britain were nugatory:—Secondly, that with respect to reinforcing our garrisons in the Mediterranean, and assembling a corps of troops to act in Italy with those of Russia, we had announced a delay of two or three months, not being prepared to act:—Thirdly, that we had stated the temporary possession of ports in Turkey or Greece, which he did not understand:—Fourthly, that with respect to Prussia's joining in any league of defence amongst the Continental Powers [that] seemed now very problematical:—Fifthly, that Austria had not yet acknowledged the new titles in Bonaparte's family, and that altho' from the situation of affairs she was obliged to temporize and negotiate, yet he believed she was well inclined, and at a proper season would unite with Russia:—Sixthly, that in the formation of so extensive a confederacy, it would be necessary to define the objects and points on which a solid peace might be established—or if war begun on the Continent, what the precise object of [*sic*] the arms of the confederacy were to attack, and also in the arrangements of the several parts of Italy the interests of the Emperor of Germany, the King of Sardinia and the King of Naples might be considered; and on the other hand, the north of Germany and Europe—that if all this was not done, the confederacy would fall into the same error as was the case in the last war, and instead of diminishing, be the means of augmenting the power of France.[1]

I replied that with respect to the pecuniary succour, it was ample and as much as could be expected, to which the Prince assented—that as to the troops in the Mediterranean, a large part of the garrison at Malta and Gibraltar could now be spared to assist in conjunction with the Russian troops from Corfu, and that the remainder of the British troops would soon follow, if the Emperor would propose or enter into a treaty to unite the several Powers of the North for the important object of saving Europe from the dominion of France; and that in the Mediterranean the naval forces of England and Russia were acting together, and that the remainder of the Russian troops from the Black Sea had not yet arrived at their station. The Prince acknowledged the fact, but remarked that the two first divisions had already arrived; and

[1] Before the War of the Second Coalition began Pitt strove to bring about a clear understanding, but this was never reached owing to the strained relations of Austria, first to Great Britain and thereafter to Russia.

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added, he was glad to find an augmentation of our naval force calculated for the coasts of Italy was likely to be sent from England prior to the troops, and without delay: I proceeded to say on the temporary occupation of the ports in Turkey and the jealousy it might occasion at Constantinople that I apprehended it was only in extreme cases and where Russia herself would pursue a similar line of conduct and precaution;—I acknowledged the justice of his Excellency's remarks with regard to the disunion of the last confederacy in which the principal object of the war was lost in consequence of the avidity of some of the States and the fears of others which had enabled France to divide the confederacy and leave Great Britain alone and without an ally:—That the plan stated by his Excellency to embrace all the objects he had mentioned was certainly to be preferred in order to prevent misunderstanding hereafter, and that I hoped his Imperial Majesty after he had resolved upon such a plan would order it to be communicated to my Court that no time might be lost as the season is far advanced and every day exhibits a fresh proof of the augmentation of the French and of their intention to divide the remaining States of Europe.

I most earnestly hope that the Emperor may at last form a resolution to enter into a treaty for the objects already expressed, but the caution observed here against any measure which may ultimately be productive of a continental war is much to be regretted.

A Russian courier dispatched by M. Alopaus[1] from Berlin arrived here the night before last. He has brought a letter from his Prussian Majesty in answer to one written to him by the Emperor a few weeks since.

14

Lord Harrowby to Sir John Warren.

F. O. Russia, vol. 55. *Draft.*) *No. 3.*

[*Extract.*]

Downing Street: July 27, 1804.

I hope to receive in your Excellency's next dispatches some further particulars of the overtures made by Sweden to Russia. My letter to Count Woronzow will have shewn you that

[1] M. Alopeus was Russian ambassador at Berlin.

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His Majesty is desirous to encourage them, and would receive willingly any propositions from the same quarter.

You will express to Baron Stedink [1] his Majesty's admiration of the dignified sentiments displayed by his Swedish Majesty, and of the great example which he has set to the rest of Europe.

I should be glad of some further explanation of your Excellency's views respecting Stratsund [*sic*].

The language which has been held by your Excellency in your conferences with Prince Czartorinski [*sic*], as to the importance of Malta, notwithstanding the increase of our territories in the East Indies, and as to the supposed negotiations for peace with France, is perfectly correct. On the latter point, a confidential explanation was enter'd into with Count Woronzow as to the only circumstance which could give rise to such a report.—This was a communication not made directly to any member of Administration; and it came from an individual who represented himself expressly as having no authority whatever, and as stating only his own private opinions as to the possibility of peace. Mr. Livingston [2] was certainly the last person whom the French Government would have selected, if they entertained the slightest wish of opening a confidential intercourse with this country.

It should be publicly known that the note given in by Mr. Livingston at Paris, in answer to the notification made by Bonaparte of the pretended part taken by this country in the conspiracy [3] against him, has, without waiting for any representation from the British minister, been expressly disavowed by the American Government in a conversation between Mr. Merry and Mr. Madison.

. . . . . .

[1] Swedish ambassador at St. Petersburg.

[2] American ambassador at Paris.

[3] This refers to the late Cadoudal-Pichegru conspiracy. As to the complicity of some, at least, of the British officials serving under Addington, see *The Life of Napoleon I.*, by J. H. Rose, vol. i. pp. 450–452.

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15

F. O. Russia, vol. 55.

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

[*Most secret.*]

St. Petersburgh: July 30, 1804.

A secret channel informs me that, in a late communication from this Government to that of Paris, a project was given for a new arrangement in the German Empire, and the north of Europe; that one stipulation was that Prussia should occupy Hanover and a proportion of the revenue be paid to France. This Court has also communicated the project to that of Vienna, where it was approved; but the French Government which had also received it from Vienna rejected it.

In the late communications between this Government and France, it is proposed, I understand, to form a new kingdom for the King of Sardinia, consisting of some of the Ecclesiastical States, and some province belonging to the King of Naples, and in order to settle any new claims in Germany, Russia is to have a prevailing interest in the north, and Bavaria to receive a considerable addition of territory.—Prussia will in this case join the territory of Hanover on the side of . . . .[1] to her own frontier; if the propositions are accepted in France an alliance is then to be formed with this country. It is also believed that the Seven Islands will be annexed to Russia in full sovereignty.

. . . . . .

The Russian army appears to be penetrating from the side of the Caspian by the river Kur to the Potick[2] in the Black Sea, the Phasis of the antients. It is believed that Russia wishes to establish the above two rivers for her frontier between the Caspian and Black Seas, in order to receive the produce of the Persian provinces, and of India by a more direct route than by Buchara. I learn these particulars at a moment when the Russian forces on that side are supposed to have received a check from the Persians.

I receive these accounts with extreme caution, and therewith submit them to your lordship's consideration.

[1] Place omitted.

[2] This is now known as the R. Rion. The town of Poti is near its mouth.

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16

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 59.*

[*Extract.*]

St. Petersburgh: July 31, 1804.

[1] . . . . . .

On my enquiry what the answer might be, which his Imperial Majesty had lately received from his Prussian Majesty, the Prince replied that it was nearly the same as heretofore—a desire to remain neutral; but that if France invaded the Prussian territory the King expressed a determination to repel by force; but that the disposition of Prussia was as bad as ever. That with respect to Austria that Government still continued aloof from France, altho' much discussion and negotiation had passed; but that the critical situation of the Court of Vienna required her not to break with France, without strong support, and the establishment of a solid basis, added to which that the ministers were weak, and that the Empress and Prince Charles were prejudiced against Baron Thugut, who was the only man of firm character and talents: the Prince however trusted that Austria would not soon recognize the imperial dignity in Bonaparte's family.

. . . . . .

17

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 65.*

[*Extract.*]

St. Petersburgh: August 14, 1804.

I considered it of consequence, after Prince Czartoryski had communicated to me the official notes between this Government and France, to obtain from his Excellency some knowledge of the intentions of the Emperor, and of the negotiations respecting a concert of the Continental Powers. I enquired if any measures had been taken by Austria towards forming an alliance with this country. Prince Czartoryski said that nothing decisive had

[1] In the first part of this despatch Warren described his effort to bring about an Anglo-Russian compact.

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been effected as yet; as Austria had rather kept back, upon the plea of her inability to enter into offensive measures. That the Emperor had however hopes of their compliance, and that he thought it would be better to offer them in the first instance only two millions, as they would certainly ask a larger sum. And he hoped they might be induced to enter into a general system of defence which whenever concluded would soon after become offensive. His Excellency said that Austria had not yet acknowledged the title Bonaparte had assumed and would perhaps evade doing so, but if she seemed in some degree to comply, it would only be with a view to gain time till the spring when the other Powers as well as ourselves would be ready to act offensively.

. . . . . .

18

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 64.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburgh: August 14, 1804.

After what Prince Czartoryski had remarked on the subject of my last dispatch, his Excellency communicated to me the full contents of the note delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris to Mr. Oubril, of which abstracts were given in my dispatches Nos. 40 and 41. The principal parts of those abstracts are similar to the original, except as to one passage, which from its being very arrogant and offensive requires to be noticed. It is to the following purport; asking, 'If it is the intention of the Russian Government to renew the war upon the Continent, and busily employ themselves in forming fresh coalitions (that may prove as illusive as the last) to be paid by England, and lend themselves to the vile purposes and views of that Power, which seeks every occasion of embroiling those of the Continent? Why all these vain pretexts respecting the invasion of the German Empire, where France has ordered some rebels to their country to be seized and executed, who were plotting the destruction of it's chief and Government?—If the Emperor of Russia wishes for war, let him say so and the First Consul makes no doubt that the same glory will attend the French arms as heretofore; and that

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if the assassins of the Emperor Paul had been planning his destruction a few leagues from the Russian frontier, and in the pay of England, the First Consul made no doubt but that the Russian Government would have ordered them to be seized. That the First Consul can only ascribe this change in the Emperor's conduct to the emissaries of England, by whom he is surrounded, and those ministers who are known to be influenced by that sanguinary and turbulent Power.' What follows is much the same as I have already stated, except that in the conclusion it is said, that if the friendly relations of the two Governments are to be preserved, it could not be by such communications as the French Government had just received, and who [*sic*] were determined not to receive dictatorial instructions from any Power, or permit any Government to meddle in the internal affairs of France; any more than it was the wish of the First Consul to interfere in the internal concerns of the Russian Empire.

The Prince then read to me the note of this Government which was sent in reply some weeks ago; and to which an answer is daily expected from Paris. This Russian note is long and well written. It retraces the conduct of Russia towards France, since the conclusion of peace between them, and the indemnifications in Germany, to which Russia had consented in order to establish tranquillity, and ensure the repose of Europe. It states the many and various efforts made by Russia to induce France to adopt a more moderate line of conduct, and the many proofs Russia had given of her earnest wish to secure the independence and neutrality of the several Powers so that the weak might be protected as well as the strong; her offer of mediation which had been rejected, and adds that, when the publick rights of mankind and of Europe had been injured by the invasion of Germany, in the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, the Russian Government had enjoined that of France to give security to Europe, and Germany in particular, by an explanation of the political reasons which had urged them to this attack; but without effect.

That as to the measure of again renewing the war on the Continent and forming fresh coalitions, and augmenting the forces of the Russian Government, the Emperor was guarantee of the independence of the North of Germany and the Hanse Towns,[1] as well as

[1] By the Treaty of Teschen (1779).

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of Naples;[1] and that he could not see any attempt to invade them without preparing to support his guarranty. That certainly the Russian Empire was powerful enough to assert it's own dignity without receiving instructions or assistance from any one; that the Emperor was determined to defend the publick rights of Europe, and wished the French Government would give a proof of equal moderation and of it's friendly intentions, by ceasing from fresh aggressions, and by performing what they had engaged themselves to in the secret articles of the convention of the 11th October, 1801,[2] and without which the friendly relations existing between the two Powers could not be preserved.

His Imperial Majesty's chargé d'affaires in France had therefore orders to demand categorically from the French Government the performance of the following articles.[3]

1. The evacuation of the kingdom of Naples, and the perfect independence and neutrality of the kingdom in the present and in future wars.

2. A complete arrangement of the affairs of Italy.

3. A suitable compensation to the King of Sardinia for his losses.

4. The evacuation of the north of Germany, and the perfect neutrality of that empire.

If the French Government did not accede to this ultimatum within 24 hours, M. Oubril was directed to leave Paris and return to his own country.

No answer has been received, and M. Oubril's arrival, or a perfect compliance with these conditions is anxiously expected by this Government.

19

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 67.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

[*Extract.*] St. Petersburgh: August 24, 1804.

I am assured through a private channel that in a conference between the Prince Czartorysky and the Swedish ambassador[4]

[1] The Emperor Paul in 1800–1801 offered his mediation to Napoleon on behalf of Naples, and it was accepted.

[2] With respect to their intervention in the affairs of Germany (before the Secularisations).

[3] For the full text of M. d'Oubril's note of $\frac{15}{26}$ August, 1804, see Garden, *Traités*, vol. viii. pp. 266–272.

[4] Baron Stedingk.

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the latter has received the firmest assurances of support from this Government in the event of Sweden being attacked in Pomerania, and that it was further desired by Russia that Sweden would enter into some measure of defence with Great Britain in concert with Russia as soon as possible.—On the Swedish ambassador's remarking that the conduct of Austria in acknowledging the pretentions of Bonaparte would have a bad effect,[1] the Russian minister replied that the critical situation of the affairs of Austria and her fears prompted her to take this step; but that he had reason to believe it would make no alteration in her ultimate views and determination. The Prince expressed his wish that full powers might be sent to Baron Stedingk to enter into an engagement with this country of the tenour above mentioned, on the particular stipulations of which [ ] said that he was already employed.

. . . . . .

20

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 55, *No. 69.*

[*Extract.*]

St. Petersburgh : August 30, 1804.

Prince Czartoryski communicated to me yesterday the contents of several dispatches to be forwarded from him this evening to Count Woronzow; who will be directed to express the Emperor's sense of the marks of his Majesty's confidence, evinced by the late explanations relative to the eventual subsidies to be granted by Great Britain: and that when this Government shall have occasion for assistance of that nature, it will be to his Majesty alone, to whom the Emperor will apply. The Russian minister assured me that the Emperor is also much pleased with the explicit declaration on the part of the King, that his Majesty will not conclude peace with France, without the participation of Russia, and that this proof of confidence towards his Imperial Majesty, would produce the best effect in their future endeavours for the salvation of Europe. That the Emperor had exerted himself to

[1] Francis II. had just recognised Napoleon's imperial title; he himself took the title of Hereditary Emperor of Austria on August 10, 1804.

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combine the principal Powers in the same laudable views, but hitherto without effect; and Prince Czartoryski here expressed the apprehension that he was not sure even of the disposition of Denmark; that the fear of Bonaparte, or the hope of his favour prevailed almost universally on the Continent, except in this country and in Sweden; that Baron Stedingk had been desired to ask for full powers to conclude a convention with Russia in the present exigency; and had been informed that in the event of the Swedish troops marching out of their country to act hostilely against France, succours would be furnished from Great Britain. And it was on that account wished that an arrangement of that nature should be concluded between the Court of St. James, and that of Stockholm. . . .

[In his despatch No. 70, August 30, 1804, Warren reports the victory of the Russians over the Persians, the latter losing all their artillery; but in answer to Warren's question as to the intentions of Russia to press on into Persia and Armenia, Prince Czartoryski assured him it was not their intention to do so 'further than to Erivan and Mount Ararat to protect the exercise of the Christian religion there under the Metropolitan who was guaranteed and nominated by Russia.'

In his despatch No. 71, August 31, 1804, Warren points out the importance of Stralsund either as a depôt for sending British merchandise through North Germany or for landing a combined force of 'Hanoverians and others who may be destined for military operations in Hanover.' They might be assembled there 'in the name of the King of Sweden or of the Emperor of Russia, but in the pay of Great Britain.'

There is nothing more of importance in the volume 'Russia, No. 55;' but the despatches in the following volume are given almost in their entirety.]

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21

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 73.*

St. Petersburgh: September 9, 1804.

The King of France [1] arrived rather unexpectedly a short time since at a seat near Mittau, and immediately wrote to the Emperor, suggesting his desire to proceed to St. Petersburgh, in order to meet the French Princes, whom his Most Christian Majesty supposed to be on their way from England; and to concert with them a protest against the usurpation and assumptions of General Bonaparte. His Imperial Majesty wrote in answer, that he apprehended such a measure would be premature, and that the object of it would be better secured by waiting the issue of the present discussions between Russia and France. In the mean time the Emperor informed his Most Christian Majesty how agreeable it would be to him if he chose to fix his residence in any part of the Russian dominions.

The French King then acquainted the Emperor with his desire to proceed to Sweden, and requested a ship of war to convey him there; but on his Majesty's pointing out the inconvenience and embarrassment it might occasion to his Swedish Majesty, by hastening a crisis for which he is unprepared; and also informing the King of France that no ship of war was ready in that neighbourhood, but that any other vessell might be prepared by his direction; his Majesty desisted from the intention of going to Stockholm, and has fixed his residence in the neighbourhood of Mittau. . . .

22

Lord Harrowby to Sir J. B. Warren.

[*Extract.*] Downing Street: September 11, 1804. F. O. Russia, (*Draft.*

. . . . . .

Notwithstanding the assurances given by Count Starhemberg [2] that the conditions proposed by Austria to Bonaparte for the

[1] 'Louis XVIII.' The following despatches will prove that the Emperor Alexander had no intention of pressing for the restoration of this prince to the throne of France.

[2] Austrian minister in London.

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acknowledgement of his title were only intended to gain time till the decision of Russia could be known, I had always been persuaded that the first serious menace of the French minister would put an end to all delay, and have expected to learn by every mail that the sacrifice was made. It is useless to waste reflections upon the manner in which it has been consummated. The conduct of Austria had left little hope that any firmness would long be maintained upon such a point; but it might have been expected that Count Cobenzel would have seen the prudence of avoiding to aggravate, by offending the just pride of Russia, the offence which she must naturally feel at her advice being disregarded. The manner in which the assumption of the imperial title by Bonaparte is placed upon the same line with the change introduced by Peter the Great, and the equal authority given to both these precedents, cannot fail to be extremely displeasing to the Emperor Alexander. It implies also an opinion that Russia has no right to object, if another Power follows the example which she herself has set.[1]

I cannot avoid feeling considerable anxiety as to the effect of this resolution at Petersburg. The precipitate acknowledgment of Bonaparte by the King of Prussia was there considered as a decisive proof, that nothing was to be expected from Berlin; and I fear the same impression will be made, with greater strength, respecting the future conduct of Austria.—Perhaps the hope that such an impression would be made was amongst the secret motives which dictated this strange transaction, and it may have been thought by the Austrian ministers, that so striking a proof of weakness would be their best security against any further exhortations to vigour and activity. It is however extremely desirable that this hope should be defeated; and although it would be perfectly inconsistent with the sentiments of his Majesty for your Excellency to defend or palliate the conduct of the Court of Vienna; yet you will endeavour as much as possible to soften any resentment which it may have occasioned at Petersburgh. The language held by Prince Czartorisky 'respecting the critical situation of Austria, which required her not to break with France without strong support and the establishment of a solid basis,' will

[1] For a criticism of Cobenzl's policy see E. Wertheimer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs und Ungarns*, vol. i. ch. vii. *ad fin.*

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enable you, on his own authority, to attribute this measure rather to timidity and a supposed necessity, than to any disinclination towards Russia or any favourable disposition to France. It will furnish you also with arguments to enforce the expediency of giving such assurances of strong and immediate support, and of backing those assurances by so considerable a force assembled upon the frontiers as may remove from Austria all pretext for further concessions.

23

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No.* 77.

St. Petersburgh: September 28, 1804.

I had yesterday an opportunity of ascertaining, in a conference with Prince Czartoryski, the state of the negotiation between this country and Sweden for the conclusion of which Baron Stedingk received full powers a few days ago from the King of Sweden. I understand that his Swedish Majesty is desirous of receiving money from this country instead of the troops stipulated by treaty: and would in that case send over a larger portion of his own forces to Pomerania, and place that country in a better state of defence.

The Swedish ambassador has also stated some other articles that the Swedish Government wish to have altered and explained, First, that in the project delivered by the Russian ministers the article stating the guaranty of the dominions of the two Powers is omitted, altho very essential to all parties and certainly to Great Britain, in the share she is to take in the Union; Secondly, the payments of the transports to convey the Russian troops to Pomerania or Mecklenburg; a sufficient number not being found in this country to transport 30, or 40,000 men, which the Emperor has signified a wish of doing, exclusively of the stipulated contingents for Sweden from hence, in the event of hostilities.

Baron Stedingk has therefore redispatched the courier to learn his Swedish Majesty's commands before he can sign the articles of the convention. This Government however informs Baron Stedingk that they are ready to send the troops to Pomerania; according to treaty whenever they are necessary. And that with respect to the money wanted for the support of their own additional troops, his

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Swedish Majesty had better conclude a treaty of subsidy with England, for all these purposes; and here the matter rests until the King of Sweden's answer arrives.

Prince Czartoryski further informed me, that the King of Sweden had sent proper powers and instructions to Baron Silverhielm [1] to enter into engagements on this subject with your lordship; and he hoped some progress had already been made in it. The Prince joins me in opinion that his Swedish Majesty is desirous of a sum of money to put his troops in a marching condition, and the garrisons in Pomerania in order; but that it is supposed the King after some trifling alterations will order the convention to be concluded. The only thing to be apprehended is that the Swedish Government might wish to introduce something in reference to the restoration of the King of France, a circumstance which would embarrass this Government as well as Great Britain, as parties to the convention. The Russian minister said the Emperor wished particularly to keep clear of such a stipulation and he was happy to see that this was also the sentiment of the British Government; that if the war took place which appeared certain, it should in no shape appear to be undertaken for the restoration of the King of France as its sole object, but upon publick grounds, for the repose, security and independence of the several States of Europe, the balance of power, the preservation of publick right, and faith, and of all social order.

In these sentiments I perfectly coincided with his Excellency, as being a more just and useful foundation of war, than by interfering in the internal government of France; especially since the return of the House of Bourbon, altho' perhaps a desirable measure, must depend on the opinion of the French nation, the troops, and a favourable movement, when other Powers might act as auxiliaries, to aid such an impulse in favour of that unfortunate monarch.

I expressed at the same time the pleasure the declaration made by his Imperial Majesty had given me and the satisfaction it would afford my royal master, and every independent State in Europe. . . .

A M. de Blancas [2] arrived here a few days ago in order to notify

[1] Swedish ambassador at London.

[2] This should be M. de Blacas, the confidential agent of the Comte de Provence ('Louis XVIII.').

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to this Government the departure of the King of France from Riga to Sweden. His Majesty embarked at that place for Colmar, and expects the Prince de Condé to meet him in Sweden. I understand he intends to sign a protest, at sea, against the late proceedings in France. The whole of this business has I believe afforded some umbrage to the Emperor of Russia.

24

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 78.*

St. Petersburgh: September 23, 1804.

When I was yesterday at Prince Czartoryski's his Excellency showed me the note of the French Government in answer to that forwarded by Mr. Talleyrand to the First Consul as mentioned in my despatch No. [1] and which was replied to by the note of which I forwarded the copy to your lordship by the last post.

After expressing surprize at the grievances set forth by Russia and the stile in which they are conveyed, which rather resembles that of a conqueror addressing the conquered than what suits two nations in habits of intimacy and treating each other on an equal footing; the note says 'that France has rather cause to reproach Russia with the non-performance of engagements and especially with interfering and changing the Government of the Seven Islands under the guaranty of France, Russia, and the Porte; that France had never been consulted on any of the measures; but that Russia had sent large corps of troops to Corfu, and continued with a degree of ostentation to prepare additional numbers.'

'That Russia had also received all the emigrants, and employed them in public capacities, and instead of sending away members of the House of Bourbon, and their chief, had retained them, and been subject to their intrigues, contrary to what had been done by Paul 1st when he was desirous of putting an end to the war and of reestablishing order and tranquility in Europe.'

'That Russia had also upon a late occasion stood forward in opposition to France, by ordering the Court to put on mourning, on account of an agent in the pay and counsel of England,

[1] Left blank.

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employed in plotting the destruction of France;[1] at a time when this traitor to his country had been tried and condemned by a tribunal of the French Government, and executed in consequence of its decision.'[2]

'That these and other instances of the bad disposition of the Russian Government, which had been changed in its mode of acting towards France, and the evident partiality which Russia had shewn upon every occasion towards England: and the disloyal conduct and constant intrigues of M. de Markoff who had fomented the causes of complaint between the two Governments, and entered into all the evil intentions and intrigues of the emigrants, and ill disposed persons at Paris; that these were the real causes of the Russian Government having shewn such coldness, and strange conduct towards that of France.'

'That if however notwithstanding all the efforts of the Emperor of the French to preserve the friendly relations of the two countries, the Emperor of Russia embraces the cause of England, in that case the former would rely on the bravery and conduct of his armies to maintain the rights of France, and the splendour of the French name. . . .'

M. Novositzoff embarks this day on board one of the Emperor's cutters, in order to proceed to England. This gentleman will probably be absent some weeks, and I believe the object of his voyage is much connected with the agricultural and legal pursuits on which he has been for some time more particularly employed.[3] He is very much in the confidence of the Emperor, and I cannot speak too highly of his talents and character.

25

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 80.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburgh: September 28, 1804.

I have the honour to inform your lordship, that an imperial ukase has just been published here authorizing a new levy of

[1] The duc d'Enghien.

[2] The condemnation was by a secret court-martial.

[3] M. de Novossiltzoff was really charged with a confidential mission to the British Government, many of the details of which are set forth in the *Czartoryski Memoirs*, as well as in the chief histories of the period.

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recruits, to begin on the first day of November next, and terminate on the first of January 1805. This addition to the land and sea forces of Russia will amount to between thirty and forty thousand, being one man from five hundred males of the population of the empire; as the ukase directs. . . .

M. d'Oubril having been detained in France (at Mayence) under pretexts which have been already mentioned in a former dispatch to your lordship; M. de Rayneval will receive his passport for passing the Russian frontier from the Governor of Riga; and will accordingly have waited at that place from the time of his arrival there some days ago, till it has been ascertained M. d'Oubril has crossed the Rhine.

26

Lord Harrowby to Lord Granville Leveson Gower.[1]

F. O. Russia, vol. 56. (*Draft.*) *No. 1.*

Downing Street: October 10, 1804.

As you are already fully apprized of all that has passed between the Russian and English Governments, it is not necessary for me to do more than to direct your attention to some particular points upon which it appears important to bring the Court of Petersburgh to a more precise explanation of its views, or upon which that Court is desirous of receiving explanations on our part.

Your first object will be, to ascertain the present state of the negotiations between Petersburgh and Vienna. It appears certain that they have proceeded so far as to produce a proposal from Austria to arrange the conditions of a treaty by a direct communication by letter between the two Emperors, and a project for a convention to settle upon what plan the two Courts should take measure for acting with their combined forces against the common enemy. There is also reason to believe, that explanations have taken place respecting the views of Austria upon Italy. No communication however upon this subject has been made by either Court to this Government;—and it is alledged, as a reason for this silence, that Austria is apprehensive of an immediate attack from France if

[1] Lord G. L. Gower was designated as ambassador to succeed Sir J. B. Warren at St. Petersburg. See biographical note on p. 24.

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the grounds of such a negotiation were suspected, and has therefore insisted upon the observation of perfect secrecy.

You will observe to Prince Czartorisky, that if this is the real object of their secrecy, enough has already been done to risk it (if any risk can be supposed to attend our knowledge of its existence) since that knowledge alone would be sufficient, if it were to reach Bonaparte, to rouse his utmost indignation against Austria—but that enough has not been done to afford the best chance of accomplishing the objects of that negotiation, unless Russia will enable us to cooperate effectually with her at Vienna, by a knowledge of the points upon which it turns.

While it is yet doubtful whether any attempt will be made to rescue Italy from it's subjection to France, and much more doubtful whether any such attempt would be successful, nothing but the recollection of the evils which were occasioned during the last war by the want of previous concert upon this point between Russia and Austria, could authorise any speculation upon so remote and uncertain a contingency—but the experience of those evils is a sufficient justification for entertaining it, even under the present circumstances.[1] It appears on this ground highly desirable to know what are the acquisitions which Austria has in view in Italy, supposing her arms to be successful, and how far Russia would be inclined to support her in the attainment of them.

Whenever the King of Sardinia is in a situation to call upon his subjects in Piedmont to form an army for the purpose of cooperating in the common cause, the sentiments which have always dictated the conduct of his Majesty towards the House of Savoy are a sufficient security, that his Majesty will not be backward in contributing his assistance towards enabling him to make an effectual use of their zeal and loyalty.

Memoranda.

The peculiar interest which the Emperor of Russia has always taken in the welfare of the King of Sardinia, would probably lead

[1] The disputes between Russia and Austria in 1799 turned largely on the refusal of the latter to reinstate the King of Sardinia in his mainland possessions, and on the plans of aggrandisement of the House of Habsburg against that kingdom and the Papal Legations. On August 10, 1799, Baron Thugut informed the British ambassador at Vienna, Lord Minto, that he considered 'the conquest of Piedmont as one made by Austria of an enemy's country.' [F.O. Austria, vol. 56.]

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him to desire, not only that all the Trans-Alpine dominions of that monarch should be restored to him, but that in exchange for Savoy (the restoration of which seems neither probable nor material) the whole of the Genoese territories and the imperial fiefs connected with them, should be annexed to his crown.

It is so important that the passes of the Alps should be possessed by a Power capable of defending them against France, that nothing could be more desirable than any arrangement by which the resources of the King of Sardinia could be made fully adequate to that object. It may well be doubted whether the addition proposed to be made to his dominions would be sufficient;—but it would certainly be inadequate, if any part of the provinces which have been successively detached from the Milenese were to be restored to Austria. The recovery of these provinces has however been so long a favourite object,[1] that unless some compensation were allotted to the Court of Vienna, it would be difficult to obtain her consent to the proposed arrangement; and for this purpose she might have the prospect of retaining all the Milanese, the Duchy of Mantua, and that part of the Venetian territory which now belongs to the Italian Republic; as however it is much to be feared, that if the restoration of the King of Sardinia were accomplished, he would find his finances too much exhausted to afford the means of putting his frontiers into a state of defence, or of placing his army upon a respectable footing, it would be very desirable that his dominions should be so far enlarged as to produce a considerable addition to his revenues; and if Austria should consent, for this purpose, that some part of the Milanese or the Duchy of Parma should be left to him, she might receive an ample compensation by recovering Tuscany for the Grande Duke, and Modena for its own sovereign, and by annexing to Austria, at the same time, their German indemnities. The Papal Legations[2] might in this

[1] This refers especially to the Novarese, which, as Lord Minto stated, formed the minimum of Austria's demands in 1799.

[2] One of the Austrian plans in 1799, as reported on August 3, 1799, by Lord Henley (Lord Minto's predecessor), was to transfer the King of Sardinia from Piedmont to part of the Papal States (the Legations). The 'further instructions' issued by the British Government in June 1799 to Lord Minto bade him not to oppose the acquisition of the Novarese by Austria, and to indemnify the King of Sardinia for this loss by giving him access to the sea. Genoa was meant. [F.O. Austria, vols. 55 and 56.] The 'German indemnities' previously referred to in

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case form a sufficient indemnification to the King of Etruria for the loss of his original dominions.

The States of the Presidi[1] ought also to be restored to the King of Naples, together with that part of the Isle of Elba which belonged to him; and to this should be added the remaining portion of that island.

27

F. O. Russia, vol. 56. (*Draft.*)

Lord Harrowby to Lord G. L. Gower.

Downing Street: October 10, 1804.

The explanation, which is now given by Prince Czartorisky, of the orders under which the commander of the Russian forces at Corfou is at present acting is a subject of great concern.

The misapprehension upon that point does not rest with his Majesty's Government, and the interpretation put by Count Woronzow upon the former dispatch of Prince Czartorisky, appeared to be founded not only upon the necessary purport of his expressions, but upon the reason of the thing. It was never understood that the Russian forces had orders to attempt the expulsion of the French from the kingdom of Naples, because it was well known that they were unequal to such an undertaking; and that it would be the height of rashness to attempt it, without the cooperation of an Austrian army. But Russia had declared, that one of the objects to be effected by the forces at Corfou was to succour the King of Naples whenever such succour became necessary, and could be really useful;[2] it was conceived that no necessity could be more urgent than the expulsion of the King from his capital, and his retreat to Sicily, and that no assistance could be more useful than a body of auxiliary troops which would enable him to keep a footing in Calabria and defend his remaining kingdom.

the despatch were the Breisgau allotted to the dispossessed Duke of Modena by the Treaty of Campo Formio (Oct. 17, 1797).

[1] These were scattered districts on the coast of Tuscany, and included also part of Elba.

[2] At the close of the year 1798 Russia made a treaty with the kingdom of Naples, granting it her protection. This led the Queen of Naples in 1801 to beg the intercession of the Czar Paul to avert the conquest of the kingdom by France. Napoleon yielded to his intercession on her behalf.

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The essential importance of the Calabrias to the protection of Sicily must be sufficiently known to the Court of St. Petersburgh, and the peculiar nature of the country, and the great strength of the post of Campestrino, by which alone it can be attacked, would render the defence of it easy to a small body of troops, assisted as they certainly would be by the valour and military spirit of the inhabitants. If this pass is occupied, the French can never be secure in Naples; but if they are allowed to seize it in the first instance, it will not be possible to dispossess them, and they will continually menace the opposite coast of Sicily. You cannot therefore impress too strongly upon the Russian Government the importance of immediately directing their General at Corfou, to send a small body of troops for the defence of the post of Campestrino, as soon as he receives a requisition from his Sicilian Majesty, or as soon as he is informed of the march of the French army towards Naples, and of signifying to the Neapolitan Government that such orders have been given. They are already apprized in such an event fifteen hundred or two thousand British troops are ready to assist in the defence of Messina, and have eventual orders to proceed immediately to that port, but unless they can also be assured that some assistance will be afforded by Russia in the first instance for the defence of Calabria, it is much to be feared that the King of Naples will submit to any terms, which may be imposed upon him, rather than risk the issue of a contest, which under such circumstances he might easily be persuaded to consider as hopeless.

The French will probably insist upon their demands of placing a garrison in the castles of St. Elmo and Gaëta, and of excluding the British ships from all his ports.[1] If he accedes to the latter demand, in order to avoid complying with the former, the loss of all the supplies, derived both from Naples and from Sicily, will add so materially to the difficulty of keeping our fleet in the Mediterranean, that it would become doubtful whether the blockade of Toulon could be maintained as effectually as it has been hitherto; and in case the French fleet should escape from that port, and be able to detach any considerable force to the Adriatic, the Russian Government would do well to consider the danger to which their

[1] This was one of the terms on which Napoleon insisted with the Neapolitan Government in 1801.

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own squadron in those seas would be exposed, and the opportunity which would be afforded to the French of making a successful attack upon Albania, and the Morea. . . .

You will receive the assurances, which were given by my letter to Count Woronzow, that exertions would be made to increase the disposal force of the garrison of Malta; and you may express your hopes that a reinforcement of 5 or 6,000 men will have reached it in a few months from the present time.

These troops will have eventual orders to act in the defence of Sicily, of Calabria, or of Turkey, as circumstances may require, but upon a comparison of the different circumstances of the Turkish and Neapolitian dominions it seems necessary that their attention should be specially directed to the defence of the latter, particularly of Sicily. . . .

It is therefore highly to be wished that until the British reinforcements are arrived, the Russian troops at Corfou should be charged with the defence of Calabria, and the British troops at Malta with the defence of Messina, in case the French should advance to Naples.

After the arrival of our reinforcements the troops of each Power may act jointly or separately, whenever there appears a necessity for the greatest exertion, but the vicinity of Corfou to the Turkish dominions and to Calabria, and of Malta to Sicily naturally points out to each its separate sphere of action.

28

[There follows a long despatch (No. 3) of the same date from Downing Street to Lord G. L. Gower, dealing with the complications that had arisen in the affairs of Albania and the Morea, the misunderstandings between the British and Russian agents, and the French intrigues with Ali Pacha. The points of chief interest are to be found in this postscript:—]

P.S.—An improvement, in the situation of the Greeks, is stated by Russia to be the principal object of her intervention, and the expectation held out, of procuring such an improvement, to be her chief hold upon their minds.

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The extent to which this improvement is intended to be carried has never been explained.

Is it limited to a milder exertion of the power now vested in the Pachas? Is it to include that degree of liberty which prevails in Moldavia and Wallachia? or is it in fact to leave the dependance of the Greeks upon the Porte merely nominal? Upon these points it is very desireable that you should obtain a thorough insight into the views of Russia.

29

Lord Harrowby to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56. (*Draft.*) *No. 4.*

Downing Street: October 10, 1804.

Although I have been repeatedly assured by Count Woronzow, that the principal obstacle to a good understanding between Austria and Russia arose from the opposition of the latter to the proposals made by the former for a partition of Turkey, yet the confidential overtures made by Prince Czartorisky, respecting the possible conduct of the Court of Petersburgh towards the Porte, are far from indicating a decided disinclination to a plan of that description.

The policy of such a measure, even if it were the result of a just and successful war against the Porte, is extremely doubtful; but no doubt can be entertained that Great Britain cannot give its sanction to a proceeding incompatable with the relations of friendship and alliance, which, at the present moment, connect it with Turkey.

The expression in my letter to Count Woronzow of the 26th of June, which is referred to by Prince Czartorisky, was intended to apply merely to those cases in which it might become absolutely necessary that a temporary possession of particular posts should be taken, by Russian or British troops, for the express purpose of defending them against an imminent attack on the part of France, and with a *bonâ fide* intention of restoring them to their lawful sovereign, whenever the purpose for which they might be occupied should have been completely fulfilled.

This remark was intended to be applied to the landing of any part of Genl. Aureps army upon the most exposed parts of the

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coast of Albania, or the Morea, in case the menace of a French invasion appeared near its execution; and altho' the proposal made first by Mr. Stratton [1] and afterwards by Mr. Lock, for the admission of British troops into Alexandria was without authority from Government, yet such an eventual occupation was undoubtedly one of the cases to which the principle alluded to was intended to refer.

The wish expressed by the Court of Petersburgh, and so warmly embraced by the Porte, for the renewal of the alliance between them, has placed the former Power in an embarrassing situation.

The conditions of the present treaty appear to be considered by that Court as so various, that the renewal of it in its present state seems out of the question. On the other hand a refusal to accomplish a proposal, which was made by Russia in the first instance, is likely to diminish her influence in the Turkish councils, and to give great advantages to the intrigues of France.

Under these circumstances, the plan which his Imperial Majesty proposes, of declining to treat except conjointly with England, and therefore of accounting for the delay of an answer from the necessity of mutual consultation, appears to be best calculated to avoid, as far as possible for the present, any impression materially unfavourable; and Mr. Stratton will be directed to give a similar answer to an intimation which he transmitted from the Porte, that the renewal of the alliance was desirable; but it is evident this excuse will not avail beyond a certain time.

The question of this renewal, either simply, or with the addition of such stipulations as may be adapted to the present situation of affairs, requires mature consideration.

The views of Russia are so indistinctly expressed in the dispatch of Prince Czartorisky, that it is impossible to form a judgement how far they may be consistent either with the views, or the good faith of his Majesty.

You will express the earnest wish to find them of such a nature as to admit of the concurrence of Great Britain: and you will endeavour to obtain a confidential explanation, both as to the countries which it is proposed eventually to occupy, the cases in which this occupation is intended to take place, and the nature of the equivalents, which are expected from Turkey, in consideration of the renewal of the Treaty of Alliance. . . .

[1] British minister at Constantinople.

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30

[The draft (No. 5) dated Downing Street, October 10, 1804, to Lord G. L. Gower, refers to details of the negotiations between Great Britain and Sweden. The postscript only need be given here.]

P.S.—Since this dispatch was written the King of Sweden has proposed to postpone the consideration of any treaty of subsidy until the system of other Powers, and particularly of Russia, is more developed. In the mean time he has requested some pecuniary assistance for the defence of Swedish Pomerania; and Mr. Pierrepont[1] has been empowered to supply him with a considerable sum, on condition of his permitting the establishment at Stralsund of a depôt for Hanoverian levies, and for British goods. This convention is intended to be kept secret.

31

Lord Harrowby to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56. (*Draft.*) *No. 6.*

[*Most secret and confidential.*]

Downing Street: October 10, 1804.

Complaints have been so frequently repeated by the Court of Petersburgh of the feebleness of the Austrian Ministry, and it has so often been represented as the chief obstacle to the formation even of a defensive concert, that it seems important, without loss of time, to suggest to Prince Czartorynski the necessity of uniting the efforts of the two Courts to produce a change in the Cabinet of Vienna. As soon as you have established your intercourse with him upon a confidential footing, you will sound his opinion upon this subject, and, if you find any proper opening, endeavour to prevail upon him to engage in this important and delicate measure, unless there should appear reason to believe that the negotiation with Vienna is so far advanced as to make a change in the administration unadviseable.

Although it is much to be desired that the assumption of the imperial title by the House of Austria should not produce any coldness between that Court and Russia; yet the mean and

[1] British minister at Stockholm.

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degrading policy which suggested that expedient is justly appreciated at St. Petersburgh, and will probably tend more effectually to lower the character of Count Cobenzil, than any other acts of weakness and timidity of which he may have been the adviser.

The general views which are entertained as to the means of effecting either his dismissal or the reduction of his influence, are explained in two dispatches to Sir Arthur Paget, which are inclosed for your information and guidance. It is unnecessary to recommend to you that circumspection in the conduct of this business, which the nature of it evidently requires. Your communications with Sir Arthur Paget, upon this subject, may be carried on by means of the Russian messengers, but should not be trusted to the post.

32

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 82.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburgh: October 12, 1804.

The Russian minister has informed me that Count Goltze[1] has by order of his Court made an overture of his Prussian Majesty's mediation between Russia and France in order to arrange the misunderstandings which have arisen between the two countries and had signified in answer his Imperial Majesty's fixed determination to have nothing further to do with the French Government until they had fulfilled the just demands of his Imperial Majesty—and that with respect to the proposal of mediation, there was no ground upon which it could be undertaken; and that his Imperial Majesty had further expressed his determination to insist upon the full execution of his Majesty's demand, (the Prince remarked that the overture in question was no doubt suggested by the King's fearful and critical situation in Prussia; and that with respect to Austria she still continued to temporize, but with the assurance of being friendly and disposed to join this country at a future period).

The Russian minister informed me also that Bonaparte had given orders for pontoon bridges to be constructed in Hanover, which it is imagined must be with a view to attack the King of

[1] Count Goltz was Prussian minister at St. Petersburg.

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Sweden in Pomerania as well as in his Mecklenburgh dominions.— His Swedish Majesty, however, who was at Stralsund, is preparing to resist the French troops if they should march that way; that the King of Sweden is well disposed and sincere in his intention towards the general cause of Europe, and that altho' a party in Sweden, and of the Swedish ministers dislike a contest with France, the Prince[1] made no doubt that his Swedish Majesty would enter into a connection with Great Britain and this country; and that altho' he had some enthusiastical notions respecting fame, which the Prince said he was glad to find our Government had resisted, a little time and reflection would induce him not to bring those notions forward as a primary object in a treaty with us.

The steps which may be taken by General Bonaparte in Italy will of course have excited much attention here: especially as it is known that he has made some movements with the troops on the side of Milan towards Naples; and among those which are near Otranto.

M. de Novozilsoff having been prevented from pursuing his voyage by sea to England on account of contrary winds, put back to Cronstadt some days ago, and is on his way to Sweden by land in order to proceed from Gothemburgh. I thought it an attention due to this gentleman to order an extra packet to receive him on board, and give the best accommodations.

I understand that his Swedish Majesty having sent Baron Armfeldt to Berlin, in order to furnish some explanation of the defensive measures which his Majesty has judged it advisable to direct in the Duchy of Pomerania, his Prussian Majesty has expressed his disapprobation of those precautions, on the ground of their tending rather to give umbrage to and invite a powerful enemy, than to afford any real security against his attempts.

His Prussian Majesty therefore has recommended rather a state of inactivity, and has given the King of Sweden to understand that a line of conduct conformable to this advice was the most likely to ensure him the advantage of his Prussian Majesty's resolution to oppose the introduction of foreign troops into the north of Germany. This answer has been communicated to this Government, and to that of Paris.

I have had the honor of receiving your lordship's dispatch

[1] Prince Czartoryski.

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No. 4, and shall take the earliest opportunity of endeavouring to give effect to its contents.

[Warren's ciphered despatch, No. 83, dated St. Petersburgh, October 19, 1804, to Lord Harrowby, dwells on the need of encouraging Austria to join Russia in resisting France.]

83

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 84.*

St. Petersburgh: October 19, 1804.

In answer to the communication made here from the Court of Berlin as mentioned in my last dispatch, Count Goltze has I understand been informed that altho' the Emperor approved the principle of not provoking hostilities by unnecessary preparations, he did not think this principle applicable to the case in question, and that every sovereign is justified in taking such defensive measures as the safety of his dominions may require.

Since this answer was given to the Prussian minister advices have been received here, according to which it is the intention of his Prussian Majesty immediately to occupy the province of [Swedish] Pomerania as a temporary deposit for the securing of the neutrality of the north of Germany. It is imagined that this is the effect of measures already concerted between Prussia and France; and that at the same time the French army having exhausted the Electorate of Hanover will extend itself and take possession of the Hanse Towns and of the adjacent countries.

The King of Prussia however will naturally consider the consequences of so bold a measure as that of occupying Swedish Pomerania; and I trust we shall not see this interesting point fall in the course of the winter, into the occupancy of France; nor, under any pretext whatever, into that of Prussia.

The intelligence respecting this new measure of the Cabinet of Berlin has been communicated by Mr. Alopeus from that Court, and the Swedish ambassador here assures me that instructions have been sent to that minister to declare the Emperor's disapprobation of a military measure like that said to be in agitation

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with regard to Pomerania. Your lordship will perhaps be of opinion that his Swedish Majesty's means of holding out against a series of attacks on the town of Stralsund, and his present position seems more particularly to call for some immediate arrangement in his favor on the part of Great Britain and Russia.

I understand that the Russian minister has been directed to inform the Prussian Ministry that the Emperor does not object to any mediation between him and the French Government, which shall secure such a settlement of the claims urged by his Imperial Majesty as have been so often insisted on, and from which the Emperor cannot depart.

P.S.—The Batavian minister here, M. de Hogendorp, has been officially informed by Prince Czartoryski that in the case of a rupture between Russia and France, his Imperial Majesty would nevertheless be desirous to preserve the diplomatick and commercial relations of Russia and Holland.—J. B. W.

34

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 85.*

St. Petersburgh: October 26, 1804.

[After reporting the concern of the Russian Government at the prospect of a rupture between England and Spain, he proceeds:—]

. . . I then enquired of Prince Czartoryski what answer had been returned from hence to the offer of mediation from the Court of Berlin, as there were several reports on the subject; and his Excellency communicated to me the following particulars.

That the Emperor was very sensible of his Prussian Majesty's kindness and good intentions in offering his intervention between Russia and France: that he considered it as necessary to state to his Prussian Majesty the grounds of his breaking off all connection with that Government; that he therefore recapitulated the four points which had been so often urged, and had been set forth in the ultimatum from Russia to France; that if thro' his Prussian Majesty's means the French Government were brought to execute

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the first and last of these points, which might be done by immediately evacuating Naples, and Hanover; in that case his Imperial Majesty would be happy to benefit by his Prussian Majesty's mediation in inducing the French Government to engage for the execution of the other articles, and in concerting an arrangement of the affairs of Italy, and the restitution of the King of Sardinia, and would give orders to Mr. Alopeus to open a negotiation for those purposes but that without these conditions, so necessary for the repose and tranquillity of Europe, the Emperor could not renew any intercourse with the French Government. . . .

[The rest of the despatch refers to the affairs of Sweden and the Empire. A note of Prince Czartoryski follows, describing the seizure of Sir George Rumbold, the British chargé d'affaires at Hamburg, on October 24, 1804.]

[No. 1, from Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby, dated St. Petersburgh, Friday, $\frac{\text{Octr. 21st}}{\text{Novr. 2nd}}$ 1804, states that the former had arrived at St. Petersburgh, and expected an audience with the Emperor Alexander on the following Sunday.]

35

Lord Harrowby to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56. (*Draft.*) *No. 11.*

Downing Street: November 4, 1804.

I have learnt with concern from Sir Arthur Paget, that the Court of Petersburgh has either actually refused to acknowledge the title of Hereditary Emperor of Austria, or has thrown such difficulties in the way of its acknowledgment, as have produced a very unpleasant sensation at Vienna. Your Excellency will have seen in a former dispatch to Sir John Warren, the language which he was directed to hold upon that subject. It is impossible for the Emperor of Russia to be more strongly impressed than his Majesty, with the wretched and degrading policy of that transaction. But the union of the great Powers of Europe in a concert for resisting the encroachments of France, appeared an object of such transcendant importance as to induce him to overlook all

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inferior considerations. His ambassador at the Court of Petersburgh was therefore directed to employ his efforts in calming the resentment which the conduct of the cabinet of Vienna might have excited—and upon the same grounds it would be extremely desirable, that your Excellency should be able to procure the acquiescence of that Court in the new title assumed by the Emperor of Austria. I am well aware that it is a point upon which it may be difficult to interfere with unsolicited advice, and the manner in which the opinion of his Majesty is to be brought forward, must be left to your discretion. As the Emperor will probably be anxious to learn what conduct his Majesty has thought proper to adopt upon this occasion, I have thought it right to enable you to give the fullest information upon this subject; and have therefore directed copies to be inclosed of the two letters written by his Majesty in answer to the notifications from Vienna; and of the instructions which have been sent to Sir Arthur Paget. It has been his Majesty's object in the turn given to those letters, to acknowledge, with civility, the notification; to comply with the request contained in it, and at the same time to avoid making use of any expressions which could imply a sentiment of approbation.

It may be hoped that the authority of his Majesty's example may have considerable weight in inclining the Court of Russia to pursue the same measures, and to take similar means for reconciling what it owes to its own opinions and its own dignity, with the regard due to considerations of expediency, and to a wish to conciliate the good will and friendship of Austria.

You are at liberty to read these letters, as a confidential communication, to Prince Czartorysky—but you will not allow any copy to be taken.

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[Lord Harrowby's despatch to Lord G. L. Gower, dated Downing Street, November 4, 1804, refers to the seizure of Sir G. Rumbold, and the British protest against that outrage.]

36

Lord Harrowby to Sir John Warren.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56. (*Draft.*) *No. 13.*

Downing Street: November 5, 1804.

The French General Bernadotte[1] having, as it is said, alleged as a pretext for the late unwarrantable outrage against Sir George Rumbold that he was concerned in forming conspiracies and plots against the French Government, I think it right to inform you, that the mission of that minister was so far from being of a secret and confidential nature, that he was not even in possession of an official cypher, and that as far as his Majesty's Government is informed, the allegation is totally destitute of foundation.

37

Lord Harrowby to Lord G. L. Gower.

Ibid. (*Draft.*) *No. 14.*

Downing Street: November 5, 1804.

In conformity to the intimation contained in my dispatch of yesterday, I now proceed to give your Excellency further instructions relative to the same subject.

It is impossible that the Russian cabinet should not perceive, both in the place which has been the scene of this unparalleled outrage, and in the nature of the outrage itself, and in the moment which has been selected for its perpetration, as marked a design in the French Government to hold out defiance to his Imperial Majesty, as to gratify its hatred against this country.

The relations existing between the Court of Petersburgh and

[1] General Bernadotte commanded the French forces then occupying Hanover. Born in 1764 at Pau, the son of a notary of that town, he distinguished himself as a soldier in the revolutionary wars; gained the title Prince de Ponte Corvo in 1806; in 1810 was chosen by the Swedish Government to be Crown Prince of Sweden; ascended the throne as Charles John XIV.; died 1844.

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the Hanseatic Towns had led them to look up to his Imperial Majesty as the guarantee and protector of their independance.

It is in the suburbs of the chief of those towns, that a midnight band of robbers have executed the orders of the Parisian Minister of Police, by arresting and carrying off the representative of that Power, whose friendly connexion with Russia had excited the peculiar jealousy of France.

The violation of the territory of the Elector of Baden by the arrest of the Duke of Enghien had roused the indignation of his Imperial Majesty, and had called forth the expression of these sentiments, which, in proportion to their truth and justice, had been offensive to the French Government.

It is by a fresh violation of neutral territory, by a repetition of a similar outrage upon a person still more sacred, as the representative of a sovereign, that the cabinet of the Thuilleries has shown its sense of that just and dignified reproof. There is nothing in the principles or conduct of the ruler of that cabinet which can give any security that this transaction will have a less tragical conclusion. But the moment chosen for perpetrating the outrage, which might have been as easily executed at any former period, is perhaps the strongest proof of the spirit by which it has been dictated. The Court of Petersburgh had just closed a discussion in which the solidity of the principles which it had laid down had not been more distinguished than the moderation with which it had forborn to draw from those principles the conclusions to which they appeared necessarily to lead. It had stated a variety of grounds upon which his Imperial Majesty would have been fully justified in an appeal to arms, but after declaring his determination to confine himself for the present to a suspension of diplomatic intercourse, he announced to France and to the world the limits assigned to his forbearance. No sooner had this declaration been received, than orders were dispatched for the commission of an act by which all these warnings were disregarded—by which it was evidently intended to put the firmness of the Court of Petersburgh to the test. The indifference with which the Continent appeared to view all preceding outrages had naturally led to a repetition of them; and if the only great Power, which had openly manifested it's displeasure and notified it's intention to oppose a barrier to the further progress of the French encroachments, allows this occasion to pass by, it is difficult to

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expect even from the insolence of France, a provocation which calls more strongly for resentment.

It is not however by any means the wish of his Majesty to induce the Court of Petersburgh to abandon at once it's system of moderation; and to bring its armies into action at a season of the year ill calculated for exertion, and before any plan has been arranged, by which the co-operation of either of the great German Powers has been secured. But you cannot press too earnestly, the absolute and urgent necessity of employing the interval of winter, in endeavouring by more precise explanation and more distinct overtures, to procure at least a defensive concert—and particularly in bringing the negotiations with the Court of Vienna to a point. It seems also extremely desirable that this opportunity should not be lost of fostering that spirit which the Court of Berlin appears to have shewn by it's declared protection of Swedish Pomerania, against any attack from France.

The danger is so near the frontiers of Prussia as to make that Power afraid of taking any ostensible step towards a connexion with Russia, but that very circumstance might incline it to listen to any secret overtures; and when secure of support to take a stronger and more decisive part.

Unless the co-operation of Prussia can be obtained the difficulty of delivering the north of Germany and Holland from French arms is so great, that a faint hope of success is a sufficient inducement to make the attempt to obtain it. For this purpose Mr. Jackson[1] has been authorized to take this opportunity of giving distinct assurances of the readiness of England to afford pecuniary assistance, in case Prussia will enter into a defensive concert with other Powers, and in consequence of that concert, should be engaged in war with France.

You will endeavour to prevail on the Russian Ministry to give orders to Mr. Alopeus[2] to co-operate with Mr. Jackson, and either (which would be the most desireable) to make a direct offer of Russian alliance, or to shew an inclination to embrace any overture from Prussia.

[1] Jackson, Francis James (1770–1814), was British minister at Berlin in 1802–1806, except for intervals when his younger brother George was in charge.

[2] Russian minister at the Prussian Court.

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Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 87.*

St. Petersburgh: November 5, 1804.

I have had an opportunity of seeing Prince Czartoryski since the arrival of a courier from Berlin, who brought a letter from his Prussian Majesty to the Emperor as well as dispatches from M. Alopeus to this Government. I understand that the note lately delivered by the Russian minister at Berlin had produced a strong sensation in that cabinet, and that however they may have been inclined to take possession of Swedish Pomerania the King of Prussia now expresses to be satisfied with the reasons given by Russia, that the King of Sweden did not intend to act hostilely against France, or to engage the north of Europe in a war, and that the King of Prussia trusted his Swedish Majesty would not augment his garrison of Stralsund with a greater number than 1,700 men, that no pretext or cause might be alledged by France to advance further towards the shores of the Baltic, as the French Government had assured his Prussian Majesty they had no intention so to do, unless the King of Sweden or the Emperor of Russia should land troops in Pomerania.

Such was the communication made to me by Prince Czartorysky respecting the answer returned from Prussia. I observed to his Excellency that it was to be feared the Prussian cabinet which seemed desirous at the present moment of holding out an ostensible system of neutrality might, at a future period, adopt a different mode of conduct or bring forward some delusive proposition to paralyse the efforts of this country against the ambitious projects of Bonaparte. The Prince replied he believed from the personal regard existing between the Emperor and the King of Prussia, that such an event would be avoided if possible as the King of Prussia was much against any decided hostile measures; but that the Emperor was aware of the sinister views of Prussia and likewise of the influence of France in that cabinet; and that Prussia from her fears might be induced to act against this country, and other Powers, in restraining the views of Bonaparte in the north of Europe; and that he therefore hoped a general system might be completed between Great Britain and Russia and Sweden, to secure the peace and repose of Europe. . . .

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F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 88.*

Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburgh : November 5, 1804.

I understand from Prince Czartoryski that the late communications from Vienna were made principally with a view to the future arrangement of the subsidies in the event of Austria being engaged in war, and joining England and this country in restraining the views of France. His Excellency observed that he was at a loss to determine whether the Court of Vienna wished to temporize, or to find an excuse for doing nothing at the commencement of the war, leaving the whole expence to be paid by other Powers; the demands of that Court being exorbitant, and much beyond what it was hoped the Court of Vienna would have proposed.[1] The proposals were that Great Britain should advance two millions to put the Austrian army in a state to march; and four millions annually during the war. The Prince stated that the Austrians pleaded their being exposed to the first attack whenever they moved: and that the deranged state of their finances prevented them from putting their army in a condition to take the field. I told the Prince that the utmost which it appeared possible in any event for Great Britain to afford to Austria, who should feel some degree of interest in a cause in which the general salvation of Europe was concerned, and that for that purpose three millions per annum, or even one million for equipment seemed fully sufficient to enable Austria to fight her own battles as well as those of all Europe. The Prince fully agreed with me on this head, and hoped the cabinet of Vienna might be induced to act with more vigour and publick virtue. He considered it however as a very necessary and indispensable measure that a regular system and convention should be finished between this country and Great Britain and Sweden, which should be on a liberal plan to ensure

[1] Nevertheless the negotiations between Russia and Austria led to the secret convention of November 6, 1804 [o.s.], whereby the two Powers agreed to take steps to guard against further French encroachments in Europe, especially against Turkey and Naples, and to place in the field armies of not less than 115,000 and 235,000 men respectively for that purpose, if either of them should be attacked by France. For the text see Thiers, bk. 21. For Austrian policy at this time see Wertheimer, *op. cit.*, vol. i. ch. vii. *ad fin.*

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the independence of the rest of Europe from the ambition of Bonaparte, and to oblige him to evacute the countries already stated in the Russian ultimatum, and that with this view, and to explain the Emperor's real sentiments and intentions to his Majesty as well as to finish and conclude any such arrangement and convention, M. de Novosilsoff had been sent from hence with full powers to state these particulars to the British Ministry, and to act with Count Woronzow that no further time might be lost in so important an affair, and that our Government might have it in their power to come to a full explanation and conclusion upon these several points without which every State would be preparing a system of defence for itself, and of private interest, and Europe be entirely lost in detail.

The Prince further stated that if our Government would enter into an enlarged and regular system of offensive measures in the Mediterranean, the Russian troops at Corfu had orders to act in unison in the Neapolitan territories; but that the British forces should not be less than 10,000 men, and be landed on the side of Naples, in the Gulph of Salerno; and that without some such measures that State must fall. The Prince further stated that the British troops being shut up in Sicily would produce no effect against the army of France in Naples, or assist the Russians if they landed there, or encourage the Austrians to join on their side. The Prince therefore trusted that our Government would agree upon these points that the whole might be concluded upon a general and enlarged system of policy which would ensure success.

His Excellency afterwards proceeded to pay me several compliments on the feeble efforts it had been my fate to pursue in these important negociations, and expressed his regret at my departure. I returned a suitable compliment to the Russian minister, and relying humbly on the gracious approbation of my own sovereign, trusted that my conduct had also been agreeable to his Majesty the Emperor.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 3.*

St. Petersburg: November 7, 1804.

I had in a former dispatch the honour of informing your lordship that upon my first introduction to Prince Czartoryski I had

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expressed some impatience to have an early opportunity of presenting my credential letter, in order that no time might be lost in communicating to him the instructions with which I had been charged by my royal master. His Excellency seems to have participated in my impatience to enter upon the discussion of public business, for I received on Friday night an invitation to call upon him on the following morning, the day before that which had been fixed for my first audience of his Imperial Majesty.

No official communication could pass between his Excellency and myself till I had been presented to the Emperor, but I had great satisfaction in finding from the confidential conversation which took place between us, that the disposition of the Court of Petersburg to enter into a vigorous system of active cooperation against the power of France seemed to be still stronger than there was any reason to expect, from what had been communicated to the Court of London by the Russian Government.

Since my audience of his Imperial Majesty, I have had another interview with Prince Czartoryski. The state of the negociation between the two Imperial Courts was the first object of discussion, and I was glad to learn from his Excellency that the cabinet of Vienna seemed at length disposed to lend a more favourable ear to the propositions which had been made to them by the Court of Petersburg, that the Austrian Government seemed impressed with the necessity of joining this country in an alliance to resist the daily aggressions of France, but that their finances were in a state of such complete disorder and the pecuniary resources of their empire so entirely exhausted, that it was impossible for them to stir a step unless they could be assured of receiving a very considerable subsidy.

Prince Czartoryski then added that somehow or other it had been discovered in Vienna, that five millions was the sum which England destined for continental subsidies, but that what the Austrian ministers proposed, and what they wished the Russian cabinet would second them in proposing, was to receive two millions for the purpose of preparation, and four millions annually for the current expences of the war. I could not avoid expressing my surprize at the exorbitancy of this sum, but this being their '*premier projet*' I wished he would tell me sincerely what he thought would be their '*dernier mot*,' and for what sum Austria might be induced to engage in a war against France. He acknow-

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ledged the exorbitancy of their demand, and said that by giving them one million and a half to prepare themselves, and three millions annually we might hope for their active cooperation. I then observed that five millions which had been originally communicated to the Court of Russia, as the sum which England would engage to furnish to the continental Powers, was proposed under the idea of obtaining a force sufficient to afford a probability of success in a continental war against France, that indeed we had suggested such a distribution as we conceived be[st]? calculated to attain that object; but that if it could be made to appear that the same result was likely to be produced, by any other distributi[on], I did not doubt that his Majesty's ministers would afford every facility towards the conclusion of such an arrangement. I enquired from his Excellency what number of troops Austria proposed bringing into the field if any agreement took place as to the amount of the subsidy which England should furnish. He answered certainly not less than 200,000 men, probably 230,000. It was proposed that these troops should be divided into two armies, one to act on the Suabian and Swiss frontier, and the other in the north of Italy; the latter, Prince Czartoryski added, would be assisted by a considerable body of Russians.

I embraced this opportunity to execute that part of your lordship['s] instructions, where I am directed to obtain information as to what are the objects which the Court of Vienna has in view in Italy, supposing her arms to be successfull, and I was assured by Prince Czartoryski tha[t] the possession of Mantua, and the acquisition of a secure frontier to her Venetian territories, was all that the Austrian ministers desired to obtain.

The sentiments of the Court of Petersburg with respect to the proposed augmentation of the power and territory of the King of Sardinia seem also completely to coincide with those of his Majesty's Government.

I then proceeded to enquire from his Excellency, what he imagined might be the force which the allied Powers upon the Continent could bring into action against France; he said that the united armies of Russia and Austria would be 350,000 men, and that with the auxiliary troops of Sweden, Naples, and others, that the whole would amount to 400,000 men.

I observed that if Austria received three millions annually, and

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a million and a half for preparation, that there remained but 500,000*l.* towards subsidizing the other Powers of Europe, that my instructions did not allow me to add a single farthing to what had been originally offered, but that I should with pleasure hear from his Excellency what he really thought would be sufficient to set in motion against France all the Powers which he had reason to expect might be brought forward in a general cooperation? After some little hesitation he said six millions. I answered that when his Majesty's ministers had proposed five millions, that they had offered as much as they thought in prudence they could appropriate to continental service, but that if his Excellency's calculation of the subsidies absolutely requisite to enable the different Powers upon the Continent to make an effectuall exertion, had exceeded only [by] 3 or 4 hundred thousand pounds what was proposed for that service, although I had no instructions whatever to authorize me to say it, I could not help indulging a hope, that rather than an object of such vast importance to the welfare of Europe should entirely fail, that his Majesty's ministers might have been induced to go beyond the limits which they had conceived it to be their duty to prescribe to themselves, that however I could at present only promise his Excellency to repeat faithfully to your lordship all he had said upon this subject, and that I should lose no time in dispatching a messenger to London.

I trust that I shall not incur your lordship's disapprobation, in having ventured thus distantly to throw out a hope, that some inconsiderable addition may be afforded by his Majesty's Government to the subsidies originally suggested for the Continent.

It appeared to me that to have turned a deaf ear to any proposal for increasing their amount might have checked the disposition which at present prevails to form a great coalition for the purpose of commencing offensive operations against France. Perhaps the circumstance of my recent introduction to Prince Czartoryski, and the desire of establishing a system of confidential intercourse, may have caused me to listen with more attention to his opinions and suggestions.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 4.*

St. Petersburgh: Wednesday, November 7, 1804.

The immediate danger to which his Sicilian Majesty is exposed, and which by a letter I have received from Mr. Elliot is, I find, every day becoming more imminent, induced me to take the very earliest opportunity of communicating to the Russian Government the instructions with which I am charged by your lordship.

In my first private conversation with Prince Czartoryski, I stated the anxious wish of the King's ministers, that his Sicilian Majesty might not be abandoned to the mercy of the French army, and the regret with which they had learnt that the instructions of the Russian commander at Corfu would not allow him to detach any part of his force to the assistance of that sovereign. I recapitulated the various arguments contained in your lordship's dispatch No. 2: and particularly declared that with the Russian garrison now at Corfu, we looked only to the defence of the passes of Calabria, and did not expect, or wish, that his Imperial Majesty's troops should be engaged in the open territory of Naples against the superior numbers of the French army. I did not obtain from his Excellency any very decisive answer, and he seemed to doubt the possibility of defending the Calabrias on the side of Tarentum, without a very considerable force; but said that the subject should be brought under the immediate consideration of the Emperor, and he would not fail to communicate to me his Imperial Majesty's determination.

On the following day I saw the Duke de Serra-Capriola,[1] who informed me that he had very lately received instructions to solicit the succour of the Emperor since Bonaparte had threatened to march eight thousand additional troops into the territories of the king his master;—he was also instructed to say that the defence of the Neapolitan dominions could only be accomplished by the augmentation of the force at Corfu, and the debarkation of 25,000 Russians in the south of Italy. The Queen of Naples has written to the Duke of Serra-Capriola directing him to communicate confidentially with me upon all these subjects and to ask me to support

[1] Neapolitan minister at the Russian Court.

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his solicitations at the Court of St. Petersburgh. The Duke told me that the request of the King of Naples had been very well received by his Imperial Majesty, and he entertained sanguine hopes of communicating to his Court a favorable answer. In my next conference with Prince Czartoryski I mentioned to his Excellency what I had heard from the Neapolitan minister, and assured him of the satisfaction which his Majesty would feel in finding that the Court of Naples might look with confidence to the protection of the Emperor of Russia; that I was particularly instructed to state the various advantages which would be derived from the augmentation of the Russian army upon the coasts of the Adriatic, that it was certainly desirable, if possible, to defend the whole of the dominions of his Sicilian Majesty and that when I had pressed upon his Excellency the expediency of only securing the passes of Calabria, I had merely done so because at this moment there were not troops sufficient, including Russians and English, to undertake more than the defence of Calabria and Sicily. Prince Czartoryski said he agreed with me in thinking, that if it were possible, it was certainly to be desired that the whole of the Neapolitan territory should be protected against France, that however as the Emperor had not yet come to a determination, it was not in his power to communicate anything to me upon that head. . . .

42

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 5.*

St. Petersburgh: Thursday, November 8, 1804.

I am sorry to inform your lordship that no convention has yet been signed between the Courts of St. Petersburgh and Stockholm.[1]

In my first interview with Prince Czartoryski, his Excellency gave me reason to understand that the two Courts were perfectly agreed upon the principles of a treaty, and that he hourly expected to hear of it's conclusion.

He explained to me in very general terms, that the mutual guarantee and defence of their respective territories was the basis of this negotiation. This basis seems so plain and simple that it is difficult to conceive what obstacle can have arisen to delay the

[1] See note on p. 60.

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signature of a convention. I expressed to Prince Czartoryski my surprize at not having yet received any communication from him upon this subject; he said that the extreme penury of his Swedish Majesty's finances renders him desirous to assure himself of a subsidy from Great Britain, before he will enter into any stipulations even for his own defence; for that purpose he had made overtures to England, with which Power he proposed treating directly, rather than through the intervention of Russia.[1] Prince Czartoryski seemed to be of opinion that the sum of one million was an exorbitant demand considering the small force which his Swedish Majesty proposed to bring forward. He added that the militia of Sweden were certainly very expensive, and that it might perhaps be more advisable that we should only subsidize his troops of the line which he said amounted to about eleven or twelve thousand men. . . .

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 6.*

St. Petersburg: November 12, 1804.

Intelligence of the seizure of Sir George Rumbold by a detachment of French troops reached Petersburg five days ago, and was communicated to me by Prince Czartoryski.

I was desirous of entering upon the immediate discussion of the consequences naturally arising out of this interesting event, but his Excellency with that caution which characterizes the Russian Ministry was disinclined to enter upon the consideration of the measures which ought to be pursued, untill the arrival of a more circumstantial account of the transaction and of the impression it had made upon the Court of Berlin.[2]

[1] Overtures for an alliance with England were made by Gustavus IV. in the autumn of 1803, when he was travelling in Germany. They were continued in the spring and summer of 1804. A secret convention for the grant of a subsidy was signed at Stockholm on December 3, 1804; by it Great Britain agreed to pay to Sweden the sum of 60,000*l.* for her armaments, while Sweden covenanted to help the raising of a corps of Hanoverian troops for Great Britain in Swedish Pomerania and to admit British wares on easy terms. (Garden's *Traités*, vol. ix. p. 383).

[2] The outrage took place in the Circle of Lower Saxony, of which the King of Prussia was Protector. For the protest sent by the King of Prussia to Napoleon, see Hardenberg's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. pp. 94 *et seq.*

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I waited with great impatience till last night, when I had from Mr. Jackson a letter communicating to me the accounts he had received from Hamburgh, the representation which he had made to the Prussian Government, and the answer given to it by Baron de Hardenberg;[1] I lost no time in requesting to see Prince Czartoryski, and had a conference with him this morning. I gave him a copy of the two notes which had passed between M^r^ Jackson and B^n^ de Hardenberg, and began our conversation by congratulating his Excellency upon the appearance of energy and vigour, which the Court of Prussia had at length manifested.

I observed that it was of the very last importance that his Prussian Majesty's disposition to resent the insult offered to him by France, and to maintain by force of arms the independence of the north of Germany, should be cherished not only by every assurance on the part of his Imperial Majesty, of satisfaction and approbation, but by the positive promise of the effectual support of a large Russian army, and that if any coolness existed between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin, that the opportunity now presented itself of reestablishing a good intelligence between them; Prince Czartoryski answered me by saying, that the conduct of Prussia upon the event of the murder of the Duke d'Enghien had certainly indisposed His Imperial Majesty to communicate with that Court, but that he could assure me, that by a courier arrived at Berlin scarcely 24 hours before the news of the violation of the Hamburgh territory had reached that capital, M. Alopeus had received instructions to make some advances to the Prussian Government, to use his endeavours to dissipate the jealousy subsisting between them and the Court of Vienna, and he was also authorised to promise them effectual military succour in the north of Germany against France—that by dispatches from M. Alopeus it appeared that that minister had urged in the strongest manner the necessity of receiving from France ample satisfaction upon the occasion of the seizure of his Britannick Majesty's chargé d'affaires, and had assured the Prussian Government most positively of the support of Russia—that since the news of the last outrage of the French Government had been

[1] Karl August, Baron von Hardenberg (1750–1822), held the portfolio for Foreign Affairs at the Prussian Court in 1804–5, but thereafter was chiefly in retirement until 1810, when he became Chancellor of State. He received the title of Prince in 1814.

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received at St. Petersburg, his Imperial Majesty had himself written to the King of Prussia, and that I might be satisfied that no means would be left untried to engage the Court of Berlin not to recede from her present vigorous determinations.

Prince Czartoryski then told me that the Prussian ministers had informed M. Alopeus, that in the course of eight days they could bring into the field an army of 40,000 men, which in six weeks might be encreased to the number of 90,000. . . .

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 7.*

[*Secret and confidential.*]

Petersburg: November 24, 1804.

Prince Czartoryski having in a conversation with me some days ago complained of the want of steadiness and decision in the counsels of the cabinet of Vienna, I took this opportunity of executing your lordship's instructions contained in the dispatch No. 6. I joined with him in lamenting the feebleness of Comte Cobenzl's character, and asked whether when wearied by the dilatoriness and dispirited with the meanness of his conduct, his Excellency had never turned in his mind the possibility of effecting some change in the Austrian Ministry? that it was generally understood that both the Arch-Dukes Charles and John were dissatisfied with Comte Cobenzl and desirous of his removal, and that it appeared to me, with such an engine in our hands, if judiciously and delicately worked, hopes might fairly be entertained of establishing at Vienna a more efficient and vigorous administration.

Prince Czartoryski with great readiness entered into the discussion of the subject, he said that it was one which had already engaged his attention, but that a material objection occured against making any attempt at present to remove C^te^ Cobenzl, namely the difficulty of finding a good person to supply his place; that Thugut was the *bête noire* of the Arch Duke Charles, and that there seemed to be no other man of weight, and abilities sufficient to be recommended to the Emperor, as fit to undertake the situation of Prime Minister.

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I mentioned Comte Trautmansdorf, who, possessing the confidence of the Arch-Duke, might with the assistance of M. de Fassbinder[1] (of the goodness of whose principles there seems to be entertained but one opinion) be able to form an administration, such as the Courts of London and Petersburg would with satisfaction see established in power.

His Excellency observed in reply, that C^te^ Trautmansdorf was the creature of the Archduke Charles, that the Emperor of Germany was not altogether free from jealousy of his brother, and that he would consider the appointment of M. de Trautmansdorf, as the complete surrender of himself, into the hands of the Arch Duke, that an attempt therefore to remove C^te^ Cobenzl, with the view of substituting Trautmansdorf, might very probably fail of success, but that if it did succeed, he doubted whether the views of Russia and England would be much advanced, that the Arch Duke Charles was surrounded by men who (with the exception of Fassbinder) entertained political sentiments such as we should be sorry to see prevail, that his Royal Highness was adverse to war, from an unwillingness to risk in another contest, the laurels he had acquired in the last war with France.[2] That we were also to consider the evil effects which might be produced by Comte Cobenzl suspecting a project to remove him had been concerted between the Courts of Petersburg and London, that that minister would in this case use his utmost influence to alienate his imperial master from those Courts, and in order to secure himself, would devote Austria to the interests of France. Prince Czartoryski ended by saying that these considerations, and the more favourable disposition lately evinced by the cabinet of Vienna, induced him to think that before we entered into any plan to effect a change of Ministry, that it would be adviseable to wait at least the issue of the present negociations.

As by your lordship's instructions I was directed only to sound the opinion of Prince Czartoryski, I did not judge it necessary to press his Excellency any farther upon this subject, and did not

[1] For the work of this man in helping the Archduke Charles to reform the Austrian War Department, see the *Paget Papers*, vol. ii. pp. 163–167; also Wertheimer, *op. cit.*, vol. i. chs. ix. and xi.

[2] For the Archduke Charles's hostility to war, see the *Paget Papers*, vol. ii. pp. 167, 179.

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therefore attempt to controvert the opinion with which he concluded his observations.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 8.*

Petersburg: November 28, 1804.

On Thursday last the 22nd Novr I received by the messenger Dressins your lordship's dispatches numbers 8, 9, 10 and 11, with their inclosures.

The news of the detention of the Spanish treasure ships by a British squadron [1] had caused considerable sensation at this place, and the French party were indefatigable in their endeavours, by a misrepresentation of the circumstances preceding that event, to create an unfavorable impression on the conduct of his Majesty's Government. They have even circulated reports that the Emperor expressed himself in terms of strong disapprobation of the measure, and I was privately assured that to this intelligence, and to that of the capture of Goa by a detachment of English troops (which, whether true or false, was implicitly believed by Prince Czartoryski), was to be attributed the delay which had taken place in returning an answer to the representations made to this Government by the Neapolitan minister and myself upon the affairs of his Sicilian Majesty; under these circumstances I had great satisfaction in finding myself enabled by the contents of your lordship's dispatch No. 8 and its inclosures, to do away any misconception that might prevail in the cabinet of his Imperial Majesty, and to explain with precision the principles upon which his Majesty's ministers were acting with regard to Spain.

I therefore lost no time in requesting an early conference with Prince Czartoryski, and was appointed to call upon him on Saturday last. I began by communicating to him what had passed between your lordship and the Chevr Anduaga in consequence of the capture of the Spanish treasure ships and particularly called his attention

[1] Four Spanish frigates bringing treasure from the Spanish colonies were stopped by a British squadron on October 5, 1804. In the ensuing fight one blew up; the others were taken to England. For the reasons of this action see Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*, vol. ii. pp. 188–189.

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to the explicit warning given to the Spanish Government, by M^r^ Frere's note of the 18^th^ Feb^y^ last. His Excellency did not attempt to controvert what I had advanced, upon the perfect right of his Majesty to act hostilely against Spain, or deny the moderation which had hitherto guided the councils of the British cabinet in its relations with that Power. His Excellency expressed his hopes, that as the Spanish ships were only detained *en gage*, that peace might still be preserved between the two countries, and he seemed particularly anxious that no positive rupture should take place before the last advices from this Court had reached Madrid, as he evidently here alluded to hopes, which in a former conversation with me he had held out of his Catholic Majesty being inclined to join in a general cooperation against France. I could not help remarking, that it was rather extraordinary, if these intentions were seriously entertained, that nothing had dropped from the Spanish minister in London conveying any hint that such were the dispositions of the King of Spain, that at any rate little credit should be attached by his Imperial Majesty to such insinuations, as long as the Court of Madrid remained an useful instrument in the hands of France, but that even if these professions were sincere, it appeared to me that Bonaparte was at present reaping more benefit from the pecuniary supplies he received from Spain, and by the occupation given to our fleets in blockading the Spanish ports, than he could in future sustain injury from the hostility of his Catholic Majesty. I ended by requesting his Excellency to repeat to the Emperor the communications I had just been making, and expressed the earnest desire of his Majesty's ministers, that by a true representation of all that had passed between the Courts of London and Madrid his Imperial Majesty might be satisfied that they had in no degree deviated in this transaction from principles of sound policy and perfect justice.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 10.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburg: November 28, 1804.

In a former dispatch I informed your lordship of the disappointment I had felt, in not being able to obtain from the

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Russian Government an answer to the propositions I brought with me from England, respecting the defence of the dominions of his Sicilian Majesty. I can assure your lordship that I have omitted no opportunity of expressing to Prince Czartoryski the anxiety of my Court upon this subject, and have pointed out to him the danger that may ensue from delaying to concert measures for the security of Sicily and the Calabrias. In my last interview he stated, that although the post of Campestrino was very strong the access to Calabria on the side of Tarentum was by no means difficult, and that if a Russian detachment were sent to its defence, they would be exposed to being entirely cut off by the French army; he seemed to wish that the protection of the dominions of his Sicilian Majesty should be undertaken upon a larger scale, and thought that for such an object England might afford 12 or 15,000 men.

I could only answer by repeating what I had formerly observed to him that we had already appropriated as many men to the service of the Mediterranean as we could afford consistently with a due regard to our domestic defence, and that the facility with which soldiers were raised in Russia led me to hope that the additional number of troops he seemed to think necessary for the military defence of the Neapolitan territories might be afforded by his Imperial Majesty. He then proposed that the English and Russian troops to be employed in the south of Italy should be commanded by one general, and on account of the superior number of the latter, that the general should be Russian. I answered that though I thought there should be a combination and concert in the plans of the two armies for the protection of Naples, yet it appeared to me they had better have distinct objects assigned to them, but that my Government not knowing whether the Russian cabinet was determined to enter into any plan whatever for the defence of his Sicilian Majesty, I could not be prepared to give any answer upon a point of such detail as that to which he had just been referring. He concluded by promising in a few days to communicate to me the determination and opinions of his Imperial Majesty upon this subject which he should forward soon to C^te^ Woronzow by a Russian courier.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 11.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburg: Wednesday, November 28, 1804.

[In this despatch Lord G. L. Gower informed Lord Harrowby of Prince Czartoryski's explanation of the disputes which had arisen with regard to Montenegro as a result of Russian action there, and of the Diet of that country placing itself under Russian protection.]

... Prince Czartoryski then proceeded to say that he also had it in his power to inform me that the Porte had expressed no dissatisfaction at the events which had happened at Montenegro, that the influence of Russia in the councils of the Divan was in no degree abated as was satisfactorily proved by intelligence from M. Italinski; that Brune had threatened to quit Constantinople unless Bonaparte's new title was immediately acknowledged by the Grand Signior; that M. Italinski had presented a remonstrance against this acknowledgement, in which he had been supported by some verbal communications from M^{r} Stratton to the Reis Effendi, and that a determination had been taken in the Divan, to incur all the risks to which they might be exposed by the departure of the French ambassador.

Although I perfectly relied on his Excellency's account of the circumstances which had happened at Montenegro, and of his conferences with Count Stadion upon the subject, I thought it my duty to make some enquiries from that ambassador, who confirmed to me, in every particular, what I had heard from Prince Czartoryski.

48

F. O. Russia, vol. 56. (*Draft.*) *No. 15.*

Marquis Camden[1] *to Lord G. L. Gower.*

Downing Street: December 7, 1804.

It appears by the note in which M^{r} de Hardenberg announces to M^{r} Jackson the success of the King of Prussia in obtaining

[1] Marquis Camden (1759–1840), Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1794.

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the release of Sir George Rumbold, that the Court of Berlin is highly satisfied with the unexpected effect which has been produced by its intervention, and considers the reparation as complete. No mention however is made in this communication either of the detention of Sir George Rumbold's papers, or of the exaction of his parole, and it does not appear whether that part of the transaction has been communicated to the Court of Berlin by M^r^ Lucchesini,[1] or purposely suppressed. If his release, together with his papers, and unfettered by any condition would have been far short of the reparation which the King of Prussia had a right to exact, that reparation becomes utterly inadequate, or rather ceases to have any pretence to be called a reparation, when accompanied with such degrading circumstances.

Sir George Rumbold is not released as an atonement for the violation of the privileges of his public character and of the rights of neutral territory; but he is sent away as a criminal, the remission of whose punishment is granted as a favour at the intercession of a friendly Power.

The manner in which his seizure is justified by the circular orders sent by M^r^ Tallyrand to all the French ministers, is an aggravation of the insult offered by that seizure to every sovereign in Europe. The extravagance of that production is fortunately such as neither to require or admit of a serious answer. The sovereigns of Europe will not easily be brought to acknowledge that, because France thinks proper to accuse England of violating[2] the new Code of Public Law which she chuses to promulgate, France has therefore an indisputable right to dictate to them all the excommunication of England from the pale of civilized Europe, and to execute in their dominions every measure of domestic police.

It cannot be doubted for a moment that the sentiments of the Emperor of Russia upon this point are in complete concurrence with those of his Majesty: and it is therefore perfectly unnecessary that I should add any further observations upon the whole of this

[1] Lucchesini, Girolamo, Marquis of (1752–1825), statesman and diplomatist; at that time Prussian ambassador at Paris. For his despatches see Bailleu's *Preussen und Frankreich*, vols. i., ii.

[2] This refers to the claims as to the liberty of action of British ambassadors put forth in Lord Hawkesbury's circular note of April 30, 1804, for which see the *Annual Register* for 1804, pp. 215–217.

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transaction. I have reverted to it in this dispatch for the purpose of pressing the Court of Petersburgh to state, in the strongest manner, to those Courts which have preserved their communication with France, how much their own dignity is concerned in not allowing the business to rest, without their either obtaining a sufficient reparation, or at least entering a solemn protest, both against the practice and the doctrine of France. The former cannot be obtained directly by the Emperor of Russia, and it is much to be feared that his influence will be insufficient to persuade other Courts to demand it with vigour and effect; but the latter is perfectly in his own power, and the declaration of his sentiments upon such an occasion cannot fail to have the best effects over the whole of Europe.

In the absence of Lord Harrowby I have received his Majesty's commands to sign the above instructions.

CAMDEN.

49

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 12.*

St. Petersburg: December 8, 1804.

I had a conference with Prince Czartoryski on Tuesday last in which he read to me several dispatches (with their inclosures) addressed to the Russian ambassador in London, and which he proposed sending immediately to England by courier.

As Comte Woronzow will without doubt communicate them *in extenso* to your lordship, I will not attempt to give a detailed account of their contents, but will only relate the conversation to which they gave rise between Prince Czartoryski and myself.

His Excellency before he began reading the dispatches, said that (although I might be disappointed in the answer, given to the particular proposition, which I had so earnestly pressed upon his attention, with respect to the employment of Russian troops for the defence of the Calabria's) he was persuaded I should not fail to see in these communications the disposition of the Court of Petersburg to concert measures towards the more effectual defence of the dominions of his Sicilian Majesty;—that the refusal of the Emperor to send to Calabria such troops, as could be at present

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spared from Corfu, arose not only from his unwillingness to risk the cutting off of that detachment by the French army and thus to compromise the honor of the Russian arms, but also from the persuasion, that it is only by a vigorous and successfull effort against France in the south of Italy that Austria could be induced to commence hostilities in the north. I answered, that the success with which the peasantry of the Calabrias had during the last war exerted themselves in defence of that country, was a just ground for believing that any Russian corps, which might be employed upon that service would not be exposed to much danger, and that the encreased difficulty which must attend future military operations for the deliverance of Naples, should the French obtain possession of the strong passes in the mountains, was one amongst other reasons which made me sincerely regret the determination of his Imperial Majesty.

When Prince Czartoryski had finished reading to me his dispatch to Comte Woronzow upon this subject, I lamented that any expectation should have been expressed of 15,000 British troops being sent to co-operate with the Russian army in Italy. His Excellency had frequently heard from me that the largest disposable force which his Majesty's Government could allot to Mediterranean service, was 8,000 men, and that I was sorry the Russian cabinet instead of suggesting the best and most advantageous manner of employing these troops, were losing time in making propositions, which I could assure him beforehand would not be attended with success. He replied 'You can at least give us above 10,000 men.'

I proceeded to say how much I was surprized, that at the moment when they were calling upon the British Government to give the promise of a specific number of troops to act in conjunction with their forces, they should observe a perfect silence as to the numbers which are to compose their own army, but that I hoped his Excellency would enable me to give some information to my Court upon this point.

Prince Czartoryski having declared that the Emperor intended to appropriate 20,000 men to this service, I observed that (considering the very large military establishment of Russia, the facility with which new levies were raised and the security of his Imperial Majesty's dominions from all hostile attacks) the number which his Excellency had mentioned, bore no proportion to that

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which he expected should be furnished by Great Britain. He said that if the south of Italy was the only theatre of war in which the forces of his Imperial Majesty were to take a part, that I might with reason complain of the paucity of their numbers, but that he had before told me of the powerful armies which the Emperor was prepared to bring forward in a general co-operation against France, and that his Imperial Majesty could not add to the army at Corfu, without diminishing the force which might be requisite elsewhere, and that besides the transport of so many troops was attended with numerous obstacles. I said that I was wholly unauthorized to make any offer towards remedying these difficulties, but that I had understood there were English transports lying at Malta, and I thought they might possibly be employed to convey Russian troops to the Adriatic, and that under the pretence of being sent for cargoes of grain, for the supply of the British navy and army in the Mediterranean, they might sail to the ports of the Black Sea, without exciting the suspicion of the French Government. His Excellency expressed a wish that I would ascertain the disposition of my Court to give this assistance, and the numbers of troops which the transports that could be spared were calculated to convey.

I then adverted to the proposition contained in his Excellency's dispatch that the combined army in Italy should be commanded by a Russian general, and expressed my apprehension that unless the Russian forces exceeded very considerably the numbers of the British, that his Majesty's Government might not very readily acceed to that arrangement. He replied that it was certainly expedient that the chief command of the two armies should be given to one general, that the person they proposed was extremely discreet and prudent and an experienced officer of great military reputation, and he therefore trusted no difficulty would impede the acquiescence of the British cabinet in his nomination.

I then called his Excellency's attention to the length of time which must elapse before any military reports from Naples could be received at Petersburg, and suggested the expediency of not waiting on that account before they began their preparations for the embarkation of the troops. He said that the Emperor had already given orders for the march of the different regiments to the ports of the Black Sea and that they would be ready to embark at a moment's warning.

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Such, my lord, is the substance of my conversation with Prince Czartoryski upon the subject; I am not, I trust, too sanguine when I express my belief that if his Majesty's Government can afford 10,000 disposable men for the service of the Mediterranean, that a large Russian army will before the month of May be sent to the assistance and protection of his Sicilian Majesty; the change that has taken place in the language of Prince Czartoryski will not, I am persuaded, escape your lordship's observation. Hitherto the Russian ministers have talked of the absolute necessity of bringing Austria into action, before they themselves engage in actual hostility against France, but they now seem prepared to set the example of vigour and activity to the cabinet of Vienna.

50

F. O. Russia, vol. 56.

[*Separate.*]

St. Petersburgh: Saturday, December 8, 1804.

Count Woronzow will inform your lordship that General Lacy [1] has received the orders of the Emperor to proceed immediately to the dominions of his Sicilian Majesty, for the purpose of making a military survey of that country. He carries with him the commission of General-in-Chief of the Russian army to be employed in the south of Italy; but, 'till the arrival of those troops, he is to remain perfectly *incognito*. I have made such enquiries respecting him as I could consistently with the secrecy which it is necessary to observe upon the very delicate mission with which this general is entrusted, and I have the satisfaction to inform your lordship that his military character stands very high in this country. He is about seventy years of age; he served in the Seven Years' War, and has been pretty constantly engaged in active service since that time, though not employed, during the last war, in the campaigns of Italy, Switzerland, or Holland.

[1] Generally spelt Lasci. He was an Irishman named Lacey, and afterwards commanded the Russian troops in South Italy.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 14.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

[*Secret and confidential.*]

St. Petersburg: December 24, 1804.

Your lordship has probably heard from other quarters of a project entertained by the Court of Berlin, respecting his Majesty's Electoral dominions. This project has been submitted to the Russian Ministry, and Prince Czartoryzki informs me, that the King of Prussia has expressed a wish to receive his Imperial Majesty's sanction in proposing to M. Buonaparte to evacuate Hanover upon the following conditions—that the Prussian troops should immediately enter the country, but that its revenues should be appropriated to the service of the French Government, and that at the period of negotiation for a general peace, the Electorate should be considered as much the property of France as if it were actually occupied by French troops.[1] This proposition, which if carried into effect would at the same time set free a French army of 25,000 men and guaranty to France every advantage which she derives, or can expect to derive from retaining possession of the Hanoverian territory, has been received by his Imperial Majesty with such decided disapprobation that it is to be supposed the further prosecution of the plan on the part of the Prussian cabinet will be totally abandoned. From a discussion upon this subject, Prince Czartoryzki was led into a conversation upon the policy of forcing Prussia to become a party in a general coalition against France; his Excellency stated the extreme difficulties that the allied Powers would experience in the prosecution of hostilities in the north of Germany from the neutrality of the Court of Berlin, and said that as fear was the predominating motive which influenced the conduct of that cabinet, it would be well to consider whether it might not be advisable that his Prussian Majesty should be made to understand, that his refusal to co-operate with Russia, England and Austria would be followed by the hostility of the three Powers.

The Prince therefore expressed himself desirous of knowing

[1] For details as to this proposal see the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of Hardenberg, vol. ii., at the close of his recital of the year 1804; also *Diaries of Sir G. Jackson*, vol. i p. 251.

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what were the sentiments of my Court upon this subject, and how far England would be inclined to threaten the interruption of the Prussian commerce, at the same time that Russia and Austria menaced the Prussian dominions with an attack by land. I answered that there existed in his Majesty's Government the strongest disposition to act in perfect concert with Russia, and to second every plan of vigorous hostility against France which might be decided upon by the Court of St. Petersburgh, that perhaps circumstances might justify our co-operation in such measures as he had suggested, but that the question he had proposed to me was of an extremely delicate nature, and involved so many important considerations, that I should not fail to take an early opportunity of communicating it to your lordship, in order to learn the sentiments of his Majesty's Government upon this point. He replied that what he had said was nothing more than a confidential statement of his own personal opinions, and in no degree authorized by his Imperial Majesty, but that we ought to be prepared by a perfect understanding between us, for every event that might occur.[1]

52

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 15.*

St. Petersburg: December 24, 1804.

I have not been unmindful of your lordship's instructions, by which I am directed to use my endeavours to procure the acquiescence of this Court in the new title assumed by the Emperor of Germany. In communicating to Prince Czartoryski the acknowledgement by my royal master, of the [title of the] Hereditary Emperor of Austria, I did not fail to state that his Majesty was strongly impressed with the degrading policy of that transaction, but that these feelings had given way to the important consideration of conciliating at this moment the goodwill and friendship of the Austrian Government, that I was far from presuming to offer anything in the way of advice to his Excellency,

[1] This statement and others on this topic bear upon the question whether Czartoryski was seeking, as a Polish patriot, for the dismemberment of Prussia. As to this see the *Czartoryski Memoirs*, vol. ii. pp. 96–100, and Oncken, *Das Zeitalter des Kaiserreichs und der Befreiungskriege*, vol. ii. *ad fin.*

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but that I flattered myself he would allow me to express my hope that the same motives which had operated upon the mind of his Majesty might influence the conduct of the Emperor of Russia; that I was happy to have it in my power to read to him the terms on which the King had written to the Emperor of Germany, for it would then be seen tha[t] in acknowledging this new title, every expression which could at all compromise his Majesty's opinion upon the subject had been cautiously avoided. Prince Czartoryzki replied by expressing some regret, and even surprize at the Court of London having thus gratified the Court of Vienna without receiving anything of an equivalent in return. He seemed to think the recognition might have been kept back, as a sort of boon hereafter to be brought forw[ard] to induce the cabinet of Vienna to engage in a closer connexion with those of St. James's and Petersburg. I answered, that it appeared to me this desirable object would be best forwarded by the manifestation of a wish to gratify and conciliate the Emperor of Germany, that if the two Courts became once estranged it might not be easy to effect the re-establishment of that union and harmony which it was to be wished should not for a moment be interrupted.—He replied that no such consequences need be apprehended, that the remonstrances of Count Razumovski had been so strong against the measure, that Count Stadio[n] in notifying the assumption of the new title, scarcely seemed to expect its recognition by the Emperor of Russia, and had afterwards expressed a hope that whatever might be the intentions of his Imperial Majesty, the Court of St. Petersburg would not interfere to prevent such compliance on the part of other Courts.

I have since this conversation at different times renewed my instances with Prince Czartoryski. He states that the recognition of the Emperor of Austria by Russia would occasion considerable embarrassment to the Porte in its negotiations with the French Government, that the Grand Signor has hitherto founded his refusal to acknowledge Bonaparte, on the ground of acting in entire concert with the Emperor of Russia, and he has given as a proof that his deferring to comply with the demand of General Brune proceeds not from any hostile disposition towards France—that he has also in conjunction with Russia equally refused to comply with a similar requisition, made by the Emperor of Germany.

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I am very sorry that I have not been more successful in the execution of your lordship's instructions upon this subject, but this Court is strongly impressed with the necessity of connecting itself with that of Vienna, and they will not, I am persuaded, persist in their present determination, if they should find that they are thereby risking the failure of the very important negotiations with the Austrian Government.

53

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 56, *No. 16.*

St. Petersburgh: Monday, December 24, 1804.

I am happy to inform your lordship that, from the last dispatches received here by the imperial ambassador, it appears that the cabinet of Vienna is rapidly advancing in those dispositions of energy and vigour upon which I congratulated you in my first letters after my arrival at this place.

Count Stadion communicated to me this information with great satisfaction, and assured me that the principles of his Court had never changed, but, that whilst Russia was acting in concert with France, and the Court of Berlin remaind subservient to the will of Bonaparte, the Emperor of Germany had no alternative but to bend to the unfortunate circumstances of the times, and had been forced to the adoption of that system of policy which he had observed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Lunéville, that from this system he could not venture to deviate, till he had some proof that the Emperor of Russia was acting upon fixed principles, and that reliance might be placed upon the professions made by the cabinet of St. Petersburgh:—That in the exhausted state of the Austrian finances, and exposed as his dominions were to the irruption of a French army, his imperial and royal master could not incur the hazard of the resentment of the French Government, 'till he was assured of pecuniary assistance from England, and effectual military succour from this country; but that he hoped the time was now arrived when there need be no further doubt upon these points, and that an arrangement might be concluded, between the three Powers, which might relieve Europe from the yoke under which it at present laboured.

I have been thus particular in relating the language of Count

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Stadion, because this conversation took place almost immediately after the arrival of his courier from Vienna, and I may therefore fairly conclude he was repeating to me the sentiments contained in the dispatches he had just received;—I consider it also the more important that your lordship should be informed of it, as, by a letter from Sir Arthur Paget, I find that he complains of great reserve on the part of Count Cobenzl.[1]

I have reason to believe that the two imperial Courts are actively engaged in concerting plans for the carrying on of hostility against France, and more particularly respecting the best means of driving the French out of Italy:—The cabinet of Vienna is desirous that the whole of the Russian force to be employed in that quarter should act in conjunction with the Austrians upon the Venetian frontier, and that the troops which are ready upon the coasts of the Black Sea to embark for Corfu, should join the Russian army upon the frontiers of Gallicia. The Neapolitan minister is extremely anxious that the plan of military operation in the south of Italy should not be abandoned, and has solicited me to join with him in urging this Government to adhere to their original intention.

It would be absurd in me to pretend to give an opinion upon a subject on which a military man could alone decide, but I cannot but be surprized that an attack upon the rear of that line of fortresses from Peschiera, Mantua, &c. which presents so formidable a front should not be considered as affording great facilities towards the expulsion of the French from Italy:—There are other considerations, however, which will induce me to express to Prince Czartoryski my hopes that the Russian troops upon the coast of the Black Sea may proceed to their original destination:—The Russian Government will have receded from the point to which it had once advanced, if the commencement of it's hostility with France is to depend upon the co-operation of the Austrians, and, notwithstanding the present professions of moderation held out at Vienna, perhaps the best security for the King of Naples, Sardinia, &c., against the views of aggrandisement on the part of Austria, may be in the presence of a large separate Russian army in the south of Italy.

[1] This may explain the paucity of Paget's papers at the close of 1804. (*Paget Papers*, vol. ii. pp. 154–156.)

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[Nos. 17 and 18, dated St. Petersburgh, December 24, 1804, are unimportant.]

54

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 1.*

St. Petersburg: January 8, 1805.

. . . I have this day heard from the Duke of Serra Capriola, that he has reason to think from a conversation he had last night with the Prince Czartoryski, that 30,000 Russian troops will be sent for the protection of his Sicilian Majesty, and that a considerable corps of Russian dismounted cavalry is to go immediately, relying upon horses to be obtained in the Neapolitan territory.

Your lordship has probably heard from Vienna the exact terms of the remonstrance alluded to by Prince Czartoryski in his conversation with me: I was given to understand by Comte Stadion that it comprehended the general situation of affairs in all Italy, but the Prince assured me, that it related solely to the interests of the King of Naples.—The Emperor of Germany is however without doubt assuming a tone of vigour and independence in his correspondence with the French Government, and Prince Czartoryski seemed to think that the *time* of commencing hostilities was the only point upon which there could be any difference of opinion between the Courts of St. James's and Vienna. I answered that I could not conceive a moment more favorable to Austria than early in the ensuing spring.—The French armies in Italy were neither numerous, nor well composed; a large Russian force was ready at a moment's warning to act in cordial co-operation with the Austrians. The public spirit in England was excellent, and his Majesty's Government was willing to assist the continental Powers in the defence of their own dignity and interests. It would be well to recollect that this state of things might not always remain the same, that we might become tired of exhausting our own resources, and waiting indefinitely for the exertions of other countries; that however little we desired to make peace with France, we might be driven to such a measure by the listlessness of the other States of Europe; and in that case the cabinet of Vienna, which declares that without a subsidy it cannot come forward, will have no alternative but submission to the mandates of the French Government.

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I asked Prince Czartoryski, what object the Emperor of Germany conceived was to be gained by delay? He answered that the Austrian Government were certainly completing their regiments, and putting their whole army in a state to take the field. I replied that in such a case, after the arrival of your lordship's instructions stating the amount of the subsidy which his Majesty's Government might afford to Austria, I trusted no delay would take place in the conclusion of a definitive arrangement between the three Courts.[1] He concurred with me in this wish, and concluded the conversation by intimating an opinion that the negotiation of a triple alliance should take place at St. Petersburg with the least possible loss of time.

55

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 2.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburgh: Wednesday, January 9, 1805.

I am sorry to inform your lordship that the Court of Berlin has renewed the project of taking possession of Swedish Pomerania; the proposition is grounded upon the pretext, that Bonaparte having become informed of the communications made by the King of Sweden to his Majesty's Government, of the great number of men which his Swedish Majesty proposed to furnish, and the amount of the subsidy he expects from England, the jealousy of the French Government could not be allayed, nor the tranquility of the north of Germany be preserved, unless the French army was secured from attack, by the occupation of Swedish Pomerania by Prussian troops.[2]—The Court of St. Petersburgh will certainly remonstrate against this design, and the Emperor is, I am given to believe, very indignant at this pretension of his Prussian Majesty; but I have no assurance that a Russian army will be employed in

[1] The tenour of the secret convention of November 6, 1804, between Russia and Austria is said to have been known to Pitt and Harrowby, but to no other British official.

[2] This is somewhat exaggerated. The French Government had heard of the secret Anglo-Swedish convention of December 3, 1804, and sent a highly coloured version of it to Berlin through M. Laforest. The Prussian Court thereupon protested strongly to the Swedish Court. (Hardenberg's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. pp. 119–121.)

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seconding the representations of this Government.—Jealousy of the establishment of a commercial depôt at Stralsund has perhaps contributed to the adoption, by the Court of Berlin, of this project, which probably was conceived originally at Paris. Under these circumstances, it is particularly to be regretted that the negociations between the Courts of St. Petersburgh and Stockholm are not concluded.—Little differences about the command of the combined troops, I have heard both from Prince Czartoryski and Baron Stedingk, are the chief obstacles to the conclusion of a convention between Russia and Sweden.—The Emperor having agreed that the superior command of the combined army should be given to the King of Sweden, it seems strange that the latter should risk the loss of the support of this country, by refusing to agree to other minor arrangements proposed by his Imperial Majesty. . . .

[The despatch then refers to internal affairs in Turkey, and the request of 'Louis XVIII.' for an asylum in Russia.]

56

Lord Mulgrave[1] *to Lord G. L. Gower.*

F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*) *No. 4.*

Downing Street: January 20, 1805.

The affairs of his Sicilian Majesty forming no inconsiderable part of the important concerns which now occupy the joint consideration of this country and Russia, it is proper that your Excellency should be acquainted that the Prince of Castelcicala has made pressing instances to prevail upon this Government to guaranty the integrity of his Sicilian Majesty's dominions, and to engage not to make peace until full restitution should be obtained to the King of Naples of every part of his territory which might be wrested from him during the war.

The answer made to the Neapolitan minister was in effect that

[1] Owing to an accident that befel Lord Harrowby at the close of the year 1804, he was succeeded at the Foreign Office by Lord Mulgrave on January 11, 1805. Lord Mulgrave (1755–1831) had distinguished himself at Toulon in 1793 and thereafter in his parliamentary career. He held the portfolio for Foreign Affairs up to February 7, 1806, and later on became First Lord of the Admiralty.

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much as his Majesty was interested in the preventing any dismemberment of his Sicilian Majesty's dominions, such an engagement on the part of this country alone and unsupported, would be nugatory and inconsistent with its character, but that his Majesty would be ready to concert with Russia for the establishment of the guarantee proposed, whenever the co-operation of that Power in Italy should be obtained, and substantial means possessed of giving effect to the terms of the engagement.

57

Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*) *No. 2.*

Downing Street: January 21, 1805.

I have the honor herewith to transmit for your Excellency's information, the copy of a dispatch to Count Woronzow, in which his Majesty's intentions are so fully detailed that it may serve you at the same time as an instruction. With this paper I also send the project of a provisional treaty to be concluded between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia.—Your Excellency will learn from the dispatch to Count Woronzow, that his Majesty is of opinion that the proposed concert cannot be established with an adequate expectation of success, unless (on the supposition of Prussia not becoming a party to the confederacy) four hundred thousand men can be brought into action, exclusive of the army of observation to be maintained by Russia on the frontiers of Prussia. In the event of Prussia's becoming a party, the amount of the active force is to be carried to five hundred thousand men. In filling up the blanks in the second and fourth articles, your Excellency will advert to these considerations.

If the general object and substance of the project should meet the concurrence of his Imperial Majesty, your Excellency has full authority to conclude a treaty on the basis proposed, and even to assent to any proposed alterations or modifications which do not affect the great leading principles on which the treaty is founded —the amount of numbers alone will not admit of any alteration.

The extreme importance of securing, if possible, the co-operation of Prussia on every consideration, but more especially with a view to the objects most particularly interesting to this country,

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the north of Germany and the Republic of the United Provinces, renders it highly essential that no effort should be omitted in bringing forward every inducement, which may influence Prussia to enter into the common concert, and at the same time to obviate whatever obstacle may arise to the proposal of sufficient temptations to that Power to rouze from its apathy.—There is some reason to apprehend, that one obstacle to this desireable end may be found in the indisposition which seems to exist on the part of Russia to allow any considerable augmentation of the power and resources of Prussia; I am therefore to recommend to your Excellency to endeavour, with all possible management, to argue the importance of holding out a sufficient inducement to Prussia, and to urge the points touched upon in the dispatch to Count Woronzow. —The interested and timid policy of the Court of Prussia will naturally lead that Government to weigh with cautious and deliberate attention the balance of the dangers and advantages to be derived to her from the double effect of the alternatives of benefits and hostility which she may expect from the contending parties. France will have the advantage of long established influence, and a long confirmed apprehension of her power. She will also have temptations to offer on the Baltic, and in the whole of the Electorate of Hanover; negotiations about which are certainly already in train between France and Prussia, and which cannot easily be met by offers equally tempting on the part of the united Powers.—The fear however of Russia, coupled with the consideration of the greater security of joining two great Powers against one rather than of creating a more equal contest by uniting with France may probably decide Prussia, provided such an acquisition of territory be proposed, as shall add materially to her power, and thereby relieve her from a great proportion of the apprehensions which keep her in subjection to France; to the objections which may be urged at Petersburgh against the proposed addition to Prussia, it may be answered that it is on every consideration more desireable that Prussia should increase towards the Middle Rhine and the Netherlands, than towards the Baltic; that although some danger may possibly exist (though I do not think that can be reasonably admitted to any great extent) to Holland, from the near and powerful neighbourhood of Prussia surrounding her; yet that this and every other danger that can be stated will be of infinitely less magnitude, when threatened on the side of Prussia, than if it were to be

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apprehended from France; and above all, that the hope of obtaining either emancipation or security for Holland will be incomparably less, if Prussia should not enter into the concert, as without her, all active operations in the north of Germany must necessarily be abandoned.—These considerations, however important, must nevertheless be urged with sufficient caution to guard against exciting any ill humour or discontent at the Court of St. Petersburg.—To your Excellency's temper and judgment I can leave that management without any anxiety or apprehension. In closing this subject I have only to state that in the stipulated amount of the proposed subsidy at the rate of one million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds for every hundred thousand men, his Majesty has made this unexampled exertion of liberal supply, with a view to forward effectually the important objects in contemplation, and to manifest the zeal with which his Majesty enters into the execution of the great principles in which his Majesty is happy to unite so fully and cordially with the Emperor of Russia.—The magnitude of the provision renders it almost superfluous to add, that it will not be possible to carry the relative proportion of men and money to any higher scale.

I anticipate with great pleasure the satisfaction which must result to the Court of St. Petersburgh from the proposals which his Majesty has commanded me to transmit, and I participate warmly in the gratification it will afford to your Excellency, to have committed to your charge the conclusion of this highly interesting and important transaction.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, in pursuance of their mutual desire, of delivering Europe from the calamities which it has long suffered, and the growing dangers with which it is threatened, by the restless ambition, and exorbitant power of France, and of opposing an effectual barrier against the renewal of such disastrous circumstances, have resolved to employ in concert the utmost means in their power for the attainment of that great object, and for that purpose have named for their plenipotentiaries, viz^{t}.—His Britannick Majesty, &c., the Emperor of Germany, &c., and the Emperor of all the Russias, &c., who,

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after having reciprocally exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have concluded and agreed upon the following articles.

ARTICLE 1.[1]

It is hereby agreed and declared that the objects of the concert thus established between their said Majesties are,—To provide for the evacuation of Hanover, and the north of Germany;—to reestablish and secure in a state of independence the Republics of Holland and of Switzerland;

To reinstate the King of Sardinia in the possession of his former dominions;—to provide for the security of the kingdom of Naples, and for the compleat evacuation of Italy and the north of Germany by the French arms, and to endeavour to form such an arrangement with respect to those countries and to all other acquisitions made since the Revolution, which may be recovered from France, on the left bank of the Rhine as shall be judged most proper to constitute an effectual barrier hereafter against future encroachments on the part of France.

ARTICLE 2.

In the event of the French Government refusing to comply with such demands as may be made to them by the allies, their Majesties agree to furnish respectively, in proportion to their power, such a force as may on the whole, amount to an active force of not less than four hundred thousand men.

ARTICLE 3.

The Emperor of Germany on his part agrees to bring into the field previous to the day of an effective force of not less than , and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias agrees on his part to bring in like manner into the field previous to the day of , an effective force of , to be kept by their said Majesties respectively compleat to the numbers respectively stipulated by them, or even augmented, if necessary, and to be actively employed within such limits, as shall be hereafter agreed upon, according to a plan of operations to be fixed by mutual consent; and his Britannick Majesty, on his part, agrees to furnish a subsidy to their Imperial Majesties, to the amount of one million, two hundred and fifty thousand pounds per annum for every hundred thousand men, to be so employed, and so, in proportion, for a greater or less number payable under the conditions hereinafter specified.

[1] Compare this draft with the treaty of April 11, 1805, printed in the Appendix.

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ARTICLE 4.

It is farther agreed that the said subsidies shall be payable by monthly instalments, in proportion to the number of men actually mustered in each month, and employed as before stated; and his Britannick Majesty will further be ready to advance to the Emperor of Germany, in order to defray the necessary expences previous to an Austrian army taking the field, a sum of money equal to four months' subsidy to be advanced for men, and if less than men shall be mustered at the time proposed, the difference (in the proportion of 12*l.* 10*s.* per annum for each man) shall be deducted, and considered as part of the current subsidy to be thereafter paid for the number of men actually employed.

ARTICLE 5.

The high contracting parties further agree, that they will not make any separate peace with France, but on the conditions of the objects specified in the first article being fully obtained, and an effectual barrier being established against future encroachments, unless by the common consent of all the Powers who are parties to this treaty, and of such other Powers as may hereafter become parties to the same.

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

His Britannick Majesty, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, and his Majesty the Emperor of Russia agree to concert hereafter an arrangement, whereby the Emperor of Germany, and the King of Sardinia shall obtain on the side of Italy, and the King of Prussia (provided his Prussian Majesty shall become a party to this concert) and the Republick of the United Provinces, out of the dominions on the left bank of the Rhine, such an accession of strength as may be not inconsistent with the objects specified in this treaty, and may at the same time serve as a compensation proportioned to their respective efforts in the common cause, and likewise contribute to establish a more powerful and effectual barrier against future projects of aggrandisement on the part of France.[1]

[1] It would be of interest (if space permitted) to compare this draft of a treaty with the proposals set forth in writing by the British Government to M. Novossiltzoff on January 19, 1805; they are published, though not in full, by Garden (*Traités*, vol. ix. pp. 317–323) and by Alison (vol. vi. App. i.). The Russian envoy reported to his Government that 'the opinions of the British Ministry entirely coincide with the intentions of his Majesty the Emperor' (Czartoryski, *Memoirs*, vol. ii. ch. vii.) —a statement which demolishes Thiers's attempt to draw a distinction between the spirit of Russian and of British policy.

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Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: January 21, 1805.

I have the honor to inclose to your Excellency copies of the communication transmitted to his Majesty by the chief of the French Government,[1] and of the reply which I was commanded by his Majesty to address to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, together with copies of the official letters which respectively accompanied these papers.

The cordial and confidential intercourse which subsists between the King and the Emperor of Russia,—the principles of sound and liberal policy by which they are equally actuated,—the enlarged and benevolent views which they jointly entertain, for establishing, on a permanent basis, the future safety and independance of Europe, made it impossible for his Majesty to enter into any discussion on the subject of the French proposition, without a previous communication and concert with his Imperial Majesty.—In following this line of conduct (in all cases equally indispensable) it would have been much more satisfactory to his Majesty, and more congenial to his feelings, had the proposition itself or the circumstances by which it was accompanied, afforded any reasonable hope that secure and permanent peace in Europe might be established by negotiation.—The French Government however does not appear to have been desirous of assuming even the appearance of such a disposition. The transaction itself was accompanied, or rather preceeded, by an official address to the legislative body at Paris, delivered on the day previous to the date of the pretended pacific communication; in which the Minister of the Interior, Monsieur Champagny, stated from authority the specific conditions on which alone the French Government is resolved to admit of peace—conditions which as far as they relate to the immediate interests of this country, are totally inadmissible and which excluded all idea of any arrangement to provide for the general interests of the Continent—this address likewise avows without disguise, the intention of the present ruler of France to pursue the same restless system of ambition and to manifest his

[1] See the letter in Napoleon's *Correspondence* for January 2, 1805.

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power and his violence by fresh innovations in the different States of Europe, which are unfortunately subject to his control. His Majesty is nevertheless of opinion that in order to manifest the principles of moderation by which he is actuated, in common with the Emperor of Russia, some specific proposition should be made in answer to this overture.

His Majesty is so earnestly anxious to promote the re-establishment of peace and security in Europe that he would be readily disposed to make any sacrifice for the attainment of that desireable object, which might be compatible with its solid and permanent existence.—In conformity to this disposition, his Majesty thinks it might be expedient to propose terms of peace to France which should at once manifest to that country, to his own subjects and to all Europe, that a real and sincere desire of the return and continuance of tranquillity has been the great object of his Majesty, and of his allies; that a reasonable, safe and moderate plan has been considered and digested, calculated with no view beyond what is absolutely necessary for the general security of Europe, comprising at once the conditions without which that object cannot be stated as attainable.

In bringing forward such a proposition with a view to prevent the continuance and extension of hostilities, his Majesty thinks it advisable even to omit many important and desirable objects which might with justice and propriety hereafter be insisted upon to complete and consolidate the safety of Europe; if successful war should precede the negotiations for peace.

The conditions which to his Majesty appear indispensably necessary and without which no hope can be entertained of permanent tranquillity in Europe are as follows.—

1st The restoration of the King of Sardinia in his ancient dominions.

2. The entire evacuation of Italy by the French troops.

3. Security for the kingdom of Naples.

4. The independance of Switzerland.

5. The evacuation of Hanover.

6. The restoration of the Republic of the United Provinces, and a further provision for its future security and permanent independance by the establishment of a sufficient barrier towards the Flemish frontier.

7th The re-establishment of fortresses on the right bank of

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the Rhine for the safety of the Germanic body, and for the prevention of sudden and hostile irruptions into Germany.

It further appears to his Majesty extremely desirable that no time should be lost in making these overtures, the result of which may be so certainly anticipated; and if the Emperor of Russia should concur in this opinion it may be suggested, for the consideration of his Imperial Majesty, whether, on this occasion, the ordinary form and usual course of negotiations might not be laid aside with advantage. In which case his Imperial Majesty might take upon himself, with dignity and effect, the determination of this great question, by sending to Paris an accredited person authorised to declare the sentiments of his Imperial Majesty, and directed for that purpose to demand a personal audience of the chief of the French Government, to whom, in the name of his Imperial Majesty, he might state, with temper and firmness, the only grounds on which it appears possible that permanent tranquillity can be secured to France itself or to Europe, and the earnest wish of the Emperor to promote this object,—at the same time expressly declaring his Imperial Majesty to be desirous, before he should have recourse to active military operations, to make one effort more for establishing this arrangement by pacific agreement, but that he also thought it right frankly to avow that his armies were already on their march, and that, if such an agreement could not be effected without delay, he should feel it indispensable to employ his utmost exertions, in conjunction with Great Britain and other Powers, to enforce those conditions which appear absolutely essential for the safety of Europe.

If the tenour of this proposal should appear to your Excellency to meet the ideas of his Imperial Majesty, and to be cordially entertained, it may be desireable to open a further object for consideration.—As the person selected for such a mission would certainly be one possessed of the full confidence of the Emperor, it would be of the utmost importance to the common cause, that the weight of his talents and authority should also be exerted in an endeavour to strengthen and complete the proposed concert of Powers, by obtaining the important and decisive co-operation of Prussia.—This delicate negotiation might also be best conducted by a demand, in the name of the Emperor, that the person charged with his overtures should be admitted to an interview with the King of Prussia himself.

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The advantages of such a mode of communication, through such a channel, would be incalculable: Every point important for the consideration of his Prussian Majesty, would be brought forward with force and effect, undisguised by the false colours either of selfish views or personal prejudices.—There could remain no doubt on the mind of the Prussian monarch, after such a communication, of the real views and final determinations of his Imperial Majesty; and above all no apprehension of premature publicity could operate upon the mind of his Prussian Majesty, to whose honor and discretion alone, at Berlin, the propositions of his Imperial Majesty would be exclusively confided.

This is the sum of what it appears necessary at present to suggest to your Excellency on this subject. His Majesty has the fullest reliance on the judgment and discretion of your Excellency to avail yourself of the proper opportunities for bringing forward and enforcing the suggestion of those important measures.

I am happy to say that they have the entire and zealous concurrence of Monsieur Novosiltzoff,[1] and I cannot conclude without assuring you that nothing can exceed the zeal, candour, and ability which has marked the whole tenour of his conversation and conduct during the period of his residence in this country, from whence he will carry with him the highest sentiments of the esteem and regard of every member of his Majesty's Government.

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Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*) *No. 3.*

Downing Street: January 21, 1805.

The full powers which accompany this dispatch will enable your Excellency to sign a convention with Russia, conformable to the *projet* transmitted to you by this messenger.

It has also been thought expedient that you should be furnished with separate full powers, of which your Excellency may eventually avail yourself, if you find that other of the continental States have empowered their respective ministers at Petersburgh, to conclude, in conjunction with Russia, an engagement with this country, upon the terms to which your instructions authorise you to agree.

[1] Then on a mission to the British Government.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 3.*

St. Petersburgh: Wednesday. January 23, 1805.

Since the receipt of your dispatches of the 26th of October last I have no commands from your lordship.[1]

General Lascy is upon his road to Italy—he is preceded by General Oberman, one of the best engineer officers of the Russian army.—I have the satisfaction of informing your lordship that assurances have been given me that the number of his Imperial Majesty's troops at Corfu will, by the end of February, amount to twenty-five thousand men.—To the question whether any authority was given to send these forces into Italy for the protection of his Sicilian Majesty, no other answer has been obtained, than that the Emperor would approve of whatever was done by the general, to whom he had given the appointment of commander-in-chief.

The Swedish ambassador has obtained no official answer from this Government to his representations upon the proposed occupation of Swedish Pomerania by Prussian troops.—Some days ago I observed to Prince Czartoryski, that the King of Sweden of course relied on receiving support from Russia—to which he replied he has reason to rely on us.[2]

The interruption of the communication with England, prevents all progress in the negotiation for a continental alliance against France—every thing will remain in suspence until I am enabled to make known the determination of his Majesty's Government upon the proposed subsidy, which I transmitted to your lordship immediately after my arrival here.

[1] This was in part due to Lord Harrowby's accident and resignation, of which Lord G. L. Gower was still unaware.

[2] A secret Russo-Swedish convention had been signed on January 14, 1805, by which they agreed to unite 'to maintain the equilibrium between the Powers of Europe and to guarantee the independence of Germany.' Russia also agreed to send troops, under certain conditions, into Germany, to be under the command of the King of Sweden. (Garden, *Traités*, vol. ix. p. 305.)

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F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*) *No. 6.*

Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

Downing Street: January 29, 1805.

I have received and laid before the King your Excellency's dispatches Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

I have great satisfaction in expressing to your Excellency his Majesty's entire approbation of the judicious line of reasoning which you have pursued in discussing the subject of the recognition of the title of Hereditary Emperor of Austria.

The argument of Prince Czartoryski, relative to the Porte, does not appear to be of sufficient weight to balance the reasons urged by your Excellency.

If a rupture should take place between that Power and France, it will be upon grounds and motives very different from any considerations of etiquette.

Your Excellency's report of the intimation given by Count Stadion, of the present disposition of the Court of Vienna, is highly satisfactory, and affords ground for a sanguine hope that your Excellency may be enabled, at no distant period, to notify the accession of the Emperor of Germany to the treaty of alliance which you have been authorised by his Majesty to negociate and conclude at St. Petersburgh.

Dispatches which arrived from Mr. Pierrepont[1] at the same time with those received from your Excellency, brought information of an extraordinary and highly important measure of the Court of Berlin, which has probably been already communicated to your Excellency by his Majesty's minister at Stockholm. I allude to a note presented by Monsieur de Hardenberg to the Swedish chargé d'affaires at Berlin, in which he states having received information from Monsieur La Forêt, that a negociation was actually on foot between the Courts of London and Stockholm, by which (as he states) the King of Sweden should engage, in consideration of a subsidy of two millions sterling, to transport 25,000 men into Swedish Pomerania.[2]—Baron Hardenberg adds,

[1] British ambassador at the Swedish Court.

[2] This statement of Laforest (French minister at Berlin) was a distorted version of the secret Anglo-Swedish convention of December 3, 1804, referred to above.

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that he is called upon explicitly to demand, in the name of his master, whether any such negotiation were really in existence, as in that case his Prussian Majesty gave notice that he should consider any attempt to introduce such an additional number of troops into Pomerania as a design to disturb the peace of the north of Germany, and that his Prussian Majesty, being guarantee of the tranquillity of that quarter of Europe, should feel himself under the necessity of taking such steps as should effectually put a stop to the measure in question.

I will not detain your Excellency by detailing the obvious remarks upon the nature and fidelity of a guarantee which has permitted the Electorate of Hanover, the Hans Towns and other parts of the north of Germany to be overrun and occupied by the French armies—which has even lent itself to a negotiation for the occupation of the usurped Electorate of Hanover; which has offered to be pledged to the preservation of that territory for the benefit of the lawless invader, and which would thereby have facilitated the release of a powerful French army from the control of that country to the prosecution of further aggressions, probably within the same circuit of guaranty—and which even interferes for the purpose of preventing other Powers from taking the necessary measures of precaution for their own security.—These and other observations of a similar nature might be alleged in discussions, which the pressure of the existing exigency is too urgent to admit. The interposition of the Emperor of Russia only can check the progress of this crooked policy of the Court of Berlin; which, under the pretext of maintaining the neutrality of the north of Germany, protects the usurpations of France, endeavouring at the same time, by indirect assistance, to encourage and promote her further encroachments, in the hope and expectation of ultimate sharing in the plunder.—Should his Imperial Majesty give immediate notice that a powerful Russian army is on its march to the frontiers of Prussia, with a peremptory declaration, at the same time, that the entrance of a single Prussian soldier into Swedish Pomerania will be considered as an act of hostility against Russia, which will be followed at once by war,—his Imperial Majesty by these declarations would, in all probability at least, produce hesitation and delay, if not the absolute and final dereliction of the unjust and interested projects of the Court of Berlin.—The army however must be considerable and evidently

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adequate to enforce, with effect, the utmost consequences of the menaced hostility.—As it is evident that objects of great territorial acquisition, and those in their circumstances and situation the most tempting to the Prussian monarchy, have been held out by France to induce a closer connection, or, at least, a more active manifestation of their existing union; it may be expedient for your Excellency to urge to the Russian cabinet the necessity of counteracting the influence of France by uniting temptation with menace, and by acting at the same time upon the fears and upon the cupidity of the Prussian Government. If the disposition of the Court of Vienna be, in fact, such as Count Stadion has represented it to your Excellency; if the sense of danger and the desire of action have indeed made so sensible and decisive a progress in the councils of Austria; the period will also have arrived at which it may be discreet and adviseable to open proposals to the Prussian Government, and it appears, in every point of view, essential to the promotion of the general interests of Europe, most consistent with sound policy, and conducive to the desireable object of Prussian co-operation, that the vigorous and decisive measures above stated should be opened in a manner calculated to conciliate the concurrence and to spare the feelings and dignity of the Prussian Government; for which purpose it might, in the first instance, be represented, that the security and tranquility of the north of Germany can be no longer entirely confided to the protection of Prussian interposition, which has hitherto proved so insufficient to prevent the most hostile encroachments, or to mitigate in any degree, the arrogant pretensions of France; that any opposition on the part of Prussia to the adoption, by the German States, of the measures necessary for their future security and defence against the aggressions of the French Government, must necessarily be followed by the most serious consequences; that Russia can no longer be an inactive spectator of the dangers which threaten the safety of the Germanic body and the general security and independence of Europe—dangers to which Prussia cannot have been either blind or insensible, however she may have been disposed to dissemble to herself their awful magnitude or impending pressure; that the Emperor of Russia feels it a duty resulting from his good-will and cordial regard to Prussia, to state to her the advantage of the opportunity now offered to extricate herself, without hazard, from this painful situation, by an hearty union and

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cordial co-operation with the confederacy to which she is invited to accede; that immediate and certain deliverance from danger and anxiety, and a future accession of power, which may avert the recurrence of those consequences of French preponderancy, will be the compensation for the solicited co-operation of Prussia; but that the semblance of neutrality, accompanied by a conduct which in reality promotes the views of France, must, in such a crisis as the present, be considered as nearly equivalent to hostility; that the safety and independence of Europe in general, and of the north of Germany in particular; cannot now be secured but by active and decided exertion, that Prussia is earnestly invited to contribute to this great and indespensable object; that rich and tempting offers of advantage are liberally and earnestly offered on the one side, and immediate and inevitable contest frankly avowed as the consequence of continuing directly or indirectly to favour the cause or the pretensions of France.—If in the event of this alternative being offered, the decision of Prussia were to render it necessary that the two imperial Courts should commence hostilities against that Power by land, your Excellency may give the most positive assurances, that his Majesty will in that case co-operate with those Powers by maritime exertions, to distress the commerce of Prussia.

But I cannot too strongly recommend to your Excellency to press on the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, the importance of bidding high, in the first instance, against France; and of offering the most substantial advantages, in order to secure the important weight of Prussia in the balance of contest against the overgrown, restless and formidable power of France.

Having put your Excellency in possession of the views of his Majesty's Government, I shall rest perfectly satisfied that they will be promoted by your exertions, as far as the general nature of circumstances, and the disposition of the Court of Petersburgh will permit.

[In a private letter from the Admiralty, dated January 26, 1805, Lord Melville suggests the desirability of opening negotiations for the purchase of certain Russian ships of war by the British Government, seeing that the supply afforded by British dockyards was unequal to the existing demands. In the next despatch from Lord

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Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower, dated January 29, 1805, attention is called to the proposal contained in the foregoing letter.]

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F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 4.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburgh: Tuesday, February 5, 1805.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your lordships dispatches Nos. 12, 14 and 15, with their inclosures.—No. 13 has not yet reached my hands.

I have at different times represented to Prince Czartoryski that the release of Sir George Rumbold, upon the conditions to which he had been obliged to subscribe, could not be considered as any satisfaction for the gross violation of the rights of nations and the outrageous insult offered to the Court of Berlin by the seizure of that minister.—I have not failed to state, that nothing short of an unequivocal disavowal of the new principles lately promulgated in M. Talleyrand's circular note, and by which M. Bonaparte assumes the right of obtaining possession, either by fraud or force, of the persons, papers, and property, of his Majesty's ambassadors, or envoys, residing in neutral countries, can be considered as adequate reparation.

To the truth of these opinions and representations Prince Czartoryski has uniformly assented, and I have great satisfaction in assuring your lordship, that the repeated acts of violence and aggression lately committed by the French Government, have made a due impression on the minds of the ministers of his Imperial Majesty.—No arguments are necessary to convince the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, that by arms only the independence of Europe can be recovered;—and they defer the commencement of actual hostilities against France, not from any expectation, or hope, of avoiding that extremity, but with the view of beginning the war with more extensive means and better concerted measures.—Separated as Russia is from France by the different States of Germany, a very partial good alone could be effected by the single operation of a Russian army:—the relief of Europe from the yoke and tyranny of M. Bonaparte is, in the opinion of this cabinet, to be looked for only from a great and combined effort on the part of the continental

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Powers:—to obtain this object the Ministry here have laboured with zeal and perseverance, and the success which has attended their labours, at Vienna, is strongly evinced in the communications which have lately taken place between that Court and the French Government.

With the Court of Prussia they have not yet been so successfull.

The same miserable and short sighted policy, which has hitherto guided the councils of his Prussian Majesty, seems still to prevail at Berlin:—against this system, M. Alopheus has not remonstrated with that firmness and decision which alone is likely to produce effect with the Prussian cabinet; and the manner in which that minister has softened down the communications he has been instructed to make, has been highly dis-approved by his Imperial Majesty.—M. de Wintzingeroda [1] has been therefore charged with a special mission to the Court of Berlin.—He is the bearer of a letter from the Emperor to the King of Prussia, in which his Imperial Majesty declares, in positive terms, his resolution to support his ally, the King of Sweden, against any attack which may be made upon him, from whatever quarter it may come.—To obviate the argument which the Court of Berlin has adduced; that if Prussian troops do not occupy Swedish Pomerania, the French army will take possession of that province, M. Wintzingeroda is empowered to concert with his Prussian Majesty's ministers the means of resisting such an invasion, and to promise the powerful co-operation of a Russian army.—The mission of this officer is however not confined to this object; he is directed to state the sentiments of his Imperial Majesty upon the situation of Europe, and upon the necessity of restraining the overbearing and increasing influence of M. Bonaparte: he is instructed to require from the Prussian Government a plain and explicit declaration of the line of conduct which that Court will pursue, in case of the renewal of hostilities against France.—Monsieur Wintzingeroda is aide du camp to the Emperor, and stands high in the confidence of his Imperial Majesty.—He is a man of energy and decision, one who will not be satisfied with the evasive and shuffling language with

[1] General Winzingerode was an accomplished officer on the general staff of the Russian army, who afterwards achieved distinction in the campaigns of 1813–1814. For Metternich's despatches describing his mission, see Metternich's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. pp. 46 *et seq.* (Engl. edit.).

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which the Court of Berlin has hitherto amused the other cabinets of Europe.—The happiest effects therefore may be expected to result from this mission, for, if Prussia be driven to the alternative of uniting with Russia against France, or with France against Russia, it seems scarcely to be believed that she should choose a line of conduct by which she would render herself a dependent Power upon the French Government.

In a conversation I had yesterday with Prince Czartoryski, I found, however, that he was not very confident of what might be the ultimate determination of the Prussian Government. The opposition given by this Court to the projects of aggrandisement lately entertained by that of Berlin, had created much ill-humour in the minds of the Prussian Ministry, and they did not conceal their dissatisfaction, when they found their proposal of occupying Hanover thwarted by this Government, and were particularly displeased with that part of the Emperor's answer in which, with that sense of justice which so eminently distinguishes his character, his Imperial Majesty says, that he cannot approve or sanction any arrangement, with respect to his Majesty's electorial dominions, which has not received the previous concurrence of its lawful sovereign.

Baron Stedingk has confidentially shewed to me the letter he has received from Prince Czartoryski in answer to the official representations which, in conformity with the instructions he had received from his sovereign, he had made to this Government, upon the proposed occupation by Prussian troops of Swedish Pomerania.—In this answer, the King of Sweden is assured, not of a limited succour, such as, by the Treaty of Gatchina, Russia is under obligation to furnish; but, in general terms, of the support of the Emperor, against any invasion of the Swedish territories, by any Power whatever.[1]—A spirited letter of the King of Sweden's to his Prussian Majesty, in which the former insists upon his right of making what preparations he may think necessary for his own defence, and of contracting what alliances he may think fit, has been submitted for the consideration and opinion of the Emperor, and the sentiments contained in it have received his Imperial Majesty's approbation.

[1] This was covenanted in the secret Russo-Swedish convention of January 14 1805.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Russia vol. 57, *No. 5.*

St. Petersburg: February 5, 1805.

I have in the preceeding dispatch alluded to the change that has taken place in the tone and language of the Austrian Ministry, and as it is possible that Sir A. Paget may not have been made acquainted with what has passed in Paris, between M. Talleyrand and M. Philip Cobenzl,[1] I think it my duty to inform your lordship, that a dispatch written by the latter, has been confidentially communicated to me by C^te^ Stadion. From this it appears, that the members of the Consulta having been all called together at Paris, to settle with Bonaparte some new form of government for the Italian Republic; C^te^ P. Cobenzl was instructed to require from the cabinet of the Thuilleries an explanation of its views and intentions with respect to Italy, and was also instructed to claim on the part of the Austrian Government, the right of being consulted upon any measure that might be in contemplation regarding that country; that the Court of Vienna would not consent to any project by which Lombardy might be rendered more dependent than it was at present, and would on no account agree to its becoming a province of France.

Various subterfuges were resorted to by M. Talleyrand to avoid an explanation with the Austrian ambassador upon this representation; when pressed for an answer, M. Talleyrand said that Bonaparte had observed with regret, many instances in which the hostile dispositions of the cabinet of Vienna towards France had been clearly manifested. In the recapitulation of these instances, he mentioned the answer which had been given to his circular note upon the non-recognition of the English Corps Diplomatique, the publicity that had been given to this offensive answer, and the reinforcement of the Austrian army on the Venetian frontier, which Bonaparte was not dupe enough to believe had been ordered there, for the purpose of forming a cordon against the introduction of the yellow fever. These circumstances, said he, added to the discussions which had given rise to their present conversation, had satisfied his master, that the Emperor of Germany was only waiting for the most favorable opportunity of becoming the ally of

[1] Brother of the Austrian chancellor, and ambassador at Paris.

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England, and the enemy of France. C^te^ Cobenzl returned no other answer to these observations, than that his sovereign was determined to resist any infringement of the stipulations of the Treaty of Lunéville.

Prince Czartoryski in expressing to me the satisfaction he derived from this spirited conduct of the Austrian Government, said it was natural that the cabinet of Vienna should be extremely anxious to know what they had to rely upon in the way of subsidy from England. He regretted very much that so long a delay had taken place in returning an answer to the propositions which he had communicated to me, upon my arrival at this place, that he had however received letters from London which gave him hope that no difficulties would occur upon this head, and that he was particularly glad to find that there existed in his Majesty's Government the disposition to act with perfect confidence, and in the strictest union with the Court of Russia, and that nothing could be more satisfactory to the Emperor, than the idea of a confidential connection between the two countries.

I answered by saying, that the delay which had taken place must be attributed to the unfortunate accident which had happened to your lordship, that his Majesty's ministers had given too many proofs of their anxious desire to cultivate the most intimate connexion with the Government of his Imperial Majesty to make it necessary for me to repeat the assurances he had before heard from me, and that I trusted the time was now arrived for confirming and consolidating by a treaty of alliance the friendship and connexion which for the mutual benefit of both countries subsisted between them.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 6.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Harrowby.

St. Petersburg: February 16, 1805.

The Russian courier by whom I have now the opportunity of writing to your lordship, is the bearer of dispatches to Comte Woronzow, inclosing copies of the communications which have lately passed between the Courts of Petersburg and Berlin.

The substance of these papers I have in former dispatches had the honor of making known to your lordship, but I am persuaded

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that his Majesty's Government will observe with great satisfaction the energetic and decisive language in which this Court has expressed itself upon all the points contained in these communications. The firm rejection of the continually repeated overtures of the French Government, conveyed through the Court of Prussia, the just point of view in which his Imperial Majesty sees the inadequacy of the satisfaction, and reparation afforded by Bonaparte for the violent seizure and imprisonment of Sir George Rumbold, and the vigorous opposition given from here to the insidious projects of the Court of Berlin, with respect both to Hanover and Swedish Pomerania, are all satisfactory manifestations of the sound principles which guide the cabinet of Petersburg, and of the steadiness with which it adheres to its present system.

The only question, upon which in a long conversation I had yesterday with Prince Czartoryski, it appeared that the Courts of London and Russia do not quite coincide, is that of the war now existing between Great Britain and Spain. The Prince expressed to me, that his Imperial Majesty took great interest in the situation of the King of Spain and was extremely anxious to detach his Catholic Majesty from his present alliance with France; that the vigorous manner in which we carried on the war against that country increased the difficulties, in the way of a successful pursuit of this object, of his Imperial Majesty.

I replied by saying that as the alliance and co-operation of Spain with France against England was the ground upon which we went to war, I was persuaded that his Majesty's Government would be very well disposed to a reconciliation in the event of her completely throwing off her dependence upon France: that till such a change did take place, and as long as she continued under the dominion of Bonaparte, we could not do otherwise than take every means of crippling her power, and resources, and that the manifesto's of the Court of Madrid, and particularly that which was signed by the Prince of Peace,[1] were not of a nature to give much hope of the speedy accomplishment of the wishes of his Imperial Majesty.

The last news from Vienna is of a sort rather to damp the expectations which had been formed of the future vigour of that

[1] Emmanuel Godoy (1767–1851), chief minister of Spain in the years 1792–1808.

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Court. The answer given by C^te^ Cobenzl to the notification of Bonaparte's intentions with respect to the north of Italy, indicates something of a relapse from the tone which the Austrian ambassador in Paris had adopted in his former communications upon this subject with M. Talleyrand.

Count Stadion seems inclined indirectly to justify their present measured language, upon the uncertainty in which his Court still remains, as to pecuniary assistance from England, and which he insinuates is increased by the delay which has occurred in returning an answer to the propositions conveyed to London through this Court three months ago, and I am happy to find that P^ce^ Czartoryski is of opinion that the Austrian Government are only trying to defer for a little the commencement of hostility, and that he does not apprehend any change in the system, upon which they seemed inclined to act. I expressed to the Prince my wish, that he would repeat to C^te^ Stadion his persuasion that his Majesty's Government were disposed liberally to assist the Court of Vienna, and that he would satisfy him that the delay which had unfortunately taken place, in receiving an answer from London, arose solely from accidental causes.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 57. *No.* 7.

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

St. Petersburgh: Wednesday, March 6, 1805.

I received on Wednesday last by the messenger Basset, your lordship's dispatches from No. 1 to No. 5 inclusive, with their several inclosures.—The Russian courier dispatched by Count Woronzow at the same time with Basset from London, reached St. Petersburgh on the preceding evening.

I lost no time in requesting to see Prince Czartoryski, and had a conference with his Excellency on Saturday last.—I began our conversation, by expressing the satisfaction I had felt in reading your lordship's very interesting letter to Count Woronzow, and added my hopes that the opinions, and propositions contained in it, completely co-incided with the sentiments of the Russian Government;—his Excellency replied, that he had not yet had time to read it with that attention which a paper embracing so many important considerations necessarily required, and that therefore

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in what he was about to say, I must understand that he was telling me merely what had occurred to him upon the first hasty perusal of the letter, and not by any means consider it a communication of the opinions of his Imperial Majesty or of his cabinet.

He then proceeded by saying that though he could not but be gratified with the frankness with which his Majesty's Government had explained their sentiments, he could not help expressing the great disappointment he felt in finding that the subsidy which we proposed to Austria was infinitely less than what he had stated to me to be the lowest sum for which the Court of Vienna could be prevailed upon to join in a confederacy for the deliverance of Europe. That twelve hundred and fifty thousand pounds for every hundred thousand men would (supposing the Austrian armies in the field to consist of two hundred and thirty thousand men) amount only to two million eight hundred and seventy five thousand pounds, and that for that sum he could not indulge any expectation of Austria being induced to begin war.[1] In reply to this, I insisted upon the extreme fairness of the principle of proportioning our supply of money to the number of men;—his Excellency I said would recollect, that it was the joint opinion of the British and Russian Governments that hostilities should not be commenced unless four hundred thousand men could be brought into action against France and that for this number of men Great Britain would by the proposed arrangement be bound to pay no less a sum than five millions—that I was positively instructed to admit of no alteration in the relative proportions of men and money, but that it would certainly be open to the continental Powers to make any arrangement amongst themselves in the disposition of the sum total afforded by my Court. This hint of Russia's contributing a portion of what she received in the way of subsidy, to the necessities of the Austrian Government, did not seem to satisfy Prince Czartoryski, and he replied that in former wars we had paid larger subsidies for fewer men; he expressed his expectation that I should consider myself at liberty to reckon the first payment of the subsidy as being due at the beginning of the year. To this I answered, that it would be

[1] In its earlier negotiations with Russia the Austrian Government gave her to understand that it expected from England 2,000,000*l.* for the preliminary preparations and 4,000,000*l.* a year. Russia promised to use her good offices to obtain this from Great Britain. (Czartoryski's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. ch. vi.)

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unreasonable to imagine, that if the campaign commenced in summer, we should be six months paying for troops either not raised, or in a state of perfect inactivity, and that the agreeing to such a proposition would in fact be the same as consenting to give a large advance of money, independent of the annual subsidy, to which alone I was strictly limited by my instructions; but that the amount of the advance which was to be deducted from the annual subsidy, and the exact period of it's payment, were minor points of detail, which I flattered myself might easily be arranged, when we came to the consideration of the project communicated by your lordship to Count Woronzow, of which I trusted that the basis was one which met the ideas of his Imperial Majesty.

Prince Czartoryski, at the same time that he admitted the goodness of the principle upon which this project was founded, said, that there were many points in it not sufficiently explained or developed. In reply, I urged the necessity of losing no time in making known to me what these points were, and hoped that I should soon receive from him a *contre-projet*, or rather that he would return to me your lordship's *projet*, with such alterations and modifications as he thought desirable, and to which I might find myself at liberty to assent consistently with my instructions.—His Excellency replied, that the importance of the points in question necessarily required some little time, but that he would immediately occupy himself in preparing to lay before me the sentiments of the Russian Government upon them. . . .

[Czartoryski then referred to backwardness of England to promise armed support for Naples.]

. . . The Prince here took occasion to observe, upon the magnitude of the exertions expected from Russia, and upon the very numerous armies which the Emperor must keep constantly prepared to act, independent of the one hundred and twenty thousand men whom he proposed bringing into active service against France, that his Imperial Majesty's forces upon the frontiers of Prussia, and Austria, must be upon a scale sufficiently large to insure the neutrality of the former, and keep a check upon the views of the latter.—His Excellency was from this led to the consideration of the territorial acquisitions, which your lordship had suggested, as adviseable to hold out to the cabinet of Berlin, in

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order to tempt that Court into a confederacy against Bonaparte.—These he considered as extravagant, and desired me to recollect that the Court of St. Petersburgh could not so entirely lose sight of the interests of Russia, as to contribute to, or consent to any very great augmentation of the power and resources of a neighbouring State, already powerful from the largeness of it's military establishment. In reply I urged the various arguments with which I am supplied by your lordship, and reminded the Prince that we were bidding against Bonaparte for the co-operation of the King of Prussia. That as without doubt, the French Government would not fail to offer large acquisitions, as a bait to the cupidity of the Court of Berlin, it was necessary that such offers should be met by some alluring proposal on the part of the allied Powers; that if the Prussian cabinet lent itself to the views of the French Government, the Prussian territories might be aggrandized in a way, to increase it's influence over the secondary Powers of the Baltic, and in a quarter which might with more reason occasion some uneasiness to the Court of St. Petersburgh.—He answered that no such acquisitions would ever be permitted by his Imperial Majesty.

I then continued by saying, that although his opinions did not exactly co-incide with those of your lordship, upon the exact measure of temptation which should be offered to the King of Prussia, I hoped his Excellency agreed with me in the expediency of making some offers of increase of territory to the cabinet of Berlin, in order to induce that Court to become a party to a general confederacy;—he replied by informing me, that though M. de Wintzingeroda had not been charged with any distinct offer to his Prussian Majesty, he had been instructed to intimate to that sovereign the readiness with which this Government would listen to any projects which the Court of Prussia might entertain for the extension of her possessions, that he had been directed to require a frank and explicit statement of the objects, to which the views of that Court were turned.—That M. de Wintzingeroda in his first audience of the King of Prussia, and in his first conferences with M. de Hardenberg had confined himself to a discussion relative to the proposed occupation of Swedish Pomerania, by Prussian troops, to which project the Court of Berlin adhered, with some tenacity, but upon which the determination of the Emperor to support his Swedish Majesty had been unequivocally declared by M. de Wintzingeroda.

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The last point which Prince Czartoryski noticed in your lordship's letter, was that of the extension of the Austrian frontier in Italy, beyond what the Court of Vienna had expressed as the limit which it had in view in case of a successful attack being made against the French in Lombardy. He could not, he said, see the advantage of gratuitously thus aggrandizing the possessions of another powerful neighbour upon the Russian frontier, that it was not to be expected his Imperial Majesty should exhaust his own resources in rendering over-powerful the only two great States, whose frontiers were in contact with his own empire.—To this I answered, that your lordship's propositions went only to strengthen those Powers on the side of France, and that it appeared to me that the interests of Russia, as well as the safety of Europe, could not be better provided for, than by creating a strong barrier against the encroachments of the French Government.

Count Stadion having informed me that he had as yet received no instructions from his Court, and that probably some days would elapse, before he should be authorized to begin a negotiation, I expressed to Prince Czartoryski my apprehensions that the cabinet of Vienna were receding from the ground they had once taken, and were returning to their former system of submission to the will of Bonaparte: the Russian minister acknowledged that the conduct and language of the Austrian Government upon the question of the newly created kingdom of Lombardy, had manifested unpleasant symptoms of fear, and indecision, that this conduct of Austria had even been adduced, by the Prussian ministers, as a reason for the indisposition of the Court of Berlin, to enter into an alliance with this Government, that however Count Cobenzl justified his conduct, upon the expediency of deferring the moment of beginning war, 'till the three Courts had finally concerted, and concluded the necessary arrangements.

I have since had some conversation with the Austrian ambassador, to whom Prince Czartoryski had communicated the basis, upon which his Majesty's Government proposed that a subsidiary treaty should be founded. Count Stadion assures me, that his Court will engage to produce in the field two hundred and fifty thousand men, but he insists strongly on the absolute necessity of a considerable advance being paid by England for the *frais mobiliaires* of their army.

I have to apologize to your lordship for the detailed account I

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have written of my conference with Prince Czartoryski, but the cold manner in which his Majesty's very liberal offers have been received here made me feel the necessity of informing your lordship very exactly of what passed between the Russian minister and myself.

The return of M. Novosiltzoff is looked for with great impatience, I trust that his representations will produce a more just estimation of the fairness and liberality of our propositions, and I can assure your lordship that no exertion shall be wanting on my part to bring to a successfull issue a negotiation in which your lordship has done me the honor to leave in my hands so much discretionary power.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 8.*

St. Petersburgh: Thursday, March 7, 1805.

The answer returned by his Majesty's minister to the pacifick propositions lately received from the French Government, and the particular, but well merited, compliment paid to the Emperor of Russia, both in that answer and in his Majesty's most gracious speech, has given great satisfaction at this Court.—In obedience to the instructions contained in your lordship's dispatch No. 2, I have proposed to Prince Czartoryski, that an accredited person should be sent by the Emperor to Paris, who should be authorized to state the grounds upon which alone, in the opinion of his Imperial Majesty, permanent peace can be established in Europe; I have urged the expediency of sending such a person without loss of time, but Prince Czartoryski seems to be of opinion that the rejection by Bonaparte of the conditions proposed by the Emperor ought to be immediately followed by the commencement of hostilities;—that, therefore, it was desireable, before this step was taken, that the arrangements between the three cabinets of St. Petersburgh, London, and Vienna, should be agreed upon and concluded:—he also hinted, that as all relations between the French Government and that of Russia had been entirely broken off, the Emperor might be indisposed to give the appearance of having any wish to re-establish an intercourse between them;—but begged me to recollect, that he was saying nothing more than what occurred

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to him, personally, upon the first communication of this suggestion.—He asked me if M. Novosiltzoff was not in the contemplation of the British minister, as a proper person to be employed on such a mission? and then added, that the Emperor had learnt, with great pleasure, that the conduct of that gentleman had given so much satisfaction in England.

[No. 9, from Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave, dated St. Petersburg, March 7, 1805, refers to the rupture between Spain and England, and expresses the strong desire of the Russian Court to see the dispute peacefully settled.]

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F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*) *No. 10.*

Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

Downing Street: March 11, 1805.

Your Excellency's dispatches Nos. 4 and 5 have been received and laid before the King.

Their contents could not fail to be highly satisfactory to his Majesty, as they afford the most encouraging prospect that the salutary influence of the exertions of the Emperor of Russia, in conjunction with his Majesty, may at no distant period produce a situation of affairs calculated to deliver Europe from its progressively increasing state of oppression and alarm.

The preparations which have been commenced on the part of the Emperor of Germany, and the increased firmness and energy of the language held by the Austrian minister at Paris, are calculated to create a confident expectation that the Court of Vienna will be disposed to avail itself of the invitation held out by his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia.

Your Excellency will perceive from the nature and amount of the supplies which have been proposed to Parliament, and which are already provided for, that his Majesty has taken measures for the complete performance, on his part, of the proposed concert; and that the necessary means for giving effect to the convention which your Excellency has been instructed to negotiate, have been provided previous to any intimation of its actual conclusion.—This measure, whilst it manifests his Majesty's entire reliance on the

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firmness and decision of his Imperial Majesty, will afford to the Emperor of Germany that security for a liberal and effectual support in the way of subsidy from this country, which your Excellency represents Prince Czartoryski to have stated as so essential for the continuance of the spirited conduct adopted by the Austrian Government. I have also great satisfaction in acquainting your Excellency, that measures are in progress by which there can be little doubt that his Majesty will be enabled to add, very considerably, to the disposeable military force of this country.

His Majesty observes, with great satisfaction, the wise and spirited course which his Imperial Majesty has taken, in sending a person of the tried talents and firm character of Monsieur de Wintzingrode to Berlin, with orders to counteract the injudicious management of Mons^{r} Alopeus, and to deliver to the King of Prussia the genuine sentiments of his Imperial Majesty, with dignified firmness, and in language of that distinct and candid sincerity with which they are conceived.—The long and melancholy display of temporising policy and timid forbearance, which has obscured the lustre of the Prussian character, through the course of many aggravated provocations on the part of France, leaves little ground to hope that Prussia can be brought to join in a concert as important to the security and continuance of that monarchy, as to the essential and permanent interest of Europe, unless the cabinet of Berlin can be rouzed from it's apathy, by the inevitable necessity of taking an active part either with the opressors, or the deliverers of Europe. And it is highly gratifying to his Majesty to find, that the measure which I had the honor to propose, by his Majesty's command, in my dispatch No. 2 is precisely similar to that which has suggested itself to the wisdom of the Emperor of Russia.—Upon the alternative of joining with Russia, or with France, there is great reason to expect that everything which remains of sound policy in the cabinet of Berlin, and every impression of a more timid view of national expediency would equally tend to determine the choice of Prussia to the more efficient and more moderate ally; in whose good faith an implicit confidence can be placed, and the object of whose ambition is confined to the security of the independent States of Europe, (of which Prussia is at present the most exposed and endangered) and to the reduction of an exorbitant Power, whose existence, in it's present state, is incompatible with the general tranquility.

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The opposition given by the Emperor of Russia to the project of the Court of Berlin for the occupation of Hanover, is an additional manifestation of his Imperial Majesty's sense of justice, equity, and honorable policy: whilst a measure so entirely consistent with his Majesty's general views, and so congenial to the whole tenour of his own conduct adds to his Majesty's anxious desire for the most cordial and confidential connection between the two crowns: it will at the same time, if dispassionately considered, hold out to Prussia the best and most incontestable security for the benefit which that monarchy must derive from an alliance contracted with a sovereign influenced by such principles and guided by such motives.

The firm and effectual support which his Imperial Majesty has engaged to afford the King of Sweden beyond the stipulated extent of the alliance subsisting between these Powers, is a further proof of the generous and enlightened view which the Emperor of Russia has taken of the just rights of independent sovereigns, and cannot fail to make a due impression at the Court of Berlin.

It would give me great satisfaction to find that your Excellency had already concluded a treaty on the part of his Majesty with the Emperor of Germany, in consequence of the full powers with which you have been furnished, and which were calculated to be adequate to that object.—The favorable aspect of affairs however, affording at this moment a more immediate prospect of a full and satisfactory termination of the negotiation committed to your Excellency, I send herewith in a separate dispatch the draft of a joint treaty for including such Powers as may become parties to the concert to be executed between your Excellency and the respective ministers of those Powers at Petersburgh. At all events, the dispatches this day received from your Excellency, afford the most flattering prospect of an early conclusion of the important measure in the success of which the future happiness of Europe is so deeply involved.

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Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, (*Draft.*) *No. 11.*

[*Secret.*]

Downing Street: March 15, 1805.

In transmitting to your Excellency the draft of a treaty of alliance to be concluded between his Majesty and the imperial

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Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburgh, there are a few points only to which it appears expedient that I should direct your Excellency's attention.

The treaty is drawn, as your Excellency will perceive, in conformity to the principles laid down in my dispatch No. 2.—The objects specified in the first article of the treaty are in substance the same, though, for obvious reasons, not so distinctly detailed as in the dispatch.

The condition which introduces the provisions of the second article is inserted with reference to the proposed preliminary demands to be made in the name of the Emperor of Russia at Paris,—the particular expression being left for your Excellency's insertion, either according to the circumstance of that step having been already taken,—or with reference to its intended adoption: The description of [the allies] [*sic*] must also depend upon the actual number of the parties to the treaty,—the demand being made in the name of the three Courts, or of the Emperor of Russia separately or in conjunction with his Majesty.

In Article 3, the proportion of force to be respectively supplied by the different Powers is left in blank, to be filled up by your Excellency according to the relative numbers by which the total force of 400,000 men is to be set on foot for active service.

The exorbitant amount of the demand made by Sweden for the number of troops which that Power can supply, is far beyond any calculation on which the pecuniary means of active warfare on the Continent can be furnished by this country. There remain therefore no hopes of Swedish co-operation forming any part of the collective force of the alliance in the field, unless the subsidy to that Power can be brought within the limits of the proportionate payments to be afforded to the other contracting parties.

In the 4th Article, provision for an advance of four months subsidy to defray expences previous to an army taking the field, has been made with reference to the Austrian quota only, because it is not yet precisely ascertained whether a similar advance will be required by Russia as indispensably necessary for the same object: It is earnestly hoped that this will not be the case, and your Excellency will endeavour as far as possible to discourage such a demand; but, if insisted upon, it must of course be complied with, and your Excellency will prepare a corresponding provision to be inserted in the treaty for a proportionate advance

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to the Emperor of Russia; but, in the event of his Imperial Majesty finding his own resources sufficient for the purposes of putting his army in motion, your Excellency will be at liberty to add the amount of the four months subsidy (not required by Russia) to the advance destined for Austria, if it should appear necessary or expedient to make such addition;—or your Excellency may appropriate a part of the four months' advance above mentioned to the object of bringing a Swedish force into action: provided such payment to Sweden shall be clearly understood to be a single and separate disbursement, made with the sole view of putting the Swedish force on foot;—and that the future payments shall not exceed the limited proportion of twelve pounds ten shillings per man for twelve months. And in that case if the Court of Petersburgh should be desirous of admitting the King of Sweden as a party to the treaty, and the Swedish minister at Petersburgh should be duly authorized on his part, your Excellency will by virtue of your full powers, execute the treaty accordingly.

If the Emperor of Russia should absolutely require the four months' advance for the contingent of troops to be supplied by his Imperial Majesty; his Majesty has commanded me to authorize your Excellency even to go to the extent of engaging to advance a further sum of five hundred thousand pounds to Austria, in case it should appear to you that such further advance is actually necessary to enable that Power to enter upon the war with promptitude, vigour and effect.—Your Excellency will however reserve this last concession for the moment at which you shall have ascertained the necessity of that additional spur to the exertions of Austria.

It is a great relief to the anxiety which I must inevitably feel from the precarious and interrupted intercourse at this interesting crisis, when I consider that the conclusion of this important business is committed to the judgment and discretion which your Excellency has manifested in all the preceding conduct of your mission.

I have only to add that should the Court of St. Petersburgh prefer any other *form* of treaty, preserving the whole substance of that which is herewith transmitted, your lordship is empowered to execute it in any mode that to your Excellency's discretion seems best.

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His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, in persuance of their mutual desire of delivering Europe from the calamities which it has long suffered, and the growing dangers with which it is threatened by the restless ambition and exorbitant power of France, and of opposing an effectual barrier against the renewal of such disastrous circumstances, have resolved to employ, in concert, the utmost means in their power for the attainment of those great objects; and for that purpose have named for their plenipotentiaries, viz^{t}—His Britannic Majesty &c.—the Emperor of Germany &c.—and the Emperor of all the Russias &c. . . . who, after having reciprocally exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have concluded and agreed upon the following articles.

ARTICLE 1.

It is hereby agreed and declared that the objects of the concert thus established between their said Majesties are—To provide for the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Germany—To re-establish and secure, in a state of independence the Republics of Holland and of Switzerland—To re-instate the King of Sardinia in the possession of his former dominions—To provide for the security of the kingdom of Naples, and for the complete evacuation of Italy and the north of Germany by the French arms, and to endeavour to form such an arrangement with respect to those countries and to all other acquisitions made since the French Revolution, which may be recovered from France, on the left bank of the Rhine, as shall be judged most proper to constitute an effectual barrier hereafter against future encroachments on the part of France.

ARTICLE 2.

In the event of the French Government refusing to comply with such demands as may be[1] made to them by [the allies], their Majesties agree to furnish respectively, in proportion to their power, such a force as may on the whole amount to an active force of not less than four hundred thousand men.

ARTICLE 3.

The Emperor of Germany, on his part, agrees to bring into the field previous to day of an effective force of not less than and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias agrees, on his part, to bring in like manner into the field previous to the day of an effective force of , to be kept by their said Majesties

[1] The words 'have been' are written above the words 'may be.

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respectively compleat to the numbers respectively stipulated by them or even augmented if necessary, and to be actively employed within such limits, as shall be hereafter agreed upon, according to a plan of operations to be fixed by mutual consent; and his Britannic Majesty on his part agrees to furnish a subsidy to their Imperial Majesties to the amount of one million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds per annum for every hundred thousand men to be so employed, and so in proportion for a greater or less number, payable under the conditions hereinafter specified.

ARTICLE 4.

It is farther agreed that the said subsidies shall be payable by monthly instalments, in proportion to the number of men actually mustered in each month, and employed as before stated, and his Britannic Majesty will further be ready to advance to the Emperor of Germany, in order to defray the necessary expences previous to an Austrian army taking the field, a sum of money equal to four months' subsidy to be advanced for men, and if less than men shall be mustered at the time specified, a sum equal to the sum so paid in advance for the number deficient at such time shall be deducted monthly in equal proportions from the subsequent payments of the current subsidy during the remainder of the year.

ARTICLE 5.

The high contracting parties further agree, that they will not make any separate peace with France, but on the conditions of the objects specified in the first article being fully obtained, and an effectual barrier being established against future encroachments, unless by the common consent of all the Powers who are parties to this treaty, and of such other Powers as may hereafter become parties to the same.

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

His Britannic Majesty, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, and his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, agree to concert hereafter an arrangement whereby the Emperor of Germany and the King of Sardinia shall obtain on the side of Italy, and the King of Prussia (provided his Prussian Majesty shall become a party to this concert) and the Republic of the United Provinces, out of the dominions on the left bank of the Rhine, such an accession of strength as may be not inconsistent with the objects specified in this treaty, and may, at the same time, serve as a compensation proportioned to their respective efforts in the common cause, and likewise contribute to establish a more powerful and effectual barrier against future projects of aggrandizement on the part of France.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 11.*

St. Petersburg: March 22, 1805.

The flattering attention paid to the sentiments of the Emperor of Russia, in the answer of the British Government to the late overture from France, and the liberal and enlightened policy which dictated that answer, have not failed to make a due impression upon the mind of his Imperial Majesty: the cabinet of St. Petersburg concur in the opinion of his Majesty's ministers, that specifick terms of peace should be proposed to the French Government, in order that it may be made manifest to the world, that in carrying on war against France the Courts of London and Russia are influenced by no other consideration than a regard to the tranquility and security of Europe. His Imperial Majesty adopts the suggestion contained in your lordship's dispatch, of sending to Paris an accredited minister, who shall state to Bonaparte in person the grounds upon which alone any hopes of the re-establishment of peace can be entertained.

Your lordship will learn with great satisfaction, that M. Novosilzow is the person to whom this important mission is to be confided. The soundness of his principles, and the firmness of his character, banish those apprehensions which the opening of a negotiation at Paris, between Russia and France would otherwise naturally excite. I am sorry however to observe that there exists a disposition in the cabinet here, to modify the conditions which your lordship states as indispensably necessary, in the opinion of his Majesty's Government, for the permanent safety of Europe.

The exact extent, and nature of these modifications, Prince Czartoriski says, he is not at this moment prepared to state to me with any precision, because the Emperor has not as yet come to any decisive determination upon them, but his Excellency has observed to me in conversation, that if it should appear that Bonaparte was unalterably resolved not to restore Piedmont to its lawful sovereign, that some arrangement might be agreed upon by which that country should be made a part of the intended kingdom of Lombardy and that a very important object would be gained in preventing the union of Piedmont to France as an

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integral part of the French territory, and that although the brother of Bonaparte could not at the present moment be considered as an independent Prince, that circumstances might arise to create divisions between the Government of France and Lombardy. His Excellency suggested that the Ligurian Republick with some considerable extension of the old Genoese territory, might be given as an indemnity to the King of Sardinia,[1] and that this kingdom together with an improved frontier to the Austro-Venetian provinces, might afford considerable security to the Southern States of Italy; in reply, I stated as a general principle, the impolicy, as well as injustice of parcelling out countries without regard to any natural tie and relation between the sovereign and the subject, and added that the strong attachment of the Piedmontese to his Sardinian Majesty, made it peculiarly incumbent upon us in this instance, not to lose sight of this consideration.

Prince Czartorisky replied, that if we insisted upon the total renunciation of so much of what Bonaparte possesses, and upon the evacuation by his troops of all those countries of which he is now in military possession, something should be offered in return to afford him at least the semblance of treating, upon a footing of equality. With this view he asked me, whether in the East Indies we could not cede something (some arrondissement to Pondicherry in itself of little importance) which might be held out to the French nation, as an equivalent for the cessions made by France? I thought it my duty to declare without hesitation, that such an idea could never be listened to by his Majesty's Government, that we had had too much experience of the intriguing spirit of the French in the East Indies, to allow us in any way to facilitate the augmentation of their possessions and influence in that quarter of the world, and that it was not to be expected that we should pay, by the cession of any part of our own territory, for the deliverance of those countries, which had been acquired not only in defiance of the laws of nations, but in direct violation of positive stipulations. I also added, that the utmost sacrifice that Great Britain could be expected to make for the purpose of securing the interests of the Continent, was the restoration of the conquests acquired during the

[1] The annexation of Genoa to Piedmont appears in Czartoryski's draft plan for the reconstruction of Europe, drawn up in 1804. See his *Memoirs*, vol. ii. ch. v.

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present war, and that although I had no instruction which authorized that opinion, I thought it possible that his Majesty might, from his regard to the tranquillity of Europe, be inclined to make that sacrifice. The Prince begged, that in reporting this conversation to my Court, I would avoid giving the impression that there existed here any wish of benefiting France at the expence of Great Britain; on the contrary he could assure me, that the Ministry here were persuaded that in the strength and resources of the latter were to be found the best security to the continental Powers.

M. de Novosilsoff will leave Petersburg towards the end of next week. He will in conformity to the recommendation of his Majesty's Government, pass some days at Berlin, whilst he waits the arrival of a passport from Paris. He will be authorized by the Emperor to demand an audience of the King of Prussia, in which he will be directed to state the object of his mission to Paris, and the terms upon which alone the Court of Russia can consent to a general pacification. He will declare the determination of the Emperor, in the case of such conditions being rejected, to commence vigorous and immediate military operations against France and will endeavour by tempting offers of territorial acquisition, to engage his Prussian Majesty to become a party to a general alliance.

His Imperial Majesty is firmly of opinion, that if the Court of Berlin cannot be bribed into an alliance against Bonaparte, that the effect of menace must be resorted to; it is the fear of a sudden irruption into the Prussian provinces, against which the Government is not prepared with means of resistance, that will produce effect upon the King of Prussia.—If in his way to Paris M. Novosilsow were to declare the determination of his sovereign, not to permit the Court of Berlin to continue longer its present pernicious system of neutrality, the Prussian Ministry being warned of the intentions of Russia, would have time to put their own troops in a state of preparation, and could also have the opportunity of concerting with the French Government, plans of operation for their mutual defence. The language of menace should therefore, it is judged, be removed to the return of M. Novosilsow, when a Russian army might proceed without delay to give effect to such menace. With this view, his Imperial Majesty intends ordering his troops to advance to the Prussian frontiers, so soon as intelligence shall be received of M. Novosilsow's arrival at Berlin.

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The C^te^ de Stadion still continues to assert, that the principles of his Court remain unaltered, but he does not give any satisfactory reason for the non-arrival of his expected instructions to enter into negotiations with Prince Czartorisky and myself; he tries to explain away the obsequious answer of the Emperor of Germany to Bonaparte's notification of his intention to make his brother King of Lombardy,[1] by urging it was written merely with the view of quieting the suspicions of the French Government, and preventing the commencement of the campaign, before the allied Powers are prepared to act, but I find from Prince Czartorisky that the C^te^ de Cobenzl holds rather a wavering and uncertain language, that he talks of the necessity of a defensive rather than an offensive alliance, that he cites a secret article of the Convention of Eichstedt, by which the Court of Vienna guarantys [*sic*] the arrangements, that had been made in Italy up to the date of that convention, as a difficulty in the way of Austria concurring in the demands which the Court of Petersburg requires as conditions of peace with France.[2] Prince Czartoryski has however, through the channel of C^te^ Stadion as well as C^te^ Razumovski, strongly pressed the Austrian Government to instruct their ambassador at Paris to join in M. Novosilsow's representations to Bonaparte.

Your lordship will perceive by this dispatch that the views and sentiments of the British Government are now more justly appreciated by this Court, than when I had last the honor of writing to your lordship M. Novosilsow's report of the unreserved confidence with which he has been treated by his Majesty's ministers during his mission in England, and the satisfactory explanation he has been enabled to offer upon all the points in discussion between the two Governments have put an end to those expressions of disappointment and dissatisfaction which appeared in my first conference with Prince Czartoryski upon your lordship's late communications to Count Woronzow. From the assurances I now receive, I have reason to hope that no insurmountable difficulty will occur in the conclusion of a treaty founded upon the basis of your lordship's *projet*. The Russian cabinet adopt entirely

[1] This plan of making Joseph Bonaparte King of Lombardy came to nothing, because he would no renounce his claim to succeed to the throne of France.

[2] Austria signed two conventions with France at the close of 1802, by which the former gained Eichstadt, Trent, and Brixen, but recognised recent changes made by the French in Italy.

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the principles of that *projet*, and the modifications regard, I am assured, points of detail, to which there can be no objection to accede.

I have repeatedly stated in strong terms the impolicy of losing time in the consideration of points of minor importance, and have represented the necessity of concluding, before the departure of M. Novosilsow; in this opinion that gentleman, and Prince Czartorisky perfectly concur, and I am assured by the latter, that in two days he will be prepared to lay before me the alterations which his Imperial Majesty deems expedient in the proposed arrangement between the two countries.

Your lordship will probably hear from other quarters, that Bonaparte since the receipt of his Majesty's answer to the late overtures from France, has instructed M. Laforet to renew his proposals of reconciliation with this Court; these proposals however contain nothing more than a repetition of the absurd plan of indemnifying the King of Sardinia out of possessions, over which he has neither power nor influence. He proposes that the Septinsular Republic[1] and the Island of Malta should be allotted to his Sardinian Majesty. The Emperor has received this communication with merited contempt, and has returned no answer whatever to the proposition.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 12.*

St. Petersburgh : Friday, March 22, 1805.

The momentary dissatisfaction created here, by the proposed change in the destination of the British troops intended for Mediterranean service, having entirely subsided, I have lately in several conversations with Prince Czartoryski, urged the expediency of supplying the place of those troops by a further augmentation of the Russian army at Corfu.—In these representations I have been joined by the Duke de Serra-Capriola, and though we have not been able to obtain any promise that the Emperor will employ a larger force upon that service, than he had formerly proposed, yet the answers we have both received have led us to indulge the expectation that his Imperial Majesty is not disinclined to make

[1] The Ionian Islands.

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some additions to that army.—At the same time the Prince represented that such disposeable force as we have at Malta (however small it may be) might be ordered to co-operate with the Russians in the south of Italy:—his Excellency also mentioned to me the necessity of our assisting in the transport of the Russian troops, and he particularly desired me to convey to his Majesty's Government the request, that those persons, under whose orders our transport vessels in the Mediterranean were placed, might receive instructions to that effect.

The treaty which has been so long pending between this country and Sweden has at length been signed.[1]—The efficiency however of this treaty depends upon the conclusion of a subsidiary convention with Great Britain;—and the expectations of his Swedish Majesty, with regard to subsidy, are so extravagant, and so wide from the proportion between men and money proposed by his Majesty's Government to the continental Powers, that Prince Czartoryski despairs of any agreement taking place, upon this point, between the Courts of London and Stockholm.—He is therefore endeavouring to settle some additional articles, by which the nullity of the treaty may, in some degree, be remedied.

He is of opinion, that as the necessary means by which the Swedish army could be brought into active service are not forthcoming, that the militia might remain embodied upon the coasts of Sweden, as an army of demonstration, ready to embark at a moment's warning, and that it might thus serve as a very useful check upon the King of Prussia;—that, at any rate, Stralsund must be strongly garrisoned, that such is the importance of this fortified town and port, as a *place d'armes*, that it should on no account be exposed to be taken by a *coup de main*; that in the present state of the King of Sweden's finances even this expence will be with difficulty sustained, and that, towards these important objects, the British Government might be inclined to contribute pecuniary assistance. These seem to be the grounds upon which Prince Czartoryski wishes to procure some additional articles, and his Excellency has promised to lose no time in giving me a copy of the arrangement when it is arrived at it's final conclusion.

[1] See p. 97, n. 2.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia vol. 57, *No. 13.*

St. Petersburg: April 7, 1805.

I have the honor to inform your lordship, that after daily discussions with Prince Czartoryski during the last fortnight, I have at length adjusted with his Excellency the terms of a provisional treaty of alliance between the Courts of London and Petersburg; the exact form of words in which the treaty and the separate articles shall be drawn up have not been quite definitively settled, but I have no doubt of its being signed in the course of three or four days. It appearing to me however highly important that his Majesty's Government should as soon as possible be informed of the terms upon which we have agreed, I will not detain the messenger by writing a detailed account of the *projets*, *contre projets* and discussions which have led to the conclusion of the arrangement, of which the following is the substance.

His Imperial Majesty having communicated his conventions with the Emperor of Germany and the King of Sweden to the Court of London, his Britannic Majesty is willing to fulfill the stipulations of the present concert towards both or either of those Powers, provided that according to their engagements with the Emperor of Russia, they are willing to commence hostilities against France within four months from this date. The King is likewise willing to accede to the arrangements of the Court of Petersburg with Prussia[1] and Denmark so far as they are compatible with the subsequent articles of this treaty.

The contracting parties agree to adopt every measure for the formation of a general league to check the future encroachments of France, and particularly to induce the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia to acceed to the present concert.

It is proposed to effect the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Germany by the French forces, to ensure the independence of Holland and Swisserland [*sic*] by the cession of the Low Countries to the former, of Geneva and Savoy to the latter, to re-establish the King of Sardinia, to obtain security for Naples and the liberation of the rest of Italy, to secure an increase of territory to Austria and acquisitions to other

[1] This refers to the secret Russo-Prussian convention of May 24, 1804 (taking the form of two declarations), providing against any new encroachments of France against the States of North Germany, or any increase of French garrisons there. See the text in Garden's *Traités*, vol. ix. p. 385.

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Powers which may be proportioned to their efforts in the common cause, and consistent with the balance of Europe.

A force of 500,000 men shall if possible be made to act against France, of which number Russia shall bring forward 115,000, and Austria the proportion of 250,000 besides the quota's of other Powers.

His Britannick Majesty engages to assist his allies, by the employment of his fleets, soldiers, and transports, and to furnish subsidies in the proportion of 1,250,000*l.* st. for every 100,000 men.

These sums shall be paid monthly according to the official reports of the armies, at the commencement of each campaign, the mode of payment shall be settled hereafter, although his Majesty promises to advance a part of the yearly subsidy for the expences necessary to put the armies in motion, on condition that the whole sum advanced within a year does not exceed the above proportion.

Persons accredited from their respective Courts, shall be permitted to reside at the head quarters of either army.

Peace shall not take place but with the consent of every party to the alliance, and no Power shall withdraw its forces untill the conclusion of the war.

The Emperor of Russia engages to advance an army of 60,000 men to the frontiers of Austria, and 80,000 men on the side of Prussia, independent of the 115,000 men who are to act against France, although his Britannick Majesty is only bound to subsidize those who quit their own frontier.

Considering the advantages of a general alliance against France, it is farther secretly understood between the contracting parties, that the stipulations of this Act shall be fulfilled towards Sweden and Austria at any time before the expiration of the year 1805, should they be disposed to embark in the common cause against France.

That his Imperial and Royal Majesty may be enabled to recruit his army sufficiently to take the field immediately his Britannick Majesty promises to pay one million of the subsidy in advance to that sovereign after his adhesion to this Act which sum his Britannick Majesty will not reclaim, in case the negotiations at Paris should prove successfull, on condition that in a contrary contingency Austria shall immediately commence hostilities.

Their Majesty's [*sic*] agree not to interfere in the internal government of France, or other countries, to take possession of towns and provinces only in the name of their legitimate sovereigns, and to establish a congress after the war which may settle the publick law of Europe.

Their Majesties agree to make common cause against every Power, which by too close an union with France, may impede the objects of the present alliance.

The advantages which would accrue from the efforts of Spain, and

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Portugal, induce his Britannick Majesty to accept the mediation of Russia in his quarrel, with the former Power, provided that the arrangement shall include a secret article, engaging Spain to join the common cause against France, within three months after the commencement of hostilities.

As a farther inducement for Prussia to come forward, it is proposed to offer that Power the districts ceded to France by the convention of the 5th August 1796,[1] with an arrondissement, provided she engages to form an efficient barrier on her new frontier.

It is agreed to declare that the belligerent Powers will sanction any form of government, compatible with public tranquility in France, they will likewise consent to whatever independent government Holland and Swisserland may adopt; if however Prussia should take a part in the war, they will be happy to see the family of Orange restored to their former dignity.[2]

To convince all Europe of the justice of their intentions, their Majesty's will take every measure to avoid a recourse to arms and his Imperial Majesty will send a plenipotentiary to France charged with the propositions of peace included in the present article to which his Britannick Majesty accedes.

It is resolved to make known to Bonaparte, that a continental war can only be avoided by a more equal balance of power in Europe, and that it is necessary to establish a barrier between France and Holland, a barrier between France and Italy, and the independence of Holland, Suisserland [*sic*], Italy and Germany, which points can only be obtained by reducing the limits of France between the Moselle, the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees.

The contracting parties will submit to the following modifications.—If the King of Sardinia obtains Piedmont with an increase of territory sufficient to render him independent, Bonaparte may be permitted to establish one of his own family in the remainder of the north of Italy.

If Bonaparte is unwilling to accede to these conditions, Piedmont may be ceded as an independent kingdom to his brother, and the King shall receive the Italian Republic, Genoa, and Parma, or either of the following arrangements may take place in favor of his Sardinian Majesty.—1st, that he acquire the Italian Republick to the junction of the Po with the frontier of Parma, the Duchy of Parma, and the

[1] By this the Prussian Government renounced its claims to Geldern on the left bank of the Rhine. See Häusser, vol. ii. pp. 72–73 (edit. of 1869).

[2] The House of Orange was related to that of Hohenzollern, and by the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss of 1803 received Fulda and other smaller domains as a set-off to the loss of its authority and lands in Holland. As the sequel shows, Fulda was to be ceded to Prussia.

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Republic of Genoa; 2d, that he receive Genoa, Parma and the country between the Po and the Tuscan frontier; 3d, or Genoa, Parma, the district of Tortona Lucca, Massa Carrara, Modena and a frontier in the Bolognese.

If Bonaparte wishes to divide the north of Italy, in the first case the Duke of Modena may be restored to his former territories, and the three Legations may be added to Etruria; in the 2d the Elector of Salzburg may be placed at Milan, and the Duke of Modena may have Bergamo and Brescia; in every point of view the contracting parties acknowledge the indispensable necessity of placing Mantua in the possession of Austria.

It is proposed to obtain the re-establishment of the Stadtholder in Holland, the cession of Antwerp, with the territory behind a line drawn from that town to Maestricht, and permission to erect a line of fortresses or to render the Government independent, with permission to fortify the frontier as it existed before the last war.

The French troops shall evacuate the territories of each independent Power. Every State shall be at liberty to build fortresses, and to choose its own form of government.

A general congress shall regulate the interests of the Powers affected by the new arrangements, and more particularly of Germany. The contracting parties are willing to dispose of the indemnities in the possession of the Elector of Salzburg, according to the convention between Russia and Austria. Fulda shall be ceded to Prussia.

The King of England will restore his conquests since the beginning of the present war, and if after every effort Malta cannot be obtained for that Power, it is agreed that rather than break off the negotiation the island shall be evacuated by the British and shall receive a Russian garrison, provided that an ulterior arrangement take place agreable to the inhabitants, but the plenipotentiary shall take no steps in virtue of this article, until he shall be informed that it is approved of by the Court of London.

The King agrees to extend the pacification to Spain and Holland and to acknowledge the King of Etruria. The Emperor will be happy to reestablish a good understanding between France, Sweden and the Porte and to stipulate a clause in favor of Portugal which may protect her from future pecuniary exactions.

I trust that no part of this convention will be found contrary to the spirit of the instructions I have received, although I am aware that in the secret and separate article there are some provisions, upon which I have not had the opportunity of knowing the sentiments of my Court, and to which nothing but the extreme

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importance of immediately concluding an arrangement with this country could possibly have induced me to accede without previous authority from your lordship.

The concurrence of sentiment, and union of views which appeared in the discussions with M. Novosilzow at London will lead, I fear, his Majesty's Government almost to distrust my account of the difficulties I have had to encounter in the negotiation with Prince Czartoryski. The variety of new matter brought forward by the Russian minister, and the tenacity with which he adhered to many of his propositions, had nearly made me despair of being able to agree upon any terms, and I must intreat your lordship not to consider whether it would have been desirable that many of the articles should have been omitted, but whether the whole, such as it is, is preferable to no treaty at all.

I strenuously endeavoured to prevent the introduction of so great a mass of additional articles, and particularly that which contains the modification of the terms of peace which M. Novosilzow will be authorized to propose to the French Government. I found however the Emperor was quite decided not to send to Paris a plenipotentiary, merely to make the declaration of the conditions stated in your lordship's dispatch, and that he was also equally determined not to conclude a treaty of offensive operation against France, if I refused to agree to the proposition of such terms as your lordship will find in the article above alluded to. No consideration however, not even the certainty of a total rupture of the negotiations between Great Britain and Russia could have induced me to consent to two provisions, which untill yesterday had been insisted upon by Prince Czartoryski, as a *sine quâ non* in the conditions of the treaty; the one that I should on the part of Great Britain assent to M. Novosilzow's engaging that the Emperor of Russia should use his *bons offices* with his Majesty, to submit to such reforms in the present Maritime Code, as a congress composed of the great continental Powers might deem expedient. The other, that if the rupture of the negotiation at Paris should turn upon the demand of the restitution of Malta, that M^{r} Novosilzow should be authorized to promise the evacuation upon the condition of the island being garrisoned by Russian troops. Both these propositions have (notwithstanding repeated threats of breaking up the negotiation) been given up, the former by totally expunging the article, the second by the addition of a restriction,

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which in fact renders the provision itself quite null, for it is left perfectly open to his Majesty's ministers to assent or to refuse such authority being given to M. Novosilzow, according as in their judgement they shall think fit.[1] For the last three days indeed, Prince Czartoryski and M. Novosilzow have been labouring to persuade me to omit the restrictions, and to sign the article *sub spe rati*; in this latter case his Majesty's Government would be left at liberty without assigning any reason to refuse the ratification of the article, but the conduct of their plenipotentiary must have been disavowed, and the Russian cabinet, if the opportunity had occurred, might have taken steps before the opinion of his Majesty's Government could have been known; that something of this nature was in view I have reason to imagine, from the urgent manner in which Prince Czartoryski this very day pressed me, that instead of the words 'faire des démarches en vertu de cet article' there should be substituted the words 'prendre des engagemens.'

There is another article upon the subject of which, having received no instructions from your lordship, I feel it necessary to explain the reasons which induced me not to withhold my assent, I mean that by which the Court of Vienna is to receive for her warlike preparations, one million of money, which shall not be reclaimed in the case of peace being the result of the negotiation at Paris.—Such is the state of the Austrian finances, that the Court of Vienna will not incur the risk of expending a very large sum of money in preparation, unless some security is given that she shall be in some measure indemnified.—Three months at least, it is affirmed, are necessary for putting the Austrian army upon its complete war establishment; if the Emperor of Germany does not therefore begin his preparations till the return of M. Novosilzow from Paris, his troops will not be ready to take the field till after the season for a campaign is over. In the event of war we gain time, and lose no money by this arrangement; in the improbable event of peace, I trust that that million will not be thought to be ill expended, which has produced such a demonstration of force as will probably have been the greatest inducement to Bonaparte to subscribe to our conditions.

[1] Nevertheless, as is well known, the Russian Government insisted on the surrender of Malta by Great Britain forming part of the treaty, as sent to London. See Martens, *Traités*, vol. xi. pp. 108 *et seq.*

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I shall wait with feelings of the utmost anxiety the opinion of my sovereign upon my conduct; the situation in which I have been placed has been arduous and difficult; I have on the one hand had before me the fear of breaking up by too much pertinacity a negotiation embracing objects of the most transcendent importance to the peace and tranquility of all Europe, on the other hand the fear of sacrificing with too little caution, the peculiar interests of Great Britain, in favour of the Powers of the Continent.[1]

[The draft of the treaty which follows is not printed here, as it is practically identical with the final treaty which, along with the separate and additional articles, is printed in the Appendix.]

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 14.*

St. Petersburg: April 12, 1805.

I have the honor to transmit to your lordship a provisional treaty of alliance between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg, which was signed last night on the part of his Majesty by myself, and on that of the Emperor of Russia by Prince Czartoryski and M. Novosilzow.

My dispatch of Sunday last containing an abstract of the terms will have already apprised your lordship of the provisions, upon which I had agreed with Prince Czartoryski.

Their form however has undergone considerable alteration since I signified to the Prince the probability of his Majesty's ministers finding it necessary to submit the treaty to the consideration of Parliament, therefore suggesting the propriety of leaving nothing in the body of the Act from the publication of which any inconvenience might arise. All mention of the proportion of force which each Power is expected to bring into the field, and every allusion to particular and secret conventions between this and other Courts, from this consideration has been

[1] As to Lord G. L. Gower's firmness, see Czartoryski's and Novossiltzoff's letters of this date to Woronzow at London, in the *Archives Woronzoff*, vol. xv. p. 292, vol. xviii. p. 458.

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omitted in the treaty itself and transferred into the separate articles.—Notwithstanding however, the present innocent and contracted state of the body of the treaty, the Russian minister has expressed to me very strongly his wishes, that it may not be made public till after the return of M. Novosilzow from Paris.

I should waste your lordship's time and unnecessarily detain the messenger were I to enter into a detailed history of the frequent conferences I have had with Prince Czartoryski, which have terminated in the present arrangement; it will be sufficient for me to state such leading features of the negotiation as are essentially requisite for the information of his Majesty's Government, and for the justification of my own conduct.

The inclosed paper marked A[1] contains on the one side the *contre-projet*, as read and delivered to me by Prince Czartoryski, and on the other the alterations which (after much discussion and after receding from many objections, which in the first instance I deemed it to be my duty to urge) I represented as the utmost limit to which I could venture to go, in compliance with the views and notions of his Imperial Majesty. The objections which I stated upon the first perusal of the *contre-projet* were chiefly directed against the length and speculative tendency of the separate articles, and particularly of that which contains the basis of the terms of peace proposed to be offered to the French Government. I stated that that variety of plans, for the arrangement of affairs in the north of Italy, appeared to open a door to a long and unnecessary negotiation, of which M. Bonaparte would not fail to profit, and that I therefore could not but express my conviction of the superior policy of adopting the plan recommended by his Majesty's Government stating distinctly certain conditions by a compliance with which alone on the part of France a continental war could be avoided.

I then added that I had no instructions authorizing me to agree to the cession of any of the conquests made by his Majesty's forces during the present war, but that I was so convinced of the moderation of the views of the British Government, and so persuaded of the disposition of my sovereign to sacrifice everything (not essentially necessary for the security of the permanent interests of England) to the peace and tranquility of Europe, that I would take upon myself the responsability of agreeing that M. Novosilzow

[1] This is missing.

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should, in return for the cessions expected from Bonaparte, offer the restitution of these conquests, but that with respect to giving any addition to the French possessions in the East Indies, and the evacuation of Malta by the British, I thought it necessary to declare in the first instance I could never take upon myself to consent; that it was also equally impossible for me to agree to any article which in the most indirect manner implied that some alteration might be expedient in the present system of maritime law, or that the British Government could under any circumstances be induced to subscribe to any other principles than those now established.

In reply it was urged by Prince Czartoryski, that to send M. Novosilzow charged merely with the conditions specified in your lordship's dispatch, unauthorized to agree to any modification whatever, so far from conciliating the public opinion of Europe, would have directly the contrary effect, that it was only by proving to the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia that Bonaparte resisted every variation of equitable arrangement that the Courts of Vienna and Berlin could be brought to take up arms against France, and this opinion was so firmly rooted in the mind of his Imperial Majesty that if I persisted in not admitting any deviation from the conditions suggested by your lordships [that] all idea of joint negotiation with the Court of St. Petersburg must be entirely abandoned.

That with respect to Malta, the Emperor of Russia would certainly prefer, if that point could be obtained, that it should remain in the possession of England, and it was only in the case of the evacuation being made a *sine qua non* by Bonaparte, in the conclusion of a general peace, that his Imperial Majesty would consent to garrison the fortress; that after the frequent declarations of the Court of London that his Britannic Majesty only retained Malta, because no other certain means could be devised for its security, to refuse such terms when they were offered to us would create a doubt in the mind of the public upon the truth of our former declarations, and cast a suspicion upon the sincerity of our present wishes for the restoration of peace.—The question of maritime law was by no means introduced with the idea of effecting any change in the present system, upon which England acted, and of the soundness of which M. Novosilzow professed himself to be convinced, but with a view by an impartial discussion, to establish

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the recognition of its justice by the other Powers of Europe. It would be endless to attempt to put down upon paper the arguments used on both sides upon these different questions. Your lordship will see by the alterations in the margin of the *contre projet*, how far I receded from the objections which I had urged in my first conversation. For ten days after this time, I was sometimes separately, sometimes jointly, attacked by Prince Czartoryski, and M. Novosilzow, the same arguments were repeated, interspersed with intimations that by my obstinacy upon the two articles regarding the question of maritime law, and the evacuation of Malta, I should entirely break off the cordial and confidential connexion between the two Courts.—I could hardly believe that they really attached to these articles the importance they represented, but I imagined they shrunk from the obligations they would have contracted by the stipulations of the treaty, and that they used these points as a pretext to defer the conclusion of an alliance till they received some more certain assurances of the co-operation of the Court of Vienna.

On Saturday last however they abandoned both these questions, and the terms of the convention were finally adjusted.

I will now proceed as shortly as possible, to make such observations as appear to me necessary upon the treaty itself.

The body of the treaty is strictly conformable to what is contained in the English *projet*, with the exception of that part of the fourth article which relates to the monthly payment of subsidy. It was proposed by your lordship that the amount should be regulated each month, according to the number of men actually mustered. I found from Prince Czartoryski and Count Stadion, that both their Imperial Majesty's [*sic*] would revolt at the idea of an English commissary mustering the number of men in each regiment.[1] I therefore proposed that our payments should be regulated according to the officiall monthly reports of the state of the respective armies, and that English officers should reside at the head quarters of each, to whom every necessary information should be afforded. To the residence of officers at the head

[1] The British proposal on this head was due to the neglect of its allies in the previous wars to keep up their forces to the numbers agreed upon and subsidised. Woronzow, in a letter of January $\frac{9}{21}$, 1805, to Czartoryski, stated that both the Prussian and Austrian forces were but half of those subsidised by Great Britain. (Czartoryski, *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 71.)

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quarters no objection was made, but to the payments being regulated according to monthly report, it was objected by Prince Czartoryski, that such an agreement would be a premium to that army which least exposed itself to the dangers of loss, and that while the army of one Power was by its bravery and vigour doing much for the common cause, it was hard that it should be deprived of those advantages which that of another continued to enjoy on account of inactivity. I found so great a repugnance to anything that had the appearance of hiring out their soldiers, that I was induced to agree to the arrangement proposed by Prince Czartoryski.

The 1st and 2nd separate articles were part of the body of the *contre projet*, but were transferred into separate articles, that in case the treaty was laid before Parliament, the secret conventions made by the Court of Petersburg with those of Vienna, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Berlin might not become public. It appeared to me that these articles (with the restriction which I added as to the time for which England is bound to the fulfillment towards each Power of the stipulations of the present concert) were perfectly conformable to the spirit of your lordship's instructions.

The 3rd and 4th separate articles are also extracted from the body of the *contre projet*, and with a slight variation as to the manner in which the 400,000 men shall be composed are exactly taken from your lordship's *projet*. The Swedes have been omitted, because from the exorbitancy of their pecuniary demands, there seems little hope of their becoming active members of the proposed coalition.

The 5th article I subscribed to with great unwillingness, and upon that point I did not expect to encounter such determined resistance.—Your lordship however will be less surprized at the pertinacity with which Prince Czartoryski insisted upon this article of money, when I mention that his Excellency proposed to me that our first monthly subsidy should be considered as being due from the time when the Russian troops were assembled in force upon the Prussian and Austrian frontiers. He repeated to me he had received a letter from the Chancellor Woronzow,[1] in which that minister counsels him on no account to conclude a

[1] Brother of Count Simon Worońzow (Vorontsoff), the Russian ambassador in England.

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subsidiary treaty with England, but upon condition that our subsidy commences at the beginning of the year.

The Prince also proposed, that we should pay for their sailors serving in the Mediterranean in the same proportion as for their land forces. I had great difficulty in beating down the terms to three months. The treaty with Russia concluded by Lord Whitworth has been over and over again quoted to me to prove the moderation of the present demand; by that treaty England engaged to pay two months' subsidy after the return of the troops within their own frontier.

I mention these circumstances to prove that I have not hastily and inconsiderately agreed to this article, but it appeared that I had no chance of obtaining the abandonment of their demand but by delaying to conclude the treaty, and the necessity of a speedy arrangement induced me to give my assent.—I added the last paragraph relating to the army at Corfu, in order to avoid any misunderstanding which might arise in the construction of this article, with respect to those troops who have quitted for some time the frontiers of Russia.

The general principles in the 6th article perfectly accord with those contained in your lordship's letter to Count Woronzow upon this subject.

The 7th separate article is exactly formed upon the principle of the separate article attached to the English *projet*.

To the 8th separate article I am authorised to accede by your lordship's dispatch No. 6.

The 9th article I have agreed to, without any instructions whatever, but the principles of it appeared to me in themselves so just, and so exactly conformable to what is contained in his Majesty's declaration upon the commencement of hostilities with Spain, that after tying down the Court of Madrid with somewhat more precision than was originally proposed, I could feel no hesitation in assenting to it.

I have in the beginning of the dispatch informed your lordship of my attempt to exclude altogether the 10th article, and to substitute in its place a simple declaration such as is contained in your lordship's dispatch No. 2. The impossibility of having succeeded in this object is evident, from the extreme difficulty that has occurred in obtaining the omission of such stipulations as were inserted in that part of the *contre projet*, to

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which I deemed it to be my duty on no account to subscribe.

I have been the more readily induced to admit the varied modifications of arrangement for the north of Italy from being persuaded that notwithstanding their moderation, there is little probability under any circumstances of their being agreed to by Bonaparte and no chance whatever of their being accepted, if Great Britain is determined to retain the Island of Malta. I should certainly have not agreed to any mention of Malta, if I had not been satisfied that his Majesty's Government were in no degree fettered by this article in their determination of that question. Your lordship will perceive considerable alteration in this article as it is at present drawn up from what it was when first presented to me, and I hope will be of opinion that all the most objectionable parts have been omitted.

The eleventh article I have agreed to, though wholly unauthorized by instructions, but it appeared so advantageous to the common cause that Austria should lose no time in preparing herself to begin the campaign, either with a view to the conclusion of peace, or to the event of war, and this object being unattainable for a less sum than one million, I did not think myself justified in refusing my consent to the article.

The 1st separate and secret article is an extension of the principles contained in the 6th. I should have been better satisfied that these principles had been expressed in fewer and more general words, but after Prince Czartoryski consented to omit those parts which appeared to me most objectionable in this article of the original *contre projet*, I could not withold my concurrence to it as it is at present drawn up.

The second separate and secret article I agreed to as a sort of compromise, for the necessary insertion of the four months which I had insisted should appear in the first separate article which was to be communicated to the Court of Vienna.—It was certainly desirable that the Austrian Ministry should have an interest in not delaying the period of commencing hostilities, though I could not obtain the concurrence of Prince Czartoryski to this provision, but by consenting to a secret article between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg, by which a farther extension of time should be given to the Emperor of Germany to become a member of the alliance against France.

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The enclosed declaration B [1] signed by Prince Czartoryski and M. Novosilzow was delivered to me immediately after the signature of the treaty. I expressed my regret that his Imperial Majesty had judged it expedient, that the Plenipotentiaries should give in a paper of that nature upon any such frivolous objection as that to which the declaration alludes, but at the same time I promised to forward it to your lordship together with the treaty of alliance.

Such my lord are the observations with which I have felt it necessary to accompany the treaty I have concluded with this Court. I am aware of the responsibility I have incurred, and shall look with a very anxious eye for the approbation of my sovereign; my conduct has been guided by what in my conscience I thought best for the interests of my country, and with the latitude afforded by the instructions I have received, I could not I thought consistently with my duty risk the rupture of the negotiation, and even three months delay in the conclusion of it, by witholding my signature from the conditions of the alliance which I now transmit.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 15.*

St. Petersburg: April 14, 1805.

Your lordship's dispatch of the 28th February enclosing the letters which had passed between the British and French Governments relative to the appointment of a Commissary of Prisoners in France, were received at the end of last week and communicated to me by Prince Czartoryski. This intimation of the unwillingness of Bonaparte, to admit the interference of any third Power in the negotiations for peace, has made no alteration in the determination of the Emperor to demand passports for M. Novosilzow. I have the honor of transmitting to your lordship a copy of Prince Czartoryski's dispatch to M. Alopeus, by which that minister is directed to request the Court of Berlin, to make known to the French Government the intention of his Imperial Majesty, to send a plenipotentiary to Paris, and to require the necessary passports for that purpose.

The King of Prussia has such a dread of being forced to take

[1] See Appendix.

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part in the war between Russia and France, that he will use every possible effort to obtain the acquiescence of Bonaparte to this proposal.—I have however the satisfaction of informing your lordship, that M. Winzingerode's last reports from Berlin lead us to indulge more sanguine hopes than we have hitherto entertained as to the ultimate conduct of that Court, and Prince Czartorisky does not despair, when once the imperial armies are in motion against France, of his Prussian Majesty being induced to join the confederacy. I was proceeding to state that no late accounts had arrived from Vienna, when I received a letter from Prince Czartoryski requesting to see me. He sent to me for the purpose of shewing some dispatches and private letters, which he had just received by a courier from C^te^ Razumovski,[1] the contents of which I very evidently perceived had much depressed his spirits. It appears by these dispatches that the Russian ambassador had communicated to Count Cobenzl the general plan of alliance, which the Courts of London and Petersburg were engaged in forming; the objects to which that alliance was directed, and the intention of the Emperor before he had recourse to measures of hostility, to send a plenipotentiary to Paris charged with the proposal of equitable conditions for a general pacification. He had called upon the Austrian minister to second his Imperial Majesty in the pursuit of this object to prepare for war, in case every effort to obtain by negotiation a just settlement of the affairs of Europe should prove ineffectual.

Count Razumovski had three conferences with C^te^ Cobenzl, and was unable to extract any other than an evasive answer to these propositions. During the continuance of the conferences, the news of the junction of the Crowns of France and Italy had arrived at Vienna and a letter from Bonaparte to the Emperor of Germany, announcing that event. In this letter are explained his reasons for placing upon his own head the crown of Italy, which he promises to surrender into other hands when the Islands of Malta and Corfu are, according to his expression, restored to their independence. This news from Paris, which it might have been imagined would have quickened the movements of the Court of Vienna, in joining with those of Russia and England, seems to have produced no effect upon the panic-struck mind of C^te^

[1] Russian ambassador at Vienna.

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Cobenzl, and the last conference ended with that minister saying, that the proposition made by the Russian ambassador was one of the greatest importance, that it required mature consideration, but that in a few days he would send a courier to Count Stadion with the answer of his Court.

The contents of these dispatches gave occasion to a very long conversation with Prince Czartoryski and M. Novosilzow, which the necessity of sending off immediately the messenger with the treaty will not allow me time to detail to your lordship. I cannot however omit to mention, that Prince Czartoryski indirectly expressed his regret that the treaty with England was already signed, that if he had any notion that the Court of Vienna would not join with this country, he should have felt it necessary to have made my agreement without any restriction to the evacuation of Malta a *sine qua non* condition of M. Novosilzow being sent to Paris.

I resisted an idea started by Prince Czartoryski of countermanding the instructions sent to M. Alopeus, and his Excellency immediately abandoned it. He asked me what was to be done in the event of Bonaparte's refusing to receive a plenipotentiary from the Emperor and rejecting the conditions which M. Novosilzow was authorized to offer? what means had Russia unsupported by any other continental Power, of enforcing by arms those cessions from France which she demanded as the price of peace?

I answered that one word of encouragement to the King of Naples, to resist the continually repeated aggressions upon the independence of his Sicilian Majesty, followed up by sending a Russian army to his assistance, would produce the *casus fœderis*, in which Austria is bound by her convention of the 6th Nov^{r} to assist this country with all her forces. Both Prince Czartoryski and M. Novosilzow agreed, that if the Emperor of Germany could not be persuaded into the alliance, he must by such means as these be entrained. But the danger in the prosecution of this plan would arise from Austria being engaged in hostilities before she was prepared for war.

I cannot conclude without expressing the satisfaction I derived from the extreme openness with which Prince Czartoryski and M. Novosilzow conversed. It seemed to be their intention to establish a system of unreserved communication, and confidential intercourse, such as ought to be the result of the treaty of alliance,

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by which the two Courts are connected, and which it will be my earnest desire to cultivate, by every means in my power.

[A despatch from Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower (No. 12), dated Downing Street, April 17, 1805, rebuts the charges made by the Russian Government against England for the rupture with Spain and the delay in sending British troops to the Mediterranean. In a 'private' despatch of the same date Lord Mulgrave refers to the circumstances attending the resignation of Lord Melville, and states that even a possible change of Ministry would not endanger the Anglo-Russian negotiations for an alliance. A further despatch from Lord Mulgrave, dated Downing Street, April 22, 1805, to Count [Simon] Woronzow, recounts the aims of the British Government for the settlement of Europe.]

[Lord G. L. Gower's despatch (No. 18) intimates to Lord Mulgrave that the Russian Government will not object to the construction of British ships of war, but that it can only be done at Archangel.]

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 19.*

St. Petersburg: April 25, 1805.

By a Russian courier last week, I had the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your lordship's dispatches No. 10 and No. 11. I took an early opportunity of communicating the former to Prince Czartoryski, together with the *projet* which your lordship had proposed for a Triple Alliance between the Courts of London, St. Petersburg and Vienna.—The Prince expressed an opinion that it would save time and discussion, if instead of arranging a new treaty of Triple Alliance, the Court of Vienna were simply to accede to that already concluded between Great Britain and Russia.

The courier so long expected by Count Stadion is not yet

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arrived, and the Russian Government still remains in anxious suspence as to the ultimate decision of the Emperor of Germany. The Austrian ambassador has however received dispatches by Estafette, which lead him to entertain sanguine hopes that in a very few days he shall receive satisfactory instructions from his Court. Count Cobenzl, he says, is perfectly impressed with the necessity of opposing a barrier to the daily augmenting pretensions of Bonaparte, and his Court is determined not to acknowledge the new King of Italy; if such be indeed its fixed determination, it would seem that it can pursue no other system, than intimate and close connexion with Great Britain and Russia.

The latitude afforded me by your lordship's dispatch No. 11, makes me feel very confident that the formation of the triple confederacy will not fail from any disagreement as to the amount of our pecuniary advances, but I can assure your lordship, that I will not agree to the last additional 500,000*l.* until I am perfectly persuaded that that advance is absolutely necessary towards obtaining the immediate and vigorous co-operation of Austria.

The last accounts from Stockholm would not permit me to entertain any hopes of bringing into action a Swedish force even if the four months of advance of subsidy to Russia had not been insisted upon by this Court, and I had consequently had it in my power to make the offer of it to the King of Sweden.

I find that his Swedish Majesty objects to the secret article, proposed by Prince Czartoryski, and that his present demands of pecuniary supply are not much abated from his original expectations.

M. de Zastrow, who, by accounts from Berlin, it appears is charged with a special mission to this Court and who is instructed to enter into confidential explanations upon many of the points brought into discussion by M. de Winzingerode, is not yet arrived.[1] I trust he will bring with him the confirmation of those good dispositions, of which I had the honor to inform your lordship, in a former dispatch.

[1] For General von Zastrow's mission to the Russian Court, and his instructions, see Hardenberg's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. pp. 153 *et seq.*

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Lord Mulgrave to Count [Simon] Woronzow.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: May 7, 1805.

Since I had the honour of addressing your Excellency, by his Majesty's command, on the 22nd of April, in answer to the note of your Excellency dated on the preceeding day, I have received from his Majesty's ambassador at St. Petersburgh a summary account of the modifications of his Majesty's original proposals which had been suggested and insisted upon by the Court of St. Petersburgh; together with heads of the provisions and stipulations, prepared to be inserted in a treaty about to be concluded in conformity to the conditions which had ultimately been agreed upon.

The substance of this dispatch I had the honor to state to your Excellency in a confidential conversation on the day after I had received it.

In consequence of the conditional authority to Monsieur Novosiltzoff to speak on his Majesty's behalf, which I had the honor of notifying to your Excellency in my letter of the 22nd ult°, I am now commanded by his Majesty again to address myself to your Excellency.

The King observes that the modifications urged and assented to, fall considerably short of the conditions originally proposed by his Majesty, as necessary for the security of Europe, and of those which his Majesty had believed to have been so considered by the Court of St. Petersburgh.—His Majesty also observes that an additional object of exertion and expence on the part of his Majesty is introduced by the stipulation of assistance with transports:—Such however is the zeal for the welfare of Europe, such the desire to afford effectual relief to the Powers of the Continent which animate his Majesty's mind, that although the prospect of advantage be circumscribed, and the proportionate exertion required from his Majesty extended, the King is notwithstanding disposed to admit of the modifications, and to consent to the additional contribution, content (if perfect security cannot at present be exacted) that at least some present improvement shall be procured to the existing state of Europe, and brighter hopes held out to the greater means and energy of future times.

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His Majesty therefore, having restricted the authority given to Mons^r^ Novosiltzoff to modifications consistent with the great outline detailed in my letter of the 22nd of April, as introductory to that credential, deems it expedient to notify to your Excellency that Monsieur Novosiltzoff's authority to speak in his Majesty's name continues valid under the conditions now stipulated, with the exception of one point which is stated, by his Majesty's ambassador to rest in suspence under the agreements at St. Petersburgh, and to remain subject to the reserved decision of his Majesty.—That point is the surrender of Malta, if, after every effort to preserve it to his Majesty, the evacuation of that island should be absolutely insisted upon by the chief of the French Government. The frankness which at all times characterizes the King's conduct and which is most peculiarly due to the intimate and cordial connection which subsists between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, renders it expedient at once to declare that no contingent or eventual cession of this important and only remaining object of British interest under the concert, should be offered or admitted amongst the conditions to be proposed by Mons^r^ Novosiltzoff on the part of his Majesty.

The importance of Malta to his Majesty's distant possessions is become obvious, since the manifestation of the French views in Egypt, and of the evident danger which may from thence arise to the British possessions in India.

The necessity of a secure port in the Mediterranean not liable to capture on a sudden attack at the commencement of war; and the assuring thereby a ready opposition to the maritime operations of France from her ports and arsenals in that quarter to whatever object they may be directed, are considerations of such importance to the interests of Great Britain, that if they be duly estimated upon the principles of the friendly, cordial, and enlightened system of policy of the Emperor of Russia, his Imperial Majesty will probably not be disposed to urge or to wish for such a sacrifice; which could not indeed be deemed consistent, either with the just consideration due to his Majesty as a member of the proposed concert, with the general feelings of his people, or with the essential interests of his dominions.

Were his Majesty disposed to seek for peace (without regard to the interests and independance of the Powers of Europe) by the sacrifice of the Island of Malta, and of the possession of any

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secure harbour in the Mediterranean, there can be little doubt that his Majesty might negotiate a separate pacification, on terms which would even diminish the danger to be apprehended in the East Indies from the invasion of Egypt by the French. But his Majesty is by no means disposed to contemplate or pursue the interests of his own dominions separate from, or unconnected with, the essential interests, the substantial security, or the permanent independence of the Powers of Europe—his Majesty on the contrary is persuaded, that all these objects (more especially with reference to the south of Europe) are intimately connected with the possession of Malta by Great Britain.

It is well known to your Excellency that when the Island of Malta was conferred on the Order of St. John of Jerusalem by the Emperor Charles the 5th in the year 1530, a principal inducement for placing that most important port in the hands of the Order, was the expectation of deriving essential services against the then existing enemy of Christendom, from the military marine, and from the peculiar object and interests of that institution.—The means, the character and the constitution of the Order are no longer adequate to the benefits which may be derived from the valuable naval station of Malta, and it is as a British port and arsenal alone that it can contribute to check the progress (in that quarter) of the present common enemy of Europe. His Majesty therefore, in reserving to himself the possession of Malta, consults the interests of Europe in common with his own; by the retention of this only exception to the national sacrifices which accompany his Majesty's great and almost unlimited exertions in the common cause.[1]

In entering so fully into the discussion of this object with your Excellency, I conduct myself in conformity to the principle of the cordial and unreserved confidence with which his Majesty has determined to cultivate the union of interests and sentiment which so happily subsists between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia.

[1] That Count Woronzow was convinced of the necessity of Malta to Great Britain may be seen by his private letters of May 10 and May 18, 1805, to Prince Czartoryski. (Czartoryski, *Memoirs*, vol. ii. pp. 74, 75.)

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F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*) *No. 14.*

Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

Downing Street: May 11, 1805.

Your Excellency's most important dispatch No. 13 has been laid before his Majesty, and I am commanded to express to your Excellency his Majesty's highest approbation of the zeal, discretion and judgment with which your Excellency has conducted every stage of this most arduous and delicate transaction.

In consequence of the information communicated in your Excellency's dispatch, I was commanded by his Majesty to prepare and transmit the inclosed letter to Count Woronzow, to be forwarded, without delay, to M^r^ Novosilzoff that he might be fully apprised of his Majesty's sentiments on the points proposed to be included in the conditions of peace to be opened to Monsieur Bonaparte. If Monsieur Novosilzoff should not have left St. Petersburgh when your Excellency shall receive this dispatch, it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you should immediately communicate to him my letter to Count Woronzow. I have sent by this opportunity a duplicate of the same letter to be delivered to Monsieur Novosilzoff at Berlin, if he should have reached that city on his way to the chief of the French Government,—or to be forwarded from thence by a messenger in the event of his having quitted Berlin to proceed on his journey.

The treaty signed by your Excellency and by Prince Czartorisky, with the accompanying dispatch and private communications, have been received.—I reserve what I may have to say on the subject of the treaty to a future dispatch, when that instrument shall have received the consideration of his Majesty's Government.

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Ibid. *No. 20.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

St. Petersburg: May 12, 1805.

Your lordship will receive through the hands of Count Woronzow, different plans of campaign which have been proposed

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by this cabinet, and that of Austria, for carrying on a continental war against France. The last which was only sent by a courier this morning to Vienna, is formed upon a much larger scale than any that had hitherto been in the contemplation of the two Courts, and is founded upon the active service of a greater number of Russian troops, than this Court had engaged to furnish by the stipulations of the treaty which I signed a month ago. By the provisions of that treaty it appeared to me, that the Court of London was bound to contribute pecuniary assistance towards this augmentation of the Russian force, but Prince Czartoryski being desirous that before the communication of this project to the Court of Vienna I should sign an article, expressly binding my Court to subsidize this additional number of Russian soldiers, which the Emperor proposes bringing into the field, and the plan itself appearing well calculated to attain in a short time the object of the continental confederacy and to decide the wavering councels of the Austrian Government, I did not refuse to comply with the wishes of the Russian minister and on Friday last signed the enclosed article.[1]

The conduct of the Court of Vienna is wholly inexplicable, and has created considerable doubts in the minds of the Russian Ministry. Three months have elapsed since Count Stadion has received a courier from his Court, notwithstanding the repeated promises during the last six weeks of Count Cobenzl to Count Razumovskoi, that the Austrian ambassador here should be immediately furnished with ample instructions upon the convention concluded between England and Russia, and to which the Court of Vienna had been called upon, to accede as a principal party.

It is indeed rumoured that the Austrian Government is endeavouring to obtain by negotiation from that of France, some new acquisition of territory in Germany, that this negotiation has for object the appropriation of Bavaria to the House of Austria, and the placing the dispossessed Elector at the head of the Government of Holland, and that in order to propitiate the good will of Bonaparte, that C^te^ Cobenzl had betrayed to M. de la Rochefoucault the arrangements, concluded between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg; at the same time that Prince Czartoryski mentioned to me these reports, he assured me that he gave no credit to

[1] See Appendix.

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them notwithstanding the late conduct of the cabinet of Vienna could not but raise doubts of its sincerity, and fair dealing.

By the last dispatches however, which have been sent to Count Razumovskoi, that ambassador is directed to express in very strong terms, the dissatisfaction of the Emperor of Russia at the delay in returning an answer to the communications made by this Court, and to state that a perseverance in such conduct, was totally incompatible with the continuance of amicable, and intimate relations, hitherto subsisting between the two imperial Courts.

Instructions have been sent to General Winzingerode, to proceed to Vienna, to second the representations of Count Razumovskoi, and to assist in concerting military operations with the Austrian Government, since which letters have been received from the General giving notice of his intention to return to Petersburg, in order to communicate many things which he finds it difficult to express accurately in a dispatch.

Prince Czartoryski has sent a letter to meet him upon the road, leaving it to the discretion of General Winzingerode to decide, whether the communications he wishes to make in person, outweigh the advantage which the Russian cabinet expects may be derived, from his immediate presence at Vienna.

Count Stadion persists in holding out expectations, that he shall soon receive his instructions, and that those instructions will be satisfactory, and attributes the delay that has intervened to the occasional and severe illnesses of Count Cobenzl.

General Zastrow arrived here on Tuesday last, and on Wednesday had a private audience of the Emperor. Prince Czartoryski informs me that the conversation of this General, leads him to think sanguinely of the future conduct of the Court of Berlin and he entertains hopes, that the King of Prussia will join the alliance of England, Russia, and Austria, whenever the two imperial Courts are actually engaged in hostilities against France; if this disposition does exist in the mind of his Prussian Majesty, it cannot fail being confirmed by the report which General Zastrow will have to make, of the strong and decisive language he has heard, from the mouth of his Imperial Majesty.

[No. 21, from Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave, dated St. Petersburg, May 12, 1805, describes Czartoryski's arguments in

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favour of special efforts being made by Great Britain so as to enable Sweden to join the coalition with a force of 10,000 to 20,000 men.]

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 22.*

St. Petersburg: May 12, 1805.

The messenger Proudman arrived here on Saturday last, and delivered to me your lordship's dispatch No. 12, containing 13 inclosures.

I had yesterday a conference with Prince Czartoryski, who appeared very much pleased that the reinforcement of British troops is sent to the Mediterranean, and well satisfied with the instructions given to General Sir James Craig. His Excellency hoped that the most intimate union would subsist between the English and Russian generals, and expressed particular anxiety, that nothing should occur to induce Sir James Craig to commence operations, in any part of his Sicilian Majesty's dominions, till after he had concerted measures with General Lasci.

He acknowledged the advantage the Russians would derive, from being assisted by English vessels in the transport of their troops from Corfou to Italy, but at the same time regretted, that the instructions given to L^{d} Nelson and Sir James Craig, did not extend to the transport of troops from Servastopol and Odessa. He said the Russian shipping in the Black Sea could not carry more than four thousand men, and that therefore the whole number of Russian troops destined for Corfou, and the south of Italy, could not be conveyed in less than four different voyages.

I suggested the expediency of the Russian Government hiring neutral vessels as transports, but at the same time added, that perhaps under circumstances of great emergency, L^{d} Nelson and Sir James Craig might take upon themselves, at the requisition of General Lascy, to order the English transports upon that service.

[The despatch then adverts to the disputes between British and Russian agents on the Adriatic coasts.]

. . . Prince Czartoryski then proceeded to talk upon the renewal of the treaty of alliance with the Porte. The *projet* of

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the treaty, such as it had been made known to his Majesty's Government, when M. Novosilzow was in England, the Prince said, he had reason to believe, was not palatable to the Divan:— that M. Italinski had therefore received instructions, in which he was allowed much latitude, both as to the form and substance of the treaty, that it was desirable similar discretionary powers should be accorded to M^r Arbuthnot.

My late conversations with the Russian minister, give me reason to hope, that our conduct with regard to Spain is now considered here in a more just point of view, than at the time when hostilities first commenced against that country. The Emperor however still looks to the possibility of this mediation, producing peace, between the Courts of London and Madrid.

Baron Stroganow is appointed Minister to the Court of his Catholic Majesty. He will pass through London, and will be instructed to confer with your lordship, respecting the terms upon which England will consent to the restoration of peace with Spain, and then proceeding to Madrid will endeavour to procure the acquiescence of that Court, in those conditions.

79

F. O. Russia, vol. 57. (*Draft.*)

Lord Mulgrave to M. de Novossilzoff.

Downing Street: May 18, 1805.

The modifications and conditions which have been introduced into the treaty signed at St. Petersburgh on the 11th April, are of so extensive and complicated a nature, as to require a deliberation of some days previous to the declaration of his Majesty's final decision upon the various objects which present themselves for consideration; I am, therefore, commanded by his Majesty to request, that your Excellency will abstain from taking any steps, under the authority which has been delegated to your Excellency, until you shall receive a further communication either from me or from Count Woronzow.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia vol. 57, *No. 23.*

St. Petersburg: May 26, 1805.

An Austrian courier has at length arrived, but he has brought no full powers to Count Stadion, nor any instructions authorising that ambassador to give an answer to the invitation of this Court to that of Austria, to become a party to the alliance concluded between Great Britain, and Russia. The copy of the treaty had not indeed been received by Count Cobenzl before the departure of the messenger from Vienna; consequently the dispatches to C^te^ Stadion of which he gave copies to the Russian minister, and which Prince Czartoryski sent to me for my perusal, contain little more than an history of communications that have passed between the Austrian and French Governments. By these dispatches it appears that M. de la Rochefaucauld[1] had complained of the language held by a M^r^ de Mölle, an Austrian agent at Milan, that gentleman having quitted his situation at the moment when Bonaparte was expected in the city:—

He expressed dissatisfaction at M^r^ Philip Cobenzl's journey into Holland, and asked an explanation of the frequent communications with the Court of St. Petersburg. To these complaints a general unmeaning answer is given by Count Cobenzl, who in his turn complains of the great reinforcements lately arrived in Italy.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the Emperor of Germany's letter to Bonaparte, in answer to the notification given by the latter of his assumption of the title of King of Italy. Count Cobenzl attempts to justify the measured terms, in which the recognition of this new title is avoided, upon the ground of the actual superiority in number of the French troops in Italy, over those under the command of General Bellegarde, and the danger to which in consequence the Austro-Venetian States would be exposed, from an immediate rupture, with the French Government. At the same time the Austrian minister charges Count Stadion to declare to the Russian cabinet, that the sentiments of his Court remain invariably unchanged, with respect to the views of Bonaparte in Italy, and the little reliance that is to be placed upon his

[1] M. de la Rochefoucauld was French ambassador at Vienna.

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pacific declarations, that in consequence the Austrian Government is at this moment occupied, but in the most secret manner in making such changes in their military arrangements in regard to the composition, the number and the disposition of their army, as will with the assistance of their allies, secure them against the new danger arising from the augmentation of the French force in Italy; but that the accomplishment of their measures would necessarily occupy a valuable part of the good season.

This, my lord, is the substance of the dispatches communicated by the Austrian ambassador to Prince Czartoryski, they are in some degree satisfactory in as much as they dissipate the apprehension which the previous silence of the Court of Vienna, added to the current rumours of the day, had led us to entertain of the establishment of a good understanding between the Austrian and French Governments, and as they prove that Austria still relies on Russia as a security against the influence and ambition of Bonaparte, and we indulge a hope that under these circumstances the strong language which Count Razumovski has been instructed to hold, will have the effect of driving Count Cobenzl, into the adoption of a more decisive system of conduct.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 57, *No. 24.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

St. Petersburgh: Sunday, May 26, 1805.

[The first part of the despatch relates to Albanian affairs and the hope of the Russian Government to conclude a treaty with Turkey.]

. . . Prince Czartoryski is extremely anxious to know whether the escape of the fleet from Toulon will be followed by any very considerable diminution of the British naval force in the Mediterranean? He expressed a hope that I should receive from your lordship some communication of the intentions of his Majesty's ministers upon this question:—I answered, that the absence of the Toulon fleet rendered unnecessary the presence of so large a force as that which had hitherto been under the command of Lord Nelson; that I was persuaded, however, that a squadron sufficiently

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large to maintain our naval superiority in the Mediterranean would be stationed in that sea; but that I would not fail to make known to your lordship his Excellency's anxiety upon this subject.

I am happy to find that the step taken by the King of Sweden, of sending back to his Prussian Majesty the Order of the Black Eagle, has not been viewed by the Emperor with that dissatisfaction which the Prussian party had flattered themselves it would create in the mind of his Imperial Majesty.[1]—Prince Czartoryski talked of it to me with perfect good humour; and hoped that the same spirit which had prompted his Swedish Majesty to take this step, would urge him to the adoption of measures of more importance, and of real advantage to the common cause.

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Lord Mulgrave to Count Woronzow.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58. (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: June 5, 1805.

Since I had the honour of addressing to your Excellency, by his Majesty's command, the former dispatch dated on this day, but which I was about to send to your Excellency at an earlier period, the treaty signed at St. Petersburgh on the 11th of April, together with the separate article agreed upon, and also signed on the same day, have been received.

The proposed concession with respect to the Island of Malta, appears in the 10th separate article conditional, and subject to the determination of his Majesty according to the proposal which had been made by Lord Granville Leveson Gower and assented to by the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial Majesty.—It is therefore with equal disappointment and regret that I have found myself called upon to communicate to his Majesty the intimation which has been received through your Excellency of the earnestness and anxiety with which you are directed to press for the unconditional ratification of that part of the tenth article which authorises the proposal of the evacuation of Malta.—I should most deeply regret this apparently fatal obstacle to the conclusion of an union in

[1] See the King of Sweden's letter in the *Paget Papers*, vol. ii. p. 170.

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which the interests of Europe are so essentially involved, if I were not persuaded, that the representations which I am commanded by his Majesty to make on this important subject are of a nature to afford conviction to the impartial and enlightened mind of his Imperial Majesty.

It becomes important at this decisive crisis of the negotiation, to bring into consideration the uniform tenour of British policy with reference to the Powers of the Continent, and the nature of the concessions proposed to be made on this occasion, together with the general bearing of the sacrifice which (many of great importance having been proffered) is alone withheld by his Majesty.

Upon the general conduct of Great Britain towards her allies on the Continent of Europe, I can with confidence refer your Excellency to the stipulations of every treaty of peace retrospectively (including that of Amiens) and to the tenour of his Majesty's proposals in his negotiations during the last war, to prove that Great Britain has, on all occasions, been disposed to make extensive sacrifices of her own immediate conquests, in exchange for arrangements condusive to the general interests of the Continent of Europe, and to the particular benefit or security of the several Powers, respectively, with which she has been in alliance.

At the present moment his Majesty is disposed to surrender conquests of great value and importance to the particular interests of Great Britain, which are in no way necessarily connected with the immediate objects of any of the continental Powers except France; in the disposal of which consequently those Powers have no equitable claim of interference; but his Majesty is nevertheless willing to concede to France such an addition of force, resources and means of aggression against his own dominions, as the price of greater security to the Powers of the Continent.—The cession of important naval stations in the West Indies, and of rich and valuable colonies in that quarter of the world, however considerable, are not the only proofs of the extent to which his Majesty has carried this disposition.—It has even induced him to consent to the restoration of the French establishments in India, notwithstanding repeated experience that, by their activity and intrigue, the potentates of Hindostan have been so frequently drawn into combinations hostile to the interests of Great Britain in that quarter. Such being the extent of the proffered sacrifices of Great Britain, it remains to consider the nature of that which is required

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and insisted upon in addition.—In order to discuss that subject on its true ground, the relative situation and political views of Great Britain with respect to the Continent of Europe, and the essential difference which exists in the position and objects of France, must be taken into consideration. The central position of France in Europe, the strength of her frontiers, the internal resources of the country, the immense proportion of a numerous population which she can bring into action, the facility with which she has acquired and confirmed her extended dominions, are circumstances which already furnish her the most formidable means of offence and aggression,—and these must hereafter be encreased if she is allowed to remain in possession of the extensive line of coast and multiplied naval stations which must open to her new maritime and commercial resources, and thereby augment still further her influence and control over the Continent.

The power and influence of Great Britain has, on the other hand, been necessarily defensive and protecting.—The Continent of Europe, so tempting to the ambition, and unfortunately now so open to the power of France, holds out no object of acquisition to this country; on the contrary being, from geographical position and national interests, the naval and commercial rival of France, Great Britain has shewn, on repeated occasions, when the liberties of Europe were in danger, a disposition to afford succour, and support to every Power of the Continent which would oppose resistance to the dangerous aggrandizement and growing influence of France; and any additional means which can be secured to Great Britain of affording that succour, and of rendering that support, under such circumstances, effectual, ought, at all times, to be considered as an object of general interest to all the sovereigns of Europe, but more especially so in the present state of depression and of impending subjugation to which so many of them are reduced.

Under these circumstances there is no quarter in which the naval power of Great Britain is more necessary to check the further progress of French ambition on the Continent during the war, or counteract the sudden revival of its activity during peace than the Mediterranean.

The particular possession in those seas by which the means of naval exertion in the common cause can be most securely provided is Malta—a station purely defensive in the possession of Great

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Britain, covering the exposed and threatened countries of Egypt, Greece, and Turkey, and affording a ready protection to the defensible parts of the Neapolitan dominions, and security to the only retreat of the sovereign of those kingdoms, whose safety and independence have been so frequently menaced by France.

Under the dominion of France, Malta would be a commanding offensive position for prosecuting her views in that quarter.—If that island should, as it is proposed, be placed under the guard of a Russian garrison, unless the naval power of Russia could at the same time be rendered equal to that of France in the Mediterranean, Malta would indeed not furnish to France fresh means of promoting her ambitious views, but could not be opposed as an effectual obstacle to them; and that important station, under such an arrangement would be merely rendered neutral.—It can oppose no active check to the extensive objects of France, unless it be made the station for a powerful fleet of ships of war and transports.—This advantage can never be derived from that island in the possession of Russia, at any period when that Power shall continue at peace with France whilst the latter shall be at war with Great Britain. Such was the state of things during the greater part of the last war—such has it been during the existing war, up to the present time.—Under such circumstances, however adverse the disposition of the Court of Russia might be to the general policy and proceedings of France, yet so long as that Court shall deem that any motives of interest or policy render it expedient to preserve to itself a state of peace, the duties of neutrality would prohibit the occupation of Malta by the British squadron for the object of naval operations against France. By this cession therefore on the part of Great Britain without some other adequate provision of a naval station, the Mediterranean might be left to the unrestrained dominion of the fleets of France, thereby exposing the shores of Egypt, Greece, Turkey and Italy to be the victims of her projects, either of revolution or conquest. Under the pressure of all the dangers which have now so long menaced those countries, the generous succours for the King of Naples which have been prepared and provided by his Imperial Majesty, could not in the opinion of the Russian Gov^{t} (as appears by the urgent request of naval assistance from Great Britain) be conveyed without great difficulty to their object, unless with the aid of a British fleet in the Mediterranean, and with the use of British transports

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under the convoy of his Majesty's ships of war.—Even on the flattering supposition that the present cordial and intimate union between Great Britain and Russia should be so confirmed by the ties of mutual interest and of active co-operation, as that France could not in future attack the one without becoming thereby the enemy of the other, still would the interests of that union require that the same facility of co-operation, which their communication by the Baltic affords in the north of Europe, should be equally secured in the south, by an uninterrupted intercourse between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea—an object which can be most effectually provided for by a British naval establishment constantly in Malta. The great tie which connects Great Britain with the Powers of the Continent must depend on her possessing means of extending succour and support to the Powers most exposed to the influence of France, and of interposing, for the preservation of a due balance of power in Europe. If it be evident that Malta in the hands of Great Britain can only be used for the general security of the circumjacent Powers; is there indeed reason to expect (as has been apprehended) that the retention of that island by his Majesty will in fact, produce an unfavorable impression in Europe and give to the Powers of the Continent an idea, that the Government of this country is disposed to sacrifice the general tranquility to selfish objects or to ambitious views? Will it not on the contrary be obvious that the conditions to be proposed to Buonaparté with respect to the Continent, would of themselves be far from giving substantial security against the renewal of his ambitious pursuits, and that, under such an arrangement, Malta, in the possession of Great Britain, would at least in one quarter, present a most important obstacle to the future completion of his system of aggression and conquest. Another consideration however has been urged as bearing strongly upon the expediency of making an offer of the evacuation of Malta; but it is one which, if admitted, would apply not only to this point, but would in a great measure preclude the proposal of any effectual conditions for the preservation of Europe. This consideration is the difficulty apprehended of inducing Buonaparte to depart from an object to which he has publickly pledged himself.—If such [*sic*], his pledges are in all cases to be adhered to, with what prospect of success can the lowest modifications of the concert be urged—if such pledges are to be respected, upon what grounds can any of the conditions stipulated in the

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treaty be proposed? Piedmont is an integral part of France—Buonaparte is pledged to maintain the Republic indivisible—Antwerp and the Low Countries are rivetted to France by the same pledge. It is unnecessary to detail particular objects, because your Excellency will find that every condition which remains of the original plan proposed as the basis of the concert between H.M. and the Emp^{r} of Russia is as positively precluded by some pledge of Buonaparte as the retention of Malta and Corfu by the two Powers. Even the arrangements last proposed by Russia with respect to Italy as an expedient to satisfy the French Government, could not be effected without the dismemberment of the kingdom of Italy of which he has himself recently assumed the crown with a declared resolution to retain it, till British and Russian troops are alike withdrawn from Malta and Corfu.—It is therefore against the more active exertion of the arrogance and encroachments of Buonaparte that the efforts of the Powers of Europe should be directed.—It is against the principles, the pledges, and the perseverance of the common enemy that common concert and united efforts should be opposed—and it is as a powerful and efficient instrument of resistance against the dangers to be apprehended from a system of desperate pledges and restless aggression, that Malta, under the dominion of Great Britain, is become an interesting and important object for the future security of Europe.

Upon the general extent of the modifications introduced, I am not commanded to make any representation to your Excellency; nor am I even directed to dwell in this place upon the inadequate provision for the independence of Holland, the most near and interesting object of Great Britain, because although the King regrets that these modifications fall so far short of the original objects which he had in view, yet his Majesty is disposed, in this respect, to meet the wishes of his Imperial Majesty, and to offer in return even for such an arrangement all the sacrifices which he originally proposed; but, for the reasons I have already detailed, it is impossible for his Majesty to consent to purchase so inadequate a provision for the security of the Continent, by adding to all his other sacrifices an object so important as Malta to the immediate interests of Great Britain and to those of Europe.—In addition to those reasons, it is hardly necessary for me to state to your Excellency how impossible it would be to reconcile the opinion either of

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the Parliament or of the people of this country to such a concession under such circumstances.—Your Excellency is fully enabled to judge what would be the impression if it were to be stated that while this country had engaged, in the alternative of war, to take upon itself so large a share of the burden by the payment of immense and unprecedented subsidies, she had, on the other hand, with a view to negotiation not only agreed to purchase for the Continent inadequate terms of peace by the sacrifice of every conquest made by his Majesty's arms during the war, but that Malta—an important British station in the Mediterranean, the most popular and prominent object, as well as, in some degree, the point of honour of the war, was to be added; that no adequate substitute for that station had been even proposed or suggested on the part of Great Britain; that, while the arrangement made on the Continent was attended with a confirmation and exaltation of the power and dignity of Buonaparte and of his family, Great Britain should sacrifice her conquests, surrender her possessions, and relinquish her more immediate and national views as well as the most effectual means of future co-operation and concert with the other Powers of Europe; your Excellency will perceive, therefore, that when the evacuation of Malta is objected to on the part of his Majesty on grounds of reasoning and general policy, it is also, at the same time, refused as incompatible with the fundamental objects of the concert, and therefore impossible to be made a condition of its existence. I therefore trust that your Excellency will press these points on the consideration of your Court, with the weight and authority which must result from your long and intimate knowledge of this country, and I entertain an earnest hope that the interests of humanity and the fate of nations, which have so long and so honourably engaged the united attention of our sovereigns, will not be finally and unfavourably decided by a rigid adherence to a point which, according to this view of the question, Russia is far from having an interest in urging, and to which this country has the strongest grounds for objecting.

I have further the painful task of expressing to your Excellency the infinite regret with which the note that accompanied the treaty was received by his Majesty's Government.

Upon the more deliberate consideration of that note, I venture to hope and to expect, that it will neither be persevered in nor

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insisted upon.—Having already adverted to the state of public opinion in this country, it will be sufficient here to state, that, next to the fundamental laws on which the free and happy constitution of our Government is built, the received and established principles of maritime law, by which the power and prosperity of the country is supported and promoted are nearest to the heart, and most rooted in the attachment of every British subject, and that no statesman could be found in this country who would recommend or justify the reference of these great and essential principles to any mediation or revision. The proposal therefore of such a revision and discussion could never meet with the approbation or assent of his Majesty.—Lord Granville Leveson Gower, as his Majesty's ambassador, discharged an obvious and indispensable duty, not only in the reserve which he stipulated on the point of Malta, but also in the decided resistance to this proposal, and in its ultimate rejection.—There appear however to remain some observations on this subject which may be addressed to your Excellency as the ambassador of the Emperor of Russia, and which may be submitted by your Excellency to the consideration of his Imperial Majesty.

The Maritime Code, as at present established, is recognized and acquiesced in by the Powers of Europe; it's operations have been restrained, and it's influence has been mitigated in many instances by the express stipulations of particular treaties. Amongst the specific regulations and exceptions of this nature the general principle of a favorable disposition on the part of Great Britain towards Russia, and certain circumstances peculiarly applicable to the trade of that Power, have induced and enabled the Government of this country to agree to a regulation of the Maritime Code, and in many respects, more favorable to Russia, than to most of the commercial States of Europe.—If under these circumstances, the Emperor of Russia should become the mediator of a revision of the Maritime Code, his Imperial Majesty would subject himself to the dilemma, either of maintaining that the same provisions, of which it was equitable and reasonable for Russia to claim the benefit, might justly and properly be refused by Great Britain to any other country (a position which, however true in itself, would carry an insidious appearance if urged by Russia) or his Imperial Majesty must be prepared to urge the concessions and advantages covenanted to Russia, as a general measure of maritime law, which, carried to that extent, must be deeply injurious, if not absolutely

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destructive to the best interests of Great Britain. The only motive assigned for the proposal of such a mediation, is the false and insidious allegation of Bonaparte to which his Imperial Majesty declares that he does not give any credit.—The revision of the Maritime Code has not been made a condition of the co-operation of any Power to which the concert has been proposed. It is consequently in no degree necessarily connected with the arrangements in contemplation for the security of Europe against the agression of France. His Majesty therefore entertains the most sanguine hopes, and the most confident expectation that a measure, resting upon grounds disclaimed by his Imperial Majesty and to which his Majesty is under the indispensable obligation of declaring his dissent, will not be entertained by his Imperial Majesty as in any degree expedient or desireable.

The consequences of a perseverance in the offer to Bonaparte of the mediation of Russia on this subject, must, in any course of that proceeding, be of the most serious and distressing nature.

If, (as must necessarily follow) the mediation on that point should be disclaimed and protested against, that step would operate at once as a proclamation of disunion and difference at the very outset of the concert.—The circumstance of a mediation proposed, accepted by one party, and rejected by the other, necessarily gives the appearance of an adverse character to the relation between the latter and the mediator, totally inconsistent with the union of interests and perfect cordiality which so happily subsist between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia.—It is his Majesty's earnest wish that the full and accurate statement of the grounds on which he feels himself obliged to object to the two conditions proposed, may prove satisfactory and convincing to the mind of his Imperial Majesty, and that the authority to Monsieur Novossilzoff to speak on the part of the King, which has been renewed in my other letter to your Excellency of this date, may be acted upon by that gentleman, whose zeal and talents are so well known and so fully appreciated by his Majesty, and that the restrictions to be made on the two points of Malta and the Maritime Code may create no delay in the conclusion and execution of the conditions jointly admitted and approved.

I cannot avoid again assuring your Excellency of the anxious suspense with which his Majesty's Government looks to the final and favorable result of this discussion. Undoubtedly the means

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this country has of continuing a protracted war with France, must be, in some degree, diminished by the annual payment of so great a subsidy—but the King is so strongly impressed with the importance of rescuing the Powers of the Continent from the degradation and danger to which they are at present exposed, that his Majesty is inclined to admit every reasonable modification, to use every practicable exertion, and to meet every sacrifice that may not be inconsistent with a due attention to the great and important object of the naval power of this country.—In that naval power an enlarged and provident policy will see the motive and the means which must forever connect the views and interests of Great Britain with the safety, prosperity, and general tranquillity of Europe.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 14.* (*Draft.*)

Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

Downing Street: June 7, 1805.

Your Excellency's most important dispatch No. 13 has been laid before his Majesty; and I am commanded to express to your Excellency his Majesty's highest approbation of the zeal, discretion and judgment with which your Excellency has conducted every stage of this most arduous and delicate transaction.

In consequence of the information communicated in your Excellency's dispatch, I was commanded by his Majesty to prepare and transmit two letters addressed to Count Woronzow, to be forwarded, without delay, to Mons[r] Novossilzoff, that he might be fully apprised of his Majesty's sentiments on the points proposed to be included in the conditions of peace to be opened to Monsieur Bonaparte.—If Mon[r] Novossilzoff should not have left St. Petersburgh when your Excellency shall receive this dispatch, it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should immediately communicate to him my letters to Count Woronzow, copies of which you will find inclosed in my next number.

The treaty signed by your Excellency and by Prince Czartoriski, with the accompanying dispatch and private communications, have been received. I reserve what I may have to say on the subject of the treaty to a future dispatch, when that instrument shall have received the consideration of his Majesty's Government.

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Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 15.* (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: June 7, 1805.

The treaty of alliance signed by your Excellency and by the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor of Russia, was received by the messenger Wagstaff on the 9th ultimo.

The stipulation respecting Malta in the 10th separate article, appears (according to the previous intimation received from your Excellency) to have been left in terms conditional and subject to the final decision of the King.

It is with infinite regret therefore, that his Majesty has learned the instructions which have been sent to the ambassador of his Imperial Majesty at this Court, by which his Excellency has been directed to state, that the absolute and unconditional assent of his Majesty to the stipulation respecting Malta, is made a *sine quâ non* of the ratification of the treaty by his Imperial Majesty.[1]

The earnest desire of his Majesty to meet the wishes and opinions of the Emperor of Russia have induced his Majesty to consent to further exertions on his own part (by the supply of his transports and by the payment stipulated of one million without reserve to Austria) and, at the same time to concur in the proposal to Bonaparte of territorial arrangements very far short of the original views entertained by his Majesty as necessary to the attainment of the great object of the concert. But his Majesty trusts that, upon a reconsideration of this important subject, the Emperor of Russia will not only perceive the impossibility of his Majesty's assent to the evacuation of Malta, as a part of such an arrangement; but that his Imperial Majesty will be convinced, by the arguments urged in my letters to Count Woronzow, (of which I send your Excellency copies inclosed) that the security and tranquillity of Europe, which is sought by the proposed alliance can be most effectually provided for by the continuance of the naval superiority of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, and that, under this persuasion, his Imperial Majesty will no longer be desirous of including the evacuation of Malta amongst the proposals to be made to Bonaparte.

But if, unhappily his Imperial Majesty should persevere in his

[1] For the details of this demand see Martens, vol. xi. pp. 108 *et seq.*

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determination not to ratify the treaty of alliance, with the omission of that condition, I am commanded by his Majesty to direct your Excellency to declare, that his Majesty will under those circumstances find himself under the necessity of relinquishing the gratifying prospect of affording immediate relief to the sufferings of Europe—lamenting however that a point which appears to his Majesty not only peculiarly essential to Great Britain, but also highly important with a view to the interests of Europe, should have been so differently considered by his Imperial Majesty as to have frustrated the perfect and entire agreement which so happily prevails between their Majesties, with respect to the ultimate objects connected with general security.

In the event of the unfavorable result of this negotiation, which his Majesty deprecates, the King will continue to trust to the resources of his own dominions for the protection of the interests and safety of his people against the attempts of the arrogant and rapacious enemy of Europe, and his Majesty trusts, with confidence, that, under the favour of Divine Providence, the exertion of those means will prove sufficient for the attainment of every object essential to the safety, independence, and dignity of the British Empire.

Your Excellency is, at the same time, authorised to declare, that if, in the course of the contest in which his Majesty finds himself engaged, and previous to the conclusion of a separate peace, the Powers of Europe should become more fully convinced of the urgent necessity, not only of checking the progress, but of reducing the power of France, his Majesty's opinion upon the general policy of Europe will remain unaltered; his Majesty's sense of the mutual interests of Great Britain and Russia, and his feelings of cordiality and friendship towards his Imperial Majesty will be found unshaken, and his Majesty will be still disposed to afford such degree of assistance, support and co-operation to the Emperor of Russia and to the other sovereigns of the Continent as the resources of this country may admit in a more advanced period of the contest. It is however highly important that, in making this declaration of his Majesty's firm adherence to the general line of policy which, upon due consideration he has adopted, I should expressly declare his Majesty's determination not to submit the maritime principles of law acknowledged and acted upon by Great Britain, under any circumstances, to any mediation or revision.

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Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 16.* (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: June 7, 1805.

In addition to the contents of my dispatch No. 15 of this date, in which I treat of the proposal that his Majesty should consent without reserve to an offer to be made, in the last resort, to Bonaparte by Monsieur de Novossilzoff, of the evacuation of Malta, as a condition of the immediate adoption of the arrangements proposed in the treaty signed on the 11th of April at St. Petersburgh,—it appears expedient, at this crisis, that, in order to place in their true light, the great and extensive sacrifices already consented to by the King, I should declare more at large to your Excellency the sense which his Majesty entertains of the comparative situation of Great Britain and of the nations on the Continent of Europe, with respect to the power and views of France, lest those liberal sacrifices which are the result of a great and comprehensive view of general policy, should be misconceived as the effect of impending danger or of anxious apprehension. It cannot however have escaped the observation of the cabinet of St. Petersburgh that, whilst the energies of the continental Powers are held in suspense between the danger of submission and the apprehended consequences of opposing resistance to the uninterrupted course of insults or encroachment on the part of France, Great Britain has disproved the vain glorious boast of the French Government by a contest maintained with advantage single-handed.

The immense and expensive preparations for the invasion of this country have been blocked up and confined by the British navy within the range of the protecting batteries which line the enemy's coast, and valuable colonies have been conquered from France and her dependent allies.—During this period of successful events, the naval and military force [*sic*] of Great Britain have progressively increased and the financial resources of the country have continued unimpaired.

But notwithstanding the means which his Majesty has proved that he possessed of providing for the immediate security of his own dominions, he has never lost sight of the policy by which their permanent interests are connected with those of the Continent.

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On this principle his Majesty has declined entering into any negotiation with France except in concert with other Powers, and especially with the Emperor of Russia. On the same principle he has offered great and extensive sacrifices for the purpose of obtaining, if possible by treaty, a general arrangement for the security of Europe, and, in the other alternative, the most liberal co-operation towards the vigorous prosecution of a continental war.

His Majesty in proposing these extensive sacrifices for stipulated conditions of general security, in undertaking to provide such ample contributions for the support of war, if that alternative should be resorted to for the general advantage, stated at the same time the degree of security which he deemed essential, and the outline of the provisions by which alone it appeared to his Majesty such security could be ensured to the different States of Europe.—The King observes, with the highest satisfaction, that, in the event of war being found to be the only course by which a state of security to Europe can be established and preserved, the views of the Emperor of Russia are in perfect conformity to those of his Majesty.—But in estimating the conditions proper to be offered to Bonaparte with the intent to avert the calamities of war by proposing the most moderate provisions for the future safety and independence of the Powers of the Continent, his Majesty observes, with regret, that the modifications introduced into the treaty, as signed by your Excellency, fall, in many essential points, far short of the stipulations stated as necessary in his Majesty's original proposal.

In Italy the intended arrangement by no means gives effect to the principle, the importance of which is recognized in the 10th separate article of the treaty, that the frontiers of France should on one side be confined within the Alps, for it cannot be contended that, in effect (whatever may be expressed in terms) France will be confined within the Alps, if a sovereign of the family of Bonaparte should be established in Piedmont.—The uninterrupted influence of France over the councils and conduct of Spain from the period of the accession of the Duke of Anjou to the throne of the latter kingdom, affords a sufficient example of the consequences which must inevitably follow from the proposed distribution of the north of Italy, connecting as it will, France and Lombardy under the government of the family of Bonaparte. The sovereignty in that case provided for the King of Sardinia

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would not, either in strength of frontier, in extent of territory, or in the amount of its revenue or population be capable of maintaining a state of independence against France, even with every support which might reasonably be hoped for from Austria, though the latter Power should be put in possession of Mantua, which however is not made an absolute condition under the terms of the treaty.

On the side of Holland and the north of Germany the provisions for security and independence are not more solid. Although the establishment of a powerful State in that quarter is specified as the surest mode of providing for the security of the United Provinces, such an arrangement is relinquished as hopeless. In the present instance, the additional barrier proposed for Holland, inadequate as it is, is not to be insisted upon, and even the antient line of their territory is not positively stipulated.—It is evident upon this cursory statement of the inadequacy of the modified terms which compose the conditions of the treaty as signed by your Excellency, that the view with which his Majesty proffered the sacrifice of all his conquests made during the present war, has not been adhered to.—Yet his Majesty is fully sensible of the benefits which may be derived from any improvement of the present state of Europe, and from any arrangement of territory which may afford some additional means of resistance, especially if this improvement is accompanied by that confidence which is the result of successful opposition to encroaching ambition, and which may lead to future exertion, if encreased means of such future exertion are held forth, and above all by a system of co-operation and concert among the leading Powers.—His Majesty therefore, however disappointed in the expectation of a more adequate provision for the immediate and effectual security of Europe, is ready, on his part, to agree to the modifications proposed by his Imperial Majesty.—The treaty has accordingly been ratified with the exception of that part of the 10th separate article which relates to the evacuation of Malta by his Majesty's troops; and with certain verbal alterations in the same article, where the expression of sentiments attributed to the King is carried somewhat beyond the real opinion and feeling of his Majesty: These alterations however in no degree affect either the principles or the object of the concert. There is also an alteration in the 7th separate article which becomes necessary in consequence of the terms

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on which his Majesty has expressed his readiness to admit of a substitute for Malta in the Mediterranean.

Having stated to your Excellency the view which his Majesty has of the probable degree of efficacy of the conditions provided by the treaty, if they should be accepted by Bonaparte, I trust your Excellency will be able to convince the Russian cabinet that the evacuation of Malta by Great Britain under such a state of things, would not be consistent with the future security and permanent tranquillity of Europe.—If the Continent should be left (as stated above) open to the future aggressions of Bonaparte, and that the restraint on the naval operations of France in the Mediterranean should be removed by the surrender of the British establishment in that sea; the coasts of Italy, Turkey, Greece and Egypt would be exposed to the unresisted enterprizes of the common enemy; and would soon be subject to his absolute control.

[The despatch then recounts the reasons why Britain must insist on retaining Malta: they are similar to those of the preceding despatch. It then refers to the measures necessary for the due pacification of Europe.]

. . . The following conditions, in his Majesty's view of the necessary measures to be pursued, ought to be insisted upon—

First—The absolute re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with such a line of defence in the Alps as may be deemed sufficient for the security of his dominions.

Second: The present and permanent independence of Switzerland, secured by the uninfluenced choice of its own form of Government, and by the undisturbed construction of the fortresses necessary for the perfect security of its territory, as stated in the 10th separate article.

Third: A substantial barrier to Holland, and further effectual means for the future preservation of that country against the attempts of France,—by the interposition and co-operation of some great military Power interested in its defence:

His Majesty on the fullest consideration, is confirmed in the opinion that, in the present state of Europe, that essential object can be assigned to Prussia alone—but to induce, and enable that Power to make effectual exertions for that important purpose, it

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will be necessary to give to Prussia such a military line of frontier as shall connect advantageously with that of Holland, together with such an acquisition of territory as shall amply supply the means of supporting the necessary charges of maintaining and defending that frontier.

The King entertains an earnest desire to conform his proposals for effecting this purpose, to the views entertained by the Emperor of Russia, in as much as may be consistent with the objects for which alone his Majesty would feel himself justified in admitting any exchange for Malta. His Majesty is disposed therefore to state the acquisitions to be assigned to Prussia considerably short of the extent of those originally suggested in the dispatch to Count Woronzow of the 19th of January, as expedient to be given in the event of Prussia becoming a party to the concert:—

Although at that time the evacuation of Malta was not in discussion, and certainly not in the contemplation of his Majesty, your Excellency will observe that the territory proposed as an inducement to Prussia to join in the concert consisted of the whole of the Netherlands (not within the line to be drawn from Antwerp to Maestricht) together with the whole of the Duchies of Luxembourg and Juliers, and the other territories between the Meuse and the Moselle; and further (if no insuperable objection should be stated) the whole of the country acquired by France on the left bank of the Rhine, eastward of the Moselle; but in consideration of that arrangement having been in contemplation as the result of successful war, and that the present proposals are to be made with a view to prevent that extremity, the King is disposed to assent to the offer of lower terms, even for the evacuation of Malta, which his Majesty cannot, however, but consider as, on his part, giving an advantage; which could not otherwise be obtained by the enemy, except as the consequence of the most successful war. His Majesty, under the circumstances of the present moment will be contented that the proposal to be made to France shall not exceed what to his Majesty appears the least which can afford either sufficient means, or sufficient temptation to induce Prussia to undertake, and effectually provide for, the safety of the United Provinces, and which was stated in the dispatch of the 19th of January,[1] as the least that could afford security.

[1] The important despatch of January 19, 1805, from Lord Mulgrave to Count Woronzow, in F. O. Russia, vol. 60.

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For this object, therefore, his Majesty would deem it an adequate arrangement if Prussia should be put in possession of the fortress of Luxembourg together with such proportion of that duchy as will form an effectual military line from thence to Maestricht, with the fortresses necessary to be constructed, and the whole of the country included within that line, the Meuse, the Moselle and the Rhine; trusting however that any necessary increase for the sole and obvious purpose of rendering more effectual the military line of defence will not be objected to by his Imperial Majesty.

His Majesty is the more disposed to flatter himself that the Emperor will be inclined to acquiese in this proposal, as he perceives with pleasure, not only that the principle of securing the barrier of Holland by the interposition of a great Power is recognized by his Imperial Majesty; but that after stating in the first instance, the restoration of the former Prussian territories on the left of the Rhine, as a fit offer to be made to Prussia, it is proposed to make in certain cases an addition (the extent of which is not defined) to those territories, and to carry their limits to whatever frontier may ultimately be assigned to France in that quarter.

His Majesty is indeed aware that this extension of territory is suggested only in the supposed event of successful war.—But the same degree of security in this most essential quarter, which is meant in that case, to be obtained by war, his Majesty thinks himself reasonably and justly entitled to insist upon in the first instance as a condition of negotiation, in return for such an additional sacrifice of strength and security as he is now called upon to make with a view to pacific arrangement.

The King however on his part, is not disposed tenaciously to adhere to any precise view of this question which he may have adopted, though it has by no means changed since the original exposition of the subject in the dispatch above alluded to; but his Majesty will be well satisfied to give his consent to any different or more limited arrangement to which the King of Prussia would consent as sufficient to induce and enable him to undertake the protection and co-operate in the future defence of the United Provinces.

The security of Holland, the ancient and important ally of Great Britain, being so far provided for, and the different States

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of Italy being placed in a situation to repel the hostile attacks of France, the King will be satisfied to place after a time to be limited, the harbour of Malta under the protection of a Russian garrison,—due provision being at the same time made for the civil government of the island, in a way satisfactory to the inhabitants, provided an arrangement can be made by which his Majesty shall be put in possession of the Island of Minorca as the substituted naval station for the fleets of Great Britain, although the relative security of that island against invasion and capture, can bear no comparison with that of Malta.—But his Majesty considering the advantages to Europe of the improved stipulations under which he engages to make such exchange, is satisfied in this, as in other instances, to relinquish considerations peculiar to himself for the solid advantages to be procured for his allies; and for the better and more certain establishment of general and permanent tranquillity.

With a view to compensate Spain for the transfer of Minorca his Majesty w^{d} be ready to concur in any reasonable arrangement wh^{ch} might be made in Italy for the benefit of the King of Etruria, and he trusts that, by the interposition of his Imperial Majesty the Court of Spain might without much difficulty be reconciled to this proposal.—The period to be limited at the expiration of which this arrangement can take place, must not be less than three years; in order to afford his Majesty a reasonable time for completing such works as may be necessary for the defence of Minorca; and also to afford an opportunity of making a considerable progress in the essential work of strengthening the barriers of Holland, Germany and Switzerland.

His Majesty thinks it necessary also expressly to declare, that, in agreeing to make this last sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining security for the Continent by negotiation rather than war, he can consider this offer as binding only in the event of a pacific arrangement, and that if the negotiation should not take place, or should not prove successful, it shall at no future time be made a claim, that this important possession shall again become matter of negotiation.—Although the King has every reason to be convinced, that this disposition on his part to concur in the views of his Imperial Majesty will be met in every respect with a corresponding sentiment on the part of the Emperor of Russia,—his Majesty has nevertheless especially commanded me to repeat to

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your Excellency in this confidential dispatch, his firm determination not to concur in any proposal that can countenance the slightest expectation of a revision of the Maritime Code,—and to express his Majesty's confident hope, that his Imperial Majesty will not persevere in the idea of a measure, which however contrary to the intention of his Imperial Majesty, will nevertheless bear the appearance of a disposition unfavorable to the rights and interests of Great Britain, and which can lead to no practical result.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 58. (*Draft.*)

Lord Mulgrave to Count Woronzow.

Downing Street: June 8, 1805.

I have it in command from the King to declare, in the strongest terms, the great satisfaction with which his Majesty has received the communications which your Excellency has been instructed to make.

His Majesty is highly sensible of the energy and decision so fully manifested by his Imperial Majesty, in the great and extensive plan of operations proposed for the united exertion of the great Powers of Europe.

Upon a plan so vast and comprehensive, it is impossible to pronounce, without a more mature deliberation than the immediate departure of the courier will permit. I am commanded however to request your Excellency to give the most distinct assurances to his Imperial Majesty, that no time will be lost in the consideration of that important and pressing object, as well as in the contemplation of the course which it may be expedient to adopt, if the Powers of the Continent (especially Austria and Prussia) should not manifest a disposition to unite their efforts with those of Great Britain and Russia for the deliverance of Europe.

87

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 25.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

St. Petersburg: June 10, 1805.

Your lordship will long before the receipt of this dispatch have been apprized by his Majesty's minister at Berlin, of passports

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having been sent by Bonaparte to M. Laforet for M. Novosilzow. That gentleman will leave Petersburg this evening, and hopes to arrive at Berlin about the 21st or 22nd of this month. He will remain there no longer than is necessary to have an audience of the King of Prussia. His Majesty having expressed an expectation that he should be made acquainted with all the details of the intended plan of negotiation, and having insinuated some dissatisfaction at greater confidence being placed in the cabinet of Vienna, than in that of Berlin, I have had several conversations with Prince Czartoryski and M. Novosilzow, upon the degree of communication which will be prudent with that monarch—to confide to the Court of Berlin the whole of the instructions with which M. Novosilzow goes to Paris, would be to incur the risk of our ultimatum being known by Bonaparte before the opening of the negotiation; there is no degree of moderation in terms which to his Prussian Majesty would appear sufficiently moderate, to induce that sovereign to insist in conjunction with the Emperor of Russia, upon the acceptance of those conditions by the French Government.

No immediate good could therefore result from communicating at Berlin, the different modifications which the instructions of the Russian plenipotentiary allow him to propose—M. de Novosilzow will endeavour to satisfy his Prussian Majesty, by stating in general terms the basis of the propositions which the Courts of London and Petersburg have agreed upon, as the only means of permanently reestablishing the tranquillity of Europe, and express distinctly the determination of his Imperial Majesty, that the rejection of those propositions should be followed by the commencement of hostilities on the part of Russia against France.

The reports of General Zastrow have had the effect of opening the eyes of his Prussian Majesty, with respect to the real sentiments and intentions of the Emperor, and the language held latterly by that General at his audiences of his Imperial Majesty, is calculated to give better hopes of the dispositions, and future conduct of the Court of Berlin.

A courier arrived here from Vienna on Saturday last, who brings the unpleasant intelligence of that Court refusing to accede to the treaty concluded between Great Britain and Russia. This refusal is chiefly grounded as it appears from the dispatches and letters of M. de Cobenzl to Count Stadion, upon the cessions which we require from Bonaparte, as conditions of peace; these he

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considers so little moderate, that he is persuaded the rejection of them will be popular in France, and create an enthusiasm among the French people in favor of Bonaparte, such as existed in the early times of the Revolution, in defence of the Republic against the allied Powers. He states that the only basis of general pacification, which can be directly seconded and supported by the Austrian ambassador at Paris, must be founded upon the treaties of Amiens, and Lunéville.

In a conversation I had last night with Prince Czartoryski, his Excellency endeavoured to convince me that we might adopt the basis recommended by Count Cobenzl, and still insist upon the conditions contained in the 10th additional article of our treaty, for that there was nothing in the Peace of Lunéville which authorized the annexation of Piedmont to the French territory, or which gave the dominion of Parma and Placentia to the French Government. The Prince then shewed me a sort of *projet de traité* which he had drawn up, of which the first article contained a declaration that the treaties of Amiens and Luneville should be the basis of a general peace under such modifications as are requisite to prevent the interruption of the future tranquillity of Europe, and of which the subsequent articles were nearly word for word, such as we had agreed should be the propositions of peace made to Bonaparte. I said to Prince Czartoryski that being as ignorant at the present moment, as I was at the time I signed our treaty, of the opinion and intentions of my Court upon the subject of Malta that I could not consent to any article being brought forward, which might be construed to imply a willingness on the part of the English Government, to evacute that island. I also added that even supposing his Majesty's ministers should adhere to that article, by which M. Novosilzow is authorized to agree to the evacuation of Malta, it must be recollected that point was only to be ceded, when it appeared that no other means could be found of obtaining the restitutions required from Bonaparte,—that to present a *projet de traité*, of which the Treaty of Amiens was in the first article, declared to be the basis, would be a complete violation of what had been agreed upon between us; the Prince very candidly acknowledged the justice of this observation, and added that the great advantage of the Austrian Government being a party to the negotiation had alone induced him to suggest to my consideration this means of attaining that important object.

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He then proceeded to read to me the communications he had received from Count Stadion, by which it appears that the military preparations of the Court of Vienna are carrying on with great activity, and that an army of 80,000 men will be ready to oppose on the side of Italy, any attempt of the French to invade the Austrian dominions. Count Cobenzl proposes, that the Court of London should accede to the defensive alliance, concluded last November between the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna, and repeats his promise not to acknowledge the new King of Italy, and to enter into no engagement with France without the knowledge of this Court.

This my lord is the substance of the communications last received from Vienna, of which I do not trouble your lordship with the details, as it is the intention of Prince Czartoryski to forward to Count Woronzow for the information of his Majesty's Government, copies *in extenso* of all the papers he has lately received from Vienna, and Berlin.—I then observed to the Russian minister that though perhaps we have no reason to despair of drawing the Austrian Government into war, upon the rupture of M. Novosilzow's negotiation, yet I trusted that the Russian cabinet had taken into consideration the means of carrying on hostilities against France, should every effort to obtain the co-operation of the Court of Vienna prove ineffectual.[1] I was persuaded that the Prince would feel how little it became the dignity of the Emperor of Russia, upon the rejection of the overtures for peace, to take no other means of manifesting his resentment, than by continuing to refuse all political connection with the French Government.—The Prince completely coincided with me in this opinion, and said that the Emperor himself felt the necessity of taking some decisive measure of hostility, that Count Woronzow had been already instructed to ask the sentiments of his Majesty's Government upon this question, but that it was difficult to discover, where, and how a Russian army unsupported by the Austrians or Prussians, could act with any good prospect of success; I represented the possibility of the Russians acting in the south of Italy and also in the north of Germany. To neither of these propositions did Prince Czartoryski

[1] As late as July 20, 1805, Sir A. Paget wrote from Vienna to Lord Mulgrave that nothing would be concluded there by negotiation, and that Russia ought to march 0,000 men into her States. (*Paget Papers*, vol. ii. p. 188.)

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state any positive objection, and I have reason to believe, from what I heard in a conversation with M. Novosilzow, that the Emperor has it in contemplation to send an army of between 15 and 20,000 men to Stralsund, even before he hears the issue of the negotiation at Paris.—The Russian troops upon the Polish frontier have received orders to be collected into separate armies, and to advance still nearer to the Prussian territory, than where they have been till now cantoned. Generals Michelson, Buxhovden, and Koutusov have been appointed to the command of these armies. Prince Zizianov, who has been commander-in-chief against the Persians, has also been sent for, but it is doubtful whether he will arrive in time, to take the command of the forces intended to act in Germany. A naval squadron is fitting out at Cronstadt, which is destined for the service of the Mediterranean, and the Russian fleet in those seas upon the arrival of this re-inforcement, will amount to ten or twelve sail of the line.

The zeal and energy of the Emperor and his ministers seems to encrease in proportion to the difficulties that have occurred in the negotiations with the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, and notwithstanding the miserable timid policy of those Courts, I cannot help looking to the happiest effects, from the union which has been established between the Courts of London and Petersburg.

The King of Sweden has declined sending full powers to Baron Stedingk to enter into a joint negotiation with Prince Czartoryski and myself, and has assigned as his reason for this refusal, that he expects to receive an answer to his propositions of subsidy, through M^{r} Pierrepont. Prince Czartoryski considers it of great importance, and as it appears to me with reason, that the camp in Scania should not be dissolved before the conclusion of M. Novosilzow's mission; it is thought that it would be highly advantageous to the common cause, that the army there assembled should at that period be in a state of readiness to join the Russian army, which this Government have an intention of sending to Stralsund. The King of Sweden has not however the means necessary to keep on foot these troops beyond the period of a very few weeks, and pecuniary assistance is looked for from England, to enable him to fulfill that object.—These views and sentiments of the Russian minister, I have thought it my duty to communicate to his Majesty's plenipotentiary at Stockholm.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 26.*

St. Petersburg: June 10, 1805.

Since the departure of the last messenger I have not been honoured with your lordship's commands.

[After referring to the expulsion of a Russian subject from the kingdom of Naples, Lord G. L. Gower continued.]

By the courier who brought this intelligence, some letters have been received from General Lasci. That officer had landed at Tarento and having travelled through Calabria, had arrived at Naples. The whole of the Neapolitan army he represents as amounting to no more than 9,000 men, and that of the French in the south of Italy to 18,000 men.

His report and plans for the defence of his Sicilian Majesty's possessions, were not prepared at the time of the departure of the courier, but he purposed sending them in the course of a few days.

I am happy in communicating to your lordship, that I am informed by both Prince Czartoryski, and M. Novosilzow that the reinforcements from the Black Sea, which are to complete the Russian army at Corfou to the numbers of 25,000 men, will arrive there in the course of a very few weeks.

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Lord Mulgrave to Lord G. L. Gower.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 18.* (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: June 28, 1805.

Your Excellency will observe by the proceedings in Parliament, that the vote of credit provides three million five hundred thousand pounds to be applied to the purposes of any alliances which his Majesty may form on the Continent during the recess of Parliament —although your Excellency would easily have accounted to the Russian Government for the difference between the vote of credit, and the sum of five millions originally stated in Parliament, yet it appears expedient that your Excellency should be authorised to

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state, directly from his Majesty's Government, that the difference between the two sums in question arises merely from the long interval which has elapsed since the larger sum was suggested, and which was intended at that time to provide for the possible contingency of the immediate commencement of active operations, that the sum now voted will be sufficient, during the recess of Parliament, to meet the full extent of his Majesty's views as already explained to the Court of St. Petersburgh; and which have in no respect been either contracted or suspended.

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Copie de la lettre particuliére de M^r de Novossiltzoff au C^te Woronzow.

Berlin: ce $\frac{28 \text{ Juin}}{10 \text{ Juillet}}$ 1805.

M^r le Comte—

Comme j'expedie aujourd'hui 3 Coureurs à la fois, l'un à Londres, l'autre à Vienne et le 3me à St. Petersbourg, pour communiquer la note que je viens de présenter ce matin au Cabinet d'ici, il m'est impossible de vouz écrire aussi longuement que j'aurois désiré. Je me borne donc à ce que j'ai de pluz essentiel à vous dire. L'histoire de Gènes a produit chez nous, comme vous le voyez, le plus mauvais effet, j'ai reçu à la suite de cela deux instructions dont l'une étoit ostensible et l'autre confidentielle: la prémiére me prescrivait positivement de rompre et la seconde me laissoit la liberté d'agir suivant les circonstances. Si j'apprenois que l'Empereur d'Autriche étoit menacé d'être assailli avant qu'on ait pû venir à son secours et que j'eusse prévû le moyen de le sauver en trainant, je devois aller: Si le Roi de Prusse prenoit un engagement de se joindre à vous sans cette condition, je devois aller aussi, mais si tout cela n'avoit pas lieu je devois rompre. Heureusement j'étois encore à Berlin lorsque ces Ordres me sont parvenûs, d'attendre l'arrivée du Roi qui n'est revenu que le 8 de juillet. A peine cez paquets étoient-ils arrivés que je recûs deux estafettes, l'une sur l'autre qui me pressoient de rompre, les ordres avec la derniére portant que l'Ambassadeur de Vienne étoit aussi de cet avis, et L^d L. Gower enchanté de la détermination qu'on a prise, et que lez *trouppes étoient en mouvement pour se porter sur les différents points qu'on a*

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arrêtés dans le Plan. En attendant j'étois déja sans cela tout préparé de rompre car je voyois que quand même les francois tomberoient sur les Autrichiens je ne pourrois retarder ce mal en allant à Paris que de quelques jours, car que pourrois-je faire si non de rebrousser chemin, aussitôt que Bonaparte me diroit au prime abord: 'Oh quant à l'Italie je ne veux pas en entendre parler—elle est toute à moi.' Et pour ce qui regarde les Prussiens j'ai tout de suite vû qu'ils sont bien loin, mais bien loin de s'unir à nous. Ce Cabinet est fondé sur un principe d'isolement, sur un égoisme affreux, et j'espère qu'ils verront tôt ou tard qu'il est bien pernicieux pour eux. Je ne sais en vérité ce qu'il y aura à faire avec eux, je ne prévois pas le moyen d'éviter à leur tomber sur le corps. Rien ne les emeut, ni appas, ni raison, ni ménaces. Je joins ici l'extrait de mon rapport à l'Empéreur où je dis en gros ce que j'en pense. Je vous communique aussi la copie d'une note que M^r^ Laforet a remis par ordre de Bonaparte au Cabinet d'ici. Il prétend qu'elle contient les bases de la Pacification. Elle contient des phrases, des impertinences, des balivernes et des mensonges, comme l'histoire qu'il fait du Traité de 1798. M^r^ de Hardenberg me l'a remise hier comme des propositions; je lui ai repondû qu'il n'y en avoit pas, qu'on ne leur en demandoit pas, et que je ne m'en chargerois pas, parceque j'avois Ordre de ne plus m'en mêler: alors il me pria de vous la communiquer pour la remettre au Ministre Anglais. Je lui ai dit que je la donnerois à M^r^ Jackson qui en fera l'usage qu'il voudra. Je vous dois, M^r^ le Comte, une longue reponse justificative, mais je n'ai pas pû trouver encore le moment de m'en acquitter. M^r^ Jackson[1] rendra compte, j'espère, de la manière franche dont je me suis comporté avec lui, et de toutes les communications que je lui ai faittes. Je ne doute pas qu'il y aura encore bien des occasions qui prouveront que quand nouz traiterons de l'Angleterre cela ne sera jamais autrement que pour son avantage.

(Signé) N. NOVOSSILTZOFF.

[*Endorsed*] Most secret communication
from Count Woronzow.
Rec^d^ July 10, 1805.

[1] See Jackson's Diaries (vol. i. Appendix) for documents on this topic; also Novossiltzoff's letter of the same date to Hardenberg in the *Paget Papers*. vol. ii. pp. 186–7.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 27.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

St. Petersburg: June 29, 1805.

I have for some days past been prevented by a severe indisposition, from attending to business, or I should have taken an earlier opportunity of communicating to your lordship, that in consequence of the late measure of Bonaparte with regard to Genoa, the Emperor of Russia has sent orders to M. Novosilzow not to proceed to Paris.

The annexation of the Ligurian Republic to the French Empire, executed at the very moment when a Russian plenipotentiary was expected in France charged with propositions of which the professed object had been the general arrangement of the affairs of Europe, is considered as so gross an insult to both sovereigns, whose sentiments that plenipotentiary was empowered to declare, that his Imperial Majesty has judged under these circumstances he could not consistently with what is due to his own dignity, or to that of his august ally, permit M. Novosilzov to proceed to fulfill the object of his mission.

One indeed of the objects of negotiation with the French Government, that of conciliating the opinion of the public, and proving to the world that the reestablishment of the independence of Europe would in vain be looked for from the moderation of Bonaparte, is completely accomplished by this late act of aggression, and perhaps indeed more satisfactorily than by the publication of the terms offered by the two allied Courts.

The estafette with these orders to M. Novosilzov, left Petersburg on Saturday the 22nd. On Monday the 24th the messenger Elsworth arrived bringing with him the ratifications, and your lordship's dispatches to No. 16 inclusive; I learn with the greatest regret, and surprize, that Count Woronzow had been instructed to state, that the assent of his Majesty to the stipulation respecting Malta, was made the condition of his Imperial Majesty ratifying the treaty. During the eleven weeks that have elapsed since its signature, not a syllable has dropped either from Prince Czartoryski or M. Novosilzov which could lead me to suppose that such instructions had been sent to the Russian ambassador. I refrained however when I saw Prince Czartoryski, from reproaching him

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with the unfairness of signing a treaty; with the predetermined intention of its not being ratified, but upon certain conditions; and, informing him that I had received the treaty ratified by his Majesty, expressed my hope, now that the whole of the tenth additional article was rendered null by the recall of M. Novosilzov, and that no practical inconvenience could occur, from the difference of opinion between the two Courts, upon the question of the evacuation of Malta by his Majesty's troops, we might proceed without delay to the exchange of the ratifications.

My proposition was however very coolly received by the Russian minister. He said to me, that his Imperial Majesty felt hurt that his intentions regarding both the Maritime Code, and Malta, had been so completely misunderstood in England, that in neither of these questions was the Emperor actuated, by any personal views of interest, but solely by a desire of conciliating the other Courts of the Continent, that if we looked only to our own individual advantage, it could not be expected that the continental Powers should take our part against France;[1]—I replied that I found nothing in your lordship's dispatches, which could countenance an opinion that his Imperial Majesty's intentions had been misconceived; that in a most temperate letter to Count Woronzow, your lordship had stated some unanswerable reasons against the evacuation of Malta, but in which there was nothing that could be construed into a doubt of the liberality of the views of his Imperial Majesty; that with regard to the question of the Maritime Code, as we had risked a war against all Europe for the maintenance of what was at present established, it was not to be expected, that we should concur in any measure, or proceeding, of which the tendency was to set on foot a revision of our system; that we had never expected of the Powers of the Continent, to take *our* part, but that we had indulged the hope, that when assisted by the resources of Great Britain, they might have been inclined to take their *own part* against a Government whose ambition and power threatened their very existence.—It is unnecessary to repeat to your lordship the details of a long conversation, which reminded me but too much of those which preceeded the signature of the

[1] For the Czar's irritation on this matter, see Czartoryski's despatch of June 4, 1805 [o.s.], to Woronzow: 'Je n'ai jamais vu notre Maître plus mécontenté et plus hors de lui.' (*Archives Woronsow*, vol. xv. p. 323.)

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treaty; in the course of it, the Prince more than once expressed disappointment, not to say dissatisfaction, at no notice having been taken of the extended plan of operations, lately communicated in London, and I therefore felt extremely happy at the receipt of the ratification of the additional article of the 28th of April, which was brought here by the messenger Hunter, late on Thursday night.

I had yesterday another conference with Prince Czartoryski, and [*sic*] from which, though his Excellency distinctly expressed to me, that he was as yet unable to give me any opinion as to what decision the Emperor might take, with respect to my proposed exchange of ratifications, I cannot help hoping that by the next messenger, I shall have the satisfaction of forwarding the treaty, ratified by his Imperial Majesty. I began the conversation by expressing in strong terms, his Majesty's sense of the energy and decision, manifested by the Emperor of Russia, in proposing to add largely to the troops he had engaged to bring into the field, and expressed my persuasion, that his Imperial Majesty would receive with great satisfaction the proof of a corresponding sentiment on the part of my royal master, who had not hesitated by ratifying the additional article of the 28th April, to engage to furnish the subsidy, for the encreased numbers of the Russian armies.

His Excellency seemed satisfied with the arrival of this instrument, and hoped that I should soon receive the opinion of his Majesty's Government, upon the large and comprehensive plan of operations, which had been submitted to their consideration.—I then again pressed upon the attention of the Prince, the expediency of not delaying the exchange of the ratifications. I told him that Count Stadion was aware of their arrival, and that any delay in the exchange might, by giving a notion of a want of union and concert between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg, produce at this critical moment the worst effect upon the Court of Vienna.

The Prince replied, that the Emperor was occupied in the attentive perusal of the voluminous papers that had been transmitted by Count Woronzow, and that it would be seven or eight days before he should be able to inform me of the final decision of his Imperial Majesty; but that to avoid the suspicions of the Austrian ambassador, it would be well to give him to understand, that the ratification was only delayed from a doubt, whether the Emperor could ratify a treaty, by an article of which he engages to send M. Novosilzov to Paris, when he had in fact already taken

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the determination, not to enter into negotiation with the French Government.—He then proceeded to state to me, that the last accounts from M. Razumovski, and M. Winzingerode, were more flattering to our hopes than any he had hitherto received, and I was happy to find from the whole tenour of Prince Czartoryski's language and manner that he seemed to have completely returned to the footing of cordiality and confidence, which he had appeared in the preceeding conversation to have abandoned.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No.* 25.

St. Petersburg: June 29, 1805.

Prince Czartoryski has received dispatches from M. Italinskoi, by which it appears that the state of affairs at Constantinople is at this moment extremely critical—M. Joubert, whom Bonaparte had charged with a letter to the Grand Signor, has carried with him a considerable sum of money, with the view it is supposed of corrupting the janizaries, who are already in a state of discontent on account of the new levies of troops, amongst whom the Turkish Government have been endeavouring to introduce the European system of discipline, and tactics; the new Vizir is a decided friend to the French party, and all progress in the negotiation of the renewal of the treaty of alliance is for the present suspended.

At this moment unfortunately, news arrived at Constantinople of a detachment of the army of Prince Zizianow, having taken possession of the town of Anaghria on the eastern coast of the Black Sea; I will not trouble your lordship with a detail of the circumstances which led to this measure, of which the object was the rescue of an infant Prince of Mingrelia, but it is hoped, that the immediate disavowal of the officer who commanded that detachment, accompanied by an offer of completely indemnifying any loss which the Turks have suffered in consequence of the invasion of their neutrality, will prevent evil effects arising from this untoward event.

Prince Czartoryski looks with great impatience for the arrival of M^{r} Arbuthnot at Constantinople, and expects great advantage to the common cause, from his co-operation with M. Italinskoi.

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Traduction de lettre sécrette & confidentielle de M^r de Novossiltzoff au C^te Woronzow.

Berlin: ce $\frac{6}{18}$ Juillet, 1805.

Il m'est arrivé ces jours-ci de Vienne un courier du Comte Razoumowsky qui m'a apporté de sa part les toutes prémières communications que je reçois de lui depuis que je suis ici. Il m'informe que les préparatifs de guerre vont grand train; que à la mi-d'aout les Autrichiens seront en état de quitter leur frontiére, mais que d'ici à ce tems ils courroient les plus grand risques si les Français leur tomboient sur le corps et qu'il falloit, soit par une véritable soit par une fausse négociation tenir Bonaparte en suspens jusqu'à ce tems. Il m'a écrit cette dépêche à la suitte des communications qui ont été transmises à la cour de Vienne de la résolution que notre souverain a prise, lorsqu'il a appris la nouvelle usurpation de Bonaparte, de me rappeller et de rompre entiérement, si toutefois la position de l'Autriche n'exigeoit pas que je continuasse mon chemin pour gagner du temps. Il voulut donc que je continue. Je lui repondis qu'il n'y avoit plus à en revenir sur ce qui est déja fait et que n'ayant reçû de lui aucune information il m'étoit impossible de prendre aucune autre parti que celui de renvoyer mes passeports. Au reste j'ai taché de trouver un expédient moyennant lequel on puisse espérer d'obtenir les mêmes résultats. Le voici: J'ai fait entrevoir dans mes conversations avec le B^n de Hardenberg, comme par hazard un petit sentier qui pourroit mener à un renouement: c'est, disois-je, si l'on pouvoit se flatter que Bonaparte eu voulû donner au Cabinet de Berlin quelques explications tant soit peu satisfaissantes, sur sa conduite avec Gènes, qu'alors on verroit &c. &c. M^r Hard. s'est emparé de cette idée avec une joie dont on ne peut pas se faire une idée et m'a dit qu'il travailloit déja fortement dans ce sens et qu'il espéroit que Bonaparte donneroit des éclaircissemens satisfaissants. C'est donc à la suite de cela que les La Foret et Chev^r de Bray disoient tout ce qui est clair dans mon autre lettre. Si cela prend il est facile à prévoir qu'avant qu'on nous communique ces prétendues explications, et qu'on ait reçû notre reponse, le mois qu'on désire de gagner sera passé. (Signé) N. Novossiltzoff.

[*Endorsed*] Communication from
Count Woronzow,
August 3^d

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Traduction de lettre de Mons^r de Novossiltzoff au C^te Woronzow.

Berlin: ce $\frac{6}{18}$ Juillet, 1805.

Je profite encore du dernier moment de mon séjour à Berlin pour vous donner, M^r le Comte de mes nouvelles. Je pars aujourd'hui et je me rends tout droit à S. Petersbourg. C'est M^r Jackson qui se charge de la présente.

J'ai peu de choses à ajouter, M^r le Comte, aux observations que je vous ai transmises par le dernier courier sur tout ce qui a rapport à ce pays-ci; je crois pouvoir dire seulement que le ton du Cabinet de Berlin vis-à-vis de Bonaparte change visiblement, il est plus ferme; on s'est prononcé ici assez fortement sur la derniére usurpation de Gênes et on a taché de faire entrevoir la possibilité que le cour de Berlin se verroit à la fin obligée de changer de système vis-à-vis de la France. Ce ton a produit d'assez bons effets. M^r la Foret a tout de suite commencé à essayer s'il ne parviendroit pas à faire de nouvelles dupes en cherchant de persuader M^r le Baron de Hardenberg que l'incorporation de Gênes n'est qu'une chose provisoire qu'il y manque une formalité trez essentielle, le *Senatus Consulte*, et qu'au moment où le Senat conservateur viendroit à en faire l'addresse à Bonaparte il se pourroit faire bien que celui-ci étaleroit quelques grands sentiments qui remettroient les choses où elles en ont été avant qu'il fut question de porter des propositions de paix à Paris. D'un autre coté M^r le Cte. de B., jocquet diplomatique [*sic*] de M^r de Foret remue ciel et terre et ne cesse de tourmenter le B. de Hardenberg pour le persuader de m'engager dix ou douze jours de plus, enfin que les explications qui arriveront de Paris sur cet évènement mémorable puissent me trouver encore ici. Tout cela ne prouve rien, sinon qu'on a les raisons de croire qu'il n'y a pas de quoi se féliciter tant de ce qu'on vient de faire avec Gênes.

Il me semble qu'on peut dire aussi avec assez de certitude que l'esprit qui regnoit en Allemagne commence à changer à son avantage: l'on y voit plus clair, Bonaparte n'est plus un ange tutélaire, c'est tout bonnement un diable, et on est persuadé que ce diable va gober l'Allemagne si on le laisse faire et si elle persiste plus longtems dans son inaction. Quelques articles dans les

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journeaux et surtout une brochure de 150 pages à peu près qui vient de paroitre nouvellement le prouve bien. Je tacherai de vous la faire avoir.

(Signé) N. NOVOSSILTZOFF.

[*Endorsed*] Communication from
Count Woronzow,
August 3d

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F.O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 29.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

St. Petersburg: July 21, 1805.

When I last wrote to your lordship, I had the honor to state that Prince Czartoryski had given me reason to expect that in eight days after the date of my dispatch, I should be made acquainted with the final determination of the Emperor, with respect to the ratification of the treaty of the 11th April. Ten days however having elapsed without my hearing from the Prince, I requested a conference with his Excellency, in which I expressed my disappointment at not having yet learned the intentions of his Imperial Majesty and I represented in strong terms the great evils that might result both to England and Russia, as well as to the common cause of all Europe, from the present uncertain state of relation between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg.

Prince Czartoryski did not deny the truth of these representations, but intimated a wish, that I would repeat them in the shape of an official paper; I in consequence on the following day delivered to his Excellency the enclosed note marked A, and upon his observing that I had totally omitted all mention of the ground of difference which had created the delay in the ratification of the treaty, I replied that I had purposely avoided at this moment, when no practical good could possibly arise from such discussion, the consideration of a question upon which unfortunately the two Courts did not entertain the same sentiments, and upon which the opinions of his Majesty's Government had been very fully and candidly expressed in your lordship's letter to Count Woronzow.

After waiting for above a week, in daily expectation of receiving Prince Czartoryski's answer, I was on Friday invited to a conference by his Excellency, in which he read to me the enclosed letter marked B. I regretted that the same reasons

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which had induced me to avoid touching upon the questions of Malta, and the Maritime Code had not operated upon the mind of the Prince, but he answered that, as according to Count Woronzow's dispatches, the bringing forward this subject had been considered by his Majesty's Government, to be indicative of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Emperor, towards the interests of Great Britain, it became necessary to state with precision the real views and sentiments, which upon this occasion had influenced the conduct of the imperial cabinet.

I then expressed my willingness, to accept the ratification by his Imperial Majesty, with the entire omission of the tenth additional article, and my readiness to adopt the mode recommended by the Prince, of drawing up a protocol of a formal conference, in which should be explained the grounds of the difference, that existed between the two acts of ratification, signed by his Majesty, and by the Emperor of Russia.

I am given to understand by Prince Czartoryski, that in the course of four or five days, he will be ready to deliver to me the ratifications signed by his Imperial Majesty, with which I shall immediately dispatch the cutter, which is now waiting at Cronstadt.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 30.*

St. Petersburg: July 22, 1805.

I was on the point of dispatching yesterday the messenger to England, when I received an invitation from Prince Czartoryski to a conference, in which he read to me some very important dispatches he had just received from Count Razumovskoi and General Winzingerode. By these it appears, that the Emperor of Germany is at last awakened to a sense of his true dignity, and the real interests of his empire, and that foreseeing the inevitability of war, he is determined not to leave to Bonaparte the choice of the moment to commence hostilities.

The whole tenour of the arrangements proposed by the Court of Vienna, is grounded on the supposition, that M. Novosilzow proceeds to Paris, and under this idea, the Austrian ministers insist very strongly upon some further modifications in the

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propositions with which the Russian plenipotentiary was charged, and particularly that the separation of Piedmont from the French Empire should not be made a *sine quâ non* condition of peace; they seem to have entertained no hopes whatever of peace being the result of M. Novosilzow's mission, but at any rate either with the view of obtaining the establishment of peace by negotiation, or by the force of arms, they consider it necessary, that the armies of the combined Powers should without delay advance towards the frontiers of France, and with that view they propose that a Russian army of 55,000 men should enter Eastern Gallicia by Brody on the 15th August, and proceed without halting to Braunau, where it would arrive in about sixty days from the time of beginning its march. The French army it is calculated by the Austrian Government, could not arrive in that neighbourhood under eighty days, including the time necessary for the news of the march of the Russian army beyond its frontier, reaching Paris, and for the orders and preparation for the departure of so large a body of men, as that now encamped in the neighbourhood of Boulogne.[1] It is also proposed that the Russian force collected near Brzeszk, should march through the Prussian Polish Provinces, by Warsaw, with the double object of aproximating itself to the French frontier, and obtaining the co-operation of the Court of Berlin, in the system adopted by the two imperial Courts.

In addition to these satisfactory appearances of vigour in the councils of the Court of Vienna, I have the pleasure to inform your lordship, that General Winzingerode states very positively, that the Arch Duke Charles perfectly approves of the system at present adopted by the Austrian ministers, and that a good understanding now subsists between his Royal Highness and General Mack.

Prince Czartoryski having finished reading the dispatches, of which I have given in very general terms the substance, expressed his regret, that the determination of his Majesty's Government respecting Malta had rendered impracticable the execution of the plan, proposed by the cabinet of Vienna, that though without doubt the conduct of Bonaparte, in adding so considerably to the territory of France by the annexation of Genoa, at the moment he was expecting a Russian plenipotentiary, charged with propositions

[1] This miscalculation was the primary cause of the disaster at Ulm.

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for the general settlement of the affairs of Europe, fully justified the Court of Petersburg in recalling M. Novosilzow, yet that in point of fact, if it had not been for the sake of extricating the two Governments of England and Russia from the difficulty in which they were involved, by their difference of opinion upon the question of Malta, that M. Novosilzov would have been instructed to have suspended his mission, instead of being ordered to return the passports, which had been sent by the French Government—I interrupted him by entreating, that he would not now enter into the discussion of a question, upon which we had already talked so much, and which was totally past, and gone by, more particularly so, after the return of the French passports, which I should conceive no consideration whatever could induce his I[1] Majesty to redemand; that I did not see the great difficulties which the Prince seemed to feel, in consequence of the Austrian plan, and propositions having been formed before the news of M. Novosilzov's recall had reached Vienna, that the intended negotiation had always been spoken of by Count Stadion (who I suppose held the language of his Court) in terms of regret, and that there appeared no ground for supposing, that the return of the Russian plenipotentiary would produce any change in the present intentions of the Austrian Government, that I saw no reason why orders for the march of the Russian armies, such as had been requested by the Court of Vienna, should not be issued by his Imperial Majesty, that the same advantages, the same anticipation of the intentions of Bonaparte, that was looked for by the Austrian cabinet, when they suggested this plan, would be derived from the execution of that proposal, under the present circumstances—To this Prince Czartoryski replied, that the Emperor of Germany was anxious before he engaged in war, to convince his subjects, that he had no other means of security from the ambition of the chief of the French Government; it might therefore be expected before Austria actually committed herself by hostilities against Bonaparte, that an opportunity should be afforded of shewing to France and to Europe, the moderation of the views of the two imperial Courts.—The Prince then however added that he was perfectly ignorant what might be the determination of his sovereign, but that he himself, though without any fixed opinion whatever, was inclined to think that some general propositions might be made to Bonaparte, at the

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time the combined armies were in motion, that as it was quite evident, both from the transaction that had taken place at Genoa as well as from the paper circulated by M. Laforet, at Berlin (of which I enclose a copy, though I suppose your lordship will have some time ago received it from M[r] Jackson) that there was no chance whatever of the proposed terms, even with the Austrian modifications, being accepted, he hoped I might perhaps feel myself at liberty to consent to the evacuation of Malta forming a part of these propositions.

I replied that his Excellency must recollect too well, all that had passed upon this question, to make it necessary for me to join my reasons, why I could not assent to what he had just proposed, that I did not see any advantage that would arise, from a general statement of the proposal of exchanging Malta for Minorca, after a period of three years, and that therefore I hoped all idea of the mention of Malta would be entirely abandoned. We separated by the Prince begging me to reflect upon the measures most advisable to be pursued, in the present critical situation of affairs, and expressing a hope that he should again see me, in the course of two or three days.

Previously to the arrival of the last dispatches from Vienna, the Austrian Court had requested that the Russian army destined to act in Suabia, might be under the command of the Arch Duke Charles, to which his Imperial Majesty had consented, under the condition that the Arch Duke should not be fettered in his operations, by orders from the council at Vienna.[1]

The Emperor of Germany it appears by General Winzingerode's dispatch proposed by his presence at the head quarters of the Austrian army in Italy, to prevent the numerous intrigues, and differences amongst the Austrian generals, which proved so fatal to the interests of the Court of Vienna, and the cause of Europe, during the last continental war.

M. Novisilzov is expected from Berlin in the course of six or seven days. I will not trouble your lordship with an account of the impression he has been able to make on the indecisive mind of his Prussian Majesty as I find that he has been upon a footing of confidential communication with his Majesty's minister at that

[1] This was doubtless in order to obviate the difficulties under which General Suvóroff laboured in 1799 from Austrian dictation.

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Court, and your lordship will have learnt some time ago, how little is to be expected from the efforts of the King of Prussia, unless they are stimulated by the fear of Russian hostility.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 31.*

St. Petersburg: July 31, 1805.

I had the honor to inform your lordship, in my last dispatch, that Prince Czartorisky had in general terms expressed to me confidentially his opinion, that notwithstanding the recall of M. Novosilzov, whose mission to Paris had been the groundwork of the late propositions, from the Court of Vienna, the same plan of operations might still be acted upon. The subject has been since renewed by the Russian minister, who observed to me, that it appeared from the late declaration given by C^te^ Cobenzl as well as from the dispatches of C^te^ Razumovskoi and General Winzingerode, that the Emperor of Germany felt it necessary before the commencement of hostilities, to convince his subjects of the moderation of his conduct, and of his unwillingness to take up arms, by some conciliatory propositions to Bonaparte, that the objections made by the Austrian Government to the conditions of peace, agreed upon in the 10^th^ additional article of the treaty of the 11th of April,[1] made it evident that the Court of Vienna would not be inclined to charge itself with propositions for the establishment of a general pacification in Europe, that the only means therefore left, by which Austria might be immediately engaged in a confederacy with Russia and England, were by allowing the Emperor of Germany to make some general proposal of peace on the part of the continental Powers, to the French Government, whilst the Russian armies were advancing towards France through the Austrian and Prussian territories; that before however such a proposal could be put into execution, the assent of the British Government was necessary, in order that the stipulations of the provisional treaty between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg might not be invalidated, by a negotiation taking place in which England was not included and the countries who might

[1] This article was afterwards omitted, as is stated in Gower's next despatch.

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be engaged in war against France might still be assured of the benefit of the British subsidies; that the advanced period of the season made it impossible to receive from London the opinion of his Majesty's Government upon the plan, which if acted upon at all must be executed without delay, and that he therefore called upon me to assent on the part of my Government to his proposition; that with this view, he had drawn up the projet of an additional article for my consideration, but that if I would not take upon myself to agree to it that his Imperial Majesty had no other line of conduct to pursue, than that of giving general assurance of support to the Emperor of Germany, whenever he might be attacked by France, but that all idea of opening the campaign this season must be entirely abandoned.

After maturely considering what I had heard from Prince Czartoryski, and attentively perusing the enclosed *projet* of the article, it appeared to me, that I could not feel myself justified in withholding my consent to the proposition of the Russian minister; all hope of joint negotiation seemed by the recall of M. Novosilzow, and by the difference of opinion between the Russian and Austrian cabinets, and that of England upon the terms which ought to be proposed to France, entirely at an end; no other mode appeared to be left of succeeding in the formation of a hostile confederacy against France, than the adoption of the plan proposed by Prince Czartoryski.

Some alteration however appeared to me to be requisite in the projet drawn up by his Excellency. In the first place I saw no reason why, in the declaration to be made to France by the two imperial Courts, all connexion with England should be so entirely disclaimed, and secondly some provision seemed to me to be necessary, which, in the case of the negotiations being protracted, and the Russian armies remaining inactive during the winter in Germany, should secure his Majesty's Government from the expence of maintaining those armies during the period of their inactivity. Prince Czartoryski having agreed, with some modifications, to the alterations I suggested, I signed the article, which I have now the honor to inclose, on the 24th.[1]

This new proposition of the Russian cabinet, or rather this adoption[2] of the Austrian proposal to the circumstances of the

[1] Printed in the Appendix to this volume.

[2] [Query 'adaptation.']

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present moment, was forwarded to Vienna on the 23rd and Prince Czartoryski entertains a confident expectation, that the Russian army near Brody may begin its march into Gallicia about the 20th of next month, and that cantoned in the vicinity of Brzesk, into Polish Prussia a few days after. The troops destined for Stralsund are also ready for embarkation, and measures have been taken to procure vessells [*sic*] for the transport of them; but upon this part of the plan of general operations Prince Czartoryski feels considerable uneasiness, the exorbitancy of the pecuniary demands of the King of Sweden, and the little hope that remains of reducing them to anything like the proportion between men and money, as determined upon by his Majesty's Government, give no immediate prospect of the co-operation of a Swedish army. The Prince has also in conversing upon this point, frequently repeated to me his regret at being unacquinted with the intentions of the British cabinet; he seems to consider the debarkation in Lower Saxony of the Hanoverian troops now assembled in England, as very essential towards the accomplishment of the objects of the combined Powers, and that either with the view of expelling the French from the north of Germany, or with that of awing the Court of Berlin into the confederacy, the sixteen thousand Russians at Stralsund, alone and unsupported can effect but little.

So anxious indeed was Prince Czartoryski, to obtain the co-operation of a Swedish army, that he urged me in pressing terms to name some sum beyond the fixed proportion of men and money, which in the case of Baron Stedingk having been furnished with full powers, I might have been induced to concede, to the necessities of the Swedish Government, with the hope that by making known that sum to the King of Sweden, his Swedish Majesty might have been tempted to authorize and instruct his ambassador here, to enter into negotiations with me, but upon my answering, that I felt myself at liberty to add but little to the established proportion between money and men, and even that addition only in the shape of *première mise en campagne*, he concluded the subject by begging me to press upon your lordship's attention the consideration of this question, and to represent how much it was to be regretted that all the advantages to be derived from a successful operation in the north should be abandoned for the want of 150,000*l.* or 200,000*l.* He hoped that the expeditious conveyance, by which this dispatch was forwarded to England,

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would give time to your lordship to send, before the commencement of operations in the north, farther instructions either to Mr Pierrepont or myself with regard to the pecuniary arrangements to be made with his Swedish Majesty.

In the course of the different conversations I have had with Prince Czartoryski, I have called the attention of his Excellency to the situation in which the British cabinet finds itself placed, in consequence of the recall of M. Novosilzov, and the very little notice that is taken in his note to M. Hardenberg, of the sentiments of the Court of London, that it was very probable under the actual circumstances, his Majesty's Government might judge it to be expedient to make some direct communication to that of France,[1] and that of course no objection could be made by the Court of Russia to such a step.

Prince Czartoryski in reply, expressed his hope that the communications of the British Government to Bonaparte might be extremely general, and said that in the event of the Court of Vienna adopting the last proposal sent from hence, that the negotiations of the two imperial Courts with the French Government might be referred to, as affording an opportunity of proving the sincerity of Bonaparte's pacific professions.

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F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 32.*

Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

St. Petersburg: July 31, 1805.

I have the honor to inform your lordship, that the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty signed the 11th of April, took place on Monday the 28th. Those signed by his Imperial Majesty I now forward to England by Ellsworth the messenger, who takes his passage in the *Prince of Wales* cutter which in consequence of your lordship's directions, I had detained at Cronstadt for this purpose.

[1] That is, by way of reply to Bonaparte's letter of January 2, 1805, to King George III. Novossiltzoff's note of $\frac{\text{June } 28}{\text{July } 10}$, 1805, to Hardenberg is printed in the Woronzow *Archives*, the Appendix to Sir G. Jackson's Diaries (vol. i.), and in the *Paget Papers*, vol. ii. p. 186.

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Your lordship will perceive that the English and Russian ratifications differ in two respects. In the latter the alterations in his Majesty's ratification of the 7th additional article have not been adopted and the 10th additional article is entirely omitted—Prince Czartoryski insisted upon retaining the original form of words of the 7th article, upon the ground of the Court of Vienna having already expressed some uneasiness and jealousy at the territorial temptations which the Courts of Petersburg and London had proposed holding out to the Court of Berlin. His Excellency in arguing this point contended that our whole dependance, for a continental confederacy against France, rested upon the Emperor of Germany, and that it would be unwise by any alteration in this article, more favorable to the Prussian interests, than what had been originally agreed upon, to risk giving dissatisfaction to the Austrian Government.

The 10th additional article became so perfectly nugatory, after the recall of M. Novosilsov, that I did not feel myself called upon to make any objection whatever to its being entirely omitted. The difference in the two acts of ratification has been recorded in the protocol of a formal conference, which I have the honor to enclose.

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Lord G. L. Gower to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Russia, vol. 58, *No. 33.*

St. Petersburgh: August 14, 1805.

I have the honor to inform your lordship, that General Winzingerode arrived here on Friday the 2d instant, bringing with him the details of the military arrangements agreed upon in the conferences which had taken place between him, General Mack, and Prince Schwarzenberg, and also the intelligence that the intention on the part of the Court of Vienna to execute those arrangements, was not changed by the recall of M. Novosilzov.

Count Stadion having received on Sunday last the long expected instructions and full powers by which he is authorized to sign the accession of the Emperor of Germany (under certain modifications and conditions) to the treaty concluded at St. Petersburg on the 11th April, the enclosed declarations [1] were exchanged

[1] See Appendix to this volume.

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between Prince Czartorisky, and the Austrian ambassador; to their declarations I was invited to accede on the part of his Majesty, having previously received a communication of the subsidiary demands brought forward by the Court of Vienna. These demands, which your lordship will find detailed in the Act delivered by Count Stadion to me in exchange for that by which I have accepted his accession to our treaty, are so little conformable to the principle of subsidiary arrangement laid down by his Majesty's Government, that when insisted upon by the Austrian ambassador I despaired of any sort of agreement taking place between us. During two days I had frequent conferences with his Excellency, in which after much discussion and dispute, we found ourselves but little advanced in our negotiation. I urged the unfairness of expecting that Great Britain should be burthened with the expence of subsidizing troops, who were not employed in weakening the force of the enemy, and stated in positive terms that my instructions did not authorize me to agree to our monthly payments dating before the commencement of hostilities: Comte Stadion in answer contended, that England could not fail to derive the greatest advantage from the whole military force of France being drawn to the German frontier, and the attention of the French Government occupied with the menaced continental invasion. He declared that by his instructions he was positively prevented from concluding with me upon the terms I proposed; that the Emperor of Germany was determined not to recur to war, till the impossibility of reestablishing the equilibrium and independence of Europe by negotiation was made manifest to the world, that whether with the view of giving every chance of success to the negotiation, or with that of being prepared for war in case of a rupture, it was necessary the Austrian armies should be placed upon their full war establishment, that the expences therefore to which Austria would be subjected during the negotiation would be equall and perhaps even greater than if the campaign was actually opened, and the state of the Austrian finances was such that rather than risk the ruin which they must inevitably suffer, in taking upon themselves this burden, that however little secure they might consider such an arrangement, they would sooner patch up an accomodation with Bonaparte; that if I could not recede from what I had declared, nothing remained for us to do, but for each to deliver officially the propositions which we were instructed to

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insist upon, and lose no time in sending them to our respective Courts, but that the march of the Russian troops as agreed upon, in the conditional arrangements concerted between General Winzingerode, Gen^{al} Mack, and Prince Schwarzenberg must be deferred till we had received farther instructions; with this understanding we separated. I immediately saw Prince Czartoryski, who repeated the arguments, and confirmed the statements of Count Stadion. He told me that by the reports of General Winzingerode, the Austrian Government had found the greatest difficulty in procuring the money, which they had already spent in their military preparations, that by emptying the private cassette of the Emperor, and borrowing money wherever they could find it, they were only able to liquidate a part of the expences incurred by their present armaments, and that they would really be without the means of continuing their army upon the war establishment, if we refused to give them pecuniary assistance, that to delay at all the moment of the march of the Russian forces, would at any rate defer the commencement of hostilities till next spring, and in the end might lead to a recurrence on the part of the Austrian Government, to their former system of submission to the will of Bonaparte.

Finding that no order for the march of the Russian troops would be given till after the accession of Austria to our provisional concert, and that Count Stadion was determined not to accede to that treaty, if I adhered to my declaration of the monthly subsidies commencing, when hostilities had actually begun, I had no choice left but that of consenting to what the letter of my instructions does not authorize me to agree to, or by fixing myself within the limit of those instructions, to defer indefinitely the period of active operations, and perhaps throw away every chance of creating the most formidable confederacy ever yet concerted, against the power and ambition of France. It appeared to me, that I should have ill repaid the confidence reposed in me by your lordship and have unworthily served my sovereign, and my country, if I had preferred the security of the former alternative, to the responsibility I incur by choosing the latter; it occurred to me that the principle of paying armies before they actually engaged in battle is recognized in all those treaties, and amongst others in that of the 11th of April, which has received his Majesty's sanction, where the Court of London is bound to subsidize the Russian troops from the moment they quit their own frontier; I therefore proposed to

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Count Stadion, that the Court of Vienna having declared that the Austrian armies would be completed to their war establishment in the beginning of October, our monthly subsidies should commence on the 1st of that month, the amount of which would be determined by the number of troops actually brought into the field.—But even after this declaration we had great difficulty in agreeing upon the amount of the subsidy to be advanced by Great Britain as *première mise en campagne*, and also upon the limitation of the period of our monthly payments, in the case of a protracted negotiation. I will not detail to your lordship all the arguments and discussions to which those points gave rise, but will only state shortly that with regard to the first, I proposed adopting the arrangement made with Russia, and to give three months in advance. But upon the positive rejection of this proposition as falling infinitely below what the Austrian Government had already expended, I offered the advance of four months.—Count Stadion after calculating what the four months' advance, added to the three months' monthly subsidy from October to the end of the year would produce, and finding that the two together amounted to a sum less by nearly 700,000*l.* sterling than the pecuniary demand he had been directed to insist upon for 1805, rejected this proposal, asserting that even six months added to the three monthly current payments would fall short of the subsidy which his Court expected to obtain.

In your lordship's *projet* of a treaty with the Emperor of Germany, it is proposed to give four months in advance as the *première mise en campagne*, and in the dispatch in which that *projet* is enclosed, I am authorized to add 500,000*l.* to those four months; finding therefore that Count Stadion persisted in refusing to conclude, upon the terms I offered, I added one more month to what I had before proposed, and after considerable hesitation and calculation, and upon my agreeing that the sum for *première mise en campagne* should be paid with as little delay as possible, my proposition was at length accepted.

With regard to the second point I insisted that in the case of peace being the result of the negotiations, every advance of money, with the exception of the one million accorded by the 11th additional article of the St. Petersburg treaty, should be repaid to Great Britain. To this proposition I obtained, though not without difficulty, the assent of the Austrian ambassador. I was not

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equally successfull in my endeavours to establish the same limitation in our monthly payments to Austria, (in the case of a protracted negotiation succeeded by a war) as had by the last article of the 24th July been agreed upon with the Russian Government, that is to three months after the Russian troops had quitted their frontiers. Finding that if I persevered in insisting upon this limitation, that our conference would break up without any arrangement being concluded, I consented that our current monthly subsidy should be continued for three months from the date of its commencement.

The question of the subsidiary payments to Austria being thus at length settled with Count Stadion, I had to enter into negotiation with his Excellency upon the other parts of the declarations exchanged between him and Prince Czartoryski. After an attentive consideration of the modifications contained in the *declaration préalable* of the 7th July, and which was sent to Count Woronzow by the last messenger, to be by his Excellency communicated to his Majesty's Government, and the *mémoire raisonné* presented to Prince Czartoryski on the 4th of August, of which I enclose copies, it appeared to me that the only essentiall difference between the propositions of Austria, and those concerted by Russia and England, consists in the former not making the separation of Piedmont from France the *sine qua non* condition of peace with the French Government, that this is a considerable abatement in the demands to be insisted upon by the coalesced Powers is not to be denied, and it is much to be regretted, that the Court of Vienna should not view the reinstatement of the King of Sardinia in his Piedmontese dominions as an essential object towards the security of the Italian States; but on the other hand it must not be forgotten, that though the 10th additional article expresses the extreme desirableness of Mantua being restored to the Emperor of Germany, yet that restitution is not as in the Austrian proposition, made an absolute condition of peace with Bonaparte. I trust therefore that in acceding to the modifications communicated by the Court of Vienna, it will not be thought that I have adopted an arrangement much less favorable to the independence and security of the Continent than that which has already received his Majesty's sanction.

I should however not have consented without more hesitation to this proposal, but for the extreme improbability of any proposition whatever, however reasonable, being accepted by Bonaparte;

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his recent declarations, and the whole tenour of his late conduct do away every expectation of tranquillity being restored, but through the medium of continental war. To defer the period of commencing vigorous and active measures, by rejecting the modifications suggested by Austria, seemed to me to be in fact giving up a real practical good, on account of a difference of opinion which under the certainty of peace not being the result of the negotiation, may be considered as merely speculative.

The next point in Prince Czartoryski's declaration, by which the Emperor of Russia confirms the military arrangements as settled in the protocol of the conferences between General Winzingerode, General Mack, and Prince Schwarzenburg, I refused to accede to, because in that arrangement mention is made of 5,000 British troops, marching with the Russians under General Lascy, to join the Austrian army in the north of Italy, and to such an employment of the British forces in the Mediterranean, I have no reason to suppose that his Majesty's Government will consent.

I requested the Russian minister to give me a copy of the protocol above alluded to (which I had in my possession only a few hours) but it being extremely long, containing all the details of the route, and provisioning of the Russian army upon its march to Bavaria, he had none prepared. The prince however has promised to send it in three days by a Russian courier to Count Woronzow.[1]

The third point of Prince Czartoryski's declaration, by which I am invited to consent to the modifications and demands contained in a paper entitled 'Remarques sur quelques objets particuliers de la Convention signée entre les Cours de Pétersbourg et de Londres le $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avr}^{l}}$ de cette année,' I noticed only by saying, that I had no instructions whatever with regard to its contents.

Count Stadion having consented to my acceptation, with its several reserves of his accession to the treaty of the 11th April, the enclosed declarations were exchanged between us. It appeared to me necessary, in order to avoid all misunderstanding respecting the evacuation of the Island of Malta, that Count Stadion should in his act of accession to the treaty, insert the word *ratified*, and this insertion his Excellency did not hesitate to admit. Your lordship will observe, that the Austrian ambassador finishes his

[1] This is printed in the Appendix to this volume.

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declaration by reserving to his Court the power of making farther pecuniary claims upon the British Government. He has he says exceeded his instructions, in authorizing the march of the Russian troops into Gallicia, without obtaining a promise on the part of the Court of London of compliance in the full amount of the demands of the Austrian Government, but he could not, he insists, agree to the abandonment of all claim to the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty, more consonant to the expectations of his Court. I have sent copies of the declaration to M^r^ Arthur Paget, and requested him to lose no time in informing your lordship whether the Court of Vienna confirmed the arrangement concluded by their ambassador at this Court.

I trust that in my eagerness to seal the bond of the confederacy of the continental Powers, I have not been too lavish of the pecuniary resources of Great Britain. The character of the Austrian Ministry is too weak, and vacillating, not to justify the apprehension that the Court of Vienna unless made to commit itself during a momentary fit of vigour, may resume its former attitude of submission and deference to France.

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DESPATCHES RELATING TO

THE THIRD COALITION

1804-1805

PART II.—LORD HARROWBY'S MISSION TO BERLIN

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PART II

LORD HARROWBY'S MISSION TO BERLIN

100

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 1.* (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: October 27, 1805.

The urgent importance of the existing crisis requiring on many occasions a more full and immediate decision on the part of his Majesty, than can be effected under the inevitable delay attending a direct communication between the Powers of the Continent and this Government, and the objects under discussion being of a magnitude far beyond the limits of the discretionary decision of the ordinary diplomatic representatives, his Majesty has determined to employ on a special and temporary mission on the Continent, one of his confidential servants fully informed of his Majesty's views, and invested with full powers to negotiate and engage in his Majesty's name, for the establishment of such arrangements as may most effectually unite all the considerable Powers of the Continent at this crisis in a cause generally important to the interests, tranquillity, and independence of the whole, individually and collectively; and may lead to the adoption of such active measures as would be calculated to ensure the most speedy and effectual termination of the present contest.

His Majesty has thought proper to select your lordship for this most important service and I am to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you should repair in the first instance to the Court of Berlin, and from thence to that of any other

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sovereign, where you may judge that your presence may contribute to the purposes of your mission. Your first and immediate object will be, to endeavour to confirm and improve the present favorable disposition of the Court of Berlin and to endeavour to engage that Court, as well as those of Denmark, Saxony and Hesse Cassel, in active hostilities against France.

From the last dispatches received from M[r] Jackson,[1] as well as from the verbal communications I have received from Baron Jacobi,[2] there is great reason to believe that the decision of Prussia may to a great degree depend upon the extent of the subsidies which his Majesty may be ready to afford to that Court, and those who may co-operate with it. There is at the same time reason to hope that as they are in no immediate want of money, they will be content to postpone the payment of any sum for *première mise en campagne*, till after the war, and may perhaps agree to the same arrangement with respect to a part of the monthly subsidies.

Your lordship is therefore authorized to signify in the first instance his Majesty's readiness to engage for monthly subsidies at the rate of twelve pounds ten shillings per man, per ann., for any number of men which Prussia and the Powers above mentioned are willing to bring into active service, provided the total amount of the sums to be actually paid on account of such subsidies within the year shall not exceed 2,500,000*l*. This sum would be sufficient for an active force in the whole of 200,000 men. It seems not improbable however that Prussia alone, if it engages in the contest, will be desirous of employing from 150,000 to 200,000 men; and that the other Powers enumerated may furnish an addition of fifty, or sixty, or perhaps even 70,000 men. Should the aggregate of this force be carried on the whole to 250,000 men, it would be necessary to reduce the rate of subsidy to be actually paid in each month to 10*l*., instead of 12*l*. 10*s*. per ann., and the remaining 2*l*. 10*s*. would be considered as a debt to be discharged together with the amount of whatever may be agreed upon as *première mise en campagne*, within a limited period after the conclusion of peace. If the amount of the force should be still greater, a farther reduction of the rate of actual monthly payment,

[1] Mr. (afterwards Sir) George Jackson (1785–1861) was British chargé d'affaires at Berlin during the temporary absence of his brother, Mr. Francis Jackson.

[2] Prussian minister in London.

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and consequently an increase of the sum reserved as a debt, must take place in proportion. With respect to the amount to be stipulated for *première mise en campagne*, but to be paid only, as I have already stated, after the peace, I should hope there may be no difficulty in confining it to the amount of three months' subsidy which is all that is given to Russia, but after the indiscreet overture already made by M^r^ Alopeus, Prussia may possibly insist on *four* months; and in that case your lordship is authorized to accede to it.

Possibly the situation of the finances of Denmark and Saxony may enable your lordship to agree with those Courts on more favorable terms, and you will not fail to avail yourself of any such advantage. Hesse may probably be desirous of entering into a separate engagement, for furnishing troops, entirely at his Majesty's disposal, on terms similar to those of former treaties with that Power, but his Majesty would wish to decline such a proposal, and to engage instead, for their co-operation on the Continent, on the same principles as have been established with other Powers.

In forming these subsidiary engagements, it would be his Majesty's first wish that Prussia and her allies should be induced immediately to accede to the concert established by the provisional treaty between his Majesty, and the Emperor of Russia, of the 11th of April last; (copy of which is enclosed, to be communicated whenever your lordship judges proper). It is however probable that Prussia even if disposed finally to take that step, may be unwilling to do so till after discussions, which might go into considerable length. His Majesty is therefore desirous that in that case you should endeavour to form immediately some provisional and separate engagement, which may ensure without delay the benefit of active operations against France. For this purpose different expedients may be suggested. Of these the most satisfactory would be a separate engagement between his Majesty on the one part, and Prussia and the other Powers who may join with her on the other, by which they should engage to enter immediately into hostilities against France; his Majesty should engage to pay during the war the subsidies before stated, and also the sums stipulated after the peace; and all the parties should agree not to make peace but by common consent.

The next in order, (if the first could not be obtained) and one

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perhaps nearly as desirable, would be that Prussia and the other Powers above mentioned should engage to enter into immediate hostilities for the two specific purposes of acting in the most effectual manner against the French army in Germany, for the purpose of compelling them to repass the Rhine, annoying them as much as possible in that operation, and secondly of rescuing the United Provinces from the power of France. That they should engage not to make peace without common consent, till those two objects should be accomplished, and that if they should then make a separate peace, they should engage to maintain the independence of the United Provinces, and protect them, as well as the north of Germany, against any invasion from France during the remainder of the continental war, and until their security shall be provided for at a general peace, to garrison such places, as may be specified, on the Dutch frontier, with a given proportion of troops, in return for such subsidies as may be stipulated for that purpose; and to engage to consider any invasion by France of the territories of Holland, or of the frontier of Germany, north of the Mayn, or even of the Lahn, as a declaration of war.[1]

The subsidies last spoken of should of course be less than those proposed to be given for actual war. It does not seem reasonable that they should exceed the rate of 5*l.*, or 6*l.* per man, per annum, and they should if possible be reduced below that amount; but this point his Majesty would leave entirely to your lordship's discretion on the spot.

Should it be impossible to induce the King of Prussia to go at once to the extent of this last engagement, it might then be desirable to try whether he could at least be induced to engage immediately in the first operation on that side of Franconia and Suabia for the purpose of affording a powerful diversion in the present crisis, in favor of Austria and Russia, and vindicating his own honor by striking an immediate and effectual blow in that quarter against France; but without involving himself in any engagement beyond the first operation itself; and that he should confine his more permanent engagement to the other object, of the

[1] The demarcation line by which, on May 17, 1795, Prussia answered for the neutrality of the North and Central German States, had as its southern bounds the course of the River Neckar, and a line drawn from Wimpfen to Nördlingen, and thence to the Bohemian frontier.

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recovery and independence of Holland, and the evacuation of the north of Germany, agreeing not to make peace but by common consent, untill that object be attained, and to guarantee the security and neutrality of Holland and the north of Germany, during the remainder of the war, in the manner, and on the terms before stated. If this expedient should also be rejected, his Majesty would agree the most reluctantly to an engagement which combined no stipulation, with respect to operations on the side of Franconia and Suabia, but which should only provide in the same manner as the two last proposals, for the deliverance and future security (during the remainder of the continental war) of Holland and the north of Germany.

Lastly, if even this limited proposal should not be agreed to, it would only remain as a separate and provisional engagement, that Prussia should employ immediately a stipulated force as considerable as possible for the deliverance of Holland and the north of Germany, and should engage not to make peace for a year, or any other limited period, unless by common consent, without having obtained this object. In all these cases your lordship will bear in mind, that his Majesty proposes these separate and intermediate engagements only in the hope of producing immediate and active operations without the delay which would attend more extensive discussions, but that after such engagements are concluded, every effort is still to be made, ultimately to induce the King of Prussia to accede to the concert between his Majesty and the imperial Courts, and to establish a full and cordial understanding between all the members of this extensive alliance, with respect both to the operations of war, and the conditions of general peace. In addition to the proffer of such pecuniary aid as his Majesty is ready to furnish, and to all the obvious and powerful motives which the present situation of Prussia suggests, for the adoption of such a system, it will be a principal and most important object of your lordship's mission to ascertain what are the territorial acquisitions, the prospect of which would be sufficient to induce the Court to engage cordially in the common cause; and to endeavour as far as possible to render such an arrangement compatible with the views and interests of the imperial Courts.

Your lordship is aware from your knowledge of preceding negotiations, and of the present state of our engagements, how much disproportion exists between the territories which have been

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proposed to be assigned to Prussia, and those which have been destined to other Powers, not only of equal but of much inferior importance in the scale of nations. Your lordship is also acquainted with the obstacles which the jealousy of Russia may oppose to any more equitable and judicious distribution of future acquisitions which might be proposed with a view to engage the cordial co-operation of Prussia.

The jealousy of Russia however would be most naturally pointed to Prussian establishments on the Baltic, and the objects most interesting to Great Britain would render the increase of the Prussian power on the side of the Low Countries preferable to any other measure. The Court of Berlin might thereby be at once necessarily engaged in the protection of the United Provinces, and sufficiently enabled to support them against the future influence and encroachments of France.

The proposals to be made by your lordship must in a great degree depend upon what you shall be enabled to ascertain of the general disposition of the Powers concerned. It may however be expedient to point out to your lordship a general outline of the arrangement which appears likely to meet with the least objection, and which at the same time would best answer the main object of an effectual check to the future encroachments of France. With this view, and more especially for the future security of Holland, it would be desirable to assign to Prussia a military line of frontier from Antwerp to Luxembourg with such a proportion of territory as may be found sufficient to induce Prussia to occupy that line, and possibly with such an addition of territory in Germany as may facilitate the connection between the antient dominions of Prussia, and its proposed acquisitions.[1]

To balance this increase of Prussian dominion, the remaining acquisitions of France (south of the line to be drawn from the Moselle to the Rhine, as the Prussian boundary) might be assigned to the Elector of Saltzbourg. This territory would place a sovereign connected with Austria near the Austrian line of communication — Saltzbourg might in that case be assigned to Austria,[2] and, in exchange for these advantages, a proportion of the

[1] The details here given show that Hardenberg was wrong in stating (*Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. p. 353) that Harrowby officially offered *Holland* to Prussia.

[2] This was actually done on December 26, 1805, by the Franco-Austrian treaty of Pressburg.

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Austrian or Prussian territories in Poland might be assigned as an arrondissement to Russia. It may still however be necessary to add something to the inducements to be held out to Austria and Russia, to conciliate their approbation of the Prussian acquisition of territory, which is in itself of such great importance to the two leading objects of Great Britain,—the future security of Holland and of Hanover; it appears therefore expedient, if any difficulty should arise in persuading the two imperial Courts to consent to the above arrangement, that further temptations should be held out to them. The favorite object of Austria has at all times been, the recovery of Novara[1] and the acquisition of the Roman Legations. The former province is too important to the independence of the King of Sardinia to be given to Austria, if that monarch is to be re-established as the guardian of the Alps. But the Legations might be offered to the Court of Vienna; and to render this arrangement acceptable to Russia, an establishment taken from the Austrian possessions on the side of Dalmatia might perhaps be assigned to that Power; which would at once enable the Emperor of Russia at all times to afford a prompt and effectual protection to Italy, and would quiet the jealous[i]es of that Court, both as to the influence of France at the Port, and the encroachments apprehended from Ali Pacha.

If Monsieur de Novosilzof, in consequence of the proposal which has been made for that purpose, should have been sent to Berlin to consult with your lordship a more immediate judgment may be formed of the possibility of satisfying Prussia with the consent of the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, although Austria will not be likely to oppose any obstinate resistance to arrangements which meet with the joint concurrence of Great Britain and Russia, yet it will at the same time be necessary, even for the satisfaction of Russia, that a full balance should be maintained between the relative acquisitions of Prussia and Austria. Different objects present themselves as likely to come in question on the discussion of this subject, in addition to those above stated. First the Austrian debt to this country, and a further compensation for the Low Countries, which is treated of in the 'Remarques sur certains objets &c.' of which a copy is enclosed, may possibly

[1] The Novarese district, west of the River Ticino, lost by the Habsburgs in 1735.

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furnish the means of satisfying Austria in some degree for the acquisitions of Prussia in the Low Countries, to which the Austrian Government in the paper above alluded to expressly declares a disposition to give a conditional consent. On this subject I refer your lordship to my dispatch to Lord G. L. Gower, No. 26: other objects may also be discussed with the same view. The conduct of the Elector of Bavaria is of a nature to justify some further arrangement at his expence. It certainly may be objected, that the arrangement on which I should rest the greatest expectation of Russian concurrence,—I mean the establishment in Dalmatia, might occasion some, and probably no inconsiderable degree of jealousy, both in Austria and in Turkey, but at the same time it must be remembered that jealousies of this nature are to be done away before it will be possible to obtain the necessary temptation to Prussia, so to join in the concert, as to leave no apprehension of her future defection in consequence of any offers which France may hold out as the price of separate peace, and that the great object of the moment is to set aside those ancient jealousies, and to overlook contingent dangers and distant apprehensions for the annihilation of a present danger of greater magnitude and of more immediate effect than any that can hereafter arise from whatever proportionate increase of power, can be distributed to Russia, Austria and Prussia.[1]

Upon these different means of satisfying the views and uniting the wishes of the three great leading Powers of the Continent, and upon any others which may suggest themselves to your mind, or which may be brought forward in the course of negociation, your lordship will be [able] to exercise your judgment according to the disposition which you shall observe in the different cabinets.

It only remains for me, on this part of the general instructions which I have drawn up by the King's commands, to declare to your lordship, in his Majesty's name, the full reliance which his Majesty places on your zeal for his service, and on your tried abilities, and, at the same time, to assure your lordship that the exertion of those qualities, whatever may be the success of your important mission, will meet with his Majesty's gracious sanction and approbation.

[1] This sentence is of interest as showing how completely Pitt's former fears of Russia's policy in the Eastern Question had been overborne by the new and far greater danger arising from Napoleon's aggressions.

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His Majesty's accredited ministers on the Continent, of whatever rank or description, will receive his Majesty's commands to transmit punctually to your lordship accounts of everything material which may pass at their respective Courts, and to pay implicit attention to the directions which they shall receive from your lordship on the points connected with these instructions during your residence on the Continent. His Majesty's ministers at Dresden and Hesse Cassel will be instructed to propose to those Courts, immediately to send full powers to their ministers at Berlin to negotiate and conclude subsidiary engagements with your lordship; and M^r^ Garlike[1] will also be instructed, on receiving directions from your lordship for that purpose, to propose that the like powers should be sent also to the Danish minister at Berlin, but he will be enjoined not to make any overture to that Court on the subject of subsidies, without hearing from your lordship.

Your lordship will use your discretion on the spot in judging whether any benefit can be derived from proposing a subsidy to the Dukes of Brunswick and Mecklenbourg for any small portion of their troops.

Your lordship is in full possession of the present state of the Continent, of the interests of this country, and of the views and intentions of his Majesty upon those heads.

A negotiation so important to the interests of this country and the fate of Europe, cannot be committed to better hands, and I trust your lordship will be enabled to bring it to a prosperous conclusion, within the short period which can be conveniently allotted to your lordship's residence on the Continent.

101

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70. (*Draft.*)

[*Separate.*]

Downing Street: October 27, 1805.

the event of your lordship succeeding in forming any engagement with Prussia for operations directed to the immediate recovery of Holland, it will be material that a concert should be speedily established to regulate the mode in which the British and Hanoverian troops, as well as the Russians and Swedes (if the

[1] British minister at Copenhagen.

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latter should advance) may co-operate in the enterprise. It would be his Majesty's wish in that case, that the whole of the combined force should be placed under the orders of the general commanding the Prussian army, who it is hoped will be the Duke of Brunswick. If the King of Prussia should not be brought to take an active part, it still appears that the Russian and Swedish army, together with the British and Hanoverians would, in the present situation of Holland, be equal to the recovery of the provinces up to the Yssell, much more if it should be possible (notwithstanding the neutrality of Prussia) to secure the co-operation of the Swedes, Saxons, and Hessians, or any of them. On this supposition it would be more satisfactory to his Majesty, that his troops should serve under the command of General Tolstoy,[1]—but if the King of Sweden should have assumed the command of the Russian army, his Majesty will not object to his troops also serving under his Swedish Majesty's orders, till they are augmented to a number sufficient for separate operations; but it must in this case be clearly understood, that no declaration is to be issued nor any political measure adopted by that sovereign, without previous concert, and the full concurrence of the allies.—Your lordship may probably have the opportunity of a personal conference with M^r^ Pierrepont on this subject, but if not, should the case occur, you will send him instructions to this effect.—In the mean time orders will be sent to the officer commanding his Majesty's troops in case of his joining any of the allied armies, before he can receive any instructions from your lordship, to consider the question of command to be regulated by seniority of rank.

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Lord Mulgrave to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 2.* (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: October 27, 1805.

In addition to the general instructions (of which you are already in possession) on the principal objects of your mission, it may be a satisfaction to your lordship, to receive a further communication of the sentiments of his Majesty's Government, with respect to the nature and extent of the engagements to be entered

[1] The Russian general commanding in North Germany.

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into with Prussia, in the event of the cabinet of Berlin adopting a line of conduct different from that which may be expected from the disposition manifested by that Court in many respects, and more especially in the distinct and pointed overtures which have been made for the conclusion of a subsidiary convention with his Majesty.

The official intimation however, with respect to armed mediation, which is contained in the Prussian note to the French minister, renders it necessary to consider that event as one which may possibly arise.

If the Court of Berlin should have determined to have recourse to that expedient, in the first instance, your lordship will decline entering into any subsidiary engagement for the payment of Prussian troops, during the continuance of such mediation, unless it is undertaken with the concurrence of Austria and Russia, and except upon the following conditions.

First. That the terms proposed by Prussia for the general settlement of the Continent, shall be conformable to those stipulated in the 2nd article of the treaty of the 11th April,[1] as the objects of the war, or at least shall provide—1st, for the re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont; 2dly, the independence of Switzerland secured by the uninfluenced choice of it's own Government, and by the construction of fortresses for it's defence. 3dly, the line of frontier for Austria in Italy, which shall include the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera. 4thly, the entire independence of Holland, and a substantial barrier for it's defence, placed in the hands of some considerable military power, together with such territory, as will be sufficient for supporting the charge of maintaining such frontier.

Secondly. That, in the event of negotiations being opened for the conclusion of a general peace, the interests of Great Britain shall be, at the same time, discussed, and this country become a party to any treaty to be concluded between France and the Powers of the Continent.

Thirdly. You will state that Great Britain being disposed to make great sacrifices for the attainment of general tranquillity upon a secure and permanent basis, has determined to relinquish her conquests, already known to have been made in the course

[1] The Anglo-Russian treaty, printed at the close of this volume.

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of the present war, but it is to be distinctly understood that there shall be no question of the evacuation of Malta, or of the restoration of the Cape of Good Hope, if it shall have surrendered to his Majesty's arms.[1]

Fourthly. That the period of the continuance of such armed mediation shall be limited and shall, under no circumstances, be extended beyond the 1st of next March, at which time if no sincere disposition shall have been manifested by France to treat, and conclude a peace upon the basis of the conditions proposed, Prussia shall make common cause with the allies, and join in active hostilities against the common enemy.

Fifthly. That, at the commencement of the armed mediation of Prussia, that Power shall distinctly declare to France, that any violation of the German territory north of the Mayne (or at least of the Lahn) will be considered as a declaration of war, and will be followed by immediate hostilities on the part of Prussia. In the event of any disposition being expressed by Prussia, to open any discussion of the Maritime Code, your lordship will distinctly state that his Majesty cannot consent to it's being, in any shape, included among the objects either of mediation or treaty.

Under these conditions, it appears that even the armed mediation of Prussia (however short of what is to wished, and of what, under the present circumstances, may be hoped from that Power) may yet afford such advantages to the common cause, as will render it expedient for this country to afford a subsidy to Prussia to the amount of 100,000 men, with the expectation of that supply being doubled, (under the regulations already detailed in the general instructions with which you have been furnished) in the event of Prussia declaring war against France.

Lastly. If the Court of Prussia, contrary to all reasonable expectation, should determine to establish a neutrality for itself, you will endeavour by all possible means, to induce that Court not to insist upon the extension of it to the lesser States which are in a great measure dependent upon her.[2] Your lordship will, in that case, turn your attention to the subsidiary engagement of so large a body of the troops of Denmark, Hesse, and Saxony, and of any other States that may be disposed to unite their forces with

[1] It did so to General Baird in January 1806.

[2] *I.e.* by the Demarcationslinie of May 17, 1795 (see *supra*, p. 210).

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those of the allied Powers, as can be collected.—By such an arrangement there is no doubt that a powerful army of well-trained troops might be collected in the north of Germany of from 50, to 70,000 men. To these his Majesty would be enabled to add from 12, to 20,000 men at present, and to augment that force in the spring (if the circumstances of the war should be such as to admit of detaching so large a force from home) to near 60,000 men.—If circumstances should also admit of one division of the Russian troops in Lithuania, amounting to 40,000 men, being transported to Stralsund, this, together with the Russians and Swedes already in that quarter, would form another army of 70,000 men, and the whole combined force in the north of Germany would be carried to nearly 200,000 men; a force which may be considered as likely to be abundantly sufficient both for the recovery of Holland, and for protecting the parts of Germany now most exposed.

Should your lordship find the Court of Berlin disposed to enter into the general alliance, or even to make a separate engagement with Great Britain, with a view of [*sic*] the deliverance of Holland, and the north of Germany, you will in either case procure from the Prussian cabinet the general outline of the plans which they would propose for the operations of the next campaign, with a view of either a general concert and co-operation, or for rendering the separate operations to be undertaken by Prussia for the deliverance of the north of Europe, essentially conducive to the success of the allies in the other parts of the Continent; an early communication of the plans of the Court of Berlin, for the consideration of his Majesty's Government, will be extremely important towards the arrangement of the measures to be concerted by the Powers already engaged in alliance.

In the event of the unreserved accession of Prussia, and the Powers connected with her, to the general confederacy, a very difficult and delicate question will remain to be decided respecting the arrangements of command, and the regulation of co-operation.—Upon this point however, so peculiarly connected with the detail of military operations, and the relative pretensions and established etiquette of continental warfare, it seems most desirable that you should rather receive the proposals and suggestions of the different Powers for the consideration of his Majesty's Government, than make in the first instance any propositions upon a subject connected

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with so many details and pretensions. I am not sufficiently informed of the probable nature and extent of such pretensions to give your lordship any notions so distinct as to avoid objections which may be at once unforseen and unanswerable, it seems therefore more desirable that a sort of decision upon the pretensions of the different parties should, as far as possible, be reserved to his Majesty, if any great difficulties should occur on that question. In the mean time however, with a view to any present arrangement of command which it may be necessary immediately to determine, it appears reasonable that the senior officer of any united corps of troops should take the supreme command of the whole.

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Lord Mulgrave to Lord Harrowby.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 3.* (*Draft.*)

Downing Street: November 14, 1805.

By dispatches received last night from M^r^ Jackson,[1] it appears that a treaty or convention has been concluded at Berlin between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, and the ratifications exchanged on the 3rd instant,[2]—to which the Austrian minister[3] was to sign the Act of accession on the following day.—The expectation of your lordship's arrival at the Court of Berlin may possibly have prevented the treaty being at once transmitted to Count Woronzow for the sanction and acceptance of this Government. The leading objects of the treaty were communicated to M^r^ Jackson by Prince Czartoriski, previous to it's final signature.

It appears that Prussia is to offer it's mediation for peace on the following conditions :—The cession of Mantua, and the territory

[1] This was Mr. J. Jackson, the British ambassador, who had returned to Berlin. His brother George, the chargé d'affaires, was then in England. (*Diaries of Sir G. Jackson*, vol. i. p. 362.)

[2] The treaty, or convention, of Potsdam between Russia and Prussia (Nov. 3, 1805). For the text see Martens, vol. ii. p. 481; also Hardenberg, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. pp. 324–332. Dr. H. Ulmann, *Russisch-preussische Politik* (Leipzig, 1899), has described the negotiations that led up to it. See its terms compared with those of the Anglo-Russian treaty of April 11, 1805, in Dr. Hansing's *Hardenberg und die dritte Coalition* (Berlin, 1899), *ad fin.*

[3] Count Metternich. See his *Memoirs*, vol. i. ch. iii., for his action in this affair.

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up to the Minico to Austria.—Genoa, Parma, and Placentia to the King of Sardinia; and the independence of Holland, and Switzerland; with a stipulation that France shall send no troops to either; that they shall have liberty to chuse their own government and construct fortresses for their defence, and, lastly, that these conditions shall be accepted within four weeks. These conditions differ in some material points from those which your lordship was instructed in my dispatch No. 2 to consider as indispensible to be insisted upon, in return for his Majesty's agreeing to furnish subsidies during the mediation. They are less satisfactory inasmuch as they stipulate only for the cession of the territories above mentioned to the King of Sardinia, instead of Piedmont, and still more as they provide no territorial barrier for Holland. On the other hand they are more satisfactory, as having specified so much a shorter period for the duration of the mediation than that to which your lordship had been authorised to accede; and this very circumstance would make it less worth while to object to the allowance of the subsidies during that short interval, if that point should be pressed on your lordship.—On the whole therefore, as these conditions have received the sanction of the two imperial Courts, and as from the general improbability of their being listened to by Buonaparte, the offer is perhaps hardly to be considered as anything else than the mode which Prussia has chosen for joining in the war, his Majesty does not think that the differences I have stated (however material in themselves) form any sufficient ground, so far as relates to the Continent, for objecting to the proposed mediation, or refusing to allow the subsidies during the short time the mediation may last.

The reasons given by Prince Czartoriski for refusing a copy of the treaty as it stood on the 2nd of November appear scarcely sufficient, under the circumstances of the full confidence which exists between his Majesty's Government and that of Russia; especially as so considerable a part of it's eventual execution must depend upon the assistance to be obtained from Great Britain. No copy of the treaty has yet been received by Baron Nicolai.

These circumstances give some ground to suppose that it is not intended to include Great Britain as a party in the proposals for peace to be made to Bonaparte. On the other hand however, it can hardly be supposed that the Court of Berlin, after a direct and specific application for such extensive pecuniary succours,

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can seriously intend to leave the whole weight of the war with France again upon Great Britain, from which however your lordship knows this country would not shrink.

But whatever the disposition of Prussia may be, your Lordship will be aware that under the circumstances of war having actually taken place, the engagements of Russia and of Austria, by treaty with his Majesty, do not admit of their concluding any peace without the concurrence of this country. Whatever may be the terms which they are disposed to admit for the settlement of the Continent, this state of things, in the event of Bonaparte appearing disposed to treat, will, if necessary, be recalled by your lordship to the recollection of the two imperial Courts, and it may, under certain circumstances, (the existence of which must be left to your Lordship's judgement) be expedient to make the cabinet of Berlin fully acquainted with the extent and nature of the engagements by which the imperial Courts are in this respect bound to Great Britain.

M^r^ Jackson mentions that in one article of the treaty, the Emperor of Russia engages to use his good offices to prevail with his Majesty to afford a subsidy for 180,000 Prussians, and 40,000 auxiliaries of that Power. It continues to be his Majesty's disposition not to limit his exertions even to this amount provided your lordship shall be enabled to postpone the payment of the additional force to be furnished against the common enemy, so as not to exceed the immediate payments already limited by your instructions, in which case his Majesty would be ready to engage for such payments after the war, as should carry the actual force to be provided by Prussia, and the other northern States, to any extent consistant with the limitation above stated.

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F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 2.*

Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

Berlin: November 17, 1805.

I had an interview with Baron Hardenberg yesterday afternoon, which lasted for near two hours.

In the course of some introductory conversation, he went over with the map the different present positions of the Prussian [*sic*] and

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Austrian armies; and the future positions of the Prussian armies, and took great pains to assure me of the unexampled vigour and celerity with which all the measures were taken for assembling them. As soon as this was over, I began by stating to him, that the just indignation expressed by the King of Prussia at the violation of his territories by the French army, and the pointed overtures made by Baron Jacobi for a subsidy, had given his Majesty the strongest hopes for the immediate and active interference of Prussia. That I had been sent here under this impression with directions to state to the Court of Berlin the unprecedented extent of the pecuniary exertions which his Majesty was disposed to make, in order the better to enable Prussia to act with vigour in the common cause, and not only to assure that Court of the desire of his Majesty to procure for Prussia considerable acquisitions of territory, but proceed if it were necessary to the Emperors of Russia and Germany, in order to induce them to acquiesce in such an arrangement.

That I found upon my arrival, the state of things so materially changed, as to make it doubtful, whether any part of my instructions, or even whether my general knowledge of the intentions of his Majesty, could enable me to act without further instructions. That, under such circumstances, it was my first duty to ask for explanation respecting some points in the treaty which had been communicated to me by M^{r} Jackson.[1]

I was in the first place anxious to learn, whether the evacuation of the countries occupied by the French troops, stated in the second article, was to be effected upon the conclusion of a continental peace, as the tenor of the article purported, or upon that of a general peace.—Upon this point Baron Hardenberg appeared at first disinclined to give a positive answer; but, after some discussion, he observed, that when any arrangement was intended to take place, in the event of a general peace, that word was inserted, and, that accordingly, it would be found in the fourth article.[2] That the Emperor of Russia could not be expected to consent to the continued occupation of Naples, nor Prussia to that of any part of the north of Germany. He added, that, if there could be any

[1] The treaty, or convention, of Potsdam (Nov. 3, 1805).

[2] It merely specified that the Emperor Alexander would recognise Napoleon's Imperial title 'à la conclusion de la paix *générale*.' Article II., dealing with the terms of peace, only used the phrase 'le retour de la paix.'

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doubt, he would write to explain the expression, in this sense to Count Haugwiz [*sic*].

He spoke with still more decision as to the separation of the crowns of Italy and France immediately upon the conclusion of a continental peace.

Upon my observing, with respect to the terms in general, how little they provided for the permanent security of any part of Europe, he acquiesced completely in the observation, but added, that, such as they were it was impossible for Buonaparte to consent to them, and that in case of successful war, the views of the allies must be carried far beyond them. I replied that, I should think the refusal of Buonaparte certain, if the terms, as proposed, were to be considered as an ultimatum; but that the conclusion of the article, which promised the acquiescence of Prussia, in any sacrifices which Austria might think necessary, appeared to throw a doubt upon the whole. He then assured me most positively that that reserve applied only to the objects in which the Emperor of Germany was immediately interested, such as the degree of extension to be given to his own frontier, but not to any of the other terms, and particularly specified the indemnity to the King of Sardinia, as a point from which Russia was determined not to recede: this alone, he thought, secured the rupture of the treaty, as every plan for the indemnification of that Prince included Genoa.

He observed, with respect to the expression 'sur l'acceptation des bases' in the fifth article,[1] that it was not intended to express merely the accession of France to the general principles in which the proposal was founded, but also to the terms of the preceding article,[2] subject to the modification above specified.

The positions to be taken by the armies in Italy and the south of Germany during an armistice must, he said, be varied according to circumstances. The omission of the Russian and Swedish army in the north of Germany was accounted for, as it was not probable, it would be so far advanced as to have any hostile army in it's front before the rupture of the negotiation; and he added that the King of Prussia had given the most positive assurances to the Emperor of Russia, that, in all cases, the flank and rear of that

[1] *I.e.* by France (the terms described above).

[2] See note 2, p. 223.

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army should be secured from being turned by the enemy.[1] This assurance he specifically extended to the English and Hanoverian troops, acting in that direction.[2]

In adverting to that part of the fifth article, in which the Powers who are to send ministers to a future congress are enumerated, I remarked, (without laying much stress upon it,) the omission of England, and said that, in a treaty concluded by Powers, two of which were actually in alliance with England, and a third was, I trusted, upon the point of being in the same situation, it might have been well expected that some provision should have been made for the admission of an English minister, in case his Majesty should think proper to send one—Baron Hardenberg immediately said, that the persons who negotiated that treaty (and particularly Prince Czartoryski,) had not thought themselves authorized to insert any stipulation of that nature respecting England, without knowing whether it was the wish of his Majesty that such a stipulation should be inserted, and asked whether I desired that Count Haugwiz should be commissioned to propose this to the French Government. To this question, I declined giving an immediate answer.

When we came to the third paragraph of the ninth article,[3] I told him, that, as that was one of the points which was intimately connected with the principal object of my mission, and which I presumed must have formed a main part of the discussions between the contracting parties in the treaty, it appeared to me essential that I should be informed of the nature and extent of their views on this subject.—That I wished for the information, only to be enabled the better to exert myself in support of the wishes of Prussia, under the supposition that they would be of such a nature as to admit of the interference of England in procuring their accomplishment. I proceeded to state the hopes of his Majesty, that the views of the King of Prussia might be directed to such

[1] Prussian troops had already occupied a large part of Hanover, thus covering the Russo-Swedish forces previously landed; the allies were at present some 30,000 strong.

[2] This British force, with part of the King's German legion, landed at Cuxhaven on November 19–20, 1805. See C. von Ompteda, *Memoirs*, p. 184 (Engl. edit.).

[3] It stipulated that Prussia must acquire 'une frontière plus sûre;' but its meaning (the acquisition of Hanover) was explained in the first of the secret articles, which were kept from the knowledge of Harrowby and Jackson.

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acquisitions on the side of Holland and the Low Countries, connected with his provinces on both sides of the Rhine, as might give him a decided influence upon Holland; the security of that country against France being an object in which Prussia and Great Britain had an equal interest.

Upon finding, that, with respect to this point, Baron Hardenberg thought proper to confine himself to vague and indefinite expressions, I repeated the question I have above stated. Baron Hardenberg informed me, that he would take the orders of the King as to such a communication, and did not doubt of being at liberty to give me the explanation I desired.

I ought to have stated in its proper place, that in adverting to that part of the ninth article, in which subsidies are mentioned, I assured Baron Hardenberg, that if all other points were satisfactorily settled the exertions which his Majesty might be inclined to make would be bounded only by the extent of his resources.—But, that, arter the great sacrifices he had already made, there was a limit which could not be exceeded.—I added that the point at which this limit must be placed would be varied according to the period which might be fixed for the payment of any pecuniary succours.

Upon the first part of the statement Baron Hardenberg expressed his great satisfaction, and observed upon the latter, that he had no doubt it might be satisfactorily arranged.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord G. L. Gower.

F.O. Prussia, vol. 70.

Berlin: November 18, 1805.

The time does not admit of my entering into the history of what has passed between their Prussian and Swedish Majesties, and it is not indeed necessary, as you will receive full information upon the subject from Prince Czartoryski. It is equally unnecessary for me to state the extreme inconvenience which results to the common cause from this discussion, or the serious consequences to which it may lead.

Your Excellency will consult with the Russian minister as to

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the most effectual means of putting an end to these difficulties; whether it be by exerting the influence of the Emperor to persuade the K. of Prussia to relax in his expectations from the K. of Sweden, or to induce his Swedish Majesty to acquiesce in them. If neither can be obtained it appears essential that the whole progress of the combined armies in the north of Germany should not run the risk of being defeated by any order from the King of Sweden to stop the march of Gen[l] Tolstoi, and it is much to be wished that he should be vested with discretionary powers in any extreme case to declare himself no longer under the command of his Swedish Majesty. The British and Hanoverian troops have now orders to concert their movements with Gen[l] Tolstoi.

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Lord Harrowby to the Hon. H. Pierrepont.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70.

Berlin: November 18, 1805.

Mr. Jackson has communicated to me your letter of the 12th of this month, in which you express the apprehensions entertained by his Swedish Majesty of the intentions of the Court of Berlin, and request M[r] Jackson in conjunction with M[r] d'Alopeus to obtain such explanations and assurances from that Court as may remove those impressions which had been made upon the mind of that sovereign, and in consequence of which the march of his troops had been hitherto retarded. It was felt by M[r] Jackson upon the receipt of your letter, and equally so by me when he communicated it to me, that as no ground could be stated for entertaining such an apprehension, it was impossible to make it the subject of any direct communication with the Prussian ministers.

I have however the satisfaction to state to you, that the object you had in view has been fully attained,—as, in the first conference I had with Baron Hardenberg, that minister mentioned of himself the doubts which he had heard existed in the mind of the King of Sweden, and expressed the greatest surprize at the apprehension of his Swedish Majesty, for which there neither was nor had been any foundation whatever.

I trust this assurance will be considered as perfectly satisfactory,

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and that the march of the Swedish troops will be no longer delayed.

The coldness which exists between his Swedish Majesty and the King of Prussia must be a subject of deep regret, and I therefore cannot but hope that the magnanimity by which his Majesty has ever been distinguished, will lead him to consider a sacrifice of personal feeling,[1] to interests of such transcendant magnitude, as amply repaid by the benefits which must result from it to the great cause in which he is engaged; and to which nothing can be more injurious, than any want of union, much more any dissention among the legitimate sovereigns of Europe.

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Lord Harrowby to the Hon. H. Pierrepont.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70.

[*Copy.—Separate and secret.*]

Berlin: November 18, 1805.

The accompanying dispatch has been written in such a form as to leave it to your discretion whether or not it should be communicated *in extenso* to his Swedish Majesty.

You will have seen by my letter from Boitzenberg the great anxiety I felt, that all differences should be removed between the Courts of Stockholm and Berlin. I did not at that time know to what extent they existed, nor how much they had been increased by the conduct of M. de Lowenhjelm. Everything I have learnt since my arrival here increased that anxiety, and particularly a letter written from hence by the Russian minister to his brother, which was communicated by the former to M[r] Jackson for the purpose of being sent to you. The expressions in this letter appeared so strong and so capable of bearing an interpretation not consistant with the language of Baron Hardenberg to me that I thought it necessary to have some further communication with him upon that subject. I am now convinced that the expressions underlined are not intended to apply to the present state of things, and that no direct objection will be made to the advance of his

[1] The King of Sweden had sent back to the King of Prussia his Order of the Black Eagle. See his letter of April 22, 1805, in *Paget Papers*, vol. ii. p. 170. The King now refused to let his troops co-operate with those of Prussia.

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Swedish Majesty, so long as the circumstances of the war lead him to act independantly of Prussian co-operation; and no fresh occasions of difference arise. The strong part which the Emperor of Russia had taken in declaring his opinion that the satisfaction requested of his Sw: Maj^{ty} was no more than reasonable, makes it hardly possible to expect that the Court of Berlin will relax in its expectations on that head, and any fresh cause of difference might possibly bring matters to the point stated in M. d'Alopeus's letter. The course of the march of the combined army towards the frontiers of Holland must bring them so often in contact with Prussian troops and Prussian territory that it is much to be feared these differences may arise, they might occur almost immediately whenever the combined army replaces, near Hameln and upon the Ems, the Prussian troops now occupying these positions; as the Duke of Brunswick has earnestly pressed Gen. Tolstoi to march without stop of time for that purpose. It would therefore be extremely desireable to prevail upon the K. of Sweden for the present to allow either the whole or a part of his troops to continue advancing under the immediate command of Gen. Tolstoi; as both his own dignity, and the common interest might suffer by his exposing himself to any unpleasant occurrences. If he persists in advancing himself it will require the greatest caution to avoid their arising. I trust so much to the influence which his Majesty's personal kindness and your constant intercourse with him have given you, that I should think it expedient to sacrifice the benefit of a personal interview with you here, to that which might be derived from your continuing with him on his march. I can hardly suppose it possible that his Swedish Maj^{ty} would allow any feeling to induce him to desert the common cause, as to stop the march of the Russian army under Gen: Tolstoi; but if you should find that such a step is about to be taken, you will use every possible exertion to prevent it, and without stating yourself to be authorized to declare that it would be considered by his Majesty's Government as a breach of the alliance, and as putting an end to all pecuniary succours, you may state your great apprehension that it is liable to be considered in that light. This is however an argument which is only to be resorted to after every other mode of persuasion shall have failed.

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F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 4.* (*Draft.*)

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Harrowby.

Downing Street: November 23, 1805.

I have the honour to acquaint your lordship that Count Woronzow yesterday communicated to his Majesty's Government a copy of the treaty concluded at Potsdam on the 3rd instant between the Emperors of Russia and of Germany and the King of Prussia.

The treaty was brought to England by Monsieur d'Oubril, who was instructed to give any explanations or information which his Majesty's Government might require.

The object of the treaty is, to provide conditions of general peace on the Continent by the armed mediation of Prussia, and to secure the co-operation of that Power against the common enemy, in the event of the proposed conditions being rejected by Bonaparte. Although the terms to be proposed fall far short of what would be desirable as a complete security for Europe, yet they are such as (if concluded and guaranteed as it is provided they should be,) would afford a very considerable improvement of the existing state of Europe.—The three leading provisions of the treaty which refer to the measures to be adopted in case the armed mediation should prove fruitless, and Prussia in consequence be engaged in war with France, are :—

1st. A subsidy, at the established rate, from Great Britain, for 180,000 troops of his Prussian Majesty, and a further subsidy for the troops of such of the lesser States as are attached to the political system of Prussia, and who may unite with her against the common enemy.

2nd. That Great Britain should favour as much as possible the conveyance of magazines supplied from Russia to the King of Prussia *at the mouths of the rivers.*

3rd. That at the peace, a more secure frontier than at present possessed by Prussia, shall be provided either by acquisition or exchange; and in *proportion to the sacrifices and exertions which Prussia shall have been called upon to make in support of the common cause.*[1]

[1] See the notes on the F.O. despatch No. 3, of November 14, 1805, to Lord Harrowby.

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It will be sufficient to observe on the first of these points that the desire of the allies in this respect has not only been anticipated by his Majesty, but greatly exceeded, and that your lordship is enabled by your instructions to carry the pecuniary succours to Prussia and her neighbouring States to an extent far beyond that expressed in the treaty.

On the 2nd there is no probability of any difficulty or hesitation on the part of his Majesty's Government; it is necessary, however, that some explanation should be received of the nature of the facilities which are required on the part of Great Britain, as the article of the treaty does not state anything specific on the subject.

With respect to the 3rd article, his Majesty has been uniformly disposed to give his consent to an improvement of the Prussian frontier on the side of France, and to a considerable increase of the territory of that Power, in as far as it could be effected, with a due regard to principles of equity and justice, and with the concurrence and approbation of his Majesty's allies.[1]—The King continues in the same disposition, and will doubtless concur in any arrangement which may be proposed, upon such a basis. As far therefore as the public articles of the treaty are in question, under the circumstances which the unfortunate events of war have produced, there is no disposition in his Majesty's Government to complain of the step which has been taken with a view to separate proposals of peace; and in the event of those proposals being rejected by Bonaparte, the same zeal in the common cause, and the same vigorous exertion will be continued by this country.—If however, there should appear a disposition in the head of the French Government to enter into negotiation, your lordship will represent to his Majesty's allies the King's expectation that they will use their utmost exertion to provide that his Majesty shall be admitted as a party in the negotiation on the basis already adverted to in the third condition stated in my dispatch No. 2 addressed to your lordship;—namely the cession of his Majesty's conquests made in the course of the existing war, with the exception only of the Cape of Good Hope if it should have been conquered by his Majesty's arms—Malta remaining, as at present, in his Majesty's possession. Should the efforts of the King's allies for this purpose prove ineffectual his Majesty in that case,

[1] See note 3 on p. 225.

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(and this you will be at liberty, in the first instance, to communicate in confidence to the Russian Government) will be disposed to release his allies from their engagement not to make peace without common consent, provided the conditions for Europe be not less satisfactory than those contained in the Treaty of Potsdam, which must be communicated to you beforehand.

This concession on the part of the King is influenced by the consideration of the embarrassment in which his allies might be placed, between the rejection of a ratification, which to them may appear of the most pressing necessity, and upon the whole advantageous to Europe, and the conclusion of a treaty of peace in direct contravention of precise engagements, by which act, without the consent of Great Britain, this country might feel itself for ever precluded from entering into similar engagements with the Powers of the Continent.

At the same time that Count Woronzow, and Mons^r^ D'Oubril communicated the Treaty of Potsdam, they produced copies of the secret articles, by which it appears that the improvement of frontier and increase of territory mentioned in the treaty, as required by Prussia, is the acquisition of Hanover from his Majesty, by some exchange, or other arrangement. His Majesty's ministers are so fully convinced of the invincible repugnance of the King to any arrangement which should deprive him of his ancient hereditary dominions in Germany, that they have deemed it inexpedient even to convey the communication of the proposal to his Majesty, in the earnest hope that the idea will not be revived in such a way as to render an official reference to his Majesty absolutely necessary.[1] You will, on your part, in treating with the cabinet of Berlin of the general objects of your mission, and in discussing the other subjects detailed in this dispatch, avoid, if possible, any communication on the question of the cession of Hanover; but if the subject should be forced upon you by the Prussian Government, you will not fail most distinctly to express that such a proposal is, in any shape, utterly inadmissible. You will, at the same time, lend yourself freely to the discussion of any other mode of satisfying the views of Prussia, which may be brought forward by that Court, and will express, in the strongest

[1] As to this and Pitt's feelings on hearing the stipulation about Hanover, see Woronzow's despatch in Czartoryski's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. ch. ix.

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terms, the disposition, which I have already stated, on his Majesty's part, to promote to the utmost the attainment of the object upon principles of equity and justice, and as it is described in the third condition of the public treaty.

The two imperial Courts, after having undertaken to propose for Prussia the acquisition of Hanover, can no longer object to any other acquisition of equal value, if any can be found that will answer the object of Prussia, and that may either be taken from countries now in the direct possession of France, or obtained in exchange for any portion of the latter, from any Powers in Germany, who may be tempted by an advantageous bargain to agree to such an arrangement.

But as, in any case, the negotiation of such a territorial arrangement will be full of difficulty, and may require considerable time, your lordship's first object should be to endeavour as speedily as possible, to conclude a separate engagement with Prussia, by which that Court shall bind herself to act immediately against France, either for certain defined objects or for a limited period (conformably to any of the alternatives specified in my dispatch No. 3) or for an indefinite period, reserving to itself the liberty at any time to withdraw from the war after six months' notice to the allies (conformably to what is stated in the close of the secret article of Potzdam).

In return for this engagement his Majesty, as I have already stated, is ready to agree to subsidies even on a greater scale than those demanded. To give every facility which he shall find in his power for the transport of provisions, and to promote to the utmost the general object of providing such an acquisition and improvement of frontier as can be obtained for Prussia, whenever any arrangement can be settled by common consent for that purpose.

Should Bonaparte's answer to the proposal of mediation have been such as may be expected, and should no decisive change have been effected in the councils of Prussia, either by the events of war or intrigue at home, these conditions will I trust be sufficiently encouraging to confirm the determination of immediately commencing active operations against France; and if they are once embarked, it may be more easy afterwards to find some expedient which may so far satisfy their views of territorial acquisition as to ensure their hearty and permanent co-operation.

I have stated in my former dispatches that the two great

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objects to which it seems essential that the Prussian operations should be directed with the utmost expedition, are, menacing and intercepting the retreat of the French army, and the immediate occupation of a part, if not the whole, of the Dutch Provinces, unless the force of Prussia, (already in activity, together with the aid of Saxons, and Hessians) should be sufficient immediately to act on the largest scale for both these purposes, it seems desirable that the larger proportion of that force should be applied to the former. A successful attack on the French army might go a great way towards deciding at once, the whole fortune not only of the campaign but of the war, and it is therefore of the utmost importance that this effort should be made powerful, and decisive in the first instance.

A smaller Prussian force in proportion would be sufficient, in addition to the combined force of British and Hanoverians, Russians and Swedes, (amounting together to 40,000 men) to ensure success on the side of Holland. What seems to be most wanting for this purpose, is a respectable Prussian corps advancing on the side of Westphalia, sufficient to give full security to the left flank of the combined force in it's advance. To strengthen still further the combined force, his Majesty will hold in readiness a farther force of 10,000 British infantry to be carried to the Ems, if the season should not prove such as to render a debarkation there impossible, and if the nature and circumstances of the proposed operations appear to render it expedient.

Your lordship will also avail yourself of any practicable opening for securing conformably to your instructions, the co-operation of the Court of Denmark in this enterprize, and its accession to the confederacy.

Under these circumstances it seems scarce possible that Prussia should entertain any doubt of the decisive and glorious success which is likely to attend her operations, even before the close of the present year, if she is once brought to act with promptitude and vigour.

The prospect for another campaign and with a view to ultimate success is not less encouraging.

If Prussia closes with the extensive proposals which your lordship has been authorized to make, the force capable of being brought forward from the north of Germany, in the beginning of the next campaign, cannot be estimated at less than near three

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hundred thousand men. Considering how much the real strength and resources of the Austrian monarchy remain untouched, even after it's disasters, the joint forces of the two imperial Courts may be expected to amount to between four and five hundred thousand. To this is to be added a disposeable force of British and Hanoverians to the amount of not less in the whole than 70,000 men, which his Majesty will hold in readiness to employ either in co-operation with his allies on the Continent, or in maritime enterprizes against the enemy, as may, upon consultation and concert, be found most advantageous for the common cause.

Such a mass of force, if really brought into activity, can hardly fail to obtain decisive success in all quarters, and speedily to reduce France to the necessity of accepting peace on terms consistent with the general security of Europe.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 7.*

Berlin: November 24, 1805.

After having received from the Russian and Austrian ministers the explanation which I have related to your lordship, I had yesterday evening a long conference with Baron Hardenberg.

I began by stating to him, that the point to which the secret article related, was one upon which, as the British minister, my mouth must be closed.[1] That he knew as well as I did, how completely it had always been the rule of the King of England, to separate that character from his situation as Elector of Hanover, that I could not therefore charge myself with any proposal upon that subject, and that it was unnecessary to discuss it here, as the proposal had been transmitted to England, and the affair had therefore been carried into a different channel.

He then said, he was not sure it would yet have been proposed, as it was felt that the subject was of a nature to be introduced with address and management, and might require time to bring it to a decision. I replied, that, if this was felt to be the case, we could now only look to two points, either to find out some other object

[1] The first secret article of the Treaty of Potsdam, stipulating the acquisition of Hanover by Prussia.

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upon which my instructions would enable me to speak, and which would be sufficient to induce the King of Prussia to engage in a permanent concert, or to consider the question of Hanover as entirely set aside for the moment, and to discuss the means of uniting ourselves by less permanent ties, but in such a manner as would meet the present danger.

After these observations, we proceeded to consider all the different advantages which might be proposed to Prussia,—and went over the outlines of the several arrangements to which my attention had been directed by your lordship's instructions. The observation to all these proposals was, that none of them could be carried into execution, except upon the supposition of a successful war.

It appeared, however, that the willingness expressed on behalf of his Majesty to lend his assistance towards procuring a great increase to the power of Prussia, made a considerable impression upon his mind.—As, however, all these objects must equally require time to arrange, the principal point to which we directed our attention was the discussion of the terms upon which some temporary arrangement might be concluded. I then stated successively some of the propositions detailed in your lordship's instructions. I felt it however to be necessary, not to press, in a moment of dismay, conditions which were applicable to periods of more sanguine hope. I nevertheless threw out the idea of a stipulation, not to make peace within the year, unless the French were driven beyond the Rhine, *or* unless the allies were in possession of Holland—and stated his Majesty's willingness to supply the means of enabling the King of Prussia to preserve the possession of Holland till a general peace; in case he should be desirous of making his separate peace; the future disposition of Holland being to remain in such case an object of negotiation.[1]

If any such arrangement could be made, I stated the extent to which my instructions would allow me to go, and assured Baron Hardenberg that I should not object to engage for the 180,000 Prussians, together with the addition of 40,000 auxiliaries, or even beyond that number—provided the term of payment of the *mise en*

[1] This may have been the ground on which Hardenberg based his later statement (*Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. p. 853) that Harrowby offered Holland to Prussia. So too Czartoryski (*Memoirs*, vol. ii. ch. xii.).

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campagne could be deferred till after the peace.—I gave as the reason of this condition, that if immediate payment was required, it might press so hard upon the course of exchange as to put England under an impossibility of fulfilling the engagements already contracted,—an event which would prove essentially injurious to the common cause. I stated it as desirable that a small part of the monthly subsidies should also be postponed, but I did not think it necessary to explain myself positively upon this latter point; nor to reject entertaining the suggestion—that the payments of the *mise en campagne* might be brought forward before the conclusion of peace. It appears highly probable that the conduct of the King of Sweden may put an end to our pecuniary engagements with that Court; and there exists little hope of any co-operation with Denmark,—that Court having declared to the Emperor of Russia, before the occurrence of any of the late disasters that it was at all events determined on neutrality. These circumstances led me to think, that if other points were satisfactorily arranged, the whole payments could still be brought within the limits to which I was restrained.

It was impossible for me to judge, what impression was made by these liberal offers. At times his Excellency appeared to think, that some provisional arrangement might be effected on those terms; at other times he expressed his doubts, whether the King would enter into any provisional arrangement, unless the terms of the final arrangement were specifically stated and reserved.

I have been able to repeat to your lordship a very small part of the various topics which were urged.—I enforced every argument which appeared to me likely to have any effect upon the mind of his Excellency, resulting from the situation in which Prussia would be left, in case a peace should be made with Buonaparte in a moment of exultation, upon terms, such as might possibly be acceded to, in spite of all engagements, unless Prussia should come forward to the assistance of the imperial courts; I ventured even to suggest the triumph of the French party, to which his Excellency has hitherto been so successfully and honourably opposed, in case that union which he was labouring to effect between our respective countries should fail.

In conclusion, I repeated, that whatever I had said about Hanover must be considered as completely unofficial—that I wished all arrangements upon that subject to be considered as incapable

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of decision within the short period, which the urgency of affairs admitted for the discussion.—That, in so doing I only entered into the opinion, which his Court had proved itself by it's conduct to entertain.

He ended by assuring me, that he would take all these points into the most serious consideration; and with the most earnest wish, that he might receive the orders of the King, either to hold out other objects, by which his permanent co-operation might be secured, or to arrange the terms of a more limited engagement.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 8.*

Berlin: November 24, 1805.

In a conference between M. d'Alopeus, Count Metternich, and myself, the second article, of which I enclose a copy to your lordship, was communicated to me, and I was informed, that it had been sent by M^r^ Oubril to England, with full information as to all the particulars of the transaction.[1] They stated it to be a point which was yielded with the greatest reluctance by the Emperor of Russia; but that he found, that he could not bring the treaty to a conclusion, notwithstanding all his endeavours, without promising his good offices to engage his Majesty to consent to the exchange.—That the provinces proposed were more considerable in value, and were preferable in many other respects, and they offered to give me a memorial, containing the grounds upon which the advantages proposed to the Electoral House had been detailed. This I declined receiving, stating as my reason, that it was a point on which, as a British minister, I could say nothing, and that this part of the negotiation had already taken another channel.

They were extremely anxious, that, in conferring with Baron Hardenberg, I should not bring the question to a point; and that after I should have tried, if I thought it necessary to substitute conditions for the perpetual co-operation of Prussia, upon which

[1] This was the second secret article of the Treaty of Potsdam offering East Frisia and the western parts of Prussia's Westphalian lands to George III. as an indemnity for the transfer of the greater part of Hanover to Prussia.

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I might be able to speak, and in proposing which I need have no apprehensions, that any jealousy on the part of their Courts would interfere, I should endeavour to bring Prussia to some more limited co-operation, of the possibility of which however, they both appeared to entertain great doubts. Count Metternich (who was acquainted with all the engagements of his Court,) and M. d'Alopeus (who appeared less well informed upon that subject) both agreed that the treaty was not strictly consistant with them, but justified the departure from them by the urgency of the necessity.[1] Not having at that time read your lordship's dispatch, No. 3 (which, however, was written before a copy of the treaty had reached you,) I did not take upon myself to answer for the light in which it might be viewed by his Majesty; but I assured them, notwithstanding, that I was willing to take upon myself to proceed in fulfilling the assurances I had been authorized to give, although my instructions were applicable to a different state of things—provided I met with those facilities on the part of Prussia, which I had been led to hope, and which it was essential should be afforded.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 9.*

Berlin: November 24, 1805.

Baron Hardenberg informs me, that a copy of the whole treaty, open and secret, with the memoir which I declined transmitting, is sent by my courier to Baron Jacobi, who is to communicate with the Russian and imperial ministers, but not to speak of it to the British Government, unless they speak of it to him, and that Count Metternich and M^r^ d'Alopeus had also sent the memoir to Count Woronzow, and Count Starhemberg,[2] to make use of it in bringing the subject under consideration.

[1] See Metternich's despatches of November 4, 6, 1805, quoted in his *Memoirs*, vol. ii. pp. 85 *et seq.* (Engl. edit.).

[2] Austrian minister in London.

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F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 10.*

Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

Berlin: November 24, 1805.

I have just seen at Baron Hardenberg's a Russian officer come from Ollmutz, whose account of the Russian armies tallies nearly with Colonel Ramsay's. He states the three columns of Buxhowden's army at 32,000 men at least; and having seen Michelson at Ollaw, who has under his immediate orders above 30,000 men, was assured by him of his intention to begin offensive operations, as soon as he had joined the armies before him.

Your lordship has already been informed, that the march of Benixsen's army (of about thirty thousand men) from Grodno has been stopped between Warsaw and the Bug by the breaking of some bridges, which will occasion a delay of a good many days.

The Emperor of Russia has written a most pressing letter to the King of Prussia to come forward to his assistance. The answer returned was only in general terms, and notwithstanding all the pressing exhortations of M^r^ d'Alopeus and myself, I doubt whether any Prussian troops will pass into Bohemia before something is known of Count Haugwitz's reception. Orders, however, are actually given to-day (as I am informed from good authority,) to the Duke of Brunswick to begin his march immediately towards Prince Hohenlohe's army; but although M^r^ d'Alopeus assured me that orders were to be given Prince Hohenlohe to advance on his left with his 40,000 Prussians, and 15,000 Saxons, Baron Hardenberg denies any knowledge of them.

With respect to the discussion of a temporary arrangement, which was again started, Baron Hardenbergh would not as yet speak positively, but as Count Haugwitz must have arrived about this day at Buonaparte's head quarters at Schönbrün, I think the decision will be protracted as to entering into that discussion till a courier has arrived from him. If so, I shall hope to have the advantage of receiving your lordship's instructions, drawn after you have seen the treaty itself. The imperfect communication of the substance of it appears to have led you to suppose, that a permanent co-operation was intended to be offered, in return for subsidies, and future indefinite acquisitions.

In the mean time, all attention is drawn to the side of Moravia,

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and the discussions begun upon an attack on Holland are necessarily suspended. Weakened, as the combined army is by the retreat of the King of Sweden, I fear it will be found impossible, (according to the best military opinions,) to attempt anything in that quarter this winter.

I expect to have occasion in a few days to write more fully upon this subject.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 11.*

Berlin: November 27, 1805.

Baron Hardenberg told me yesterday, that, although the King was extremely attached to the idea of the exchange of Hanover, and could not abandon the expectation, that it might be effectuated, yet he had given him orders to enter into negotiation with me upon the basis on which we had conversed a few days ago. That as the state of affairs was much altered, and the chances of war uncertain, it might be difficult to ascertain the precise point of military success (such as the driving the French from the Rhine) by which this temporary co-operation should be limited, and that he thought it would therefore be better to give it some limitation in point of time, such as, (*par exemple,*) the term of a year. Tomorrow is appointed for opening this discussion.

His Excellency desired me, at the same time, to send to M^r^ Taylor, to direct him to support the proposal made by Prussia to the Elector of Hesse for the co-operation of his troops, and to request, that a person might be sent here to treat for subsidies.

He told me at the same time, that the King had sent orders to the army of Prince Hohenlohe to advance to Bayreuth, and to those of the Duke of Brunswick, and the Elector of Hesse to take a direction towards the same point—and that the King of Prussia had resolved to take in a very short time the command of those armies in person.—Baron Hardenberg added, that it was, however, impossible for his Prussian Majesty to advance his armies beyond his frontiers, consistently with his previous declarations, before the negotiation was broken off,—as such a step would be an act of offensive war, but that, in case any reverse obliged the

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armies of the two Emperors to retire on to Silesia, orders had been given to open the country to them, and to shut it against the French. That the commanders of the Silesian fortresses had also been directed to supply them with provisions, and that a pursuit of the imperial armies by the French on the Prussian territory would be considered as a hostile action on the part of France.

Notwithstanding these appearances of vigour, I am by no means persuaded, that steps are not taking at this moment, either to procure an armistice, or to open a negotiation upon terms much lower than those contained in the treaty. Count Stadion has been sent by the Emperor of Germany to the head quarters of Bonaparte, and M^r^ de Novossiltzoff and Count Tinkerstein (the Prussian minister at the Austrian Court,) have also gone from Ollmütz to meet Count Haugwitz upon his journey at Czarlaw.

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F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 12.*

Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

Berlin: November 27, 1805.

I understand from Colonel Anstruther, that, in the several conferences, and conversations which he has held with the principal officers of the Prussian staff, they have uniformly expressed a very decided opinion as to the inexpediency, at the present moment, of making an attack upon Holland from the side of Germany, *as a permanent operation*;—their opinion appears to rest upon the following considerations.

1^st^. The first object which Prussia has in view in entering into the war, is to carry the most powerful and effectual relief to the Emperor, by forcing the French to evacuate Germany. For this purpose a powerful army of ninety thousand men, is assembling under the Duke of Brunswick, whose orders are to seek the main body of the enemy, wherever he may be, and to bring the matter to the decision of a general action.

2^ndly^. With a view to the same essential object, several corps of observation and of reserve are assembling either for the purpose of reinforcing the main army directly, or of supporting it's operations, as circumstances may require; all these corps must therefore keep themselves in constant connexion with that main army and conform

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to all its movements; and to none of them can a fixed and separate destination be assigned, without destroying the unity of the plan, and deranging the whole system of operations.

3rdly. The Russian and British corps now in Westphalia, after leaving a sufficient force to blockade Hameln, could not carry forward to the Yssel more than 20,000 men. They could not therefore afford to make any other considerable detachment. But it is evident, that they could not hope to establish themselves permanently on the Yssel, far less to pass that barrier, unless their left flank, and rear are secured by a corps of observation towards Dusseldorff, and Cologne, of sufficient strength to repel any attempt which the enemy might make to cross the Rhine in that quarter, and place himself on the communications of the allies. Without this indispensable precaution the latter might be brought into a situation of the utmost difficulty and danger.

4th. Under the present circumstances, the extent of the Prussian force, compared with the possible efforts of the enemy, does not admit of her allotting to the above purpose a corps sufficient to secure the attainment of it, the more especially as that corps would be entirely separated from the main army, and would be very little, if at all, aiding to it's operations.

5th. The matter would be widely different, if the French should suffer a defeat in Bohemia, or Moravia, which would leave the great Prussian army at liberty to support the allies in the manner that might appear most desirable either by joining them in the attack on Holland, or by penetrating into Brabant, so as to give the most effectual support to their operations. This must be the subject of future concert.

6thly. But, although the attack on Holland is not considered at this moment as advisable, *as a permanent operation*, a powerful and very advantageous diversion might be made by pushing forward to the Yssel, or even beyond that river, a considerable detachment from the allied army, who would give themselves out as it's advanced guard, and make every demonstration calculated to induce the belief of an immediate and serious attack, but would be prepared to retire the moment the enemy appeared in force on the Lower Rhine.

Such appears to be the sum of the arguments offered by the Prussian Staff against an immediate attack being made upon Holland.

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The enclosed memorandums No. 1 and 2 received from them, more fully explain the general system of warfare which they conceive it most expedient to adopt under the present circumstances. It is understood to be framed on the suggestion of the Duke of Brunswick, and as Generals Tolstoi and Don were expected to arrive at his head quarters on the 24th instant, they will, no doubt, have been put fully in possession of his sentiments, both in regard to the general plan of the campaign, and the particular object in which they are more immediately interested.

No. 1.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse vient de donner ses ordres à Mons. le Duc de Brunswic et le Prince de Hohenloe [*sic*] de mettre en marche les trouppes Prussiennes cantonnées en Vestphalie et en Saxe. Ces ordres vont être exécutés sans délai. De petits arrangemens, devant [*sic*] necessairement précéder la marche des trouppes. M. le Duc le Brunswic réglera le jour du départ. Il sera à la tête du corps d'armée confié à son commandement le dixhuitième jour de marche à la hauteur de Bamberg. La tête du corps d'armée commandée par M. le Prince de Hohenloe arrivera en même tems aux environs de Bayreuth. Pour assurer les marches et les opérations des trouppes l'on poussera en consequence des avant-gardes nécessaires. Il est hors de doute qu'à l'epoque à la quelle l'armée Prussienne arrive sur le Mein, on saura avec certitude si Napoleon préférera une paix raisonnable à une guerre générale. L'armée Prussienne ne s'arrêtera donc point sur le Mein. C'est des points de Bamberg et de Bayreuth qu'elle se portera où l'intérêt commune et la nécessité de mettre une terme aux calamités de l'Europe l'appelleront.

Elle tâchera de saisir et d'écraser le premier corps ennemi qu'elle pourra rencontrer; elle fera tous les efforts possibles pour dégager la maison impériale d'Autriche des dangers, qui la ménacent dans ce moment, afin que les armées Autrichiennes renforcées par les secours puissants de sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies ne tardent pas de revenir triomphantes dans cette partie d'Allemagne qu'un concours d'évenemens sinistres les a faits abandonner. Il est impossible d'entrer dans détails sur la manière dont on remplira un objet si important. Ces détails

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doivent se régler sur les circonstances qui changent à chaque moment et qu'il est impossible de prévoir.

Outre les corps d'armée sous les ordres du Duc de Brunswic et le Prince de Howenloe, sa Majesté fera encore joindre un corps Prussien aux Hessois. Ce corps combiné coopérant avec l'armée Prussienne sur le Mein se portera sur Fulda, soit pour s'opposer à une diversion que l'ennemi pourroit faire du coté de Mayence, soit pour joindre la grande armée. En fésant avancer son armée sur le Danube ou en Bohème, sa Majesté expose ses provinces en Vestphalie à une invasion, contre la quelle un corps Prussien établi sur la Diemel et l'armée combinée des Russes et des Anglois pas encore organisée pour les grandes opérations, ne sauroient la garantir, si l'ennemi fait passer à des corps superieurs l'Yossel ou le Buskhin. Se reposant entièrement sur l'activité des armées alliées sa Majesté n'hésite plus un moment d'exposer ses propres états à un danger évident en eloignant ses principales forces au delà de cinquante milles d'Allemagne de Magdebourg tandis que cette place importante se trouve à la même distance d'où peuvent partir les diversions des armées françoises.

Les opérations des armées Prussiennes ne peuvent avoir d'autre but, que de dégager les provinces que la Maison d'Autriche possède en Allemagne et de mettre les armées Autrichiennes renforcées par les armées Russes en état de revenir avec vigueur sur le théâtre de guerre qu'elles ont été obligées d'abandonner.

Les lois de la guerre imposant au Gouvernement françois la nécessité de faire une diversion puissante du coté du Bas Rhin, il est plus que vraisemblable que l'armée Prussienne après avoir rétabli les affaires sur le Danube ou en Bohème sera obligée [*sic*] sur ses pas pour empêcher l'ennemi de s'emparer des embouchures du Weser et de l'Elbe. Les corps de reserve dont il est fait mention dans un mémoire précédent, venant des bords du Memel et du Pregel ne sauroient être en activité avant le mois de février. Si les operations de l'armée Prussienne ne se trouvent pas entravées par des diversions, cette armée se mettra à la hauteur de l'armée combinée, qui pourra faire une invasion en Hollande.

No. 2.

En Italie et dans la Haute Allemagne les armées combinées de sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne et d'Autriche, et de sa Majesté

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l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'opposent à l'aile droite des armées françoises; les armées de sa M. le Roi de Prusse, combinées avec les troupes électorales de Hesse et de Saxe et avec celles que les hauts alliés ont fait débarquer dans la Basse Allemagne tâcheront de combattre l'aile gauche de l'ennemi commun. D'écraser cet ennemi sera le but de toutes les opérations, au lieu de se porter sur des provinces dont on voudra faire la conquête et l'on préferera de passer de victoire en victoire, en continuant pendant tout le cours de la guerre d'aller à l'ennemi par la voye la plus courte.[1]

Tout sera dans un mouvement continuel. Si l'ennemi parvient à repousser quelque partie des troupes coalisées celles qui se trouvent les plus près, iront sans balancer à la rencontre de l'ennemi. En vertu de ce principe général, l'on concertera pour l'ouverture de la campagne les opérations suivantes.

L'armée combinée débarquée dans la Basse Allemagne manquant encore d'artillerie, et de cavallerie, se trouve hors d'état de se prêter à des operations offensives. Elle se bornera à détacher un petit corps pour faire le blocus de Hameln et à prendre avec le reste des troupes des positions en Westphalie qui donnent de la jalousie pour la Hollande, engagent le gouvernement françois d'y envoyer des corps considérables. Si, par des renforts, cette armée combinée se trouve organisée pour l'offensive, elle fera une invasion en Hollande pour y attirer en force les François. Cette diversion ne sera qu'une diversion puissante, une forte gélée lui seroit extrêmement favorable. L'armée combinée se gardera bien de s'opiniâtrer à soutenir en Hollande la défensive contre des forces trop supérieures. Dans ce cas elle fera passer 5 à 6,000 hommes aux retranchemens, qu'elle aura soin de préparer d'avance devant Bremen. Il est important de mettre ce point à l'abri de toute insulte; cependant ce ne sera que dans le cas que Bremen se trouve véritablement menacé, qu'on y fera passer 5 à 6,000 hommes, la plus grande partie de l'armée combinée tâchera alors de joindre les troupes qui se trouvent à côté de la Hesse. La jonction faite, cette armée reprendra l'offensive, pour donner la chasse à l'ennemi pénétré en West-

[1] The terms of this Memorandum bear a striking resemblance to those of the agreement arrived at by the allies at Trachenberg on July 12, 1813. It may also be regarded as the first draft of the convention printed below (p. 254).

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phalie. Pour mettre les opérations de côte de la Westphalie en rapport avec celles du côté de la Hesse l'on établira un corps prussien sur la Diemel.

Les troupes électorales de Hesse renforcées par un corps prussien se porteront vers le Rhin et la Mein suivant les circonstances, pour combiner leurs opérations avec celles de la grande armée prussienne. Cette armée se trouvant actuellement dans la Haute et dans la Basse Saxe se mettra de concert avec les Saxons, en mouvement contre l'aile gauche de l'armée françoise, soit que cette aile se trouve sur le Mein, sur le Danube, ou en Bohème. La première opération destinée à preparer la voye à toute autre est dirigée vers le Mein, et principalement sur Bayreuth, Bamberg, et Schweinfurth. Le corps composé de Prussiens et de Hessois opère en même tems sur la route de Fulda.

Pour donner aux operations le plus de vigueur, et pour se mettre en état de faire face à tous les évènemens, l'on établira quatre corps de réserve. Le premier à Leipzig, le second dans le pays de Halberstadt, le troisième en Silésie entre Glogau et Bunzlau, le quatrième entre Schweidnitz et Neisse. Les opérations donc il est fait mention, doivent obvier au danger principal, et ont fait naître toutes les mesures prises en Westphalie, en Hesse et en Hanovre.

L'état des choses peut changer; le danger principal peut passer à l'aile droite; pour y frapper de grands coups, l'on ne balancera pas alors d'abandonner à l'ennemi des avantages sur la gauche.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 14.*

Berlin: December 1, 1805.[1]

In pursuance of the desire of Baron Hardenberg, that I would state to him in a more distinct form the conditions upon which I thought that a provisional and temporary treaty might be negotiated, I had a conference with him to-night.—I felt that the

[1] This date is open to question. It is more probably December 10 (or some date *after* the arrival of news of Austerlitz on December 8).

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step I was taking could only be justified by the urgent necessity of inspiring Prussia with a feeling of security, that, in case the negotiation should break off, pecuniary assistance would be given; but even under these circumstances I did not chuse to give in any proposals in a formal shape. I took with me the paper which I enclose, which I read to him; and I reserved to myself the full liberty of adding or altering anything which my own reflections might suggest, or his Majesty's orders might direct.

He took notes from the paper, and from our conversation.—It included several other points, such as the admission of officers to attend the Prussian armies, and the communication of official returns, on which he did not hold out the expectation of any difficulty.

The impossibility of holding out any territorial acquisitions to Prussia at a moment when the first object is to save the Continent from ruin, led me to go farther in the extent of my pecuniary offers.

If the war continues, Prussia will take the place of Austria in the scale; and enough may be withdrawn, consistently with engagements, and with prudence for the assistance given to the latter, to leave an opening for some extension of it to the former, beyond the limits hitherto laid down.

As the whole plan is grounded upon the condition, that the negotiation is to be broken off within the time stipulated by the Treaty of Potsdam, it will be open for me, if that event should not take place, to make such modifications as may be necessary, particularly as to the time from whence the subsidy is to commence.

I have insisted upon the necessity that Prussia should enforce upon the smaller German Powers the acceptance of similar terms, as it would be impossible to make the addition desired to the auxiliary armies, unless their subsidies could be brought within at least the same limits as to time with those given to Prussia.

I feel very deeply the great responsibility I have taken upon myself, and trust that I shall receive your lordship's instructions, sent after the Treaty of Potsdam has reached you, in time to make such corrections or additions as they may prescribe.

Sa Majesté Prussienne ayant fait signifier à sa Majesté Britannique l'engagement éventuel, qu'elle a pris par le traité conclu le trois Novembre à Potsdam, de mettre ses armées en campagne contre la

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France, et sa Majesté Britannique étant disposée à fournir à sa Majesté Prussienne des secours pécuniaires pour lui faciliter les moyens d'agir avec vigueur, au cas que la guerre s'ensuive entre la Prusse et la France, en vertu de cet engagement, leurs dites Majestés desirant d'unir dans ce cas leurs efforts contre la France, et voulant éviter le délai qui s'ensuivroit, si elles cherchoient à arranger dans ce moment les conditions d'une coopération permanente, ont resolu de conclure entr'elles une convention provisoire pour un tems limité.

Si la France refuse de consentir aux bases qui doivent être proposées d'après le traité de Potsdam dans le terme stipulé par le dit traité, sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse feroit agir contre la France et ses alliés, et tiendroit au complet ses armées montant au moins à 180,000 hommes, afin de faire évacuer aux François toute l'Allemagne.

Sa Majesté Britannique s'engageroit à payer à sa Majesté Prussienne à dater depuis le — Octobre, 1805, jusqu'au 1 Janvier, 1807 (si la guerre dure aussi long tems), un subside, dans la proportion de 1,250 livres sterling par an pour chaque millier d'hommes, pour tel nombre de troupes agissant contre la France, qui n'outre passeroit pas le nombre de 180,000 hommes.

Elle s'engageroit aussi à payer à sa Majesté Prussienne pour les fraix de la mise en campagne l'equivalent de quatre mois de subsides pour 180,000 hommes.

Les subsides mensuels seront payés de mois à mois, bien entendu cependant, que les subsides à payer pour les deux derniers mois de l'année 1805 ne seront acquittés que dans les deux premiers mois de l'année 1806 ; ainsi il restera à payer après le premier Janvier 1807, deux mois de subsides, lesquels aussi bien que la mise en campagne, seront acquittés en six mois, à dater du 1 Janvier, 1807. Sa Majesté Britannique sera prête à donner des subsides à telles autres puissances voisines de la Prusse qui voudront accéder à ce traité, ou faire des traités séparés. Bien entendu toutefois, que ces subsides seront fixés, au même taux, et à des conditions pareilles (autant que les circonstances le permettront), à celles qui règlent les subsides à payer à sa Majesté Prussienne. Le nombre de ces troupes ne devra cependant pas outrepasser 40,000 hommes, ni la somme à payer dans l'année, aller au delà de 500,000 [livres].

La délivrance des Provinces Unies du joug des François étant un objet également interessant à leurs dites Majestés, sa Majesté Prussienne promet de concerter avec sa Majesté Britannique et ses alliés (aussitot que le danger qui menace actuellement sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi sera dissipé), les mesures les plus efficaces pour parvenir à ce but.—Sa Majesté Prussienne assignera pour cet objet un corps d'armée, qui devant agir conjointement avec les forces de terre et de mer

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de sa Majesté Britannique et de ses alliés, sera censé, selon un concert ulterieur, suffisant pour en assurer le succès.

La durée de cette convention sera fixée au 1er Janvier, 1807. Leurs dites Majestés s'engagent de ne faire ni paix ni armistice avec la France pendant la durée de cette convention, sans s'y comprendre réciproquement, et sans se concerter ensemble ; et promettent de se communiquer mutuellement toutes les propositions ou ouvertures qui leur seront faites de la part de la France.

Si la paix se feroit de commun accord avant le 1er Janvier, 1807, les subsides mensuels cesseroient, mais ce qui resteroit à payer sur les subsides mensuels seroit acquitté immédiatement et le paiement pour la mise en campagne se feroit dans le même espace de tems après la paix, qu'il doit se faire après le 1er Janvier 1807 si la guerre dure si longtems.

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F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 5.* (*Draft.*)

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Harrowby.

Downing Street: December 5, 1805.

Your dispatches by Captn Taylor and the messenger Monroe, have been received and laid before the King.

I have the greatest satisfaction in conveying to your lordship, his Majesty's entire approbation of the whole of your most judicious conduct in treating the very extraordinary question which had unexpectedly arisen subsequent to your lordship's departure from England. The line which you have taken appears to be in substance so conformable to the light in which his Majesty's Government had received the subject, and which I have detailed to you in my dispatch No. 4, and every consideration referred to in your last dispatches having been in a great measure, if not entirely, anticipated in that dispatch, it does not seem now necessary to enter again upon the subject, further than to repeat to your lordship, that it is his Majesty's earnest and urgent wish that a separate arrangement should be made for the payment of subsidies on some engagement however limited, but which may lead to immediate and active operations on the part of Prussia against the common enemy, reserving the question of territorial acquisition for future discussion.

The object of the present dispatch is to inform your lordship,

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that his Majesty has determined to send without delay, an additional British force of more than twelve thousand men, under the command of General Lord Cathcart, to be landed in the Ems:— The most desirable object for the employment of this force, in conjunction with his Majesty's troops and those of his allies, already assembled in Hanover, would certainly be, the recovery of the whole or a part of the United Provinces. At the same time the representation of objections in a military point of view to which your lordship alludes, comes with so much weight from the quarter in which those objections originate, that whenever they shall be more distinctly expressed, and the nature of them shall have been stated in detail, they will meet with the most attentive consideration. Your lordship will observe, that in my dispatch No. 4 a pointed preference is given to the adoption of a direct and powerful attack on the French armies, supposing the attempt upon Holland to be incompatible with the most ample provision for the former operation. His Majesty's Government however, still entertain the hope, that, with the addition of the force above-stated, and which is ready to proceed to the place of it's destination, the operations against Holland may be also undertaken with a fair and promising expectation of success.

Even though upon due deliberation, it should appear that a serious attack on the United Provinces would, under all the circumstances be inexpedient, yet, the collection of so numerous an army in that quarter, and the consequent menace of an irruption into Holland, cannot fail to operate as a powerful diversion, by fixing the attention of a considerable body of the enemy's forces. His Majesty is further induced to adopt the measure by sending so large a reinforcement of his troops at this season, (notwithstanding the doubts which have been suggested respecting the immediate occupation of any part of the Dutch Provinces) by the consideration of the advantages which might thereby be produced to his allies, in event of the vigourous and well concerted plan of the Prussian council of war for the attack of the French armies in Swabia, taking effect:—For by this addition, the force in Hanover will become so considerable, that any loss which should be sustained in the execution of the above measure might, with the greater facility, be immediately supplied by drawing reinforcements from the left of the proposed line of positions, each detachment being replaced in succession from those on the right; the position in

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Westphalia on the right of the whole line being taken up by British and Russian troops from the Electorate of Hanover, which might be effected without leaving that country destitute of the necessary force for its security.—If, on the other hand, the success of the Prussian attack should be so complete as not to require the supply of such a reinforcement, the combined army assembled in Hanover might then press forward into Holland, and by occupying that important point, add to the discomfiture of the enemy, by the additional difficulties and dangers which they would have to apprehend from that quarter.

By enlarging upon these topicks, I trust your lordship will make it evident to the Prussian Government, that his Majesty, in sending this additional body of his forces, has not merely had in view the accomplishment of the object which he would deem (if attainable) of eminent importance, but that his Majesty has been actuated by a sincere and earnest desire, to contribute his active exertions in the common cause, and to adopt, without any separate consideration, the measures which, on due consultation, may be deemed most effectual towards the accomplishment of the great end which his Majesty has had constantly in view, and for which he hopes to engage the powerful and cordial co-operation of his Prussian Majesty.

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F. O. Prussia, vol. 70. *No. 15.*

Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

Berlin: December 7, 1805.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's dispatch No. 4, dated the 23rd of November.

It was a great satisfaction to me to find, that the negotiation of any territorial arrangement for Prussia has been felt by his Majesty's Government to be liable to so much difficulty and delay, as to induce your lordship to direct my attention particularly to a convention for a limited period.

The ideas I had thrown out to Baron Hardenberg were stated in my last dispatch to your lordship, they have since that time taken a more regular form, and after repeated discussions were presented

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in the shape of a *projet* last night. I expect to receive from that minister in a few days a *contreprojet*; or remarks upon the articles. As far as I can at present judge, the principal difficulties will be in the subsidies to be furnished to the lesser Powers of Germany, for whose assistance the Court of Berlin is extremely anxious; and I do not see any hope of bringing the sum to be furnished on their account within the bounds which were originally prescribed to me. In my discussions with Baron Hardenberg, I found it impossible to bring him to listen to any reduction in the subsidies required by Prussia, and thinking that the cordial and effectual operation of the Prussian forces was absolutely essential, and of itself sufficient to afford a reasonable prospect of saving the Continent, I relaxed upon this head with respect to Prussia. I have also relaxed, upon the grounds stated in my former dispatch, as to the total sum to be furnished to these smaller Powers; but I still fear, it will be impossible for me to venture to fulfill their expectations; and that unless Prussia will be satisfied with their co-operation to a smaller extent, the negotiation may still come to an end.

Under these circumstances it has been impossible for me to take any steps towards executing that part of my instructions, which relates to Denmark; as not only the fund, from which pecuniary assistance was to be provided, has been already exhausted, but I have even gone much beyond it.

I have endeavoured, in all my discussions with Baron Hardenberg, to prove to him in the strongest manner the zeal with which his Majesty was disposed to carry on the contest—not only by the offer of such unprecedented pecuniary sacrifices; but by the great efforts he was inclined to make by land.

It did not appear from your lordship's dispatch, that the embarkation of the additional 10,000 troops was at that time actually decided upon; I was not therefore enabled to speak positively on that subject; and could only state, that they were in readiness, if not actually embarked; and would, as far as I was informed, proceed to the Continent, in case the rivers were not so frozen as to prevent their landing.

I held out also for the ensuing campaign the prospect of a great disposable force, amounting in the whole to 60 or 70,000 men, which might be employed in such operations upon the Continent or on the coasts of the enemy, as might upon concert be thought most useful to the common cause.

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I cannot however flatter myself, that even these prospects make any deep impression. The eyes of this Government are turned almost exclusively to the side of Moravia. It is there, the fate of this negotiation must be decided.—If a battle is won—the Emperor of Russia will not allow Austria to yield; and the Court of Berlin, finding itself obliged to execute its treaty, will be happy to secure both the pecuniary assistance, and the military efforts of Great Britain.—If the further success of Bonaparte appears to make a favourable turn of affairs in that quarter hopeless, and leaves the whole weight of the war, in the first instance, upon the troops of Prussia; there is not, I fear, vigour and determination enough in the Prussian councils, to run so great a risk.

I enclose a statement of the Prussian army, now on march, given me by Baron Hardenberg.

[*Inclosure.*]

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70.

Sa Majesté Prussienne ayant fait signifier à sa Majesté Britannique l'engagement éventuel qu'elle à pris, de mettre ses armées en campagne contre la France; et sa Majesté Britannique étant disposée à fournir à sa Majesté Prussienne des secours pécuniaires pour lui faciliter les moyens d'agir avec vigueur, au cas que la guerre s'ensuive entre la Prusse et la France, en vertu de cet engagement; leurs dites Majestés désirant d'unir dans ce cas leurs efforts contre la France, et voulant éviter le délai qui s'ensuivroit, si elles cherchoient à arranger dans ce moment les conditions d'une co-opération permanente, ont résolu de conclure entr'elles une convention provisoire pour un tems limité.

1.

Si la France refuse de consentir aux conditions qui doivent être proposées d'après le traité de Potsdam, dans le terme stipulé par le dit traité, sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse s'engage à faire agir contre la France et ses alliés des corps d'armée qui monteroient ensemble au moins à 180,000 hommes. Les dites armées seront et resteront complettes autant que possible. Et elles seront d'abord employées de la manière qui sera censée être la plus convenable à faire passer le Rhin, par les troupes Françoises et à leur faire évacuer toutes les parties de l'Allemagne qui sont situées au delà de la rive droite de ce fleuve.

A cette époque on se concertera sur les mesures à prendre dans l'état des choses d'alors.

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2.

Pour faciliter à sa Majesté Prussienne les moyens d'agir avec vigueur, et conformément à l'urgence des circonstances, sa Majesté Britannique s'engage à payer à sa Majesté Prussienne à dater depuis le — Octobre, 1805, jusqu'au premier Janvier, 1806, un subside dans la proportion de 12,500 livres, sterlings pour chaque millier d'hommes par an, pour tel nombre de troupes qui n'outrepasseroit pas celui de 180,000 hommes, et qui paroîtroit par les rapports officiels à la fin de chacun des dits mois d'Octobre, de Novembre, et de Décembre, avoir été à ces époques actuellement sur pied de guerre.

Sa Majesté Britannique payeroit ainsi à sa Majesté Prussienne un subside dans la même proportion par an depuis le premier Janvier, 1806, jusqu'au premier Janvier, 1807, si la guerre continue jusqu'à cette époque, pour ce nombre de troupes qui n'outrepasseroit pas 180,000 hommes, qui seront employées à agir hostilement contre la France.

Sa Majesté Britannique s'engage aussi à payer à sa Majesté Prussienne pour les fraix de la mise en campagne des troupes susdites l'équivalent de quatre mois de subsides pour 180,000 hommes, ou pour tel nombre inférieur qui paroîtroit d'après les rapports officiels avoir été sur pied de guerre, et prêt à entrer en campagne le premier Janvier, 1806.

Les subsides dûs pour la portion du mois d'Octobre, et pour les mois complets de Novembre et de Décembre de l'année 1805, seront payés dans le courant des mois de Janvier et de Février, 1806. A dater de cette époque les subsides mensuels seront payés autant que possible de mois à mois. Les subsides mensuels pour les deux derniers mois de l'année, 1806, aussi bien que les fraix de la mise en campagne ne seront payés qu'en six mois à dater du premier Janvier, 1807.

3.

Si la paix se faisoit d'un commun accord avant le premier Janvier, 1807, les subsides mensuels cesseroient, dès la signature des articles préliminaires, mais ce qui resteroit à acquitter sur les subsides mensuels seroit acquitté et le paiement des fraix de la mise en campagne se feroit dans la même espace de tems après la dite signature, qu'il auroit dû se faire après le premier Janvier, 1807, si la guerre étoit continuée jusqu'à cette époque.

4.

Les paiemens des subsides, aussi bien que des fraix de la mise en campagne des troupes seront effectués d'après un arrangement qui sera convenu entre leurs Majestés Britannique et Prussienne.

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5.

La durée de cette convention sera fixée au premier Janvier, 1807. Leurs dites Majestés se promettent cependant de se concerter dans l'intervalle sur les moyens de la renouveller et de l'étendre selon les circonstances.

6.

Leurs Majestés Britannique et Prussienne s'engagent à ne faire ni paix ni armistice avec la France, ni d'entrer en négociation pour l'un ou l'autre de ces objets, pendant la durée de cette convention, sans s'y comprendre réciproquement, et sans se concerter ensemble. Elles promettent de plus de se communiquer mutuellement toutes les propositions ou ouvertures qui leur seront faites de la part de la France.

7.

Leurs Majestés Britannique et Prussienne s'obligent réciproquement de pousser avec vigueur pendant cette campagne la guerre contre la France ; de faire usage dans cette campagne de toutes leurs forces tant de terre et de mer ; et d'arranger d'un commun accord, quand l'occasion l'exigera, la manière la plus avantageuse d'employer respectivement ces forces de terre et de mer au soutien des opérations contre l'ennemi commun.

8.

Le Roi de Prusse verroit avec plaisir, que de la part de sa Majesté Britannique, il y ait auprès de ses armées des officiers de l'état-major, ou d'autres personnes de confiance, à qui l'on donnera volontiers tous les renseignements et toutes les notions nécessaires sur l'état et la force des troupes.

9.

L'affranchissement des Provinces Unies du joug des François, étant un objet également intéressant à sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande, et à sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, sa Majesté Prussienne promet de concerter avec sa Majesté Britannique et ses alliés les mesures les plus efficaces pour parvenir à ce but. Sa Majesté Prussienne assignera pour cet objet un corps d'armée qui devant agir conjointement avec les forces de terre et de mer de sa Majesté Britan-

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nique et de ses alliés sera censé, selon un concert ultérieur, suffisant pour en assurer le succès. En attendant, sa Majesté Prussienne s'engage à garder un corps d'armée dans ses provinces Westphaliennes d'au moins 15,000 hommes, pour soutenir l'aile gauche de l'armée combinée employée du côté des Provinces Unies, contre toute attaque de la part des François.

10.

Si le Roi de Prusse faisoit la paix séparée avec la France après l'expiration de cette convention, sa Majesté Prussienne s'engage de prendre les mesures les plus efficaces pour assurer et maintenir l'indépendance des Provinces Unies contre tout attente de la part des François. A cette effet, elle se concertera avec sa Majesté Britannique pour le maintien de garnisons Prussiennes dans les places fortes des dites Provinces, depuis cette époque jusqu'à celle de la paix générale. Le Roi de la Grande Bretagne s'engageant dans ce cas de payer des subsides dans la proportion de cinq livres sterling par an pour telles trouppes Prussiennes qui formeront ces garnisons. Les villes où il y aura garnison et le nombre des trouppes qui devront y rester se règleront *d'après un accord mutuel.*

11.

Sa Majesté Britannique sera prête à donner les subsides à telles autres Puissances voisines de la Prusse, qui voudront accéder à ce traité avec les modifications nécessaires, ou faire des traités séparés. Bien entendu toutesfois, que ces subsides seront fixés aux mêmes taux, et à des conditions pareilles (autant que les circonstances le permettront,) à celles qui règlent les subsides à payer à sa Majesté Prussienne ; la somme à payer dans l'armée ne devra cependant pas aller au delà de 500,000*l.* livres sterling, ni le nombre des trouppes outrepasser celui de 40,000 hommes : à moins que les facilités, que donneroient les dites puissances rélativement au terme des rayemens ne permettent de stipuler pour un plus grand nombre sans aller au delà de la dite somme.

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O. Prussia, vol l. 70.

Armées Prussiennes réunies et en marche pour leurs destinations.

		Combattans.	Non Combattans.	Total.
1.	Grande armée Prussienne que le Roi commandera en personne.			
	1. L'aile droite aux ordres du Duc de Brunswic	39,025	4,059	43,084
	2. L'aile gauche aux ordres du Prince de Hohenloe, la destination de cette armée est la Franconie	40,149	4,804	44,953
	3. Reserve aux ordres du Marechal de Möllendorff ; celle-ci se porte d'abord en Saxe . . .	13,169	2,029	15,198
		92,343	10,892	103,235
	A cette armée se joignent 16,000 Saxons, et pourront encore s'y joindre 1,000 Chasseurs du D. de Weimar			
	17,000			
	ce qui la porteroit à plus de 120/m. homes.			
2.	Corps destiné à se joindre aux Hessois, trouppes de Darmstadt sous les ordres du L^t Gen^l Comte de Schmettau .	15,056	1,940	16,996
	En ajoutant à cette armée les trouppes de l'Electeur de Hesse 20,000 à 24,000.			
	Celles du Landgrave de Darmstadt 8,000 à 10,000.			
	Il seroit aisé de la porter à 50/m. hommes.			
3.	Corps destiné à coopérer avec l'armée alliée en Westphalie sous les ordres du G^l Comte de Kalkreuth .	13,504	1,731	15,235
	On pourroit y joindre les 3,000 h. du Duc de Brunswic et il seroit à desirer qu'on sçut exactement le nombre des autres trouppes alliés.			
4.	Corps de reserve aux ordres du Prince Eugene de Wurtemburg . . .	15,150	2,217	17,367
	Destination sur l'Elbe.			
5.	Corps du Lieut. Général de Thiele .			
	Il se rassemble en Silésie vers les frontières la Lusace . . .	12,369	2,210	14,579
6.	Corps aux ordres du L^t Gen^l de Grawert en Silésie dans le Comté de Glatz et la haute Silésie . . .	22,575	2,703	25,278
		170,997	21,693	192,690

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 16.*

December 8, 1805.

Lieut. Gen[l] Tolstoi and Lieut. Gen[l] Don in a conference held with the Duke of Brunswick at Hildesheim had arranged the manner in which the British, Hanoverian and Russian troops should be disposed in the Electorate of Hanover, by which it was determined that his Majesty's British troops should occupy the lower part of the Weser, and Lieut. Gen[l] Don having since communicated to me a representation which he had received from the Senate of Bremen remonstrating against his occupation of that city, and [*sic*] has called upon me for my opinion. As the King of Prussia and the Duke of Brunswick in quality of directors of the circle of Lower Saxony are the protectors of Bremen, I thought it necessary to consult with his Serene Highness and with Baron Hardenberg, and in consequence of their opinions respecting that measure, I addressed to Lieut. Gen[l] Don a letter of which the enclosed is a copy.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 17.*

Berlin: December 8, 1805.

Since I received the dispatch from Sir Arthur Paget, which is forwarded by this messenger, I have seen Baron Hardenberg. He was not in possession of any further details—but only informed me, that no news had yet arrived of a later date, or which gave any information of the safety of the Emperor of Russia.[1]

He told me, that, in a council of war held since the arrival of the first accounts of this disaster, it had been decided to order a part of the Prussian army to march to it's left into Bohemia, and that, if approved by the King, the orders would go tomorrow.

These events, he said, need not interrupt our negotiation; and promised to send his counter-projet tomorrow evening.

While I was with him, a courier came in from Count Haugwitz. After reading his dispatch *en clair*, he informed me,

[1] *I.e.* in the battle of Austerlitz (December 2).

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that Count Haugwitz had seen Buonaparte at Brunn on the 28th—had only had some loose conversation with him, in which Buonaparte had expressed his wish for a general peace, and had then told him, that as he was marching forward to a battle against the Russians, he could not then enter into the business; but would meet him at Vienna—Count Haugwitz (as well as Count Stadion) proceeded in consequence to that place; from whence Count Haugwitz's letter is dated on the 2nd of this month.

Although it is too soon to expect that any decision can have been taken, as to the conduct to be pursued in consequence of the late events, I could perceive in Baron Hardenberg an unwillingness to commit himself, and a fear that the negotiation with Buonaparte would now be protracted.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 18.*

Berlin: December 13, 1805.

Upon my recalling to the recollection of Baron Hardenberg last night the assurances which he had given respecting the safety of the British troops in Hanover, I was struck with something like hesitation in his manner,—with a sort of reference to the future orders of the King, and with an expression which dropped from him, that circumstances might possibly arise, in which Prussia could look only to her own defence and security. I attributed this in a great degree to the agitation of the moment; but I should have pushed the question to a point if the entrance of Count Metternich and M^r^ d'Alopeus had not then interrupted me, and if Baron Hardenberg had not been obliged to leave us abruptly, in order to wait upon the King.

I have thought it however necessary to dispatch to General Don two letters (of which I enclose copies,) in order to prevent any larger number of his Majesty's troops from being brought into a situation of possible embarrassment.

I was preparing a note this morning to Baron Hardenberg upon this subject, when I received from him the inclosed note, to which I immediately returned the answer, of which the copy is also inclosed, and I am unwilling to detain the messenger till I receive his reply.

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Lord Harrowby to Lord Mulgrave.

F. O. Prussia, vol. 70, *No. 19.*

Berlin: December 13, 1805.

Having heard late last night the report of the news brought by Count Haugwiz's courier, I wrote to desire to see Baron Hardenberg this morning, and received in return the note which I transmit.

I repeated my desire to see him, and, in the interval, dispatched an estafette to M^r^ Thornton with a letter in cypher, of which I also inclose a copy. It is grounded upon the directions given by M^r^ Huskisson in his letter to M^r^ Thornton of the 30th of November.

I saw Baron Hardenberg in the evening, and was assured by him, that nothing further was known than what his note reported.—Count Metternich and M^r^ d'Alopeus came in with dispatches received by the former from Count Cobenzl, dated on the 7th from Teschen. In these dispatches, that minister mentions the retreat of the Russian army towards Hungary, as a measure determined before the battle, on account of the want of provisions. He added that the armies are still 85,000 strong. Their loss is not detailed. He says, that he has received indirectly an account of an armistice —states it is a natural measure after such a battle—but promises further information by a subsequent courier. Nothing has been received from the Russian head quarters, which are said to be at Creisse on the Morava.

Baron Hardenberg assured us, that the military movements of the Prussian army were proceeding without a moment's loss of time.

The alarming events which have occurred, and the compleat uncertainty of the situation of Prussia have prevented my receiving from Baron Hardenberg the communication he promised of his *contreprojet*.

I have just received your lordships No. 6 dated the 6th of this month. I fear there is little prospect of a state of affairs which will afford me an opportunity of executing the instructions contained in it.

I inclose a copy of a proclamation issued by Bonaparte after

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the battle of Austerlitz, and the report of the same battle transmitted by Count Cobenzl.

I inclose also a copy of a note, which was presented this day by Count Metternich and M^r^ Alopeus—but to which in the present doubtful state of affairs, no early answer can be expected.

[It is impossible in the present volume to proceed further with the details of Lord Harrowby's mission. As is well known, it came to an end by January 7, 1806. If we may trust the rather prejudiced notes in the 'Diaries' of the British ambassador at Berlin (Sir George Jackson), Lord Harrowby created an unfavourable impression on all sides.[1] His state of health was deplorable, and his peevish temper caused much annoyance to those with whom he came in contact. Hardenberg's later judgment was as severe as Jackson's—'ein überaus langsamer und unentschlossener Negociateur.'[2] But the reasons of his failure lay far deeper than that. As the foregoing despatches show, the differences between the Courts of London and Berlin respecting Hanover could not have been bridged over by the most commanding genius; the mighty stroke of Austerlitz and Haugwitz's tame surrender to Napoleon completed the misfortunes of the allies and pent up Prussian policy in the path that led to Jena.]

[1] *Diaries of Sir G. Jackson*, pp. 377, 390, &c.

[2] Hardenberg, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. p. 352.

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APPENDIX

TEXT OF THE

I ANGLO-RUSSIAN TREATY OF APRIL 11, 1805, WITH THE SEPARATE, SECRET, AND ADDITIONAL ARTICLES;

II. DECLARATIONS OF COUNT STADION, PRINCE CZARTORYSKI, AND LORD G. L. GOWER, OF AUGUST 9, 1805;

III. STAGES OF THE PROGRESS OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN ARMY FROM BRODY TO BRAUNAU.

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APPENDIX

I

ANGLO-RUSSIAN TREATY OF APRIL 11, 1805, WITH THE SEPARATE, SECRET, AND ADDITIONAL ARTICLES

[The text here given of the Anglo-Russian treaty of April 11, 1805, is taken from that of the treaty itself, contained in the archives of the British Foreign Office.]

Au nom de la très-sainte et indivisible Trinité.

F. O. Treaties, Ser. I. *No. 215.*

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et sa Majesté, le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irelande, animés du désir de rendre à l'Europe la paix, l'indépendance et le bonheur dont elle est privée par l'ambition démesurée du gouvernement françois et le degré d'influence hors de toute proportion, qu'il tend à s'arroger, ont résolu d'employer tous les moyens qui sont en leur pouvoir pour obtenir ce but salutaire et pour prévenir le renouvellement de circonstances aussi désastreuses et elles ont nommé en conséquence pour arrêter et convenir des mesures qu'exigent leurs intentions magnanimes, savoir, sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies; le Sieur Adam Prince de Czartoryski, son Conseiller privé, Membre du Conseil d'Etat, Senateur, Ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères, Membre de la direction générale des Ecoles, Curateur de l'Université Impériale de Wilna et de son district, Lieutenant du Grand-Prieur de l'Ordre Souverain de S^{t} Jean de Jérusalem, du Prieuré Catholique Russe, et Chevalier de l'Ordre de S^{te} Anne, et Commandeur de celui de S^{t} Jean de Jérusalem; et le Sieur Nicolas de Novossiltzow, son Chambellan actuel, Ministre adjoint de la justice chargé de l'examen des projets présentés à sa Majesté et d'autres commissions spécialles, Président de l'Académie des Sciences, Membre de la Direction générale des Ecoles, Curateur de l'Université de S^{t} Pétersbourg et de son district et Chevalier de l'Ordre de S^{t} Wladimir; et sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la

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Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande ; le Lord Granville Leveson Gower Membre du Parlement du dit Royaume Uni, du Conseil Privé de sa Majesté, et son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipotentiaire près sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, lesquels après avoir verifié et échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants :

Article I.

Comme l'état de souffrance dans lequel se trouve l'Europe exige de prompts remèdes, leurs Majestés l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande sont tombés d'accord d'aviser aux moyens de le faire cesser sans attendre le cas d'empiétements ultérieurs de la part du gouvernement françois. Ils sont convenus en conséquence d'employer les moyens les plus prompts et les plus efficaces pour former une ligue générale des Etats de l'Europe, et pour les engager d'accéder au présent concert, et de réunir pour en remplir le but, une force, qui, indépendamment de celle que sa Majesté Britannique fournira, puisse monter à cinq cent mille hommes effectifs, et de l'employer avec énergie, pour amener de gré ou de force le gouvernement françois à souscrire un retablissement de la paix et de l'équilibre de l'Europe.

Article II.

Cette ligue auroit pour but d'effectuer ce qu'on se propose par le présent concert, savoir : *a*/ L'evacuation du pays d'Hannovre et du nord de l'Allemagne ; *b*/ L'établissement de l'indépendance des républiques d'Hollande et de Suisse. *c*/ Le rétablissement du Roi de Sardaigne en Piémont, avec un arrondissement aussi considerable que les circonstances le permettront. *d*/ La sûreté future du royaume de Naples, et l'évacuation entière de l'Italie, y compris l'isle d'Elbe par les forces françoises. *e*/ L'établissement d'un ordre de choses en Europe qui garantisse efficacement la sûreté et l'indépendance des differens etats et présente une barrière solide contre des usurpations futures.

Article III.

Sa Majesté Britannique, pour concourir de son côté efficacement aux heureux effets du présent concert, s'engage à contribuer aux efforts communs par l'emploi de ses forces de terre et de mer, ainsi que de ses bâtimens propres au transport de trouppes selon ce qui sera determiné à cet égard dans le plan général d'opérations. Elle aidera en outre les differentes Puissances, qui y accederont, par des subsides, dont le montant réponde aux forces respectables, que l'on veut employer ; et pour que ces secours pécuniers puissent être repartis de la manière la

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plus propre pour le bien général et assister les Puissances en mesure des efforts qu'elles feront pour contribuer aux succès communs, il est convenu, que ces subsides seront fournis (à moins d'arrangemens particuliers) dans la proportion de un million deux cent cinquante mille livres sterling pour chaque cent millier d'hommes de trouppes réglées, et ainsi en proportion pour un nombre plus grand ou plus petit, payables sous les conditions specifiées plus bas.

Article IV.

Les dits subsides seront payables dans des termes d'un mois à l'autre, en proportion des forces, que chaque Puissance employera conformément à ses engagemens pour combattre l'ennemi commun, et d'après le rapport officiel des armées employées au debut de la campagne et des corps et autres transports qui s'y rendront. On conviendra ensuite d'après le plan d'opérations, qui sera incessament reglé, du moment où ces subsides commenceront à être payés, en fixant le mode et le lieu de remboursement selon la convenance de chaque partie belligérante. Sa Majesté Britannique sera également prête à fournir dans l'année présente une somme pour première mise en campagne. Cette somme sera fixée par les arrangemens particuliers qu'on prendra avec chaque Puissance qui entreroit dans ce concert. Mais sa dite Majesté entend que la somme entière à fournir à une des Puissances dans le courant de l'année (en joignant une pareille avance ensemble avec les subsides de chaque mois) n'excedera pas la proportion de un million deux cent cinquante mille livres sterlings pour chaque cent mille hommes.

Article V.

Les hautes parties contractantes conviennent que les différens membres de la ligue pourront entretenir respectivement des personnes accrédités près des géneraux en chef des diverses armées, pour s'occuper de la correspondance et du reglement des opérations.

Article VI.

Leurs Majestés conviennent que dans le cas qu'une ligue soit formée telle qu'il a été specifiée dans l'article premier, elles ne feront la paix avec la France que du consentement commun de toutes les Puissances, qui seront parties dans la dite ligue; et de même que les Puissances continentales ne rappelleront point leurs forces avant la paix, de même, sa Majesté Britannique s'engage à continuer le payement des subsides pendant toute la durée de la guerre.

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ARTICLE VII.

Le présent concert, qui est mutuellement reconnu par les hautes parties contractantes avoir la même force et valeur que le traité le plus solennel, sera ratifié par sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et par sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande, et les Ratifications en seront échangées à St. Petersbourg dans l'espace de dix semaines ou plutôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les plenipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes. Fait à St. Petersbourg le $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$ 1805.

L.S. Adam Poe. Czartoryski L.S. Granville Leveson Gower.

L.S. Nicolas de Novossiltzoff.

ARTICLE PREMIER SÉPARÉ.

F. O. Treaties, Ser. I. *No. 216.*

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies ayant fait reconnoitre à Sa Majesté Britannique ses arrangemens avec leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Allemagne et le Roi de Suède, sa Majesté Britannique s'engage à remplir les stipulations du présent concert envers chacune de ces puissances, si dans l'espace de quatre mois à compter du jour de la signature du présent acte toutes deux ou l'une d'elles faisoit agir ses forces contre la France en vertu des engagemens qu'elles ont pris avec sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies.

Le présent article séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

ARTICLE SECOND SÉPARÉ.

Sa Majeste l'Empereur de toutes les Russies ayant fait connoitre à sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande les arrangements qu'elle a pris avec les cours de Prusse et de Dannemarc pour prévenir des empiétemens de la part de la France, sa Majesté Britannique sera également prête à concourir à leur heureux effet sur le pied arrêté dans les differens articles du concert signé aujourd'hui.

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Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

Article troisième séparé.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont convenues qu'il entre dans le but du présent concert de procurer à la Hollande et à la Suisse, d'après les circonstances, des arrondissemens convenables, tels que les ci-devant Pays-bas Autrichiens en tout ou en partie à la première et Genève et la Savoye à la seconde.

Elles entendent également que les arrangemens qui seront faits en Europe à la suite de la guerre comprendront en faveur de l'Autriche une augmentation de territoire comme elle se l'est reservée par sa Convention avec sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et en faveur d'autres états, qui coopéreroient au but du présent concert, des acquisitions proportionées à leurs efforts pour la cause commune et compatibles avec l'équilibre de l'Europe.

Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le Concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

Article quatrième séparé.

La réunion de cinq cent mille hommes effectifs mentionée à l'article premier du concert signé aujourd'hui n'étant pas aussi facile que désirable, leurs Majestés sont convenues qu'il seroit mis à exécution aussitôt, que l'on pourroit opposer à la France une force active de quatre cent mille hommes composée de la manière suivante: l'Autriche fourniroit deux cent cinquante mille hommes, la Russie pas moins de cent quinze mille hommes indépendamment des levées faites par elle en Albanie, en Grèce, &c., et le reste des quatre cent mille hommes seroit produit par des trouppes Napolitaines, Hanovriennes, Sardes et autres.

Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur, que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

Article cinquième séparé.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'engage aussi immédiatement que possible à faire avancer une armée de pas moins de soixante mille hommes sur les frontières d'Autriche et de même une

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autre de pas moins de quatre-vingt mille hommes sur les frontières Prussiennes, pour être prêtes à coopérer avec les dites cours dans la proportion établie par le concert signé aujourd'hui et à les soutenir respectivement dans le cas où elles seroient attaquées par la France qui les supposeroit engagées dans quelques négociations tendantes à un objet opposé à ses vues; mais il est entendu qu'indépendamment des cent quinze mille hommes, que sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Russies feroit agir contre les François, comme il est dit à l'article quatrième séparé elle tiendra sur ses frontières des corps de réserve et d'observation.

Il est convenu en outre, qu'à mesure que les forces promises par sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en tout ou en partie quitteront les frontières de son Empire, sa Majesté Britannique leur payera des subsides sur le pied établi par le présent concert jusqu'à la rentrée des dites trouppes dans leurs foyers et en sus à titre de première mise pour entrer en campagne l'equivalent de trois mois de subsides.

Les trouppes russes déjà stationées aux Sept Isles ou destinées à s'y transporter ne jouiront de l'avantage des subsides et de l'avance de trois mois stipulée par le présent article qu'à dater du jour où elles quitteront les Sept Isles pour commencer leurs opérations contre les François.

Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

Article sixième séparé.

Sa Majésté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande n'ayant été portés à etablir un concert energique entr'eux que dans la vue d'assurer à l'Europe une paix stable et solide fondée sur les principes de justice, d'équité et du droit des gens, qui les guident constamment, ont reconnu la nécessité de s'entendre dès à présent sur divers principes qu'ils mettront en évidence d'après un accord préalable aussitôt que les chances de la guerre en ameneront la nécessité.

Ces principes sont de ne gêner nullement le vœu national en France relativement à la forme du gouvernement, ni dans les autres pays, où les armées combinées viendroient à agir; de ne s'approprier avant la paix aucune des conquêtes, qui pourroient être faites par l'une ou l'autre des parties belligerantes et de ne prendre possession des villes et territoires qui seroient arrachés à l'ennemi commun qu'au nom du pays ou état auxquels ils appartiennent de droit reconnu, et dans tout autre cas au nom de tous les membres de la ligue. Enfin de rassembler à l'issue de la guerre un congrès général pour discuter et

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fixer sur des bases plus précises qu'elles n'ont malheureusement pû l'être jusqu'ici les prescriptions du droit des gens et d'en assurer l'observation par l'établissement d'un système fédératif calculé sur la situation des differens états de l'Europe.

Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur, que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

Article septième séparé.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes, étant convenues de ne rien omettre pour engager sa Majesté Prussienne à accéder au présent concert, ont reconnu la nécessité de convenir dès-à-présent sur les acquisitions territoriales qu'elles seroient disposées à concéder à la cour de Berlin pour prix de ses efforts pour le bien de la cause commune. Elles ont jugé cependant que la puissance de la Prusse s'étant déjà suffisamment accrue, la conservation de l'équilibre en Europe exige que ces concessions (qui dans tous les cas seront subordonnées aux chances de la guerre) consistent dans la restitution du pays que la Prusse céda à la France par la convention secrette du cinq août mille sept cent quatre-vingt et seize [1] avec un arrondissement plus ou moins grand et qui suivant les circonstances pourroit même s'etendre jusqu'à la frontière qui seroit laissée à la France du côte des Pays Bas, moyennant l'engagement que prendroit la Prusse de former une barrière avec la Hollande pour empêcher de ce côté le débordement de la puissance françoise.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande se promettent également le cas échéant où les acquisitions dévolues à la Prusse établiront une trop grande disproportion avec celles de l'Autriche ou d'autres puissances du Continent, de convenir à l'aimable sur les moyens de les régler d'après la base d'une juste proportion et de manière qu'elles ne puissent nullement enfreindre l'équilibre de l'Europe.

Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

Article huitième séparé.

L'impulsion que le gouvernement françois cherche à donner aux différens états de l'Europe pouvant determiner l'un ou l'autre de ces

[1] Whereby Prussia ceded to the French Republic her lands on the left bank o the Rhine, namely, Obergeldern, and part of the Duchy of Cleve.

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états à entraver les effets salutaires dont ce concert est l'objet et même à recourir à des mesures hostiles contre l'une des hautes parties contractantes en haine des soins qu'elles prennent pour etablir en Europe un ordre des choses équitable et permanent; sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et sa Majesté Britannique sont convenues de faire cause commune contre toute puissance qui par l'emploi de ses forces ou par une union trop intime avec la France prétendroit élever des entraves essentielles au developpement des mesures que les deux hautes parties contractantes devront prendre pour atteindre le but qu'elles se sont proposé par le présent concert.

Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

ARTICLE NEUVIÈME SÉPARÉ.

Sa Majesté Britannique reconnoissant l'importance majeure dont il seroit pour le succès des mesures arrêtées par le concert signé aujourd'hui, d'y voir concourir les souverains d'Espagne et de Portugal s'en remet à la mediation de sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies pour moyenner le plutôt possible un accommodement entre l'Angleterre et l'Espagne sur des bases équitables et promet d'y porter de son côte des facilités pourvû que l'arrangement comprenne un engagement secret de l'Espagne de faire cause commune contre la France au plus tard dans le terme de trois mois après que les armées des puissances coalisées seront entrées en campagne. Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies travaillera également à determiner le Portugal à se joindre dans ce dernier cas aux efforts de l'Espagne.

Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il etoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

ARTICLE DIXIÈME SÉPARÉ.[1]

Les hautes parties contractantes reconnoissant la nécessité de soutenir les propositions de paix qu'elles sont intentionnées de faire parvenir à Bonaparte par des demonstrations énergiques, elles ont resolu d'inviter sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique à mettre immédiatement ses armées en état d'agir en les complettant et en les

[1] The former 'tenth separate article' requiring the surrender of Malta by Great Britain, if Napoleon made it a *sine qua non* of peace, was afterwards given up by Russia; for this see Lord G. L. Gower's despatches of April–June 1805 from St. Petersburg; also Martens, *Traités*, vol xi. pp. 100 *et seq.*

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concentrant à la proximité des limites de la France. Sa Majesté Britannique, prenant en consideration les dépenses extraordinaires que cette mesure exigera, promet et s'engage de fournir à sa Majesté Impériale et Royale immédiatement après son adhésion au présent concert à titre de première mise en campagne la somme d'un million de livres sterling que le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande ne revendiquera point dans le cas où les négociations de paix seroient couronnées d'un heureux succès, pourvû que dans le cas contraire l'Autriche entre immédiatement en campagne.

Cet article séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il etoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

ARTICLE PREMIER SÉPARÉ ET SECRET.

F. O. Treaties, Ser. I. *No. 217.*

Les hautes parties contractantes pour éviter toute discussion quelconque sur l'application des principes dont elles sont convenues par l'article sixième séparé ont jugé nécessaire de s'entendre à leur égard avec plus de précision; et c'est en conséquence qu'elles se promettent eventuellement d'observer ce qui suit.

1° Les principes des deux souverains ne leur permettant dans aucun cas de chercher à contraindre le libre vœu de la nation françoise, c'est par des proclamations publiées à mesure que les évènemens de la guerre assureront leur poids, qu'ils chercheront à la disposer à écouter leurs conseils; et pour y parvenir avec plus de certitude, ils publieront qu'à toute évènement les propriétaires et les gens en place peuvent compter sur la paisible possession des avantages qu'ils ont obtenus par la Révolution et que les puissances liguées sont prêtes à sanctionner toute forme de gouvernement compatible avec la tranquillité publique, que le vœu national établiroit en France. Quoique leurs Majestés reconnoissent, que pour le repos de l'Europe il seroit à desirer que ce fut un gouvernement monarchique basé sur des principes de modération et d'équité, elles n'en feront pas d'avance la proposition formelle; mais chercheront d'en étendre et consolider la conviction en France; et dès que la nation se sera prononcé dans ce sens, les hautes parties contractantes, d'après son vœu, s'entendront sur les conditions, qu'elles proposeront à celui qui sera jugé propre à régner en France, et dont la première seroit de ne retracter aucune des promesses qui auroient été faites à la nation françoise en vertu du présent article.

2° La Hollande et la Suisse, à mesure qu'elles seront délivrées du joug qui leur est imposé par Bonaparte, pourront se donner la forme de gouvernement que le vœu national et la localité indiqueront, et s'il agissoit de désigner un Stadhouder au premier de ces états, les deux

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cours s'entendront sur le choix de la personne qui sera portée à cette dignité, qu'elles verroient avec plaisir rendue à la Maison d'Orange, si d'autres circonstances ne s'y opposent.

3° Une saine politique exigeant de prévenir tout germe de mécontentement dans les divers Etats, qui à la suite d'une guerre, deviendroient le partage du Roi de Sardaigne, et de leur procurer le plus promptement possible une consistance assurée par l'heureux accord qui régnera entre le souverain et les sujets, leurs Majestés employeront leurs bons offices auprès du Roi de Sardaigne pour l'engager à établir dans le pays de sa nouvelle domination un gouvernement à la convenance de ses sujets et adapté aux localités.

4° Leurs Majestés prenant le plus vif intérêt à l'accomplissement des objets qu'elles se proposent par l'article sixième séparé ainsi que par le présent article secret et surtout à ce que les prescriptions du droit des gens soient discutées et fixées d'une manière précise et leur observation garantie par l'assentiment général et par l'établissement en Europe d'un système fédératif, qui assure l'indépendance des états foibles en presentant une barrière formidable contre l'ambition des plus forts, elles s'entendront amicalement entr'elles sur ce qui peut concerner ces objets et formeront une union intime pour en réaliser les heureux effets.

Cet article séparé et secret aura la même force et valeur que s'il etoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

Article second séparé et secret.

Quoique les hautes parties contractantes soyent convenues par l'article premier séparé du concert établi entre elles aujourd'hui, que l'Autriche et la Suède ne jouiroient des avantages que leur présente le dit concert que dans le cas où quatre mois après la signature elles feroient agir leurs forces contre la France en vertu des engagemens qu'elles ont pris avec sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies ; cependant sa Majesté Britannique considérant l'avantage qui résulte pour la sécurité future de l'Europe d'une réunion semblable à celle formée par sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies avec leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Allemagne et le Roi de Suède pour s'opposer aux empiétemens ulterieures de Bonaparte, promet de remplir les stipulations du présent concert, simultanément envers chacune de ces puissances, si pendant le courant de l'année mille huit cent et cinq toutes deux ou l'une d'elles venoit à faire agir ses forces contre la France en vertu de leurs engagemens avec sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies.

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Le présent article séparé et secret aura la même force et valeur que s'il etoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert signé aujourd'hui et sera ratifié en même tems.

En foi de quoi, &c.

ARTICLE ADDITIONNEL

F. O. Treaties, Ser. I. *No. 218.*

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'étant déterminé, par une suite de son désir sincère d'assurer le succès de l'entreprise concertée contre la France, d'augmenter, si les circonstances l'exigeoient, jusqu'à cent quatre-vingt mille hommes les forces qu'il a promis de faire agir, sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande promet et s'engage de payer dans ce cas à sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Russies, pour les trouppes qu'elle ajoutera ainsi aux cent quinze mille hommes déjà convenus, des subsides et une première mise en campagne sur le même pied que celui arreté par l'article cinq séparé du concert établi entre sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande le $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$ 1805.

Cet article additionnel aura la meme force et valeur que s'il etoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert précité et sera ratifié par les deux hautes parties contractantes et les ratifications échangées à S^{t} Petersbourg dans l'espace de dix semaines ou plus tôt si faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les soussignés plenipotentiaires l'ont signé et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes. Fait à St. Pétersbourg le $\frac{28 \text{ Avril}}{10 \text{ Mai}}$ 1805.

L.S. Adam P^{ce} Czartoryski. L.S. Granville Leveson Gower.

L.S. Nicolas de Novossiltzoff.

ARTICLE ADDITIONNEL.

F. O. Treaties, Ser. I. *No. 219.*

[*Extract.*]

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies étant intentionné de concerter avec la cour de Vienne des mesures d'après lesquelles des armées Russes considérables se rapprocheroient à travers les états Autrichiens et Prussiens des limites de la France, en annonçant que

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ces mouvemens ont pour but d'obtenir des sûretés pour le Continent, promet et s'engage envers sa Majesté Britannique en son nom et en celui de ses alliés, que si même les circonstances exigeoient qu'ils déclarassent au moment où les troupes Russes se mettront en marche que cette opération n'est point la suite d'une combinaison existante avec sa Majesté Britannique, mais que ce sont les puissances continentales qui reclament l'exécution des engagemens pris par la France directement envers elles; que cependant aussitôt que la guérre éclatera ils ne poursuivront plus un but particulier, mais celui déterminé par le concert du $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$ avec toutes les clauses qui en font partie. En réciprocité de cette assurance sa Majesté Britannique promet et s'engage 1° de remplir envers sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies les stipulations du concert précité dans toutes ses clauses, aussitôt que la guerre aura éclatée entr'elle et la France, et nommément de fournir pour les troupes Russes les subsides convenus, à compter du jour où elles auront quitté les frontières de l'empire et en sus les trois mois stipulés à titre de première mise en campagne; bien entendu cependant que quelque soit le tems qui s'écoulera entre l'époque de la sortie des troupes Russes de leurs frontières et celle du commencement des hostilités, sa Majesté Britannique ne sera tenue de payer à la Russie pour ce tems au plus que six mois de subsides, y compris la première mise en campagne. 2° De remplir à l'égard de l'Autriche toutes les stipulations du susdit concert, et nommément tout ce qui est relatif aux subsides, aussitôt que l'ambassadeur de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale aura signé l'acte d'accession de sa cour, et enfin 3° De payer également aux autres alliés de la Russie, qui l'assisteront dans cette entreprise (à moins d'arrangemens particuliers) les subsides qui leur étoient destinés par le susdit concert et aux conditions qui y sont exprimées.

Cet article additionnel aura la même force et valeur que s'il étoit inséré mot à mot dans le concert précité, et sera ratifié par les deux hautes parties contractantes et les ratifications échangées à St. Pétersbourg dans l'espace de dix semaines ou plutôt si faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les soussignés plénipotentiaires l'ont signé et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes. Fait à St. Pétersbourg le $\frac{12}{24}$ Juillet 1805.

L.S. Signé Adam P^ce Czartoryski.

L.S. Signé Granville Leveson Gower.

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II

DECLARATIONS OF COUNT STADION, PRINCE CZARTORYSKI, AND LORD G. L. GOWER

Déclaration préalable.

[*Extract.*]

Le soussigné ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères en conséquence des autorisations qu'il a reçues à cet effet de sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies déclare à son Excellence Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Lord Granville Leweson (*sic*) Gower ce qui suit. F. O. Treaties, Ser. I. *No. 220.*

1°.

Le soussigné a échangé ce jourd'hui avec son Excellence Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche les déclaration ci-jointe en copie.

2°.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'attend que Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre adhérera au nom de sa cour sans reserve à leur contenu et que s'il ne s'y croyoit pas suffisamment autorisé il exprimera dans une déclaration formelle les points auxquels il peut souscrire dès à présent.

3°.

Le soussigné est autorisé à échanger la présente déclaration contre celle qui lui sera remise par son Excellence Lord Granville Leweson Gower.

4°.

La présente déclaration et celle remise en retour par son Excellence Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Lord Granville Leweson Gower qui doivent tenir lieu et avoir la valeur de l'acte le plus solennel seront ratifiées par les souverains respectifs et les ratifications exchangées à St. Pétersbourg dans le plus court espace de tems possible.

En foi de quoi le soussigné ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères a signé la présente déclaration, y a fait apposer le cachet de ses armes, et l'a échangée contre celle signée aujourd'hui par son Excellence Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre. Fait à St. Pétersbourg le 28 Juillet [O.S.] 1805.

L.S.

Signé
Adam Prince Czartoryski.

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DÉCLARATION PRÉALABLE.

Le soussigné ministre des affaires étrangères en conséquence des autorisations qu'il a reçues à cet effet de sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies déclare à son Excellence Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Comte de Stadion ce qui suit.

1°.

Les différentes observations et propositions énoncées par la Cour de Vienne dans la déclaration préalable remise par le Vice Chancelier de Cour et d'État, Comte de Cobenzl, à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Comte de Rasoumoffsky le 7 Juillet sont adoptées par sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies pour servir de base au concert des mesures entre la Cour de Russie et celles de Vienne et de Londres ; de même les modifications y proposées par sa Majesté Impériale Royale pour le règlement des affaires du Continent sont également adoptées pour le cas où l'on pourroit espérer d'éviter la guerre par les voyes de la négociation.

2°.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies confirme les arrangemens militaires détaillés dans le protocole des conférences tenues entre le Général Baron de Wintzingerode d'une part et Messieurs le Prince de Schwartzenberg et de Mack de l'autre, signé le 16 Juillet, et s'oblige à faire exécuter strictement l'ensemble des mesures qui y sont réglées.

3°.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'engage en outre de travailler à disposer sa Majesté Britannique à consentir aux modifications et demandes contenues dans la pièce intitulée, *Remarques sur quelques objets particuliers de la convention signée entre les cours de* [*St.*] *Pétersbourg et de Londres le* $\frac{30\ Mars}{11\ Avril}$ *de cette année.*

4°.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies promet d'employer ses soins les plus actifs pour engager sa Majesté Britannique à accorder la totalité des demandes subsidiaires que forme la cour de Vienne mais bien entendu toute fois que si malgré tous ses éfforts sa Majesté Impériale ne pouvoit y parvenir cela n'apportera pas de changement essentiel aux mesures concertées entre la Russie et l'Autriche.

5°.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'engage aussitôt que les troupes Russes en tout ou en partie auront dépassé leurs limites de ne

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traiter de la paix que sur les bases qu'elle a elle-même reconnues comme indispensables à la sûreté de l'Europe et si la guerre avoit éclaté de ne faire ni paix ni trêve que du consentement des Alliés comme cela est stipulé dans le concert du $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$ de cette année.

Le soussigné en remettant cette déclaration préalable qui doit tenir lieu et avoir la valeur de l'acte le plus solennel à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche est autorisé à lui annoncer en même tems qu'il est prêt à procéder sur ces mêmes bases immédiatement à la conclusion de l'acte formel d'accession de la cour de Vienne au Concert du $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$.

La présente déclaration et celle remise en retour par Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Comte de Stadion seront ratifiées par les souverains respectifs dans le plus court terme possible et les ratifications échangées à St. Pétersbourg.

En foi de quoi le soussigné ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères a signé la présent déclaration ; y a fait apposer le cachet de ses armes et l'a échangée contre celle signée aujourd'hui par son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Stadion. Fait à St. Pétersbourg le 28 Juillet [O.S.], 1805.

L.S.

Signé
Adam P^ce^ Czartoryski.

DÉCLARATION PRÉALABLE.

Le soussigné Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique conformément aux autorisations spéciales de l'Empereur son auguste maître, déclare en reponse à la déclaration qui lui a été remise par son Excellence M. le Prince de Czartoryski en date d'aujourd'hui ce qui suit.

1°.

Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale en acceptant les différens points énoncés dans cette déclaration, accède au concert conclu entre les cours de [St.] Pétersbourg et de Londres le $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$ de cette année ainsi qu'au dernier plan que le Ministère de Russie a fait présenter à Vienne. Elle promet d'en exécuter les engagemens sauf les modifications clauses et demandes renfermées dans les différentes pièces officielles auxquelles sa Majesté Impériale de Russie a donné son adhésion dans la déclaration préalable susdite qui sera prise pour base du concert des mesures que l'Autriche et la Russie employeront pour atteindre à leur but.

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2°.

Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale s'engage d'exécuter sans délai l'arrangement militaire convenu à Vienne le 16 de Juillet, tant pour la démonstration armée qui doit faciliter la négociation que pour les opérations contre l'ennemi qui pourroient s'ensuivre, dans la confiance et l'attente certaine que le présent accord préalable aura son plein effet de point en point, et que l'accord définitif sera conclu sans retard et sur les mêmes bases entre les trois Puissances.

3°.

Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale s'engage aussitôt que les troupes Russes en tout ou en partie auront dépassé leurs limites de ne traiter de la paix que sur les bases qu'elle a elle-même reconnues comme indispensables à la sûreté de l'Europe, et si la guerre avoit éclaté de ne faire ni paix ni trêve que du consentement des Alliés comme cela est stipulé dans le concert du $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$ de cette année.

4°.

Le soussigné en remettant la présente déclaration préalable qui doit tenir lieu et avoir la valeur de l'acte le plus solennel, à son Excellence Monsieur le Prince de Czartoryski, est autorisé à lui annoncer en même tems, qu'il est prêt à procéder immédiatement sur ces mêmes bases à la conclusion de l'acte formel d'accession de la cour de Vienne au concert du $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$.

La présent déclaration et celle remise au soussigné par son Excellence Monsieur le Prince de Czartoryski seront ratifiées par les souverains respectifs dans le plus court terme possible, et les ratifications échangées à St. Pétersbourg. En foi de quoi le soussigné Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique a signé la présente déclaration, y a fait apposer le cachet de ses armes, et l'a échangée contre celle signée aujourd'hui par son Excellence Monsieur le Prince de Czartoryski. Fait à St. Pétersbourg le $\frac{28 \text{ Juillet}}{9 \text{ Août}}$ 1805.

L.S.

Signé
J. Ph. Comte de Stadion.

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DÉCLARATION PRÉALABLE.

Le soussigné Ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique, ayant été invité par son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Stadion, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire de sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, et son Excellence Monsieur le Prince Czartoryski, Ministre adjoint au Département des Affaires Etrangères, à accéder aux déclarations reciproquement échangées entre les deux cours impériales ce 9 d'Août 1805, en vertu de ses pleins pouvoirs déclare ce qui suit.

Les différentes observations et propositions, énoncées par la cour de Vienne dans la déclaration préalable remise par le Vice-Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat Monsieur le Comte de Cobenzl, à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur le Comte Razumovskoi le 7. Juillet et dans le mémoire raisonné du 21 Juillet, sont adoptées par sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande, pour servir de base au concert des mesures entre les trois cours de Londres de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg, et les modifications y proposées pour le règlement des affaires du Continent, sont également adoptées pour le cas, où on pouvoit espérer d'éviter la guerre par les voies de la négociation.

L'Ambassadeur Britannique, tout en déclarant que ses instructions positives ne lui permettent pas d'accéder aux demandes pécuniaires de la cour de Vienne, s'engage au nom de son souverain, à faire payer les subsides mensuels convenus par le concert du $\frac{30 \text{ Mars}}{11 \text{ Avril}}$, à compter du 1er d'Octobre 1805. Il s'engage aussi d'avancer avec le moindre délai possible l'équivalent de cinq mois des subsides, à titre de première mise en campagne, sous condition expresse que sa Majesté Britannique puisse revendiquer tout payement quelconque en faveur de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique au delà du million stipulé par l'article onzième additionel du traite précité, soit à titre de première mise en campagne, soit comme subside courant, en cas que les négociations, qui vont être entamées avec le gouvernement de la France, ne se termineront pas par la guerre.

Il déclare en outre, que si les dites négociations seront traînées au delà du 31 de Decembre 1805, l'échouement du premier trimestre sera le terme des payements mensuels jusqu'au moment où les hostilités commenceraient.

Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, s'etant engagé de mettre sur pied pas moins que trois cent vingt mille hommes, le soussigné convient, que les avances comme première mise en campagne soyent payées selon ce calcul, bien entendu, que si contre toute attente, les armées Autrichiennes ne seraient pas portées à la force spécifiée ci-dessus, sa Majesté Britannique pourroit défalquer une somme proportionnée au nombre défectueux.

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L'Ambassadeur Britannique ne peut se prêter aux modifications et demandes contenues dans la pièce intitulée : *Remarques sur quelques objets particuliers de la Convention signée entre les cours de St. Pétersbourg et de Londres le* $\frac{30\ Mars}{11\ Avril}$ *de cette Année*, se trouvant encore sans Instructions de sa cour, qui l'autorise d'accéder aux demandes pareilles.

L'Ambassadeur Britannique accepte l'accession de sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, sous les conditions énoncées dans les déclarations préalables échangées aujourd'hui entre les Plénipotentiaires de leurs Majestés Impériales, avec la réserve solennelle, que cette acceptation ne sera regardée comme valable, ni les engagemens susdits obligatoires, à moins que la cour de Vienne de son côté, ne se conforme en tout aux stipulations du dit acte.

Le soussigné en remettant à son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Stadion, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi la présente declaration préalable, qui doit tenir lieu, et avoir la valeur du traité le plus solennel est autorisé à lui annoncer en même tems, qu'il est prêt à procéder immédiatement sur ces mêmes bases, à la conclusion de l'acte formel de l'accession de la cour de Vienne au concert du $\frac{30\ Mars}{11\ Avril}$. Les présentes seront ratifiées par les cours respectives dans le plus court espace de tems, que faire se pourra. En foi de quoi le soussigné, en vertu des pleins pouvoirs de sa Majesté Britannique, a signé la présente declaration préalable, et y a apposé le cachet de ses armes.

Fait à St. Pétersbourg le $\frac{\text{vingt-huit juillet}}{\text{neuf d'août}}$ mil huit cent et cinq.

L.S. Granville Leveson Gower.

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III

STAGES OF THE PROGRESS OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN ARMY

MARCHEROUTE

			Milles de Postes
Le 16	Août	Brody	2¾
17		Podhorce	2¾
18		Zloczow	2¼
19		Jour de repos	
20		Podhayczikí	4
21		Lemberg	4
22		Grudeck	3¾
23		Jour de repos	
24		Sandowa	
		Wisnia	2½
25		Lake Wola	3
26		Przemisl	3
27		Jour de repos	
28		Radymno	2½
29		Przeworsk	3½
30		Lanent	2½
31		Jour de repos	
1	Septbre	Rzreczow	2
2		Zendiczow	3
3		Dembica	3
4		Jour de repos	
5		Tarnow	4
6		Brzesko	3¾
7		Gdow	4
8		Jour de repos	
9		Mislenice	3
10		Kalwaria	2¾
11		Audrichow	3½
12		Jour de repos	
13		Biala	3
14		Skotschaw	3
15		Teschen	2
16		Jour de repos	

			Milles de Postes
Le 17	Septbre	Friedeck	3
18		Neu Titschein	3½
19		Bistretz	3½
20		Jour de repos	
21		Cremhir	3
22		Wischau	4
23		Brünn	4
24		Jour de repos	
25		Pohrlitz	3
26		Lechwitzum / Borolitz	3½
27		Jetzelsdorf	3½
28		Jour de repos	
29		Hohneswarth & Muhlbach	3
30		Krems	2½
1	Octre	St. Pölten.	3
2		Jour de repos	
3		Mölk	3
4		Premmelleach	3
5		Amsleten	3
6		Jour de repos	
7		Stremberg	2
8		Ebersbery	3
9		Wells	8
10		Jour de repos	
11		Lambach	2
12		Haag	2½
13		Ried	2
14		Jour de repos	
15		Althann	2½
16		Braunau	2

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
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